IN RE AIDEN W. C.

11/02/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs September 3, 2026 IN RE AIDEN W. C.1 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hawkins County No. 24-AD-7 Douglas T. Jenkins, Chancellor No. E2026-00109-COA-R3-PT The parents of Aiden W. C. (“Aiden”) appeal the termination of their parental rights. They contend the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss the petition to terminate their parental rights based on due process and personal jurisdiction. They also contend the evidence was insufficient to establish any ground for termination or that termination of their parental rights was in Aiden’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., C.J. delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., joined. Greg “Boomer” Easterling, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellant, Harley C. Emily Cross Morley, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tiffany S. Aaron J. Chapman, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellees, Casey and Nicole M. OPINION FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Aiden was born to Harley C. (“Father”) and Tiffany S. (“Mother”) (collectively “the Parents”) in December 2022. In early 2023, the Parents began leaving Aiden with acquaintances Amber Marcum and Casey Repass, residents of Duffield, Virginia, for extended periods while Parents 1 In cases involving termination of parental rights, it is the policy of this court to remove the names of minor children and other parties in order to protect their identities. renovated their mobile home. During Aiden’s stays with Ms. Marcum, she often had difficulty contacting the Parents. Finally, after allegedly being told that the Parents intended to take the child to the beach to live out of their car, Ms. Marcum retrieved the child from the Parents a final time. However, she was unable to care for Aiden herself because she was undergoing cancer treatment. A relative of Ms. Marcum introduced her to Casey M., (“Casey”), and Nicole M., (“Nicole”), (together, “Petitioners”), who would be able to care for Aiden. Thereafter, Petitioners began to care for the child at their home in Fort Blackmore, Virginia. The Petitioners filed for and received emergency custody of Aiden in the Juvenile Court for Hawkins County July 24, 2023. Three days later, the parties appeared for a hearing in which the court found Aiden to be a dependent and neglected child and awarded custody to Nicole. The court also found that the Parents failed their drug tests. Counsel was appointed to the Parents at the same hearing. Throughout the fall of 2023, the case was delayed due to resets, continuances, and changes to the attorneys representing the parties. In September 2023, Aiden’s paternal grandmother, Deborah C., (“Grandmother”), filed a petition for custody in the juvenile court.2 At one point, the court considered ordering an interstate investigation, but the Petitioners relocated to Sullivan County, Tennessee, in November 2023, making interstate considerations moot. The Petitioners filed their Petition for Termination and Adoption (the “Petition”), February 6, 2024, in the Chancery Court for Hawkins County. The court appointed a Guardian ad Litem, as well as counsel for Mother and Father. In November 2024, while trial proceedings were pending, Father and Mother were arrested and found guilty on methamphetamine-related charges, and both served time in jail. Following a continuance, the matter was set for trial June 18, 2025. The Petition came on for trial on June 18, 2025. Before the trial could proceed, counsel for the Parents, citing due process concerns, made an oral motion to dismiss the Petition and remand to the juvenile court so the Parents could receive and complete tasks to regain custody of the child. The motion also requested dismissal based on Grandmother’s pending custody petition in the juvenile court. Further, the motion sought dismissal of the Petition for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court denied the request to remand, as well as the motion to dismiss based on a lack of due process but it reserved judgment on the personal jurisdiction issue. 2 This petition was never heard due to procedural delays in the juvenile court and the filing of the Petition for Termination and Adoption in February 2024. -2- Nevertheless, the trial was continued based on the late filing of the Petitioners’ home study.3 The trial resumed on August 19, 2025. The Petitioners, Father, and Mother, all represented by counsel, were present. Also present were the Guardian ad Litem and various witnesses, including Grandmother, Amber Marcum, and Nicole’s mother and sister. Petitioner Casey testified first, stating that he is an IT technician for K-VA-T Food City at the corporate headquarters and that he had no felony or misdemeanor convictions. He had been married to Petitioner Nicole for about one year before Aiden came into their lives but had known her for about fifteen years prior. Casey testified that he and Nicole took custody of Aiden when he was seven months old, after Nicole received a call from a long-time friend who informed them there was “a child that had been essentially abandoned” and needed care. He stated that the natural parents of Aiden, who he identified in the court room, had never paid support, nor provided gifts or other in-kind materials for Aiden’s benefit. Casey stated that the family lives with his mother in her home, which has three bedrooms, and in which Aiden has his own bedroom and his own bed. He stated that Aiden was involved in church activities and had a close relationship with the extended family, including the Petitioners’ parents, grandparents, siblings, nieces and nephews. Casey then testified that he himself had been adopted and affirmed that he was prepared to be Aiden’s father. Pamela L., the mother of Petitioner Nicole, testified next. She stated that she was initially “skeptical” when her daughter told her about Aiden, because “somebody can’t just give you a child.” She encouraged her daughter to contact child services immediately. Pamela L. described driving with Nicole to Hawkins County and making contact with Aiden’s case manager, who advised them to file for emergency custody for the child. She described Aiden’s close attachment to the Petitioners and stated she believed it was in the best interest of the child for the Petitioners to adopt him. The court then heard from Jennifer L., the sister of Petitioner Nicole. She testified that she sees Aiden once a week, that the Petitioners take Aiden to ball games, playgrounds, swimming and other family activities. She stated that Aiden and Petitioners love each other as parents and child. 3 Before the trial resumed, the Parents filed a motion for interlocutory appeal seeking review of the court’s decision to deny its motions, alleging that such review was necessary to protect the rights of the Parents and prevent protracted litigation. The Petitioners submitted a filing opposing the interlocutory appeal, and the trial court denied the motion for an interlocutory appeal. -3-  Amber Marcum testified next. Ms. Marcum stated that she has lived in Duffield, Virginia for about five years. When she received Aiden into her home, she was told his name was Hayden, which she confirmed with the Parents. However, this name was a misspelling of his legal name, Aiden. Ms. Marcum stated that the first time Mother left Aiden at her home she kept him for about a week, three days of which she was unable to contact the Parents, despite attempts through multiple channels. She stated that she continued to look after Aiden, for about a week at a time. When she would return him to the Parents, “he would either stay with [Father’s] or [Mother’s] mom, and then it seemed like I would go right back and get him.” This pattern continued about six times, she testified. Then, following her last exchange with Father, as Ms. Marcum explained, Father told her the Parents “were going to take the baby to the beach and live in the car if I didn’t take the baby,” so she retrieved Aiden from the Parents and brought him to her home. However, she was “really struggling” with her cancer treatments, so she called her aunt who introduced her to Nicole who was able to care for Aiden. When questioned about the arrangement, Ms. Marcum testified that she had attempted to reach Social Services, and had left messages on a voicemail system, but had not made contact. However, she expressed confidence that Nicole had spoken to Social Services around the time she took custody. Petitioner Nicole then testified, discussing the phone call from a friend July 19, 2023, who told her that a child had been left with Ms. Marcum, the niece of the friend’s stepmother. Nicole then called Ms. Marcum, who said she had a baby named Hayden who needed someone to care for him, and Nicole agreed to do so. After Nicole picked up the baby, she called Social Services in Scott County, Virginia. Upon the advice of Social Services, she undertook some internet searches, which revealed the address of the Parents in Hawkins County, Tennessee. After leaving a message with DCS in Hawkins County, she drove the baby to the office there the next Monday. Then, upon explaining to a social worker that she would like to keep the baby, if possible, she was directed to file for emergency custody, which was granted. While filing for custody, Nicole learned that Hayden’s real name was Aiden. She also learned that DCS had an open case concerning Aiden. DCS ordered a hair follicle test of Aiden, and it returned a positive result for methamphetamine, which exposure was attributed to the Parents’ drug use. The DCS case was closed after a determination that Aiden was safe in Nicole’s care. After being awarded custody, Petitioners took Aiden to the doctor, where they found that, at the age of seven months, he had only received his two-month vaccinations. Nicole testified that he is currently caught up on childhood immunizations. -4-  Nicole testified that she works for a medical answering service and that her combined income with Casey is more than sufficient to provide for Aiden. She testified that the couple has plans for Aiden to go to school, then college or a trade school, that Aiden is happy, and that she is committed to being his mother. Grandmother testified that she had filed a petition in juvenile court to obtain custody of Aiden, and that she was willing, capable and financially able to take care of Aiden. However, when asked about the original babysitting arrangement the Parents had with Ms. Marcum, she acknowledged that she did not contact Aiden’s custodians and didn’t know or understand what was going on with the child. She also testified that the reason she had filed for custody was because it was “not a good time” in the Parents’ life because they were on drugs, explaining that they lived next door during this time. Grandmother also acknowledged that the Parents were arrested and convicted on drug charges during the pendency of the proceedings. Grandmother testified that she had previously had temporary custody of Mother’s older daughter from an earlier relationship and cared for the girl before she went to live with her biological father. The final witness was Father, who testified that at a previous juvenile court hearing, he was informed that he could only bring Aiden back to his trailer after it was fixed up, causing him to move into a motel. Then, Father stated, Ms. Marcum and Casey Repass asked to babysit Aiden. He averred the arrangement was only for one day, and that the next day, Ms. Marcum and Mr. Repass told Father that DCS had come to their home and taken Aiden. He was later contacted by DCS and asked to appear for a court date in the juvenile court. Father disputed earlier testimony that he left Aiden with Ms. Marcum for weeks at a time. He also denied that he had planned to go to the beach and live out of his car. He further testified that the juvenile court had failed to provide him with “paperwork stating if we had to do classes or go to meetings or go to a rehab or what” to regain custody of Aiden, which he testified he would have been willing to do. He stated that he was willing and able to take care of Aiden at this time, and that his two-bedroom trailer home had electricity, running water, plenty of food, and no safety hazards, although he acknowledged the renovations are ongoing. Regarding his income, Father testified that he earns about $2,700 a month doing odd jobs. Father stated that he did not pay child support due to a juvenile court no contact order, and that he had spent his tax return on a trip to the beach with Mother. -5-  Father was questioned about his criminal history, including possession of methamphetamine, public intoxication and arrests for drug paraphernalia. Father acknowledged “mistakes” from when he was younger and admitted spending 12 days in jail in March of 2025. He claimed his criminal history was attributable to “an ex-girlfriend that set me up,” “an ex-girlfriend that was trying to get me locked up because I wouldn’t give her money,” migraines, depression, and the death of his father. When asked why Aiden had tested positive for methamphetamine, Father admitted it was because he would leave the baby to go use drugs, then come back and handle the child. Mother elected not to testify. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within 30 days. The Petitioners submitted their proposed findings later that day. Nine days later, August 28, 2025, the final order terminating Parents’ parental rights was entered. The court ruled that the Parents had abandoned the child by failure to support, failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child, and that termination of the Parents’ parental rights was in Aiden’s best interest. The Parents then motioned for an extension of time “to file the Findings of Fact Brief as required by this court.” The Parents also filed a Rule 60 motion for relief from the judgment on the basis that “Petitioner’s Proposed Order had been entered by the Court on August 28, 2025—twenty-one (21) days prior to the initial deadline for Respondents’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.” On January 6, 2025, following a telephonic hearing on December 22, 2025, the court granted the Rule 60 motion stating, “The Order terminating Respondents’ parental rights entered August 28, 2025 is set aside.” Then, on January 7, 2026, the Judgment Terminating Parental Rights of the Parents was re-entered. The court’s reasoning for entering the final judgment is explained in footnote 1 which reads: After telephonic hearing on December 22, 2025, the Court determined, over Petitioners’ objection, that a version of this Judgment entered on or about August 28, 2025 should be set aside and subsequently re-entered given that Respondent Parents’ 30-day window(s) for the submission of proposed findings and conclusions had not closed at the time of entry, making previous entry of Judgment premature. Said issue is resolved by re-entry of this Judgment, which, as the Court noted, fully and accurately reflects the findings and conclusions of the Court. This appeal followed. -6-  ISSUES Father presents the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Father’s pretrial motions to dismiss and for interlocutory appeal, where substantial due process and jurisdictional questions arising from the underlying Hawkins County Juvenile Court dependency and neglect proceeding remained unresolved at the time this private termination and adoption action was permitted to proceed to judgment. 2. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Appellant abandoned the child by willfully failing to support him during the four months preceding the filing of the Petition, where Father was never subject to a support order, mistakenly but sincerely believed that a no-contact order barred any form of contact with the child’s custodians, and where the willfulness affirmative defense was never properly at issue given the manner in which it was litigated. 3. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of the child under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14), where the record reflects Father’s repeated, on-the-record willingness to undertake any task, class, or program required of him, and where no such plan or task list was ever provided to him by any court. 4. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child, where the record reflects a less drastic, readily available alternative—placement with the child’s paternal grandmother—that was never explored, and where Father’s incarceration-related and financial obstacles were treated as indistinguishable from indifference. Mother presents the following issues for review: 1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mother’s pretrial motions to dismiss and for interlocutory appeal where significant due process and jurisdictional issues arising from the underlying Hawkins County Juvenile Court dependency and neglect proceedings remained unresolved before this private termination and adoption action was allowed to proceed to judgment. -7-  2. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother abandoned the child by willfully failing to support him during the four months preceding the filing of the Petition and failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. 3. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest where the record reflects a less restrictive, readily available alternative—placement with the child’s paternal grandmother—that was never considered. Petitioners’ issues mirror the issues raised by the Parents. STANDARD OF REVIEW Parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). This right is among the oldest of the judicially recognized liberty interests protected by the federal and state constitutions. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). “Termination of a person’s rights as a parent is a grave and final decision, irrevocably altering the lives of the parent and child involved and ‘severing forever all legal rights and obligations’ of the parent.” In re Adalynn M., et al., No. E2025-00948-COA-R3-PT, 2026 WL 2546887, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2026) (citations omitted). Indeed, few outcomes of judicial action are so grave as the severance of family ties. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787 (1982). Parental rights are superior to the claims of others and the government, but they are not absolute. In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tenn. 2002). Due process requires the grounds for termination be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Charlee G., No. E2025-01010-COA-R3- PT, 2026 WL 852261, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2026) (citing In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d at 97). This heightened standard of review prevents unjustified termination or interference with a biological parent’s parental rights. In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d at 639 (citing In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 473–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); In re M.W.A., Jr., 980 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). Termination of parental rights requires: (1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds or termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and (2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child. -8- Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). Accordingly, a court must find that clear and convincing evidence proves not only that statutory grounds exist for the termination, but also that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re Daisy B., No. M2025-00470-COA-R3-PT, 2026 WL 555456, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2026) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(c)(1)–(2); In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tenn. 2013). Because of the gravity of terminating the parent-child relationship, “both the federal and state constitutions require an individualized determination of the existence of the required statutory grounds before the courts may terminate a biological parent’s parental rights.” In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d at 639 (citations omitted). Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k), a trial court must enter written orders containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellate courts must first review the trial court’s specific findings of fact de novo, finding the trial court’s specific findings of fact correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 523–24 (Tenn. 2016) (see also Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)) (citations omitted). Second, we must determine whether the facts clearly and convincingly establish the elements required for terminating parental rights. Id. Our review of the trial court’s ruling that the evidence supports a termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. All other questions of law in parental termination appeals are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. ANALYSIS I. PRETRIAL MOTIONS Mother and Father contend their due process protections were violated in multiple ways. A. The Parents requested that the Petition be dismissed and remanded to the juvenile court so that they could be provided with a list of tasks or guidelines to have Aiden returned to their custody. The Parents contend that the absence of any “reasonable efforts standard” or family reunification plan, which are required in matters initiated by DCS but not those originating with private parties, created a “structural asymmetry” to their disadvantage. In its judgment terminating their parental rights, the chancery court denied these requests, finding them “lacking statutory merit.” Regarding reasonable efforts to assist parents in regaining custody, our Supreme Court has noted that even in cases initiated by DCS, “the extent of DCS’s efforts remains -9- a factor to be weighed in the best-interest analysis, [but it is] not an essential element that must be proven in order to terminate the parental rights of the respondent parent.” Cf. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 556 (Tenn. 2015). DCS is not the petitioner in this action. Moreover, Petitioners Casey and Nicole were not required to make reasonable efforts to reunify Parents with Aiden. See id. As such, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to dismiss this Petition and to remand on this basis. B. Father also argues that the trial court erred in overruling the Parents’ motion challenging personal jurisdiction. Regarding the personal jurisdiction issue, the trial court found that pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-201 et seq.) . . . while the child was temporarily absent from Tennessee from July–October/November 2023, Tennessee was the child’s “Home State” at both the time of filing (since Tennessee had never lost its status as the child’s Home State) and during the six months preceding this filing (with all relevant parties residing in Tennessee at the time of filing). Otherwise, no evidence was introduced at trial establishing that Tennessee does not have jurisdiction or that any other state has (or ever had) jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. On appeal, Father does not provide an argument challenging personal jurisdiction, he merely “preserves that issue for this Court’s review.” For her part, Mother raises “jurisdictional issues” in her statement of the issues but does not discuss them in her brief. Their failure to present arguments as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) is compounded by the fact that neither parent filed a written motion to dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, the motions were made orally at the June 18, 2025 hearing, and there is no transcript of that proceeding. Thus, we do not know the basis of their contentions. The Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant’s argument include “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record[.]” Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7). Failure to comply with this rule constitutes waiver of the issue. Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Schaller, 975 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Rampy v. ICI Acrylics, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 196, 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Dickerson, 885 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). Further, “an issue is waived where it is simply raised without any argument regarding its merits.” Id. - 10 - See Blair v. Badenhope, 940 S.W.2d at 576–577; Bank of Crockett v. Cullipher, 752 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). While Father and Mother raise “jurisdictional questions” in the presentation of the issues, they failed to identify any basis for dismissing the Petition based on a lack of jurisdiction, and our review of the record reveals no basis for dismissal of the Petition on jurisdictional grounds. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on the pretrial motions regarding best efforts and jurisdiction. II. ABANDONMENT BY FAILURE TO SUPPORT The Parents next argue that the trial court erred in finding that the ground of abandonment by failure to support had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Both parents contend their failure to support Aiden was not willful. Willfulness, formerly at the core of abandonment by failure to support, In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 863, is no longer required to be proven by petitioners, but may be pleaded as an affirmative defense by respondents. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(I). The trial court found “the evidence to be uncontroverted that neither Respondent Parent paid support at any relevant time following their loss of legal and/or physical custody,”4 further concluding that they were both aware of their lawful duty to support their child. Additionally, the court found that neither parent demonstrated, as an affirmative defense, that their failure was not willful. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that Father “testified to regularly earning income, paying for a beach vacation, and paying for sporadic home improvements,” while other testimony established that Mother receives a monthly Social Security check and that neither parent provided any form of support for Aiden. At trial, Father contended that he held the sincere belief that the no-contact order put in place by the juvenile court prevented him from paying support, a defense the trial court dismissed as “not credible.” On appeal, Father renews this argument, asserting that it challenges the trial court’s willfulness finding. Additionally, Father notes that no child support order had been entered. 4 Aiden was under the age of four when the Petition was filed. When a child is younger than four years old, a parent’s failure to support or failure to make reasonable payments toward the support of the child for a period of three consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i)(b). - 11 -  We first dispense with Father’s argument that the absence of a child support order supports a lack of willfulness regarding abandonment. We have consistently held that “[i]n Tennessee, ‘[a] parent’s obligation to support his or her child exists regardless of a court order requiring the parent to pay support.’” In re Malaysia C., No. M2014-01019-COA- R3-PT, 2015 WL 572954, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2015) (citations omitted). Turning next to Father’s argument about the no-contact order, we first note that a parent’s duty to support is distinct from the duty to visit. In re Arianna B., 618 S.W.3d 47, 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). Thus, a no contact order preventing visitation will be evaluated separately from the parent’s obligation to support the child. We find the case of In re Lincoln S., No. E2024-01574-COA-R3-PT, 2025 WL 3633582 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2025) instructive. There, a mother was on a no-contact order with her children, and no child support order was entered. Like this case, it was “not a DCS case, but rather a termination action between private parties.” Id. at *7. However, in Lincoln, the ground of abandonment by failure to support was defeated because of “the trial court’s finding that Mother provided items to the Children during the relevant period. Mother testified that she sent gifts and cards for the Children’s birthdays and major holidays. She did this while under the impression she could not speak to them.” Id. These actions by the mother supported our finding that abandonment by failure to support was not proven. Unlike Lincoln, Father paid no child support and sent no gifts or cards on holidays or special occasions. When asked at trial if either parent had ever sent a birthday gift for Aiden, Casey responded they had not. Similarly, we have held that a parent “is not relieved of the obligation to contribute towards [a child’s] support because he did not know [the custodial parent’s] mailing address or because she refused to arrange a time . . . to see [the child],” noting instead that support may be paid to the juvenile court. In re Archer R., No. M2019-01353-COA-R3- PT, 2020 WL 820973, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2020). This holding supports a finding that a parent who finds himself unable to pay support directly to the custodial parents is not excused from this obligation. Additionally, in a recent case in which the foster parents were the aunt and uncle of the biological father, we noted “their location could have been ascertained by inquiry with Father’s relatives.” In re Deangelo N. et al., No. E2025-00235-COA-R3-PT, 2026 WL 2985664, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2026). Here, Aiden was connected to the Petitioners through Amber Marcum and Casey Repass, former babysitters for the Parents, and Parents made no effort to ascertain Petitioners’ address or provide support for Aiden through Ms. Marcum or Mr. Repass. - 12 -  Finally, we note and agree with the trial court that the evidence establishes that Father was earning enough to pay for improvements to his mobile home and travel to the beach for vacation during this time. The record also establishes that Parents obtained meth prior to the filing of the petition, and while trial was pending, suggesting they spent money on recreational drugs during this period. Despite this, neither provided support for Aiden. For her part, Mother cites the trial court’s “alternate finding” that “in any event, and although willfulness is no longer an element required to be proven by Petitioners, the Court concludes that Respondents’ failure to support was indeed willful and deliberate.” As noted above, willfulness is not required to be proven by the Petitioners, but may be pleaded as an affirmative defense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(I). Yet, Mother did not plead a lack of willfulness as an affirmative defense. Instead, she contends that the court’s finding that her failure to support was willful is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In support of this argument. We find this argument unpersuasive. The trial court found that both parents failed to provide support for Aiden during the relevant time period pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i)(b) and the evidence supporting this finding is uncontroverted. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on the ground of abandonment by failure to support as to Father and Mother. III. FAILURE TO MANIFEST A WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO ASSUME CUSTODY The Parents next contest the trial court’s finding that a failure to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of the child had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Termination of parental rights is authorized when [a] parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child[.] Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). This ground required Petitioners to prove by clear and convincing evidence the two prongs of the foregoing. First, that the Parents failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and second, that placing the child in the Parents’ custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child. Id. - 13 -  Our determination of willingness considers whether the parents have provided more than mere words and instead looks for demonstrated attempts to overcome the obstacles that prevent them from assuming custody. In re Mynajah S., No. E2021-00040-COA-R3- PT, 2021 WL 3520856, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2021), (see also In re Cynthia P., No. E2018-01937-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 1313237, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2019)). And, when determining a parent’s ability to assume custody, we focus on lifestyle and circumstances. In re Paisley B., No. M2024-01641-COA-R3-PT, 2025 WL 3186310, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing In re Jonathan M., No. E2018-00484-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 5310750, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2018)). In our consideration of willingness and ability to assume custody, “the most relevant time period for this ground is the time preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. But the court may also consider the parent’s actions after the petition was filed.” In re Isaiah F., No. M2023-00660-COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL 1765247, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2024) (citations omitted). Citing its previous finding of failure to support, the court also found that the Parents had not taken steps to maintain a relationship with Aiden, that they had continued to engage in drug abuse, and lack stable housing. The trial court explained its reasoning as follows: It is clear that [Parents] have moved on from any obligations regarding parenting this child and have clearly abandoned any intent of maintaining a relationship with the child (since last seeing the child in mid-2023), demonstrating that they lack any sincere interest in resuming physical custody of the child. The long period of abandonment (2023–present) would likewise undoubtedly pose a hurdle to the child’s psychological welfare if custody of this very young child were to be restored to [Parents], considering the nature and depth of the relationships he now has with Petitioners and their extended family members. Further supporting this conclusion, the Court otherwise notes that, along with making no sincere efforts to have contact restored with the child or support the child while the child has been with Petitioners, neither has checked on the child’s wellbeing, or sought any updates or information about the child, which would impact their ability to transition to a safe restoration of custodial/visitation rights with the child. Father and Mother contest these findings, arguing that their “request for guidance” of the steps needed to resume custody are evidence of their willingness to care for Aiden. Father argues that his ability was “constrained” by the lack of guidance, as well as by his incarceration while the matter was pending and renovations to the family home. Both - 14 - Parents also reference Father’s testimony at trial that he would do “whatever they wanted me to” in order to regain custody. We first review the trial court’s finding regarding the Parents’ failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody. Here, we find little more than “mere words” and almost no indication that the Parents have attempted to overcome the obstacles in their lives that prevent them from regaining custody. In re Mynajah S., 2021 WL 3520856, at *14. After Petitioners assumed custody of Aiden, the Parents continued to use illegal drugs, as shown by their failed drug screens upon appearance in court. Later, they were arrested on drug charges and spent time in jail, causing the proceedings to be delayed. Father testified that the renovations to their mobile home, the initial reason the Parents placed Aiden in the care of others in 2023, were ongoing at the time of trial in 2025. Neither Parent has provided support for Aiden. As discussed throughout this opinion, they have not demonstrated treatment for past drug abuse, suitable housing, or the ability to financiall