In Re Maddex B.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketM2026-01596-COA-T10B-CV
JudgeJudge Carma Dennis McGee
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/17/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs October 13, 2026
IN RE MADDEX B., ET AL.
Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Smith County
No. 23-DN-11 Branden Bellar, Judge
___________________________________
No. M2026-01596-COA-T10B-CV
___________________________________
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the
trial judge. In a previous appeal, this Court remanded for the trial court to enter an order
either providing the grounds upon which the trial judge denied the motion or granting the
motion. The trial court entered a second order on remand, again denying the motion. The
petitioner appeals. We again vacate and remand for entry of an order either providing the
grounds upon which the trial judge denies the motion or granting the motion.
Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile
Court Vacated and Remanded
CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.
FRIERSON, II, and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.
Hector Antonio Figueroa, Jr., Gordonsville, Tennessee, pro se.
OPINION
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This appeal arises out of a dependency and neglect case. It was filed in juvenile
court by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services against a mother and three
fathers regarding four children. One of the respondents was Hector Figueroa. Preliminary
and adjudicatory hearings were held in 2023. Several review hearings were held in 2024,
and DCS eventually closed its portion of the case, but the case remained open for the
parents regarding custody and visitation issues. At some type of hearing in August 2025,
Mr. Figueroa was held in contempt “for his behavior and attitude in court” and ordered to
serve ten days in jail. Another hearing was held in October 2025, and a permanent
parenting plan was entered in December 2025. Yet another hearing was held in February
2026 on motions filed by Mr. Figueroa.
Mr. Figueroa filed a pro se motion for recusal of the trial judge on May 4, 2026. It
was supported by an attached declaration of Mr. Figueroa made under penalty of perjury.
The recusal motion stated that it was “not based merely on disagreement with a single
ruling or on dissatisfaction with the outcome of a hearing” but rather was “based on the
cumulative appearance of partiality created by a continuing pattern in which filed motions
and pleadings have allegedly remained unresolved, have not been promptly addressed by
written order, or have not been accompanied by written grounds and lawful and legal basis
sufficient to permit meaningful review.” Mr. Figueroa alleged that some matters “have
continued to move forward while prior filings remain unresolved, creating the appearance
that one side’s requested relief may proceed while [his] filings await written disposition.”
He asserted that these unresolved matters, when “viewed together,” could cause a
reasonable person to question whether the tribunal remained neutral. He cited a “broader
appearance created by repeated non-rulings, lack of written explanations, and further action
in the case while those issues remain pending.” Mr. Figueroa acknowledged his pro se
status and claimed that “unresolved pro se motions, notices, objections, and requests for
written rulings should be identified on the record and addressed by written order rather
than overlooked, narrowed by hypertechnical construction, or functionally bypassed while
the case proceeds.” He provided a list of what he claimed to be “unresolved motions,
pleadings, notices, and requests below as part of the objective basis for this motion,” which
showed a dozen items that allegedly remained unresolved and were filed between
December 15, 2025, and March 15, 2026.
On June 10, 2026, the juvenile court entered an order summarily denying the recusal
motion, with the following explanation:
1. The defendant, Hector Figueroa, did not timely file his Motion for Recusal.
This matter began on September 8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings
prior to this Motion for Recusal without this matter being raised.
2. The defendant, Hector Figueroa, has no basis at law or equity raised that
would cause the Court to recuse himself.
3. The defendant, Hector Figueroa, has filed no supporting affidavit as
required by Tenn. Supreme Court R[u]le 10B §1.01.
Mr. Figueroa timely filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, we first explained that Mr. Figueroa had submitted a declaration in
support of his recusal motion, so the absence of an affidavit was not fatal, and the motion
was not subject to dismissal on that basis. In re Maddex B., No. M2026-01001-COA-
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T10B-CV, 2026 WL 2168749, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2026). Next, we addressed
the trial court’s conclusion that the motion was subject to dismissal because it was
untimely. Id. We explained:
The order denying the motion simply states, “This matter began on
September 8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings prior to this Motion
for Recusal without this matter being raised.” Rule 10B provides that a
written motion for recusal must be filed “promptly after a party learns or
reasonably should have learned of the facts establishing the basis for
recusal.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 1.01. “Thus, a recusal motion ‘should be
filed when the facts forming the basis of that motion become known.’”
DiDomenico v. DiDomenico, No. M2024-00476-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL
3124463, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2025) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb.
25, 2026) (quoting Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tenn. 2009)). Mr.
Figueroa’s recusal motion complained that matters he filed between
December 15, 2025, and March 15, 2026, remained unresolved. He filed his
recusal motion on May 4, 2026. Given the basis for Mr. Figueroa’s recusal
motion, and when he “learned of the facts establishing the basis for recusal,”
his motion is not rendered untimely simply because the case “began on
September 8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings prior to this
Motion[.]”
Id. Finally, we explained that the trial court’s third finding -- that Mr. Figueroa had “no
basis at law or equity raised that would cause the Court to recuse himself” -- was a
“summary denial” that did not provide any explanation for the trial court’s decision. Id.
We explained that Rule 10B requires every judge who denies a motion for recusal to “state
in writing the grounds upon which he or she denies the motion.” Id. at *3. For example,
“if a party contends the trial judge has knowledge of facts or circumstances that occurred
outside of the courtroom, the judge is under an affirmative duty to state whether he or she
does or does not have knowledge of the alleged facts or circumstances that may require
recusal.” Id. (quoting Elseroad v. Cook, 553 S.W.3d 460, 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018)). In
another case, we explained, this Court had vacated an order denying a recusal motion
because it failed to “make specific findings relative to [the movant’s] allegations.” Id.
(citing Dougherty v. Dougherty, No. W2020-00284-COA-T10B-CV, 2020 WL 1189096,
at *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2020). Specifically, the judge’s order did not “make
specific findings about the text allegedly sent by the Trial Court’s Clerk while Father was
testifying,” nor did the order “make any findings whatsoever about the allegations that the
Clerk has an affiliation with Fayette Academy, which is particularly relevant given that the
major dispute in this case involves whether the minor children will attend Fayette Academy
or not.” Id. Because the trial judge “made insufficient findings as to his reasoning for
denying the motion to recuse as required by Rule 10B, § 1.03,” we vacated and remanded
to “allow the Trial Court to make specific findings and rule upon all of the allegations and
either grant the motion or state in writing all the grounds upon which the motion is denied.”
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Id. Similarly, we explained that the trial judge’s recusal order in this case did “not mention
or explain the allegation by Mr. Figueroa that his pro se filings remain unresolved while
other matters continue to move forward.” Id. at *2. As such, we vacated the order and
remanded for the trial court to either grant the motion or enter an order that stated in writing
all the grounds upon which the motion was denied. Id. at *3.
On October 2, 2026, the trial court entered a second order denying the recusal
motion. It stated that after reviewing the motion and the entire court file, the court
concluded that “good cause exists for denying this Motion.” The order stated:
The Court finds: There is no basis for accusation that the Court would be
biased in this matter. Any reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts,
would not doubt the Court’s impartiality. Mr. Figueroa’s claim is based upon
an adverse ruling rather than bias. Further, the Court has an obligation not to
recuse himself when there is no valid reason to do so.
...
The Court finds: The motions and pleadings that Mr. Figueroa allege were
outstanding in his Motion for Recusal/Disqualification of Judge filed on May
4, 2026; were filed AFTER the Final Order of October 20, 2025, however,
many of these filings were addressed in the February 10, 2026, Order,
attached as Exhibit A. 1
....
The Court finds: Many of the filings that Mr. Figueroa allege are unanswered
were denied in an Order filed on February 27, 2026. A list of the pleadings
answered in said Order follow:
1. Father’s Notice of Intent to Seek Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 10B Review and Record Preservation Regarding Failure
to Rule and Coercive Attorney-Fee Threats filed on 1/22/26.
2. Notice of Non-Response to Father’s Filed Objection/Motion
and Request for Court Action filed on 1/5/26.
3. Motion to Require Identification of Authority for Title IV-D
Enforcement; To Require Enforcement by Motion of Record,
To Permanently Cease Coercive Threats and Emergency
Motion to Stay Incarceration Threats Pending Entry of a
Signed Order and Rulings on Objections filed on 1/5/26.
4. Petition/Motion to Confirm Matters Set for Hearing to Docket
and Hear all Pending Filings and to Require Written Rulings
filed on 1/22/26.
5. Emergency Motion to Enforce Due Process Safeguards in Any
Contempt/Enforcement Proceeding Implicating Incarceration
1
No order was attached.
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filed on 1/15/26.
However, this order also states “That until Father complies with the Courts
previous Orders, he shall not be granted any relief sought in his pleadings as
Father comes to the court with unclean hands, having failed to adhere to the
Orders of this Court.”
The trial court then addressed another issue regarding timeliness. The court explained that
Mr. Figueroa had “appeared before this court on approximately seventeen (17) occasions
in an approximate three-year span,” and it included a brief timeline of hearings dating back
to 2023 in the dependency and neglect case and also an order of protection matter filed in
general sessions court. The order then stated:
Mr. Figueroa has not demonstrated a timeliness of his motion to recuse the
Court pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10(b). Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
10B 1.01 states “the motion shall be filed no later than ten days before trial,
absent a showing of good cause which must be supported by an affidavit.”
The final hearing in this matter was heard on October 20, 2025, and the Order
was filed on December 19, 2025. Mr. Figueroa’s Motion for
Recusal/Disqualification of Judge was stamped filed by the Juvenile Clerk
of Smith County, TN, on May 4, 2026, seven months AFTER the Final
Hearing.
Thus, the recusal motion was denied. Mr. Figueroa again timely filed an accelerated
interlocutory appeal.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
Mr. Figueroa presents four issues for review on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court applied the correct timeliness standard under Rule 10B §
1.01 and the law of this case when it measured the recusal motion from the October
20, 2025 final hearing even though the recusal motion alleged a cumulative pattern
based substantially on events and filings arising from December 2025 through
March 2026.
2. Whether the October 2 order satisfies Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 1.03
and this Court’s July 28, 2026 mandate when the order repeatedly relies on a
February 27, 2026 order to answer the unresolved-filings allegation but does not
make findings concerning material filings identified in the recusal motion that were
filed on March 10 and March 15/16, 2026, after the February 27 order.
3. Whether, under the objective appearance-of-impartiality standard of Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 10, RJC 2.11(k), the trial court improperly reduced my stated
cumulative appearance theory to a complaint about adverse rulings without
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addressing the distinct allegations of repeated non-rulings, incomplete written
disposition, and allegedly unequal progression of matters.
4. Whether, after a prior Rule 10B vacatur and remand directing the trial court either
to grant recusal or state in writing all grounds for denial, the appropriate remedy for
a second materially incomplete denial is reversal with instructions for recusal and
reassignment, or alternatively another vacatur and remand with explicit instructions
to address each material allegation and the cumulative appearance question under
the correct legal standard.
For the following reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
III. DISCUSSION
As we explained in our first opinion in this matter, judicial recusal is governed by
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a
motion for recusal under a de novo standard of review. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. The
only issue we may consider in a Rule 10B appeal is whether the trial judge should have
granted the motion for recusal. Elseroad, 553 S.W.3d at 462; Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, 557
S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). We do not review the merits or correctness of the
trial court’s other rulings. Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
A. Timeliness
We begin with the trial court’s new determination regarding the timeliness of Mr.
Figueroa’s recusal motion. In the first appeal of this matter, we explained that a recusal
motion must be filed “promptly after a party learns or reasonably should have learned of
the facts establishing the basis for recusal.” In re Maddex B., 2026 WL 2168749, at *2
(citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 1.01). “Thus, a recusal motion should be filed when the
facts forming the basis of that motion become known.” Id. (quoting DiDomenico, 2025
WL 3124463, at *2). Mr. Figueroa’s recusal motion complained that matters he filed
between December 15, 2025, and March 15, 2026, remained unresolved, and he filed his
recusal motion on May 4, 2026. Id. Due to the nature of these allegations, we explained
that his motion was not rendered untimely simply because the case “began on September
8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings prior to this Motion[.]” Id.
On remand, the trial court concluded that Mr. Figueroa’s motion was untimely for
a different reason. The trial court noted that Rule 10B also provides that “[t]he motion
shall be filed no later than ten days before trial, absent a showing of good cause which must
be supported by an affidavit.” The trial court found that the “final hearing” in this matter
was on October 20, 2025, a “final” order was filed on December 19, 2025, and a hearing
“on Mr. Figueroa’s motions” was set for February 10, 2026. The trial court found that Mr.
Figueroa did not file his recusal motion until May 2026, seven months after what it deemed
the “final” hearing in October. As such, the trial court deemed Mr. Figueroa’s recusal
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motion untimely under the ten-day rule. We do not believe the ten-day rule applies under
these circumstances, however.
Initially, we note that a dependency and neglect proceeding does not involve a
“trial” in the traditional sense. Dependency and neglect proceedings have “unique
characteristics.” In re Ryat M., No. M2020-00156-COA-R3-JV, 2021 WL 4432729, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2021). They involve a series of preliminary, adjudicatory, and
dispositional hearings conducted in several phases. In re Ravyn R., No. E2017-01001-
COA-R3-JV, 2018 WL 1956488, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018). “Due to the unique
nature of these proceedings, the legislature has provided for continuing jurisdiction in a
dependency and neglect matter until one of several enumerated events occurs.” Green v.
Green, No. M2007-01263-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 348289, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11,
2009). Exclusive original jurisdiction continues “until the case has been dismissed, or until
the custody determination is transferred to another juvenile, circuit, chancery, or general
sessions court exercising domestic relations jurisdiction, or until a petition for adoption is
filed regarding the child...” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103. 2 According to the timeline
prepared by the trial judge, it had already conducted preliminary and adjudicatory hearings
in this matter in 2023 and conducted a series of at least seven review hearings in 2024
before various other hearings were held in 2025 and 2026. Attempting to designate any
one of these hearings as the “trial” for purposes of applying the rule is problematic.
In addition, we note the status of the proceedings at the time when Mr. Figueroa
filed his recusal motion and the nature of his allegations. The last entry listed in the trial
court’s timeline states, “This case was set for a hearing on February 10, 2026, on Mr.
Figueroa’s motions. Mr. Figueroa was present in court.” The trial court also notes that an
order was entered on February 27, 2026, which resolved five of the matters Mr. Figueroa
alleges were unanswered. Mr. Figueroa filed his recusal motion on May 4, 2026. He listed
a dozen items that he claims to have filed between December 2025 and March 2026 that
still had not been resolved. Thus, when Mr. Figueroa filed his recusal motion in May, there
was no impending “trial” or any other hearing scheduled, as far as the record reflects. At
that stage of the proceeding, it is not clear what purpose would be served by applying the
Rule requiring a recusal motion to be filed “no later than ten days before trial, absent a
showing of good cause which must be supported by an affidavit.”
We note that the ten-day rule was added to Rule 10B in 2020, and there are few
cases discussing it. 3 In Saxton v. Saxton, No. E2025-02081-COA-T10B-CV, 2026 WL
2
Exceptions to this jurisdiction exists for the purposes of establishing temporary jurisdiction in
certain enumerated circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103(d).
3
“The explanatory comments to this section clarify the intention undergirding the timeliness
requirement.” Harvey v. City of Memphis, No. W2025-01145-COA-T10B-CV, 2025 WL 2402063, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2025). The explanatory comments provide:
Although the rule does not state a specific period of time within which the motion must be
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125864, at *1 & n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2026), a litigant filed a recusal motion “on
the morning of a scheduled hearing on several post-trial motions,” including a pending
motion to alter or amend, a motion to strike, and a motion to dismiss another motion. The
trial court denied the recusal motion that same day, on substantive grounds and also due to
untimeliness, reasoning that Rule 10B required the motion to be filed no later than ten days
before trial, absent a showing of good cause, that must be supported by affidavit. Id. at *2.
The trial court reviewed the litigant’s affidavit and found there was “no showing of good
cause that abrogates the ten-day filing requirement before trial.” Id. On appeal, the litigant
challenged “the trial court’s conclusion that [she] filed her petition later than ten days prior
to the trial and did so without good cause.” Id. at *5. We initially observed that the trial
court “properly noted that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B requires good cause.” Id.
The litigant argued that she only became aware of the basis for disqualification days before
she filed her motion, providing good cause for her late filing. Id. It was not clear from the
record whether this was accurate. Id. Therefore, we stated that even if we assumed that
there was a good cause for the late filing, that would not eliminate the alternative
substantive basis for the trial court’s decision to deny her motion, and we affirmed the trial
court’s judgment. Id.
In Fox v. Gordon, No. M2024-01083-COA-T10B-CV, 2024 WL 3857840, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2024), a petitioner filed a recusal motion “months after the trial
concluded yet most of the allegations of bias pertain[ed] to matters that occurred prior to
the commencement of the trial.” The case was tried in April 2024, and the recusal motion
was not filed until July 2024. Id. Citing the ten-day rule, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s denial of the recusal motion based on untimeliness, explaining that the motion was
filed three months after the trial started and that the petitioner failed to show good cause
for the delay. Id.
The circumstances here, in this dependency and neglect proceeding, are not similar
to those in Fox or Saxton. We do not find that Mr. Figueroa’s recusal motion was untimely
under the “ten days before trial” rule. Even assuming arguendo that it was, this Court
would waive the timeliness requirement to reach the merits of this appeal. See Ueber v.
Ueber, No. M2018-02053-COA-T10B-CV, 2019 WL 410703, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
31, 2019) (“While Appellant’s motion is arguably somewhat untimely, Tennessee law
filed, a motion under this rule should be made promptly upon the moving party becoming
aware of the alleged ground or grounds for such a motion. The requirement that the motion
be timely filed is therefore intended to prevent a party with knowledge of facts supporting
a recusal motion from delaying filing the motion to the prejudice of the other parties and
the case. Depending on the circumstances, delay in bringing such a motion may constitute
a waiver of the right to object to a judge presiding over a matter. Further, the delay in
bringing a motion or the timing of its filing may also suggest an improper purpose for the
motion.
Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. Rule 10B, cmt.
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concerning appeals filed under Rule 10B gives this Court some discretion to waive certain
procedural deficiencies in order to reach the merits of a motion filed under Rule 10B.
Therefore, we will proceed to address this appeal on the merits of the case despite the
allegation of untimeliness.”) (citations omitted).
B. Recusal
On appeal, Mr. Figueroa maintains that the trial court’s second order still “does not
make findings on material allegations” and “leaves my core factual contention materially
unanswered.” Mr. Figueroa reiterates that his recusal motion alleged “a cumulative
appearance of partiality arising from a continuing pattern in which my filed motions and
pleadings allegedly remained unresolved, were not promptly addressed by written order,
or were not accompanied by written grounds sufficient for meaningful review.” He claims
that “substantive or enforcement-related matters continued” while his filings remained
unresolved. Mr. Figueroa contends that this Court’s prior opinion and Rule 10B required
that the trial court provide “written grounds that actually addressed the recusal allegations
presented,” and he asks this Court to vacate and remand for entry of an order that contains
sufficient findings to support denial of the motion or reverse the denial of the motion and
remand for reassignment.
The trial court’s order simply states:
The Court finds: There is no basis for accusation that the Court would be
biased in this matter. Any reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts,
would not doubt the Court’s impartiality. Mr. Figueroa’s claim is based upon
an adverse ruling rather than bias. Further, the Court has an obligation not to
recuse himself when there is no valid reason to do so.
The court explained that its February order resolved five of the matters allegedly
outstanding and that the order “also states ‘That until Father complies with the Courts
previous Orders, he shall not be granted any relief sought in his pleadings as Father comes
to the court with unclean hands, having failed to adhere to the Orders of this Court.”
Mr. Figueroa argues that the trial court’s mere reference to its “unclean hands”
ruling “shows that the court used a categorical no-relief statement as the response to
multiple matters I alleged remained unresolved,” but he insists that the trial court was
further required “to explain why, when my later-listed filings and the progression of other
matters were viewed together, the circumstances I alleged did not create a reasonable
appearance concern.” Mr. Figueroa notes that two of the matters he listed in his recusal
motion as unresolved were filed in March 2026, after the referenced February order, and
yet the trial court fails to even address these in its order denying the recusal motion. Mr.
Figueroa has provided those filings in the record on appeal. Specifically, in March, he filed
a motion to require written rulings from the trial court and to reduce oral rulings to writing
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and for clarification regarding its determination of “clean hands.” His motion contended
that there were “multiple pending filings” outstanding for which he had repeatedly
requested written rulings so that the parties would have clear notice of what had been
resolved and what remained pending. He acknowledged that some pending matters had
been addressed at hearings but claimed that no written orders had memorialized those oral
rulings. Mr. Figueroa also noted that the trial court had made reference to “unclean hands”
during the hearing, but he claimed that no written order had identified “the basis, scope, or
application (if any) of that statement to any particular request for relief.” He asked the
court to enter a written order giving the parties notice as to what relief was granted or
denied and to permit meaningful review of the court’s decisions. He said that if the court
intended to rely on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, he requested a written order
providing sufficient specificity for the parties and any reviewing court, identifying the
conduct that was found to constitute unclean hands, the requests for relief to which it was
being applied, and whether the statement was intended as a legal bar to pending motions.
Mr. Figueroa also filed a motion objecting to the entry of any substantive contested orders
until the court addressed his pending motions. The trial court’s order denying the recusal
motion failed to mention either of these March filings and simply notes, in a single sentence
of explanation, that in February it had entered an order stating “That until Father complies
with the Courts previous Orders, he shall not be granted any relief sought in his pleadings
as Father comes to the court with unclean hands, having failed to adhere to the Orders of
this Court.”
In our first opinion in this matter, we examined other Rule 10B appeals in which
this Court had remanded for courts to “make specific findings relative to [the movant’s]
allegations.” In re Maddex B., 2026 WL 2168749, at *3. We found that the trial court’s
first order summarily denying the motion for recusal failed to “explain the allegation by
Mr. Figueroa that his pro se filings remain unresolved while other matters continue to move
forward.” Id. at *2. Unfortunately, the trial court’s second order does not resolve that
problem. “Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.11 ‘incorporates the objective standard Tennessee
judges have long used to evaluate recusal motions.’” Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871,
878 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting Cook v. State, 606 S.W.3d 247, 255 (Tenn. 2020)). “Under this
objective test, recusal is required if ‘a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position,
knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning
the judge’s impartiality.’” Id. The second recusal order does not sufficiently explain the
trial court’s decision in a manner that would permit us apply this objective test to decide if
“a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to
the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.’” See id.
Consequently, we again vacate and remand this matter with instructions for the trial court
to either grant the motion or enter an order that states in writing all the grounds upon which
the motion is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
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For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the juvenile court is hereby vacated and
remanded. We decline Mr. Figueroa’s request to tax the costs to an opposing party. Costs
of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Hector Antonio Figueroa, Jr., for which execution
may issue if necessary.
s/ Carma Dennis McGee
CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE
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