SH Nashville, LLC v. FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketM2023-01147-SC-R11-CV
JudgeJustice Dwight E. Tarwater
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
11/16/2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
October 1, 2025 Session
SH NASHVILLE, LLC ET AL. v. FWREF NASHVILLE AIRPORT, LLC
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals
Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 22-0569-BC Anne C. Martin, Chancellor
___________________________________
No. M2023-01147-SC-R11-CV
___________________________________
This case clarifies Tennessee’s standard for determining whether a contractual provision
setting forth an amount of damages in the case of a breach should be enforced as liquidated
damages or should be unenforceable as a penalty. Purchaser sought a declaratory judgment
that a damages provision in a purchase and sale agreement for an existing Hilton-branded
hotel near the Nashville Airport was unenforceable. Seller responded that the plain
language of the agreement established the enforceability of the provision because the
parties agreed that actual damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain and the
liquidated sum was a reasonable estimate of damages. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Seller. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted permission to
appeal. We now clarify that when the parties to a contract expressly agree that actual
damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain and that their agreed upon liquidated
sum is a reasonable estimate of damages, there is a presumption that the provision is
enforceable as liquidated damages. To overcome this presumption, the party seeking to
avoid enforcement of the provision must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the provision is actually an unenforceable penalty. Purchaser has not demonstrated any
questions of fact to overcome the presumption. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals
Reversed; Remanded to the Trial Court
DWIGHT E. TARWATER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS,
C.J., and HOLLY KIRBY, SARAH K. CAMPBELL, and MARY L. WAGNER, JJ., joined.
Sarah B. Miller, Britt K. Latham, and Garrah Carter-Mason, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
appellant, FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC.
Donald Capparella, Michael Bressman, and Candi Henry, Nashville Tennessee, for the
appellees, SH Nashville, LLC, and UNI Nashville Airport Hotel, LLC.
Emily Hamm Huseth, Michael F. Rafferty, Allison T. Gilbert, and William L. Brantley,
Memphis, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, Belz Investco GP, Boyle Investment Company,
LPI Memphis, Inc., Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc., and Fogelman Properties,
LLC.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October of 2019, FWREF Nashville Airport, LLC (“Seller”) entered into a
purchase and sale agreement (the “Agreement”) with UNI Nashville Airport Hotel, LLC
(“UNI” or “Purchaser”) for an existing Hilton-branded hotel near the Nashville airport.1
The Agreement set forth a purchase price of $79,000,000; an earnest money deposit of
$1,750,000; and a closing date of January 3, 2020. The Agreement included a provision
that stipulated, in relevant part, that
[d]ue to the fluctuation in land values, the unpredictable state of the economy
and of governmental regulations, the fluctuating money market for real estate
loans of all types, and other factors which directly affect the value and
marketability of the Property, the parties recognize that it would be extremely
difficult and impracticable, if not impossible, to ascertain with any degree of
certainty the amount of damages which would be suffered by Seller in the
event of Purchaser’s failure to perform its obligation to purchase the Property
under this Agreement. Accordingly, the parties agree that a reasonable
estimate of Seller’s damages in such event is the amount of Earnest Money,
and if Purchaser defaults in any material respect in performing the obligation
to purchase the Property under this Agreement to close . . . then Seller, as its
sole remedy[2] therefor[e] . . . shall be entitled to immediately terminate this
Agreement . . . and receive and retain the Earnest Money as liquidated
damages[.]
1
Because UNI later assigned its interest to SH Nashville, LLC (“SH Nashville”) we refer to UNI
and SH Nashville collectively and interchangeably as “Purchaser.”
2
The Agreement additionally provided in Section 6.3 that “[i]f any litigation or other enforcement
proceeding is commenced in connection with this Agreement, then the prevailing party shall be entitled to
receive payment of its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses and court costs from the other party (and in
addition to any liquidated damages under Section 6.1).”
-2-
The next month, the parties executed the first of twenty-four amendments to the
Agreement. Each of the amendments stated the amount of an additional earnest money
deposit or deposits, set out that the earnest money was deemed earned by Seller and non-
refundable to Purchaser, provided for either an extension of the closing date or extension
of earnest money payment deadlines, and included a ratification provision.3 Amendment 2
increased the purchase price to $79,750,000; and Amendment 3 further increased the
purchase price to $82,125,000. Beginning with Amendment 7, Purchaser agreed that no
further extensions for the delivery date of the earnest money or of the closing date would
be granted “for any reason (including without limitation as a result of any factor relating to
the current COVID-19 pandemic or related circumstance, it being understood that time is
of the essence) and any further requests for extensions . . . shall result in immediate
forfeiture of the Earnest Money to Seller.” Beginning with Amendment 14, executed on
August 12, 2020, Howard Wu and Taylor Woods4 agreed “to join in as parties to the
[Agreement] for the purposes of agreeing to the terms of Section 2.2(e)[5] of the
[Agreement].” In Amendment 23, UNI assigned the Agreement to SH Nashville, but UNI,
Wu, and Woods were still to “remain fully liable for all obligations of Purchaser under the
[Agreement].”6 Across the twenty-four amendments, Purchaser deposited a total of
$18,917,500 in earnest money.
On October 21, 2020, Purchaser learned that a new, Hilton-branded, on-airport hotel
was scheduled to open in late 2023. According to Purchaser, this announcement was a
surprise and led to concerns about the impact of the on-airport hotel on the ability to have
a profitable Hilton hotel nearby. Still, the parties executed two additional amendments to
the Agreement, including the final amendment on December 23, 2020. Purchaser was
unable to close by the agreed upon date of January 11, 2021. Seller then notified Purchaser
that the Agreement was automatically terminated. In May and June 2021, Purchaser sent
letters to Seller indicating that Purchaser had acquired a replacement lender and asking
Seller to either refund the earnest money or proceed with the sale.
3
Beginning with Amendment 7, the ratification provision was titled “Ratification and No Other
Changes.”
4
Howard Wu and Taylor Woods are members of SH Nashville, LLC and UNI Nashville Airport
Hotel, LLC.
5
Section 2.2(e) provided that “Seller and Purchaser acknowledge and agree that if Purchaser does
not terminate this Agreement as set forth in Section[] 1.3(g), the Earnest Money will be deemed earned by
Seller and non-refundable to Purchaser for any reason except as otherwise specifically set forth in this
Agreement.”
6
The assignment was again acknowledged in Amendment 24.
-3-
Purchaser filed suit on April 22, 2022, seeking a declaratory judgment that Seller’s
retention of the earnest money was an unenforceable penalty.7 Shortly after the initial
complaint was filed, the suit was transferred to the “Davidson County Business Court Pilot
Project.”8 After Purchaser filed its Second Amended Complaint, Seller counter-claimed for
breach of contract and attorneys’ fees. As litigation proceeded, Purchaser sought discovery
“related to those circumstances including, but not limited to, what [Seller’s] knowledge
was of this new . . . on-airport hotel development during the process of [the] contract
negotiations at issue” and “the circumstances surrounding the formation of the Agreement
and amendments thereto.” Seller opposed, arguing that the four corners of the Agreement
and amendments were sufficient to decide whether the provision at issue was intended as
an unenforceable penalty. The trial court found a stay of discovery appropriate. Seller then
moved for summary judgment on Purchaser’s remaining declaratory judgment claim and
Seller’s counterclaims for breach of contract and award of attorneys’ fees.
The trial court granted Seller’s motion, finding no issues of material fact relating to
the enforceability of the damages provision. It reasoned that “enforcement of this provision
is appropriate because it was a reasonable prediction of the actual damages Seller would
suffer if Purchaser[] breached the contract and does not violate public policy.”
Accordingly, it dismissed Purchaser’s declaratory judgment claim and awarded Seller a
judgment against Purchaser for breach of contract and attorneys’ fees.
The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment. The panel
determined that Seller had presented no evidence “upon which the trial court could base a
determination as to whether the amount of liquidated damages ‘was a reasonable estimate
of potential damages.’” SH Nash., 2024 WL 3880089, at *14 (quoting Guiliano v. Cleo,
Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999)). It reasoned that “[t]he language of the contracts
stating that the parties agreed that the liquidated damages amounts were a reasonable
estimate [was] not sufficient.” Id. We granted permission to appeal.
7
Purchaser also brought a claim for conversion. The trial court granted Seller’s motion to dismiss
the conversion claim based upon the economic loss doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal
of this claim. SH Nash., LLC v. FWREF Nash. Airport, LLC, No. M2023-01147-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL
3880089, at *5, *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2024), perm. app. granted No. M2023-01147-SC-R11-CV,
2025 WL 668823, at *1 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 2025). Seller now concedes that the economic loss doctrine does
not bar the conversion claim but maintains that the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision is
dispositive. We agree that the enforceability of the liquidated damages provision is dispositive.
8
The Business Court Docket Pilot Project entered into Phase 2 by order of this Court on April 4,
2017. Order Establishing the Davidson County Business Court Docket Pilot Project – Phase 2, ADM2017-
00638 (Tenn. Apr. 4, 2017). We explained that the specialized docket “provide[s] expedited resolution of
business matters by a judge who is experienced and has expertise in handling complex business and
commercial disputes, and who will continue to provide proactive, hands-on case management with realistic,
meaningful deadlines and procedures adapted to the needs of each case for customized, quality outcomes.”
Id.
-4-
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo,
with no presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477
S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). Thus, we must make a “fresh determination of whether the
requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.”
Id. (citing Estate of Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tenn. 2013)). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 56.04. Likewise, interpretation of a contract is a question of law subject to de
novo review. Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 465 (Tenn. 2012).
III. ANALYSIS
The question before us is whether the provision at issue is an enforceable liquidated
damages provision or an unenforceable penalty. Seller argues that the provision is an
enforceable liquidated damages provision because (1) the parties agreed that actual
damages were difficult to measure at the time the parties entered into the contract and the
liquidated sum was a reasonable estimate of damages; and (2) Purchaser has not presented
evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact that the provision was intended
as a penalty. Purchaser’s position is that the language of the provision alone is insufficient
to establish its enforceability and the burden should be on Seller to show the number was
a reasonable estimate.
We hold that where parties agree that actual damages are indeterminable or difficult
to ascertain and further agree that a liquidated sum is a reasonable estimate of damages,
their agreement creates a presumption that the provision is enforceable. To overcome this
presumption, the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the provision must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the provision is actually a penalty.
This standard does not alter the parties’ burdens at the summary judgment stage. As
we explained in Rye,
when the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving
party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively negating
an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating
that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is
insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. . . . [T]he
nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its]
pleading,” but must respond, and . . . “set forth specific facts” at the summary
judgment stage “showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” . . . The
-5-
nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the
record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the
nonmoving party.
477 S.W.3d at 264–65 (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06) (second alteration in original).
“[S]ummary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party’s evidence at the
summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact for trial.” Id. at 265 (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, 56.06). Applied here, that
standard requires Purchaser, the non-moving party, to show that there is a genuine issue
for trial, i.e., that there are facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find
in favor of Purchaser.
A. The Presumption of Enforceability and the Burden of Proof
The presumption of enforceability prioritizes two important principles: “the
intentions of the parties and . . . the freedom to contract.” Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 100. As
to the former, we reaffirm our precedent that the intentions of the parties are best
understood through their written words. Pharma Conf. Educ., Inc. v. State, 703 S.W.3d
305, 316 (Tenn. 2024) (“[T]he ‘written words’ of the contract should remain ‘the lodestar
of contract interpretation.’” (quoting Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. v. BlueCross
BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 566 S.W.3d 671, 694 (Tenn. 2019))). We have previously
explained that “[t]he central tenet of contract construction is that the intent of the
contracting parties at the time of executing the agreement should govern. The intent of the
parties is presumed to be that specifically expressed in the body of the contract.” Planters
Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) (citation
omitted). As to the latter, we reiterate our high view of the freedom of contract as
articulated in Guiliano:
[P]arties to a contract are free to agree upon liquidated damages and upon
other terms that may not seem desirable or pleasant to outside observers. In
that respect, courts should not interfere in the contract[] but should carry out
the intentions of the parties and the terms bargained for in the contract, unless
those terms violate public policy.
995 S.W.2d at 100 (citation omitted). The presumption of enforceability upholds these
longstanding principles of Tennessee law by first looking to the words originally agreed to
by the parties and presuming, unless shown otherwise, that the parties meant what they
said.
It bears mentioning that, when interpreting contractual provisions that claim to
provide for liquidated damages, we employ the prospective approach. We explained this
approach in Guiliano:
-6-
Under [the prospective] approach, courts must focus on the intentions of the
parties based upon the language of the contract and the circumstances that
existed at the time of contract formation. Those circumstances include:
whether the liquidated sum was a reasonable estimate of potential damages
and whether actual damages were indeterminable or difficult to measure at
the time the parties entered into the contract. If the provision satisfies those
factors and reflects the parties’ intentions to compensate in the event of a
breach, then the provision will be upheld as a reasonable agreement for
liquidated damages. However, if the provision and circumstances indicate
that the parties intended merely to penalize for a breach of contract, then the
provision is unenforceable as against public policy.
Id. at 100–01 (footnote and citation omitted).
The prospective approach has long been the standard. See Tenn. Homes v. Welch,
664 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022). Our state courts and federal courts applying
Tennessee law have consistently applied this approach to alleged liquidated damages
provisions in various contexts and procedural postures. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Alexander,
844 S.W.2d 187, 188, 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (agreement for the sale of real property);
United States v. Ponnapula, 246 F.3d 576, 584 (6th Cir. 2001) (real estate contract);
Unifirst Corp. v. Lane, No. M2000-00357-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 8791, at *1, *4 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2001) (uniform rental contract); Eatherly Constr. Co. v. HTI Mem’l Hosp.,
No. M2003-02313-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2217078, at *6, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12,
2005) (construction contract); Anesthesia Med. Grp., P.C. v. Buras, No. M2004-01599-
COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2737829, at *1, *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2006) (student loan
and employment agreement); Anesthesia Med Grp., P.C. v. Chandler, No. M2005-00034-
COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 412323, at *1, *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2007) (same); Bachour
v. Mason, No. M2012-00092-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 2395027, at *1, *4–5 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 30, 2013) (real-estate contract); Shoney’s N. Am., LLC v. Smith & Thaxton, Inc.,
No. 3:12-cv-00625, 2014 WL 7369987, at *1, *13 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 29, 2014) (licensing
agreements). The prospective approach keeps our focus on what the parties understood at
the time they made their agreement: actual damages would be difficult or impossible to
ascertain and the agreed upon liquidated sum is a reasonable estimate of actual damages.
To this point, it has remained unclear which party bears the burden of showing a
provision is enforceable as liquidated damages or, in the alternative, is an unenforceable
penalty. See, e.g., Eatherly Constr. Co., 2005 WL 2217078, at *9 (placing the burden on
the party seeking to enforce the provision); Unifirst Corp., 2001 WL 8791, at *4 (placing
the burden on the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the provision); Kendrick, 844
S.W.2d at 191 (leaving unclear which party bore the burden); Ponnapula, 246 F.3d at 584
(same); Buras, 2006 WL 2737829, at *7–8 (same); Chandler, 2007 WL 412323, at *12
-7-
(same); Shoney’s N. Am., LLC, 2014 WL 7369987, at *15 (same). We clarify today that
the burden of showing a provision is an unenforceable penalty lies with the party seeking
to avoid enforcement of the provision.
Placing the burden on this party, like the adoption of the presumption of
enforceability, is consistent with upholding the intentions of the parties and the freedom to
contract. When we rejected the retrospective approach in Guiliano, we explained that it
undermines the certainty and other benefits afforded by liquidated damages.
Under that approach, the parties are allowed to fully litigate actual damages
following a breach of contract. If the nonbreaching party fails to prove actual
damages, then he or she is barred from recovering the liquidated sum
originally agreed upon in the contract. We find that it is unfair to require the
nonbreaching party to prove actual damages in cases where the parties agreed
in advance to a liquidated damages provision. Such a requirement ignores
the original intentions of the parties and defeats the purposes of stipulating
in advance to potential damages.
995 S.W.2d at 100. Just as a requirement for the nonbreaching party to prove actual
damages is unfair where the parties agreed in advance to a liquidated damages provision,
so would it be unfair to require the nonbreaching party to show the provision was not a
penalty when the parties agreed that the sum was a reasonable estimate.
Other jurisdictions likewise place the burden on the party seeking to avoid
enforcement of the provision. See, e.g., Rohauer v. Little, 736 P.2d 403, 410 (Colo. 1987);
Schroeder v. Partin, 259 P.3d 617, 622 (Idaho 2011); Pav-Saver Corp. v. Vasso Corp., 493
N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Proulx v. 1400 Penn. Ave., SE, LLC, 199 A.3d 667,
673 (D.C. 2019); Carrothers Const. Co., L.L.C. v. City of S. Hutchinson, 207 P.3d 231,
241 (Kan. 2009); Cummings Props., LLC v. Hines, 217 N.E.3d 604, 608 (Mass. 2023);
Loomis v. Lange Fin. Corp., 865 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Nev. 1993); Orr v. Goodwin, 953 A.2d
1190, 1195 (N.H. 2008); Heikkila v. Carver, 378 N.W.2d 214, 216 (S.D. 1985); Atrium
Med. Ctr., LP v. Houston Red C LLC, 595 S.W.3d 188, 192–93 196 (Tex. 2020); Boots,
Inc. v. Prempal Singh, 649 S.E.2d 695, 697 (Va. 2007). But see Pacheco v. Scoblionko,
532 A.2d 1036, 1038–39 (Me. 1987) (placing the burden on the party seeking
enforcement); Coldwell Banker-First Realty, Inc. v. Meide & Son, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 375,
377 (N.D. 1988) (explaining that the burden is on the party seeking to enforce liquidated
damages to show it is valid as an exception to the general prohibition against such
provisions under North Dakota statute).
In order to overcome the presumption of enforceability, the party seeking to avoid
enforcement of the provision must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
provision is an unenforceable penalty. “[A] penalty is ‘a sum inserted in a contract, not as
-8-
the measure of compensation for its breach, but rather as a punishment for default, or by
way of security for actual damages which may be sustained by reason of nonperformance,
and it involves the idea of punishment.’” Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 98 n.9 (quoting 22 Am.
Jur. 2d Damages § 684 (1988)); see also Penalty, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
(“Excessive stipulated damages that a contract purports to impose on a party that
breaches.”).
To show an unenforceable penalty, the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the
damages provision might offer, for example, affidavits and declarations, testimony of
witnesses, admissions of a party opponent, internal documents, or expert testimony, all of
which might go to show that the clause was meant to punish, not compensate, i.e., that the
actual damages were really not indeterminable or difficult to measure at the time the parties
entered into the contract or that the liquidated sum was actually not a reasonable estimate
of potential damages. Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 98 n.9, 100–01; see, e.g., Eatherly Constr.
Co., 2005 WL 2217078, at *6, *9 (concluding that liquidated damages provision imposing
a $500 payment per each day the construction project was late was a penalty); Bachour,
2013 WL 2395027, at *5 (finding that forfeiture provision based on failure to complete
project by a certain date was an unenforceable penalty). In accordance with the
preponderance of the evidence standard, a party’s evidence must show it is “more probable
than not” that the provision is actually an unenforceable penalty. Teter v. Republic Parking
Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn. 2005) (“Generally, in civil cases, facts are proved
by a mere preponderance of the evidence.” (first citing Endowment Rank of Order of K.P.
v. Steele, 63 S.W. 1126, 1128 (Tenn. 1901); and then citing Burchett v. Stephens, 794
S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990))).
We caution that the inquiry regarding whether a damages provision is an
unenforceable penalty should be objective rather than subjective. That is, the focus should
be on whether the provision was in fact a penalty given the objective circumstances that
existed at the time the contract was entered, not on whether the parties subjectively believed
the provision to be a penalty. Cf. Pharma Conf. Educ., 703 S.W.3d at 317 (explaining that
“[e]vidence concerning a party’s subjective understanding of a contract’s terms—
untethered from industry practice, the parties’ course of dealing, or other potentially
relevant context—is irrelevant to” determining the contract’s meaning).
In summary, we hold that once enforceability is presumed from the terms of the
contract, the burden rests with the party seeking to avoid enforcement to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the provision is actually a penalty.
-9-
B. Application
1. The Presumption
We turn to the language of the provision at issue to first determine whether the
contractual language gives rise to a presumption that the language of Section 6.1 is
enforceable as liquidated damages. The provision states, in relevant part, that
[d]ue to the fluctuation in land values, the unpredictable state of the economy
and of governmental regulations, the fluctuating money market for real estate
loans of all types, and other factors which directly affect the value and
marketability of the Property, the parties recognize that it would be extremely
difficult and impracticable, if not impossible, to ascertain with any degree of
certainty the amount of damages which would be suffered by Seller in the
event of Purchaser’s failure to perform its obligation to purchase the Property
under this Agreement. Accordingly, the parties agree that a reasonable
estimate of Seller’s damages in such event is the amount of Earnest Money[.]
The parties acknowledged in this provision that due to factors out of their control, there
would be significant difficulty in determining the amount of actual damages in the event
of a breach. Thus, they agreed on an amount both perceived as a reasonable estimate of
damages. This language, in and of itself, is agreement enough to raise the presumption. But
in this case these sophisticated parties reaffirmed this acknowledgement by ratification
provisions when each of the twenty-four amendments was adopted. Plainly said, they
agreed on an amount of liquidated damages twenty-four more times. Accordingly, this
provision is presumed to be an enforceable liquidated damages provision.
To be clear, a requirement of a metric or other explanation as to how the parties
arrived at the amount of liquidated damages is unnecessary to raise the presumption of
enforceability. Although penalties are against public policy, parties are free to stipulate as
to damages. Parties need not provide a metric for their calculation for a court to find that
the contract evinces a stipulation as to damages rather than a penalty. To require parties to
provide a metric would be particularly illogical in situations where the reason for
stipulating as to damages is that there is no reliable way to estimate damages. In real estate
transactions, for example, there may be no way to know “what price (if any) [a seller]
would get for the property if the initial sale fell through.” Ponnapula, 246 F.3d at 584.
2. Overcoming the Presumption
The presumption having been raised, the burden is now on Purchaser to demonstrate
a question of fact as to whether the provision is actually a penalty. For example, Purchaser
could show that the land values were not fluctuating, that the state of the economy was not
- 10 -
unpredictable, that the money market for real estate loans was not fluctuating, or that it was
not difficult to ascertain Seller’s damages.
Purchaser argues that because the agreement and its amendments “should be read
together and construed as a whole with reference to each other,” Equitable Real Estate Inv.
Mgt., Inc. v. Davinco, Inc., 1986 WL 1656, at *7 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1986), the
trial court erred when it “appeared to treat the [Agreement] and its amendments as separate
contracts.” Put simply, Purchaser urges us to look at the earnest money sum in the
aggregate and find the aggregated sum is unreasonable on its face.
Purchaser’s argument is thoughtful but not persuasive. First, we do not find that the
trial court erred in not considering the amounts in the aggregate. The prospective approach
requires us to evaluate the parties’ intentions at the time they agreed to each additional
earnest money deposit. Though Guiliano states that the relevant inquiry concerns “the time
the parties entered into the contract,” 995 S.W.2d at 100–01, the true aim of this approach
is to evaluate the circumstances at the time the parties agreed to the amount of damages.
See id. at 100 (“When parties agree to a liquidated damages provision, it is generally
presumed that they considered the certainty of liquidated damages to be preferable to the
risk of proving actual damages in the event of a breach.”). Applied in this summary
judgment context, Purchaser would need to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact that at least
one of the stated reasons given for the parties’ damages agreement—fluctuating land
values, an unpredictable economy, a fluctuating money market for real estate loans or
difficulty ascertaining Seller’s damages—was not true at the time of the extension. Instead,
the parties continually agreed through ratification provisions that each of the additional
deposits were a reasonable estimate of Seller’s damages.
A total of twenty-four amendments were signed over a fifteen-month period. With
each amendment, the parties ratified Section 8.14, which provided that “[f]ollowing the
mutual execution of this Agreement, Seller agrees not to solicit, discuss, accept, grant or
otherwise communicate in any way with any other party a right to purchase the Property
or any portion thereof.” When Seller agreed to each extension it lost the ability to seek out
other purchasers. And in return, Purchaser received consideration in the form of
exclusivity. Additionally, in Section 8.9 the parties explained why time was of the essence,
“it being acknowledged and agreed by and between the parties that any delay in effecting
a closing pursuant to this Agreement may result in loss or damage to the party in full
compliance with its obligations hereunder.” Seller had no way of estimating what potential
purchase price it might secure for the property in the case of a breach by Purchaser, or even
if it would be able to sell the property at all. See Ponnapula, 246 F.3d at 584.
Second, even if we did consider the amounts in the aggregate there is no question
of fact as to reasonableness in this matter. In total, Purchaser deposited $18,917,500 in
earnest money, or approximately 23% of the hotel purchase price, in accordance with the
- 11 -
terms of the Agreement and its numerous amendments. No doubt, courts have found
amounts lower than 23% to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Kimbrough & Co. v. Schmidt, 939
S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding “15% of the purchase price, reduced by
1% each year that payments are satisfactorily made, is not a reasonable forecast of damages
likely to occur in the event of a default by the buyer. If [the buyer] missed even the first
payment, he would suffer the unconscionable consequences of both forfeiting the property
and having to pay 15% of the entire purchase price”), overruled in part by Guiliano, 995
S.W.2d at 99–100; Patterson v. Anderson Motor Co., 319 S.W.2d 492, 493, 501 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1958) (finding that $2,000 deposited as earnest money for a total $20,000 purchase
price was an unenforceable forfeiture in the absence of proof it was a reasonable estimate
of damages); Am. Senior Dev. L.L.C. v. Parkside of Collierville, L.L.C., 102 F. App’x 890,
896–97 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that developer who sought full development fee as
compensation despite terminated contract to be “not only highly inequitable[] but . . . also
essentially transform[ed] the 6% [development] fee into a liquidated damages provision
disfavored under Tennessee law” (citing Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 98)). But the facts of
these cases are completely different. Neither Kimbrough nor Patterson nor American
Senior Development involved the kind of incremental increases to the stipulated sum based
on contract extensions like those present here. Rather, they involved a one-time earnest
money deposit that was deemed unconscionable, unreasonable, or inequitable and found to
be a penalty. Kimbrough, 939 S.W.2d at 109; Patterson, 319 S.W.2d at 501; Am. Senior
Dev., LLC, 102 F. App’x at 896–97. Here, as the timeframe for closing incrementally
increased, so did the potential for damages. Thus, that the sum purported to reasonably
represent those damages also incrementally increased does not by itself suffice as a per se
rebuttal of the presumption of enforceability. There are no questions of fact to suggest that
any of the incremental agreed upon sums were not a reasonable estimate of Seller’s
damages for each agreed extension.
We also note that the relevant clause in these cases did not explain any
circumstances that made the damages “difficult to ascertain.” See Kimbrough, 939 S.W.2d
at 107; Patterson. 319 S.W.2d at 494; Am. Senior Dev., LLC, 102 F. App’x at 893
(acknowledging merely that “time [was] of the essence”). In contrast, the provision at issue
explicitly listed the circumstances that led to the parties agreeing to the fixed sum: “the
fluctuation in land values, the unpredictable state of the economy and of governmental
regulations, the fluctuating money market for real estate loans of all types, and other factors
which directly affect the value and marketability of the Property.”
Accordingly, Purchaser has not created a genuine issue of fact that the aggregated
amount constitutes a penalty.
- 12 -
3. Discovery
Purchaser makes two final arguments in support of reversal related to the trial
court’s denial of discovery before ruling on Seller’s motion for summary judgment. First,
Purchaser contends that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing discovery
“about the circumstances of the formation of the [Agreement] and the twenty-four
amendments leading to such a dramatic increase in the amount of liquidated damages.”
Second, Purchaser contends that it abused its discretion in denying “any discovery into
whether Seller had advance knowledge regarding the New On-Airport Hotel,” because
such discovery would support its economic duress defense. We address each in turn.
We review a trial court’s ruling on discovery matters for an abuse of discretion. Lee
Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). “A court abuses its discretion
when it causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect
legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision
on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. Thus, a reviewing court must
determine “(1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported by the
evidence in the record, (2) whether the lower court properly identified and applied the most
appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the lower court’s
decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Id.
First, Purchaser seeks discovery “about the circumstances of the formation of the
[Agreement] and the twenty-four amendments leading to such a dramatic increase in the
amount of liquidated damages.” But these circumstances are clear from the record. As we
have explained, the parties agreed that various factors out of the control of either party,
fluctuating land values, an unpredictable economy and governmental regulations, and a
fluctuating money market for real estate loans, “directly affect the value and marketability
of the Property.” Purchaser has not identified any shift in these circumstances over the
fifteen-month period, and, indeed, the parties’ continual ratification of these circumstances
indicates no shift. Even as the parties’ recognized the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic
on the real estate market, they agreed that they would continue to pursue closing the sale.
Any discovery into the formation of the Agreement is unlikely to lead to any relevant
information on the penalty issue.
We also acknowledge that the parties requested their case be transferred to the
Business Court Docket. By order of this Court, the Business Court was given “broad
discretion . . . to develop case management procedures to allow for more efficient handling
of cases and produce quicker resolutions with reduced litigation.” Order Establishing the
Davidson County Business Court Docket Pilot Project – Phase 2, ADM2017-00638 (Tenn.
Apr. 4, 2017). The trial court recognized these interests in the order staying discovery:
“The Court finds that [staying discovery] serves goals of judicial economy inherent in the
Business Court Pilot Project.” We agree. While discovery may often be helpful at the
- 13 -
summary judgment stage, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
discovery in this case.
Second, Purchaser contends that the trial court abused its discr