Full Opinion

11/17/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs October 13, 2026 IN RE MADDEX B., ET AL. Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Smith County No. 23-DN-11 Branden Bellar, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2026-01596-COA-T10B-CV ___________________________________ This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the trial judge. In a previous appeal, this Court remanded for the trial court to enter an order either providing the grounds upon which the trial judge denied the motion or granting the motion. The trial court entered a second order on remand, again denying the motion. The petitioner appeals. We again vacate and remand for entry of an order either providing the grounds upon which the trial judge denies the motion or granting the motion. Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Vacated and Remanded CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined. Hector Antonio Figueroa, Jr., Gordonsville, Tennessee, pro se. OPINION I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This appeal arises out of a dependency and neglect case. It was filed in juvenile court by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services against a mother and three fathers regarding four children. One of the respondents was Hector Figueroa. Preliminary and adjudicatory hearings were held in 2023. Several review hearings were held in 2024, and DCS eventually closed its portion of the case, but the case remained open for the parents regarding custody and visitation issues. At some type of hearing in August 2025, Mr. Figueroa was held in contempt “for his behavior and attitude in court” and ordered to serve ten days in jail. Another hearing was held in October 2025, and a permanent parenting plan was entered in December 2025. Yet another hearing was held in February 2026 on motions filed by Mr. Figueroa. Mr. Figueroa filed a pro se motion for recusal of the trial judge on May 4, 2026. It was supported by an attached declaration of Mr. Figueroa made under penalty of perjury. The recusal motion stated that it was “not based merely on disagreement with a single ruling or on dissatisfaction with the outcome of a hearing” but rather was “based on the cumulative appearance of partiality created by a continuing pattern in which filed motions and pleadings have allegedly remained unresolved, have not been promptly addressed by written order, or have not been accompanied by written grounds and lawful and legal basis sufficient to permit meaningful review.” Mr. Figueroa alleged that some matters “have continued to move forward while prior filings remain unresolved, creating the appearance that one side’s requested relief may proceed while [his] filings await written disposition.” He asserted that these unresolved matters, when “viewed together,” could cause a reasonable person to question whether the tribunal remained neutral. He cited a “broader appearance created by repeated non-rulings, lack of written explanations, and further action in the case while those issues remain pending.” Mr. Figueroa acknowledged his pro se status and claimed that “unresolved pro se motions, notices, objections, and requests for written rulings should be identified on the record and addressed by written order rather than overlooked, narrowed by hypertechnical construction, or functionally bypassed while the case proceeds.” He provided a list of what he claimed to be “unresolved motions, pleadings, notices, and requests below as part of the objective basis for this motion,” which showed a dozen items that allegedly remained unresolved and were filed between December 15, 2025, and March 15, 2026. On June 10, 2026, the juvenile court entered an order summarily denying the recusal motion, with the following explanation: 1. The defendant, Hector Figueroa, did not timely file his Motion for Recusal. This matter began on September 8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings prior to this Motion for Recusal without this matter being raised. 2. The defendant, Hector Figueroa, has no basis at law or equity raised that would cause the Court to recuse himself. 3. The defendant, Hector Figueroa, has filed no supporting affidavit as required by Tenn. Supreme Court R[u]le 10B §1.01. Mr. Figueroa timely filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we first explained that Mr. Figueroa had submitted a declaration in support of his recusal motion, so the absence of an affidavit was not fatal, and the motion was not subject to dismissal on that basis. In re Maddex B., No. M2026-01001-COA- -2- T10B-CV, 2026 WL 2168749, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2026). Next, we addressed the trial court’s conclusion that the motion was subject to dismissal because it was untimely. Id. We explained: The order denying the motion simply states, “This matter began on September 8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings prior to this Motion for Recusal without this matter being raised.” Rule 10B provides that a written motion for recusal must be filed “promptly after a party learns or reasonably should have learned of the facts establishing the basis for recusal.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 1.01. “Thus, a recusal motion ‘should be filed when the facts forming the basis of that motion become known.’” DiDomenico v. DiDomenico, No. M2024-00476-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 3124463, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2025) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2026) (quoting Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tenn. 2009)). Mr. Figueroa’s recusal motion complained that matters he filed between December 15, 2025, and March 15, 2026, remained unresolved. He filed his recusal motion on May 4, 2026. Given the basis for Mr. Figueroa’s recusal motion, and when he “learned of the facts establishing the basis for recusal,” his motion is not rendered untimely simply because the case “began on September 8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings prior to this Motion[.]” Id. Finally, we explained that the trial court’s third finding -- that Mr. Figueroa had “no basis at law or equity raised that would cause the Court to recuse himself” -- was a “summary denial” that did not provide any explanation for the trial court’s decision. Id. We explained that Rule 10B requires every judge who denies a motion for recusal to “state in writing the grounds upon which he or she denies the motion.” Id. at *3. For example, “if a party contends the trial judge has knowledge of facts or circumstances that occurred outside of the courtroom, the judge is under an affirmative duty to state whether he or she does or does not have knowledge of the alleged facts or circumstances that may require recusal.” Id. (quoting Elseroad v. Cook, 553 S.W.3d 460, 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018)). In another case, we explained, this Court had vacated an order denying a recusal motion because it failed to “make specific findings relative to [the movant’s] allegations.” Id. (citing Dougherty v. Dougherty, No. W2020-00284-COA-T10B-CV, 2020 WL 1189096, at *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2020). Specifically, the judge’s order did not “make specific findings about the text allegedly sent by the Trial Court’s Clerk while Father was testifying,” nor did the order “make any findings whatsoever about the allegations that the Clerk has an affiliation with Fayette Academy, which is particularly relevant given that the major dispute in this case involves whether the minor children will attend Fayette Academy or not.” Id. Because the trial judge “made insufficient findings as to his reasoning for denying the motion to recuse as required by Rule 10B, § 1.03,” we vacated and remanded to “allow the Trial Court to make specific findings and rule upon all of the allegations and either grant the motion or state in writing all the grounds upon which the motion is denied.” -3- Id. Similarly, we explained that the trial judge’s recusal order in this case did “not mention or explain the allegation by Mr. Figueroa that his pro se filings remain unresolved while other matters continue to move forward.” Id. at *2. As such, we vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to either grant the motion or enter an order that stated in writing all the grounds upon which the motion was denied. Id. at *3. On October 2, 2026, the trial court entered a second order denying the recusal motion. It stated that after reviewing the motion and the entire court file, the court concluded that “good cause exists for denying this Motion.” The order stated: The Court finds: There is no basis for accusation that the Court would be biased in this matter. Any reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would not doubt the Court’s impartiality. Mr. Figueroa’s claim is based upon an adverse ruling rather than bias. Further, the Court has an obligation not to recuse himself when there is no valid reason to do so. ... The Court finds: The motions and pleadings that Mr. Figueroa allege were outstanding in his Motion for Recusal/Disqualification of Judge filed on May 4, 2026; were filed AFTER the Final Order of October 20, 2025, however, many of these filings were addressed in the February 10, 2026, Order, attached as Exhibit A. 1 .... The Court finds: Many of the filings that Mr. Figueroa allege are unanswered were denied in an Order filed on February 27, 2026. A list of the pleadings answered in said Order follow: 1. Father’s Notice of Intent to Seek Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B Review and Record Preservation Regarding Failure to Rule and Coercive Attorney-Fee Threats filed on 1/22/26. 2. Notice of Non-Response to Father’s Filed Objection/Motion and Request for Court Action filed on 1/5/26. 3. Motion to Require Identification of Authority for Title IV-D Enforcement; To Require Enforcement by Motion of Record, To Permanently Cease Coercive Threats and Emergency Motion to Stay Incarceration Threats Pending Entry of a Signed Order and Rulings on Objections filed on 1/5/26. 4. Petition/Motion to Confirm Matters Set for Hearing to Docket and Hear all Pending Filings and to Require Written Rulings filed on 1/22/26. 5. Emergency Motion to Enforce Due Process Safeguards in Any Contempt/Enforcement Proceeding Implicating Incarceration 1 No order was attached. -4- filed on 1/15/26. However, this order also states “That until Father complies with the Courts previous Orders, he shall not be granted any relief sought in his pleadings as Father comes to the court with unclean hands, having failed to adhere to the Orders of this Court.” The trial court then addressed another issue regarding timeliness. The court explained that Mr. Figueroa had “appeared before this court on approximately seventeen (17) occasions in an approximate three-year span,” and it included a brief timeline of hearings dating back to 2023 in the dependency and neglect case and also an order of protection matter filed in general sessions court. The order then stated: Mr. Figueroa has not demonstrated a timeliness of his motion to recuse the Court pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10(b). Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B 1.01 states “the motion shall be filed no later than ten days before trial, absent a showing of good cause which must be supported by an affidavit.” The final hearing in this matter was heard on October 20, 2025, and the Order was filed on December 19, 2025. Mr. Figueroa’s Motion for Recusal/Disqualification of Judge was stamped filed by the Juvenile Clerk of Smith County, TN, on May 4, 2026, seven months AFTER the Final Hearing. Thus, the recusal motion was denied. Mr. Figueroa again timely filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal. II. ISSUES PRESENTED Mr. Figueroa presents four issues for review on appeal: 1. Whether the trial court applied the correct timeliness standard under Rule 10B § 1.01 and the law of this case when it measured the recusal motion from the October 20, 2025 final hearing even though the recusal motion alleged a cumulative pattern based substantially on events and filings arising from December 2025 through March 2026. 2. Whether the October 2 order satisfies Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 1.03 and this Court’s July 28, 2026 mandate when the order repeatedly relies on a February 27, 2026 order to answer the unresolved-filings allegation but does not make findings concerning material filings identified in the recusal motion that were filed on March 10 and March 15/16, 2026, after the February 27 order. 3. Whether, under the objective appearance-of-impartiality standard of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, RJC 2.11(k), the trial court improperly reduced my stated cumulative appearance theory to a complaint about adverse rulings without -5- addressing the distinct allegations of repeated non-rulings, incomplete written disposition, and allegedly unequal progression of matters. 4. Whether, after a prior Rule 10B vacatur and remand directing the trial court either to grant recusal or state in writing all grounds for denial, the appropriate remedy for a second materially incomplete denial is reversal with instructions for recusal and reassignment, or alternatively another vacatur and remand with explicit instructions to address each material allegation and the cumulative appearance question under the correct legal standard. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. III. DISCUSSION As we explained in our first opinion in this matter, judicial recusal is governed by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for recusal under a de novo standard of review. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. The only issue we may consider in a Rule 10B appeal is whether the trial judge should have granted the motion for recusal. Elseroad, 553 S.W.3d at 462; Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, 557 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). We do not review the merits or correctness of the trial court’s other rulings. Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). A. Timeliness We begin with the trial court’s new determination regarding the timeliness of Mr. Figueroa’s recusal motion. In the first appeal of this matter, we explained that a recusal motion must be filed “promptly after a party learns or reasonably should have learned of the facts establishing the basis for recusal.” In re Maddex B., 2026 WL 2168749, at *2 (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 1.01). “Thus, a recusal motion should be filed when the facts forming the basis of that motion become known.” Id. (quoting DiDomenico, 2025 WL 3124463, at *2). Mr. Figueroa’s recusal motion complained that matters he filed between December 15, 2025, and March 15, 2026, remained unresolved, and he filed his recusal motion on May 4, 2026. Id. Due to the nature of these allegations, we explained that his motion was not rendered untimely simply because the case “began on September 8, 2023, and there have been 17 proceedings prior to this Motion[.]” Id. On remand, the trial court concluded that Mr. Figueroa’s motion was untimely for a different reason. The trial court noted that Rule 10B also provides that “[t]he motion shall be filed no later than ten days before trial, absent a showing of good cause which must be supported by an affidavit.” The trial court found that the “final hearing” in this matter was on October 20, 2025, a “final” order was filed on December 19, 2025, and a hearing “on Mr. Figueroa’s motions” was set for February 10, 2026. The trial court found that Mr. Figueroa did not file his recusal motion until May 2026, seven months after what it deemed the “final” hearing in October. As such, the trial court deemed Mr. Figueroa’s recusal -6- motion untimely under the ten-day rule. We do not believe the ten-day rule applies under these circumstances, however. Initially, we note that a dependency and neglect proceeding does not involve a “trial” in the traditional sense. Dependency and neglect proceedings have “unique characteristics.” In re Ryat M., No. M2020-00156-COA-R3-JV, 2021 WL 4432729, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2021). They involve a series of preliminary, adjudicatory, and dispositional hearings conducted in several phases. In re Ravyn R., No. E2017-01001- COA-R3-JV, 2018 WL 1956488, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2018). “Due to the unique nature of these proceedings, the legislature has provided for continuing jurisdiction in a dependency and neglect matter until one of several enumerated events occurs.” Green v. Green, No. M2007-01263-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 348289, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2009). Exclusive original jurisdiction continues “until the case has been dismissed, or until the custody determination is transferred to another juvenile, circuit, chancery, or general sessions court exercising domestic relations jurisdiction, or until a petition for adoption is filed regarding the child...” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103. 2 According to the timeline prepared by the trial judge, it had already conducted preliminary and adjudicatory hearings in this matter in 2023 and conducted a series of at least seven review hearings in 2024 before various other hearings were held in 2025 and 2026. Attempting to designate any one of these hearings as the “trial” for purposes of applying the rule is problematic. In addition, we note the status of the proceedings at the time when Mr. Figueroa filed his recusal motion and the nature of his allegations. The last entry listed in the trial court’s timeline states, “This case was set for a hearing on February 10, 2026, on Mr. Figueroa’s motions. Mr. Figueroa was present in court.” The trial court also notes that an order was entered on February 27, 2026, which resolved five of the matters Mr. Figueroa alleges were unanswered. Mr. Figueroa filed his recusal motion on May 4, 2026. He listed a dozen items that he claims to have filed between December 2025 and March 2026 that still had not been resolved. Thus, when Mr. Figueroa filed his recusal motion in May, there was no impending “trial” or any other hearing scheduled, as far as the record reflects. At that stage of the proceeding, it is not clear what purpose would be served by applying the Rule requiring a recusal motion to be filed “no later than ten days before trial, absent a showing of good cause which must be supported by an affidavit.” We note that the ten-day rule was added to Rule 10B in 2020, and there are few cases discussing it. 3 In Saxton v. Saxton, No. E2025-02081-COA-T10B-CV, 2026 WL 2 Exceptions to this jurisdiction exists for the purposes of establishing temporary jurisdiction in certain enumerated circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103(d). 3 “The explanatory comments to this section clarify the intention undergirding the timeliness requirement.” Harvey v. City of Memphis, No. W2025-01145-COA-T10B-CV, 2025 WL 2402063, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2025). The explanatory comments provide: Although the rule does not state a specific period of time within which the motion must be -7- 125864, at *1 & n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2026), a litigant filed a recusal motion “on the morning of a scheduled hearing on several post-trial motions,” including a pending motion to alter or amend, a motion to strike, and a motion to dismiss another motion. The trial court denied the recusal motion that same day, on substantive grounds and also due to untimeliness, reasoning that Rule 10B required the motion to be filed no later than ten days before trial, absent a showing of good cause, that must be supported by affidavit. Id. at *2. The trial court reviewed the litigant’s affidavit and found there was “no showing of good cause that abrogates the ten-day filing requirement before trial.” Id. On appeal, the litigant challenged “the trial court’s conclusion that [she] filed her petition later than ten days prior to the trial and did so without good cause.” Id. at *5. We initially observed that the trial court “properly noted that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B requires good cause.” Id. The litigant argued that she only became aware of the basis for disqualification days before she filed her motion, providing good cause for her late filing. Id. It was not clear from the record whether this was accurate. Id. Therefore, we stated that even if we assumed that there was a good cause for the late filing, that would not eliminate the alternative substantive basis for the trial court’s decision to deny her motion, and we affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. In Fox v. Gordon, No. M2024-01083-COA-T10B-CV, 2024 WL 3857840, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2024), a petitioner filed a recusal motion “months after the trial concluded yet most of the allegations of bias pertain[ed] to matters that occurred prior to the commencement of the trial.” The case was tried in April 2024, and the recusal motion was not filed until July 2024. Id. Citing the ten-day rule, this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the recusal motion based on untimeliness, explaining that the motion was filed three months after the trial started and that the petitioner failed to show good cause for the delay. Id. The circumstances here, in this dependency and neglect proceeding, are not similar to those in Fox or Saxton. We do not find that Mr. Figueroa’s recusal motion was untimely under the “ten days before trial” rule. Even assuming arguendo that it was, this Court would waive the timeliness requirement to reach the merits of this appeal. See Ueber v. Ueber, No. M2018-02053-COA-T10B-CV, 2019 WL 410703, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2019) (“While Appellant’s motion is arguably somewhat untimely, Tennessee law filed, a motion under this rule should be made promptly upon the moving party becoming aware of the alleged ground or grounds for such a motion. The requirement that the motion be timely filed is therefore intended to prevent a party with knowledge of facts supporting a recusal motion from delaying filing the motion to the prejudice of the other parties and the case. Depending on the circumstances, delay in bringing such a motion may constitute a waiver of the right to object to a judge presiding over a matter. Further, the delay in bringing a motion or the timing of its filing may also suggest an improper purpose for the motion. Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. Rule 10B, cmt. -8- concerning appeals filed under Rule 10B gives this Court some discretion to waive certain procedural deficiencies in order to reach the merits of a motion filed under Rule 10B. Therefore, we will proceed to address this appeal on the merits of the case despite the allegation of untimeliness.”) (citations omitted). B. Recusal On appeal, Mr. Figueroa maintains that the trial court’s second order still “does not make findings on material allegations” and “leaves my core factual contention materially unanswered.” Mr. Figueroa reiterates that his recusal motion alleged “a cumulative appearance of partiality arising from a continuing pattern in which my filed motions and pleadings allegedly remained unresolved, were not promptly addressed by written order, or were not accompanied by written grounds sufficient for meaningful review.” He claims that “substantive or enforcement-related matters continued” while his filings remained unresolved. Mr. Figueroa contends that this Court’s prior opinion and Rule 10B required that the trial court provide “written grounds that actually addressed the recusal allegations presented,” and he asks this Court to vacate and remand for entry of an order that contains sufficient findings to support denial of the motion or reverse the denial of the motion and remand for reassignment. The trial court’s order simply states: The Court finds: There is no basis for accusation that the Court would be biased in this matter. Any reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would not doubt the Court’s impartiality. Mr. Figueroa’s claim is based upon an adverse ruling rather than bias. Further, the Court has an obligation not to recuse himself when there is no valid reason to do so. The court explained that its February order resolved five of the matters allegedly outstanding and that the order “also states ‘That until Father complies with the Courts previous Orders, he shall not be granted any relief sought in his pleadings as Father comes to the court with unclean hands, having failed to adhere to the Orders of this Court.” Mr. Figueroa argues that the trial court’s mere reference to its “unclean hands” ruling “shows that the court used a categorical no-relief statement as the response to multiple matters I alleged remained unresolved,” but he insists that the trial court was further required “to explain why, when my later-listed filings and the progression of other matters were viewed together, the circumstances I alleged did not create a reasonable appearance concern.” Mr. Figueroa notes that two of the matters he listed in his recusal motion as unresolved were filed in March 2026, after the referenced February order, and yet the trial court fails to even address these in its order denying the recusal motion. Mr. Figueroa has provided those filings in the record on appeal. Specifically, in March, he filed a motion to require written rulings from the trial court and to reduce oral rulings to writing -9- and for clarification regarding its determination of “clean hands.” His motion contended that there were “multiple pending filings” outstanding for which he had repeatedly requested written rulings so that the parties would have clear notice of what had been resolved and what remained pending. He acknowledged that some pending matters had been addressed at hearings but claimed that no written orders had memorialized those oral rulings. Mr. Figueroa also noted that the trial court had made reference to “unclean hands” during the hearing, but he claimed that no written order had identified “the basis, scope, or application (if any) of that statement to any particular request for relief.” He asked the court to enter a written order giving the parties notice as to what relief was granted or denied and to permit meaningful review of the court’s decisions. He said that if the court intended to rely on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, he requested a written order providing sufficient specificity for the parties and any reviewing court, identifying the conduct that was found to constitute unclean hands, the requests for relief to which it was being applied, and whether the statement was intended as a legal bar to pending motions. Mr. Figueroa also filed a motion objecting to the entry of any substantive contested orders until the court addressed his pending motions. The trial court’s order denying the recusal motion failed to mention either of these March filings and simply notes, in a single sentence of explanation, that in February it had entered an order stating “That until Father complies with the Courts previous Orders, he shall not be granted any relief sought in his pleadings as Father comes to the court with unclean hands, having failed to adhere to the Orders of this Court.” In our first opinion in this matter, we examined other Rule 10B appeals in which this Court had remanded for courts to “make specific findings relative to [the movant’s] allegations.” In re Maddex B., 2026 WL 2168749, at *3. We found that the trial court’s first order summarily denying the motion for recusal failed to “explain the allegation by Mr. Figueroa that his pro se filings remain unresolved while other matters continue to move forward.” Id. at *2. Unfortunately, the trial court’s second order does not resolve that problem. “Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.11 ‘incorporates the objective standard Tennessee judges have long used to evaluate recusal motions.’” Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871, 878 (Tenn. 2023) (quoting Cook v. State, 606 S.W.3d 247, 255 (Tenn. 2020)). “Under this objective test, recusal is required if ‘a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.’” Id. The second recusal order does not sufficiently explain the trial court’s decision in a manner that would permit us apply this objective test to decide if “a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.’” See id. Consequently, we again vacate and remand this matter with instructions for the trial court to either grant the motion or enter an order that states in writing all the grounds upon which the motion is denied. III. CONCLUSION - 10 - For the aforementioned reasons, the decision of the juvenile court is hereby vacated and remanded. We decline Mr. Figueroa’s request to tax the costs to an opposing party. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Hector Antonio Figueroa, Jr., for which execution may issue if necessary. s/ Carma Dennis McGee CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE - 11 -