GEORGE GWINN v. AUTOMATED BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketE2025-01025-COA-R3-CV
JudgeKristi M. Davis, Judge
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/17/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Assigned on Briefs April 1, 2026
GEORGE GWINN ET AL. v. AUTOMATED BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Washington County
No. 24-CV-0166 John C. Rambo, Chancellor
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No. E2025-01025-COA-R3-CV
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The appellants sued the appellee seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase and
sale agreement whereby the appellee agreed to sell certain real property to the appellants.
Following a bench trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the appellants,
awarding them specific performance but requiring them to make monthly payments to the
appellee until the transaction closed. The appellants failed to make one of the payments as
ordered by the trial court, and the appellee filed a motion for contempt and to alter or amend
the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. After a hearing, the
trial court granted the appellee’s Rule 59.04 motion and entered an amended judgment in
favor of the appellee finding that the appellants were no longer entitled to specific
performance and had forfeited all previously-made payments. The appellants filed a
motion to alter or amend the amended judgment and alleged that the appellee’s principal
committed perjury during the hearing on the appellee’s motion to alter or amend. The trial
court denied the appellants’ motion to alter or amend. The appellants appeal this denial.
Although not raised by either party, we conclude that the appellee’s Rule 59.04 motion was
untimely. We vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the
motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated;
Case Remanded
KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,
P.J., W.S., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.
Bradley E. Griffith, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellants, George Gwinn and CAB
Properties, LLC.
R. Lee McVey II, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Automated Building Systems,
Inc.
OPINION
BACKGROUND
On February 28, 2024, CAB Properties, LLC and its sole member, George Gwinn,
(together, the “Plaintiffs”) sued Automated Building Systems, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the
Washington County Chancery Court (the “trial court”). In their complaint, Plaintiffs aver
that on or about December 31, 2021, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase
Agreement (the “Agreement”) whereby Defendant agreed to sell, and Plaintiffs agreed to
buy, certain real property located in Washington County, Tennessee (the “property”). The
Agreement was drafted by Defendant’s attorney and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
1. The total purchase price for the property is $925,000 dollars [sic]
of which the sum of $15,000.00 has been paid as earnest money and in partial
payment of the purchase price. The remainder of the purchase price is
payable as follows: $85,000 cash at closing and buyer shall pay via financing
provided by seller. In consideration of the Seller providing financing, Buyer
shall make a payment of $6,961.82[] on January 15th, 2022, and continue to
make said payments on the 5th day of every succeeding month up until
closing. Any payments made shall be credited to the promissory note to be
executed at closing. Failure to make any payments will be a breach of this
agreement and Buyer shall forfeit all previous payments made.
2. Prior to closing, in consideration of the above payments, Buyer
shall have access to and use of the yard and the open plant, with the exception
of any equipment that Seller has remaining on the property. In consideration
of Buyer’s early access to the property. [sic] All payments made pursuant to
Paragraph 1 are non-refundable, including the $15,000 earnest money
payment.
***
6. The sale is to be closed on within 60 days of execution of this
agreement or sooner if agreed upon by the parties. . . . Possession to be given
at closing and the following adjustments are to be made at closing, as of the
closing date:
(1) In consideration of Buyer’s immediate access to the
property, all property taxes, utilities, and insurance for 2022 and thereafter
will be the responsibility of Buyer.
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Buyer. [sic] Buyer is responsible for changing utilities in his name. If Buyer
is unable to change the utilities into his name Buyer shall reimburse Seller
for any expenses related to this subparagraph.
Plaintiffs allege that they made the required monthly payment of $6,961.82 from January
2022 through August 2022. They state that in September 2022, Defendant demanded that
the monthly payment be increased to $9,779, which was to be credited against the purchase
price at closing. Plaintiffs aver that they made the demanded monthly payment of $9,779
from September 2022 through October 2023. Plaintiffs also aver that they made repairs
and improvements to the property, which cost them in excess of $50,000, that they paid
property taxes for the property in excess of $30,595, and that they paid storm water fees
for the property in excess of $7,885. They allege that each of these expenditures was made
with the “knowledge and acceptance of [Defendant].” Despite this, Plaintiffs further aver
that Defendant “failed and refused to deliver possession of certain office space in the
Property[,]” which caused Plaintiffs to incur “increased costs . . . in operating their business
. . . including travel costs, additional administrative time, and other expenses[,]” and that
Defendant failed to maintain and repair the roof of the Property, which caused the office
space to become damaged.
At some point, Plaintiffs began seeking third-party financing for the purchase price.
They allege that between December 2021 and October 2023, they “repeatedly requested
that [Defendant] provide a suitable payoff letter and a copy of the lease agreement [with
Defendant’s third-party tenant1] in order to obtain financing.” Plaintiffs aver that
Defendant refused to provide these required items “[i]n order to delay or otherwise prevent
closing” while “profit[ing] from payments from Plaintiffs and the third-party tenant.”
Plaintiffs assert that after “demanding and accepting payments towards the purchase
price under the Agreement for nearly two years,” Defendant took the position that “the
Agreement is ‘void,’ . . . demanded that Plaintiffs release the Agreement . . ., and . . . asked
Plaintiffs to enter into a new agreement for a higher purchase price.” Plaintiffs posit that
Defendant’s conduct constitutes a repudiation and material breach of the Agreement,
including the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and asked the trial court to award them
specific performance of the Agreement and a declaratory judgment that the
Agreement is valid and enforceable, that [Defendant] is obligated to close
the purchase and sale pursuant to the Agreement, that [Defendant] is required
to immediately provide all documentation reasonably requested by the
1
Paragraph 9 of the Agreement provides: “Buyer understands and agrees that Seller currently leases
a portion of the premises to a third party and agrees to allow Seller to lease said portion of the property and
collect rents obtained. Buyer shall not interfere with the third-party access to the property. Once Seller is
paid in full, Buyer will immediately begin retaining rents paid.”
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lender, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to a credit for any and all payments
made against the purchase price at closing.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs requested “damages in the amount of the full costs of repairs and
improvements they made to the Property and all payments made to [Defendant] under the
Agreement[,] together with interest from the date of each expenditure as provided in the
Agreement.”2
On May 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion alleging that Plaintiffs had not made
any monthly payment to Defendant since September 2023. Defendant maintained that the
Agreement “is void and of no effect” but asked that Plaintiffs “be ordered to deposit all
payments under the alleged contract which have not yet been paid into the Court pending
resolution of this matter or, in the alternative, dismiss the case for Plaintiffs’ material
breach” of the Agreement.
The case proceeded to trial on December 3, 2024, and the trial court entered an order
on December 16, 2024, granting Plaintiffs specific performance of the Agreement and
finding, in relevant part:
(6) The Plaintiffs made the payments required by the Agreement from
January 2022 through October 2023;
(7) While several of the payments were late, Defendant accepted each late
payment and waived the requirement that the payment be made on time;
***
(11) By their course of conduct, the parties agreed to extensions of the closing
date, as payments were tendered and accepted, and the parties never agreed
to set aside the underlying contract or to enter into a new contract, and they
continued to operate under the Agreement;
(12) The Agreement contemplated seller financing for one year, and while
the parties never entered into a note or deed of trust for such financing, the
Defendant effectively financed the transaction for more than a year, receiving
payments of principal and interest, and Defendant therefore received the
benefit of its bargain;
***
2
Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: “If Seller is unable to furnish a clear, marketable, and
insurable title to the above-named property; Seller shall refund to Buyer all funds paid to Seller at the same
interest rate as well as Seller expenses utilized in this contract.”
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(14) In June 2023, the parties agreed to a payoff amount so that Plaintiffs
could obtain bank financing for the closing, and Defendant provided two
payoff letters to Plaintiffs;
(15) Each payoff letter provided by Defendant contained a caveat that it was
not a contract to purchase;
(16) Because of the caveats, the payoff letters were not acceptable to
Plaintiffs[’] lender, and this was an impediment to closing;
(17) In October 2023, Plaintiffs demanded a definitive payoff in simple
language without any caveat, and Defendant demanded the payment for
October;
(18) Plaintiffs made the payment for October 2023 and stated that another
payment would not be made unless a payoff was provided;
(19) Defendant accepted the October 2023 payment, but Defendant failed
and refused to provide a final payoff letter;
(20) Defendant’s failure and refusal to close in October 2023 was the first
material breach of the Agreement;
(21) Every contract in Tennessee contains an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and Defendant breached this covenant by leading Plaintiffs
to believe that bank financing was acceptable but refusing to cooperate in
good faith so Plaintiffs could obtain financing;
***
(27) The Court will order specific performance of the Agreement on the
following terms:
(a) Closing shall occur on or before March 13, 2025;
***
(c) Plaintiffs shall pay to Defendant the amount of the current payoff
. . . in immediately available funds at closing;
(d) On the next business day after this order is entered, Plaintiff[s]
shall make a payment of $9,273.84 to Defendant . . .;
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(e) On or before January 13, 2025, if the closing has not yet occurred,
Plaintiff[s] shall make a payment of $9,273.84 to Defendant . . .;
(f) On or before February 13, 2025, if the closing has not yet occurred,
Plaintiff[s] shall make a payment of $9,273.84 to Defendant . . .;
***
(h) The parties shall otherwise cooperate in good faith to consummate
the closing on or before March 13, 2025.
However, the closing ultimately was not consummated. Instead, on February 7,
2025, Defendant filed a supplemental3 motion for contempt and to alter or amend the
judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. In support thereof,
Defendant averred that the check Plaintiffs provided Defendant for the payment owed on
January 13, 2025 “bounced for non-sufficient funds.” Plaintiffs apparently tried to rectify
this by providing Defendant a second check for the January 2025 payment; however, that
check also “bounced.” Defendant argued that “Plaintiffs’ practice of continually bouncing
checks is not only a violation of [the trial] court’s order, but the same pattern of practice
previously established by Plaintiffs in [their] relationship with Defendant” and that
“Plaintiffs[’] actions give rise to contempt and modification of the judgment as noted in
the previous motion.” Defendant requested the following relief from the trial court:
A. Hold Plaintiffs in contempt for failing to make the required payments as
ordered;
B. Impose appropriate sanctions against Plaintiffs, including immediate
payment of outstanding amounts and attorney’s fees;
C. Alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04 to reflect Plaintiffs’
noncompliance and modify the terms of the order accordingly; and
D. Grant such other relief as [the trial court] deems just and proper.
The trial court heard Defendant’s motion on March 3, 2025, and entered an order
on April 2, 2025 finding in relevant part that
3
Although this motion is styled as a supplemental motion and references an earlier motion for
contempt, the appellate record does not contain any earlier motion for contempt filed by Defendant. In a
supplemental appellate brief, Defendant avers that it attempted to fax-file the original motion for contempt
and to alter or amend the judgment, “but the transmission apparently failed.”
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21. Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Court’s order granting specific
performance of the parties’ agreement by failing to make timely payments
under the terms of the agreement and the order.
22. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Plaintiffs have forfeited all
previous payments made.
23. Plaintiffs [are] no longer entitled to specific performance and do not have
the right to purchase the property that is the subject of the parties’ agreement.
***
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:
(1) That the Court’s previous order is amended to find that Plaintiffs
breached the parties’ agreement and have forfeited all previous payments;
(2) That the Court’s previous order is amended to find that Plaintiffs are no
longer entitled to specific performance;
(3) That the Court’s previous order is modified to find that Plaintiffs are no
longer entitled to purchase the property[.]
On April 4, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. In
support thereof, Plaintiffs averred that Defendant’s principal, Carol Graybeal,
5. . . . attempted to cash the bounced check from [Mr.] Gwinn,[4] thereby
reaffirming the contract and waiving the requirement to make payments on
time, just as she had done over the course of the contract.
6. At the hearing on March 3, 2025[], [Ms.] Graybeal testified under oath, at
least twice, that she never attempted to cash the bounced check. As a result,
the Court expressly found that [Ms.] Graybeal did not attempt to cash the
check and therefore did not waive [Defendant’s] right to contest the late
payment. . . .
Plaintiffs asserted that Ms. Graybeal’s testimony about whether she attempted to cash the
check “is provably false” and that testimony of First Citizens Bank employees “will be
presented by declaration or by live testimony at the hearing on this motion.” Plaintiffs
4
The record suggests that in some instances Plaintiffs deposited checks directly into Defendant’s
bank account, and in other instances Plaintiffs delivered checks directly to Ms. Graybeal for her to negotiate
on Defendant’s behalf.
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argued that Ms. Graybeal had committed perjury, which “lead directly to a ruling in her
favor[,]” and resulted in Plaintiffs “forfeit[ing] hundreds of thousands of dollars in
payments accepted by [Defendant].” They posited that “[t]he most suitable sanctions for
the perjury and fraud perpetrated by [Ms.] Graybeal and [Defendant] is to deny
[Defendant’s] motion for contempt, reinstate the order granting specific performance, and
order [Ms.] Graybeal [sic] to close within 30 days.”
The trial court heard Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend on April 22, 2025, and
entered an order denying it on June 23, 2025. The trial court held that motions to alter or
amend a judgment based on newly discovered evidence “should be accompanied by
affidavits from both counsel for Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs as well as declarations by the
proposed witnesses which allow the Court to determine whether such evidence should be
considered as part of the Plaintiffs’ Motion” and that Plaintiffs did not meet these
requirements. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of the June
23, 2025 order.
On November 24, 2025, this Court entered a show cause order for Plaintiffs to
explain why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final judgment, in light of the
fact that Defendant’s supplemental motion for contempt was never addressed by the trial
court. On December 31, 2025, the trial court clerk supplemented the appellate record with
an agreed order withdrawing Defendant’s motion for contempt entered by the trial court
on December 9, 2025. The order states that
the portion of Defendant[’s] previously filed Motion for Contempt and to
Alter or Amend the Judgment that is a Motion for Contempt is hereby
withdrawn. This Motion for Contempt and to Alter or Amend the Judgment
was heard on March 3, 2025, whereupon this Honorable Court granted the
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. No specific ruling was made on the
contempt. Because the Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was granted
Defendant [] hereby withdraws the Motion for Contempt.
On July 28, 2026, this Court entered another show cause order, this time seeking
clarification regarding whether the February 7, 2025 motion to alter or amend pursuant to
Rule 59.04 was timely filed because the order at issue was entered by the trial court on
December 16, 2024, more than thirty days before the motion was filed. All parties filed
supplemental briefs addressing this issue.
ISSUES
Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
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1. Whether the trial court erred in amending the judgment and holding that
Plaintiffs were no longer entitled to specific performance of the Agreement and that
Plaintiffs forfeited all previous payments.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to alter the
amended judgment.
DISCUSSION
A motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 59.04 “should be granted when the controlling law changes before the judgment
becomes final; when previously unavailable evidence becomes available; or to correct a
clear error of law or to prevent injustice.” Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 245 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2016) (quoting In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)).
However, “[i]t is well-settled that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend may
be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs.,
Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn. 2020) (citing Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479,
487 (Tenn. 2012)). Accordingly, “[t]he judgment of a court should not ‘be lightly changed,
altered, amended or set aside, but only done upon very clear, convincing, cogent evidence
that a true injustice has been done to the complaining party and that the complaining party
is in no wise responsible, or termed in another way, negligent in protecting that party’s
interest.’” Polster v. Polster, No. M2020-01150-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4167927, at *7
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2021) (quoting Myers v. Myers, 891 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1994)).
Crucially, a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59.04 “shall be filed and
served within thirty (30) days after the entry of the judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04; see
Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 489 (“In the event that a party waits to seek relief for more
than thirty days after entry of a final judgment, the trial court cannot grant relief under Rule
59.” (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.02)). The order that Defendant moved to alter or amend
was entered by the trial court on December 16, 2024. This order granted Plaintiffs specific
performance, ordered a closing deadline, and ordered Plaintiffs to make three monthly
payments prior to closing. This order adjudicated all the claims, rights, and liabilities of
all the parties and was, thus, a final judgment. Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 489.
Defendant did not file its Rule 59.04 motion until February 7, 2025. Defendant contends
that the December 16, 2024 order was not a final judgment because it required Plaintiffs to
make payments, and, therefore, the trial court had continuing supervisory jurisdiction over
the matter until the payments were made and the closing occurred. We disagree. A trial
court retains jurisdiction to enforce its orders, generally as part of contempt proceedings,5
5
It is unclear why Defendant abandoned its motion for contempt and instead pursued only its
motion to alter or amend, as a motion for contempt was an appropriate mechanism for remedying
non-compliance with the judgment.
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but this does not affect the finality of the judgment. The trial court’s order adjudicated the
issues between the parties, and there was nothing more for the trial court to do. Likewise,
Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the judgment does not affect its finality. Defendant’s
Rule 59.04 motion was untimely.
Rule 60.02 is the proper mechanism to seek relief from a final judgment. Id. (citing
Campbell v. Archer, 555 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tenn. 1977)). Moreover, “[t]he law is
well-settled that, in ruling on post-trial motions filed by the parties, the courts of this state
are required to consider the substance of the motion rather than its form or title.” Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 996 S.W.2d 803, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (collecting cases). Thus, an
untimely Rule 59.04 motion may be treated as a Rule 60.02 motion. However, in this case,
the trial court has not had an opportunity to evaluate whether Defendant’s motion could be
considered as a Rule 60.02 motion and, if so, whether Defendant is entitled to relief
pursuant to that rule. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this
case to the trial court for consideration of these issues.
In summary, we conclude that Defendant’s February 7, 2025 motion to alter or
amend pursuant to Rule 59.04 was untimely, but we remand this case to the trial court for
a determination of (1) whether the motion can be construed as a motion for relief pursuant
to Rule 60.02 and (2) if so, whether the motion should be granted or denied.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Chancery Court for Washington County is vacated, and this case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed
one-half jointly and severally to the appellants, George Gwinn and CAB Properties, LLC,
and one-half to the appellee, Automated Building Systems, Inc., for which execution may
issue if necessary.
_________________________________
KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE
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