Full Opinion

11/17/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs April 1, 2026 GEORGE GWINN ET AL. v. AUTOMATED BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC. Appeal from the Chancery Court for Washington County No. 24-CV-0166 John C. Rambo, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. E2025-01025-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ The appellants sued the appellee seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase and sale agreement whereby the appellee agreed to sell certain real property to the appellants. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the appellants, awarding them specific performance but requiring them to make monthly payments to the appellee until the transaction closed. The appellants failed to make one of the payments as ordered by the trial court, and the appellee filed a motion for contempt and to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. After a hearing, the trial court granted the appellee’s Rule 59.04 motion and entered an amended judgment in favor of the appellee finding that the appellants were no longer entitled to specific performance and had forfeited all previously-made payments. The appellants filed a motion to alter or amend the amended judgment and alleged that the appellee’s principal committed perjury during the hearing on the appellee’s motion to alter or amend. The trial court denied the appellants’ motion to alter or amend. The appellants appeal this denial. Although not raised by either party, we conclude that the appellee’s Rule 59.04 motion was untimely. We vacate the judgment and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated; Case Remanded KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined. Bradley E. Griffith, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellants, George Gwinn and CAB Properties, LLC. R. Lee McVey II, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Automated Building Systems, Inc. OPINION BACKGROUND On February 28, 2024, CAB Properties, LLC and its sole member, George Gwinn, (together, the “Plaintiffs”) sued Automated Building Systems, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the Washington County Chancery Court (the “trial court”). In their complaint, Plaintiffs aver that on or about December 31, 2021, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the “Agreement”) whereby Defendant agreed to sell, and Plaintiffs agreed to buy, certain real property located in Washington County, Tennessee (the “property”). The Agreement was drafted by Defendant’s attorney and provides, in relevant part, as follows: 1. The total purchase price for the property is $925,000 dollars [sic] of which the sum of $15,000.00 has been paid as earnest money and in partial payment of the purchase price. The remainder of the purchase price is payable as follows: $85,000 cash at closing and buyer shall pay via financing provided by seller. In consideration of the Seller providing financing, Buyer shall make a payment of $6,961.82[] on January 15th, 2022, and continue to make said payments on the 5th day of every succeeding month up until closing. Any payments made shall be credited to the promissory note to be executed at closing. Failure to make any payments will be a breach of this agreement and Buyer shall forfeit all previous payments made. 2. Prior to closing, in consideration of the above payments, Buyer shall have access to and use of the yard and the open plant, with the exception of any equipment that Seller has remaining on the property. In consideration of Buyer’s early access to the property. [sic] All payments made pursuant to Paragraph 1 are non-refundable, including the $15,000 earnest money payment. *** 6. The sale is to be closed on within 60 days of execution of this agreement or sooner if agreed upon by the parties. . . . Possession to be given at closing and the following adjustments are to be made at closing, as of the closing date: (1) In consideration of Buyer’s immediate access to the property, all property taxes, utilities, and insurance for 2022 and thereafter will be the responsibility of Buyer. -2- Buyer. [sic] Buyer is responsible for changing utilities in his name. If Buyer is unable to change the utilities into his name Buyer shall reimburse Seller for any expenses related to this subparagraph. Plaintiffs allege that they made the required monthly payment of $6,961.82 from January 2022 through August 2022. They state that in September 2022, Defendant demanded that the monthly payment be increased to $9,779, which was to be credited against the purchase price at closing. Plaintiffs aver that they made the demanded monthly payment of $9,779 from September 2022 through October 2023. Plaintiffs also aver that they made repairs and improvements to the property, which cost them in excess of $50,000, that they paid property taxes for the property in excess of $30,595, and that they paid storm water fees for the property in excess of $7,885. They allege that each of these expenditures was made with the “knowledge and acceptance of [Defendant].” Despite this, Plaintiffs further aver that Defendant “failed and refused to deliver possession of certain office space in the Property[,]” which caused Plaintiffs to incur “increased costs . . . in operating their business . . . including travel costs, additional administrative time, and other expenses[,]” and that Defendant failed to maintain and repair the roof of the Property, which caused the office space to become damaged. At some point, Plaintiffs began seeking third-party financing for the purchase price. They allege that between December 2021 and October 2023, they “repeatedly requested that [Defendant] provide a suitable payoff letter and a copy of the lease agreement [with Defendant’s third-party tenant1] in order to obtain financing.” Plaintiffs aver that Defendant refused to provide these required items “[i]n order to delay or otherwise prevent closing” while “profit[ing] from payments from Plaintiffs and the third-party tenant.” Plaintiffs assert that after “demanding and accepting payments towards the purchase price under the Agreement for nearly two years,” Defendant took the position that “the Agreement is ‘void,’ . . . demanded that Plaintiffs release the Agreement . . ., and . . . asked Plaintiffs to enter into a new agreement for a higher purchase price.” Plaintiffs posit that Defendant’s conduct constitutes a repudiation and material breach of the Agreement, including the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and asked the trial court to award them specific performance of the Agreement and a declaratory judgment that the Agreement is valid and enforceable, that [Defendant] is obligated to close the purchase and sale pursuant to the Agreement, that [Defendant] is required to immediately provide all documentation reasonably requested by the 1 Paragraph 9 of the Agreement provides: “Buyer understands and agrees that Seller currently leases a portion of the premises to a third party and agrees to allow Seller to lease said portion of the property and collect rents obtained. Buyer shall not interfere with the third-party access to the property. Once Seller is paid in full, Buyer will immediately begin retaining rents paid.” -3- lender, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to a credit for any and all payments made against the purchase price at closing. Alternatively, Plaintiffs requested “damages in the amount of the full costs of repairs and improvements they made to the Property and all payments made to [Defendant] under the Agreement[,] together with interest from the date of each expenditure as provided in the Agreement.”2 On May 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion alleging that Plaintiffs had not made any monthly payment to Defendant since September 2023. Defendant maintained that the Agreement “is void and of no effect” but asked that Plaintiffs “be ordered to deposit all payments under the alleged contract which have not yet been paid into the Court pending resolution of this matter or, in the alternative, dismiss the case for Plaintiffs’ material breach” of the Agreement. The case proceeded to trial on December 3, 2024, and the trial court entered an order on December 16, 2024, granting Plaintiffs specific performance of the Agreement and finding, in relevant part: (6) The Plaintiffs made the payments required by the Agreement from January 2022 through October 2023; (7) While several of the payments were late, Defendant accepted each late payment and waived the requirement that the payment be made on time; *** (11) By their course of conduct, the parties agreed to extensions of the closing date, as payments were tendered and accepted, and the parties never agreed to set aside the underlying contract or to enter into a new contract, and they continued to operate under the Agreement; (12) The Agreement contemplated seller financing for one year, and while the parties never entered into a note or deed of trust for such financing, the Defendant effectively financed the transaction for more than a year, receiving payments of principal and interest, and Defendant therefore received the benefit of its bargain; *** 2 Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides: “If Seller is unable to furnish a clear, marketable, and insurable title to the above-named property; Seller shall refund to Buyer all funds paid to Seller at the same interest rate as well as Seller expenses utilized in this contract.” -4- (14) In June 2023, the parties agreed to a payoff amount so that Plaintiffs could obtain bank financing for the closing, and Defendant provided two payoff letters to Plaintiffs; (15) Each payoff letter provided by Defendant contained a caveat that it was not a contract to purchase; (16) Because of the caveats, the payoff letters were not acceptable to Plaintiffs[’] lender, and this was an impediment to closing; (17) In October 2023, Plaintiffs demanded a definitive payoff in simple language without any caveat, and Defendant demanded the payment for October; (18) Plaintiffs made the payment for October 2023 and stated that another payment would not be made unless a payoff was provided; (19) Defendant accepted the October 2023 payment, but Defendant failed and refused to provide a final payoff letter; (20) Defendant’s failure and refusal to close in October 2023 was the first material breach of the Agreement; (21) Every contract in Tennessee contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Defendant breached this covenant by leading Plaintiffs to believe that bank financing was acceptable but refusing to cooperate in good faith so Plaintiffs could obtain financing; *** (27) The Court will order specific performance of the Agreement on the following terms: (a) Closing shall occur on or before March 13, 2025; *** (c) Plaintiffs shall pay to Defendant the amount of the current payoff . . . in immediately available funds at closing; (d) On the next business day after this order is entered, Plaintiff[s] shall make a payment of $9,273.84 to Defendant . . .; -5- (e) On or before January 13, 2025, if the closing has not yet occurred, Plaintiff[s] shall make a payment of $9,273.84 to Defendant . . .; (f) On or before February 13, 2025, if the closing has not yet occurred, Plaintiff[s] shall make a payment of $9,273.84 to Defendant . . .; *** (h) The parties shall otherwise cooperate in good faith to consummate the closing on or before March 13, 2025. However, the closing ultimately was not consummated. Instead, on February 7, 2025, Defendant filed a supplemental3 motion for contempt and to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. In support thereof, Defendant averred that the check Plaintiffs provided Defendant for the payment owed on January 13, 2025 “bounced for non-sufficient funds.” Plaintiffs apparently tried to rectify this by providing Defendant a second check for the January 2025 payment; however, that check also “bounced.” Defendant argued that “Plaintiffs’ practice of continually bouncing checks is not only a violation of [the trial] court’s order, but the same pattern of practice previously established by Plaintiffs in [their] relationship with Defendant” and that “Plaintiffs[’] actions give rise to contempt and modification of the judgment as noted in the previous motion.” Defendant requested the following relief from the trial court: A. Hold Plaintiffs in contempt for failing to make the required payments as ordered; B. Impose appropriate sanctions against Plaintiffs, including immediate payment of outstanding amounts and attorney’s fees; C. Alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59.04 to reflect Plaintiffs’ noncompliance and modify the terms of the order accordingly; and D. Grant such other relief as [the trial court] deems just and proper. The trial court heard Defendant’s motion on March 3, 2025, and entered an order on April 2, 2025 finding in relevant part that 3 Although this motion is styled as a supplemental motion and references an earlier motion for contempt, the appellate record does not contain any earlier motion for contempt filed by Defendant. In a supplemental appellate brief, Defendant avers that it attempted to fax-file the original motion for contempt and to alter or amend the judgment, “but the transmission apparently failed.” -6- 21. Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Court’s order granting specific performance of the parties’ agreement by failing to make timely payments under the terms of the agreement and the order. 22. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Plaintiffs have forfeited all previous payments made. 23. Plaintiffs [are] no longer entitled to specific performance and do not have the right to purchase the property that is the subject of the parties’ agreement. *** Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: (1) That the Court’s previous order is amended to find that Plaintiffs breached the parties’ agreement and have forfeited all previous payments; (2) That the Court’s previous order is amended to find that Plaintiffs are no longer entitled to specific performance; (3) That the Court’s previous order is modified to find that Plaintiffs are no longer entitled to purchase the property[.] On April 4, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. In support thereof, Plaintiffs averred that Defendant’s principal, Carol Graybeal, 5. . . . attempted to cash the bounced check from [Mr.] Gwinn,[4] thereby reaffirming the contract and waiving the requirement to make payments on time, just as she had done over the course of the contract. 6. At the hearing on March 3, 2025[], [Ms.] Graybeal testified under oath, at least twice, that she never attempted to cash the bounced check. As a result, the Court expressly found that [Ms.] Graybeal did not attempt to cash the check and therefore did not waive [Defendant’s] right to contest the late payment. . . . Plaintiffs asserted that Ms. Graybeal’s testimony about whether she attempted to cash the check “is provably false” and that testimony of First Citizens Bank employees “will be presented by declaration or by live testimony at the hearing on this motion.” Plaintiffs 4 The record suggests that in some instances Plaintiffs deposited checks directly into Defendant’s bank account, and in other instances Plaintiffs delivered checks directly to Ms. Graybeal for her to negotiate on Defendant’s behalf. -7- argued that Ms. Graybeal had committed perjury, which “lead directly to a ruling in her favor[,]” and resulted in Plaintiffs “forfeit[ing] hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments accepted by [Defendant].” They posited that “[t]he most suitable sanctions for the perjury and fraud perpetrated by [Ms.] Graybeal and [Defendant] is to deny [Defendant’s] motion for contempt, reinstate the order granting specific performance, and order [Ms.] Graybeal [sic] to close within 30 days.” The trial court heard Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend on April 22, 2025, and entered an order denying it on June 23, 2025. The trial court held that motions to alter or amend a judgment based on newly discovered evidence “should be accompanied by affidavits from both counsel for Plaintiffs and by Plaintiffs as well as declarations by the proposed witnesses which allow the Court to determine whether such evidence should be considered as part of the Plaintiffs’ Motion” and that Plaintiffs did not meet these requirements. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of the June 23, 2025 order. On November 24, 2025, this Court entered a show cause order for Plaintiffs to explain why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final judgment, in light of the fact that Defendant’s supplemental motion for contempt was never addressed by the trial court. On December 31, 2025, the trial court clerk supplemented the appellate record with an agreed order withdrawing Defendant’s motion for contempt entered by the trial court on December 9, 2025. The order states that the portion of Defendant[’s] previously filed Motion for Contempt and to Alter or Amend the Judgment that is a Motion for Contempt is hereby withdrawn. This Motion for Contempt and to Alter or Amend the Judgment was heard on March 3, 2025, whereupon this Honorable Court granted the Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. No specific ruling was made on the contempt. Because the Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was granted Defendant [] hereby withdraws the Motion for Contempt. On July 28, 2026, this Court entered another show cause order, this time seeking clarification regarding whether the February 7, 2025 motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59.04 was timely filed because the order at issue was entered by the trial court on December 16, 2024, more than thirty days before the motion was filed. All parties filed supplemental briefs addressing this issue. ISSUES Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: -8- 1. Whether the trial court erred in amending the judgment and holding that Plaintiffs were no longer entitled to specific performance of the Agreement and that Plaintiffs forfeited all previous payments. 2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to alter the amended judgment. DISCUSSION A motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 “should be granted when the controlling law changes before the judgment becomes final; when previously unavailable evidence becomes available; or to correct a clear error of law or to prevent injustice.” Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). However, “[i]t is well-settled that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn. 2020) (citing Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 487 (Tenn. 2012)). Accordingly, “[t]he judgment of a court should not ‘be lightly changed, altered, amended or set aside, but only done upon very clear, convincing, cogent evidence that a true injustice has been done to the complaining party and that the complaining party is in no wise responsible, or termed in another way, negligent in protecting that party’s interest.’” Polster v. Polster, No. M2020-01150-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4167927, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2021) (quoting Myers v. Myers, 891 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). Crucially, a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59.04 “shall be filed and served within thirty (30) days after the entry of the judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04; see Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 489 (“In the event that a party waits to seek relief for more than thirty days after entry of a final judgment, the trial court cannot grant relief under Rule 59.” (citing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.02)). The order that Defendant moved to alter or amend was entered by the trial court on December 16, 2024. This order granted Plaintiffs specific performance, ordered a closing deadline, and ordered Plaintiffs to make three monthly payments prior to closing. This order adjudicated all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties and was, thus, a final judgment. Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 489. Defendant did not file its Rule 59.04 motion until February 7, 2025. Defendant contends that the December 16, 2024 order was not a final judgment because it required Plaintiffs to make payments, and, therefore, the trial court had continuing supervisory jurisdiction over the matter until the payments were made and the closing occurred. We disagree. A trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its orders, generally as part of contempt proceedings,5 5 It is unclear why Defendant abandoned its motion for contempt and instead pursued only its motion to alter or amend, as a motion for contempt was an appropriate mechanism for remedying non-compliance with the judgment. -9- but this does not affect the finality of the judgment. The trial court’s order adjudicated the issues between the parties, and there was nothing more for the trial court to do. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the judgment does not affect its finality. Defendant’s Rule 59.04 motion was untimely. Rule 60.02 is the proper mechanism to seek relief from a final judgment. Id. (citing Campbell v. Archer, 555 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tenn. 1977)). Moreover, “[t]he law is well-settled that, in ruling on post-trial motions filed by the parties, the courts of this state are required to consider the substance of the motion rather than its form or title.” Dunlap v. Dunlap, 996 S.W.2d 803, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (collecting cases). Thus, an untimely Rule 59.04 motion may be treated as a Rule 60.02 motion. However, in this case, the trial court has not had an opportunity to evaluate whether Defendant’s motion could be considered as a Rule 60.02 motion and, if so, whether Defendant is entitled to relief pursuant to that rule. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court for consideration of these issues. In summary, we conclude that Defendant’s February 7, 2025 motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rule 59.04 was untimely, but we remand this case to the trial court for a determination of (1) whether the motion can be construed as a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 and (2) if so, whether the motion should be granted or denied. CONCLUSION The judgment of the Chancery Court for Washington County is vacated, and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half jointly and severally to the appellants, George Gwinn and CAB Properties, LLC, and one-half to the appellee, Automated Building Systems, Inc., for which execution may issue if necessary. _________________________________ KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE - 10 -