IN RE JADEN H.

06/10/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE April 14, 2026 Session IN RE JADEN H. Appeal from the Chancery Court for Jefferson County No. 20-CV-70 James H. Ripley, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. E2024-01825-COA-R3-PT ___________________________________ In this termination action, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights to his minor child based upon two statutory grounds, finding that those grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., and VALERIE L. SMITH, J., joined. F. Clinton Little, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, David H. Aaron J. Chapman, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellees, Harold W. and Natalie W. OPINION I. Factual and Procedural History On July 18, 2023, the petitioners, Harold W. (“Grandfather”) and Natalie W. (“Grandmother”) (collectively, “Grandparents”), along with the co-petitioner, Tiffany W. (“Mother”), filed a petition in the Jefferson County Chancery Court (“trial court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the respondent, David H. (“Father”), to the minor child, Jaden H. (“the Child”).1 Mother stated in the petition that she consented to the termination of her parental rights and to the Child’s adoption by Grandparents. Grandparents initially asserted two statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights: (1) Father’s conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare and (2) Father’s failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. In response to the petition, Father filed a motion for a more definite statement, as well as a “notice of revocation of waiver.” In the latter pleading, Father stated that he was revoking his previous waiver of his right to a timely preliminary hearing regarding an “Ex Parte Protective Order of Custody” that had been entered by the Grainger County Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”) on March 17, 2023. Father stated that he was specifically asserting his right to a preliminary hearing concerning the ex parte custody order. In this notice, Father explained that he and Mother had never married and that he had initiated custody proceedings concerning the Child in 2020 by filing an emergency petition in the juvenile court. Father claimed that in those proceedings, he was named the primary residential parent for the Child and was awarded sole custody. Father also claimed that Mother was incarcerated on drug-related convictions in 2022 and 2023. Father alleged that in December 2022, he and Grandfather were involved in an altercation during which Grandfather physically assaulted Father and the Child as they were leaving a funeral. Father asserted that he had subsequently sought an order of protection against Grandfather but that he had abandoned pursuit of the order when he was required to travel to California with the Child for business. Father claimed that in January 2023, Grandparents had filed a petition in the juvenile court naming both Father and Mother as respondents and seeking a finding of dependency and neglect and an ex parte award of custody of the Child. Father alleged that based on misrepresentations made by Grandparents, the juvenile court had entered an order in February 2023 stating that Father had “not been located but has [a] matter in Jefferson Sessions on 3/17/23” and that service would be attempted on that date. The matter was reset to March 28, 2023. On March 17, 2023, Father appeared in court regarding a probation violation and was served with Grandparents’ petition. After Father was sentenced to incarceration due to the probation violation, Grandparents filed a “Motion for Ex Parte Order and Attachment” in the juvenile court, stating that both parents were incarcerated and asking the court to grant them custody of the Child. According to Father, the juvenile court granted custody to 1 Harold W. and Natalie W. are the Child’s maternal grandparents, and Tiffany W. is the Child’s biological mother. -2- Grandparents that same day, even though the Child “was being well-cared for by his paternal grandfather while Father served his ten (10) day sentence.” Father acknowledged that he had initially waived his right to a preliminary hearing following entry of the ex parte order in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-117(b)2 and that the juvenile court had granted him weekly supervised visits with the Child that were to occur at Parent Place or an equivalent visitation center. Father claimed, however, that Grandparents had blocked his telephone number such that he was unable to reach them to coordinate the visits and that they had filed their termination petition shortly thereafter. Father thus sought to revoke his waiver of a timely preliminary hearing. Grandparents filed a response to Father’s notice, asserting that the trial court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction over procedural matters related to the dependency and neglect proceedings. Grandparents further asserted: Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-113 Father was not himself entitled to a preliminary hearing within 72 hours of removal because the child was not removed from his care. Nonetheless, preliminary matters were timely heard in the Juvenile Court for Grainger County on March 28, 2023 and June 20, 2023 (a date resulting after continuances were requested by Father’s counsel). March 28, 2023 was the next available Juvenile Court day available for hearing following the Ex Parte Order of March 17, 2023. Father was represented in the Juvenile Court matter and his attorney waived any objections to those hearings not occurring within 72 judicial hours of any removal. On undersigned counsel’s recollection, Father’s attorney called for an abrupt adjournment of the preliminary hearing on June 20, 2023 and conclusion of the hearing was pushed back yet again for another month. Because of Father’s intervening abandonment of the child becoming manifest, Petitioners sought termination and adoption and the Juvenile Court matter was suspended. Father is being disingenuous if he is claiming to have not been actively involved in the Juvenile Court proceedings. Grandparents also relied upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-116(f)(2), which provides that any pending proceedings concerning custody of or visitation with a child who is in the physical custody of the petitioners when a petition for 2 This statutory section provides that “a preliminary hearing shall be held no later than seventy-two (72) hours after the child’s removal to determine whether such child’s continued removal is required.” -3- termination/adoption is filed “shall be suspended pending the court’s orders in the adoption proceeding” and “shall not be heard until final adjudication of the action for termination of parental rights or adoption . . . even if such adjudication . . . will render the custody, guardianship, or visitation action moot.” By separate motion, Grandparents sought leave to amend their petition to provide “full procedural clarity.” On February 5, 2024, Grandparents and Mother filed an amended petition, adding factual allegations concerning Father’s criminal history, including that Father had pled guilty to (1) drug possession in June 2020, (2) vandalism and harassment in February 2022, and (3) a stalking-related offense and driving without proper child restraints or a license in June 2022. They also alleged that Father had recently been sentenced and incarcerated as a multiple offender for driving under the influence. Grandparents further stated that Father had caused the funeral incident in December 2022 and had then proceeded to “leav[e] [the funeral] in a bizarre manner with the child unrestrained [in his vehicle].” Grandparents and Mother detailed other incidents of Father’s behavior that they characterized as “delusional” and indicative of mental illness or substance dependency. Grandparents claimed that during the juvenile court proceedings, Father took no action to support or visit the Child after Father was released from incarceration. Grandparents also stated that after the Child came to live with them, they had the Child tested for illicit drugs and that the test was positive for recent cocaine exposure, which would have occurred during Father’s period of custody. Grandparents restated the same grounds for termination asserted in their original petition and added the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the pending motions on February 8, 2024. In its resultant order, the court denied Father’s request to resume the juvenile court’s preliminary proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-116(f). The court declared that the amended petition would be deemed filed as of February 5, 2024, because no leave of court was necessary in that Father had not yet filed a responsive pleading. On April 11, 2024, the trial court entered an order appointing a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the Child. On June 10, 2024, Father filed an answer to the amended petition wherein he denied that he had an “erratic criminal history” or a mental illness. Father further denied that grounds for termination of his parental rights existed. On that same date, Father filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, asserting that the petition did not contain any material factual allegations. Father further urged that but for the allegedly improper ex parte custody order entered by the juvenile court limiting -4- Father’s ability to visit or parent the Child, grounds for termination could not be proven. Father subsequently filed an amended answer containing his verification. On June 17, 2024, Grandparents filed a response to Father’s motion to dismiss, arguing that grounds for termination had been established during the pendency of the juvenile court proceedings due to Father’s actions rather than the ex parte order entered therein. Father then filed a second motion to dismiss, asserting that his parents, who had filed a petition to intervene in the pending juvenile court proceedings, were indispensable parties to the termination proceeding. Grandparents opposed this motion. The trial court conducted a trial regarding the termination petition on June 20 and 21, 2024. During that hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Father; Mother; Grandparents; the paternal grandfather; Grandparents’ friend, D.H.; and Grandparents’ neighbors: J.B., D.B., K.T., and Km.T. Notably, Father testified that he and a friend, who was “a prince in India,” owned a jewelry and diamond business, which provided Father with stable income. Father added that he had earned $100,000 from this business during the month prior to trial. He further stated that he had earned $50,000 from the business from October 2023 to February 2024. Despite this income, Father admitted that he had paid no financial support to Grandparents since they had received custody of the Child in March 2023. Father also acknowledged that he had incurred numerous criminal charges since the Child’s birth in June 2019, including driving under the influence, reckless driving, speeding, driving on a revoked license, making threats, trespassing, harassment, and vandalism. Father admitted that he was also charged with and convicted of driving with the Child unrestrained in the vehicle. Father further admitted that he was incarcerated in March 2023 due to a probation violation. Mother testified that she and Father had been involved in an intermittent relationship for years. She explained that she broke up with Father because he was always asking her to give him money to purchase cocaine. Mother testified that Father dealt in illegal drugs, and she played an audio recording of a conversation she had with Father during her pregnancy wherein he asked her for money and stated that he needed to get someone an “eight ball.” According to Mother, Father was still involved with illegal drugs, and she opined that his drug use often made him “paranoid” and gave him delusions of grandeur. Mother presented proof that Father had sent her pictures beginning in January 2024 of Father purportedly traveling in Paris, Dubai, and Switzerland, and she testified that Father had claimed via text messages to be “hanging out” with and dating celebrities. Mother explained that her parents had helped her with the Child since the Child’s birth. Mother admitted that she had been incarcerated by reason of -5- convictions involving gun charges and a charge of conspiracy to sell cocaine. Mother stated that she became involved in selling illegal drugs when she began dating Father. Mother further articulated that she was surrendering her parental rights to the Child because she believed that Grandparents were most capable of caring for the Child. Grandparents testified regarding their close relationship with the Child since his birth. Grandfather indicated that the Child had often stayed with them, as much as eighty percent of the time, and at some point before receiving legal custody in 2023, they had the Child in their physical custody for a period of forty-five days in a row. Grandparents explained that the Child was also close to their family, friends, and neighbors; that he was thriving in his current school placement; and that he had many friends who lived nearby. Grandparents stated that they wished to raise the Child as their own and could provide for his needs. In addition, Grandparents, Mother, and other witnesses related that after Grandparents received custody of the Child in 2023, the Child had reported that Father was “mean” to him and that he was afraid of Father. Grandparents and other witnesses explained that there was a period of months when Grandparents did not know the Child’s whereabouts while the Child was with Father during Mother’s incarceration. Grandparents had searched for the Child and eventually discovered that he was with Father’s parents after Father was incarcerated, at which time they filed a petition for custody in the juvenile court. According to Grandparents, the Child had told them upon his return to their home that Father had been telling the Child that Grandparents were both dead. Grandparents also stated that after receiving custody of the Child, they took him to the dentist, where he underwent thousands of dollars’ worth of dental work to preserve his teeth. Grandmother reported that the Child had also failed to gain weight when he was residing with Father. Grandparents further noted that after they obtained custody, Father had not tried to contact them regarding the Child and had paid no financial support. Grandparents’ neighbors and friends testified regarding the Child’s close relationship with Grandparents, as well as the Child’s close relationship with them and their children and grandchildren. They described the Child as happy in Grandparents’ care. They also stated that during the period before the Child had “disappeared” with Father, the Child was often in Grandparents’ care. Three of these witnesses reported that upon his return to Grandparents’ care, the Child had spontaneously told them that Father had been “mean” to him. In its resultant order entered on November 6, 2024, the trial court noted that although the paternal grandparents had filed a motion to continue that was heard on the first day of trial, the court had found that the motion was essentially a motion to -6- intervene filed by unnecessary parties and had denied it. The court also overruled Father’s motion to dismiss premised on a finding that the paternal grandparents were indispensable parties. The court determined that the paternal grandparents were not indispensable parties pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-117(a). The trial court found that Father had a “substantial criminal record resulting in periods of incarceration.” With regard to the statutory ground of abandonment by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare, the court determined that the amended petition had been filed on February 5, 2024, and that Father had not been incarcerated within the four- month period preceding the amended petition’s filing. Accordingly, the court found that this ground had not been proven. Respecting the statutory ground of failure to manifest, the trial court found that Father had paid no support for the Child during the fifteen months the Child had been in Grandparents’ custody despite Father’s claim that he had enjoyed “substantial income” from a jewelry business during the same period. Based on Father’s testimony at trial, the court concluded that Father had refused to pay support for the Child due to his animosity toward Grandparents. The court thus found that Father had failed to manifest a willingness to assume financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court further found that placing the Child in Father’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Child due to Father’s “history of behaviors and activities . . . often with the Child present, that reflect poor judgment, criminal behavior and uncontrolled impulsivity.” As an example, the court recounted Father’s choice to “drive 105 [miles per hour], while intoxicated, with the Child improperly restrained in the car,” as well as other instances when Father was cited for speeding or driving under the influence with the Child improperly restrained in the car. The court also relied on Father’s “substantial history of involvement with illegal drugs—both as a user and a seller.” The court noted that evidence had been presented in the form of a voice recording wherein Father had solicited money from Mother in order to purchase drugs for customers, including Father’s reference to a customer who needed an “eight ball,” which the court recognized as a slang reference to cocaine. The court also noted Mother’s testimony regarding Father’s use of illegal drugs, which she claimed made Father paranoid and “highly erratic.” The court therefore determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the ground of failure to manifest. Concerning the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to financially support the Child, the trial court found that the four-month determinative period would have begun on October 4, 2023, and ended on February 4, 2024, the day preceding the amended petition’s filing. The trial court relied on the same findings -7- it had made concerning Father’s income and his refusal to pay support with respect to the ground of failure to manifest and determined that these findings also provided clear and convincing evidence of Father’s willful failure to pay support. Finally, regarding the alleged ground of abandonment by failure to visit, the trial court utilized the same determinative period. During that timeframe, Father and Mother had the right to weekly supervised visitation, as granted by the order of the juvenile court. Because Father claimed to have tried to exercise his right to visit the Child by contacting the supervising agency but stated that he was unable to arrange visitation, the court found that clear and convincing evidence did not support this ground. With respect to the Child’s best interest, the trial court reviewed the evidence presented in accordance with the twenty statutory best interest factors and determined that the majority of those factors weighed in favor of termination of Father’s parental rights. The court specifically noted evidence of Father’s involvement with illicit drugs, Father’s criminal charges, and the Child’s development of severe dental problems during the time that he resided with Father. The court further relied upon a video recording of the Child explaining to a neighbor that he was afraid of Father because Father had placed a pillow over his face, causing the Child to be unable to breathe, and that Father had forced the Child to go under the bed and not come out when Father was watching television. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based on clear and convincing evidence of the following statutory grounds: (1) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child and (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the Child. The court also found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father’s notice of appeal was not filed with this Court until December 10, 2024; however, we recognize that the Supreme Court had entered two orders during that timeframe extending filing deadlines for trial courts in the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Judicial Districts due to the impact of Hurricane Helene. See In re: Limited Disaster Plan, No. ADM2024-01498 (Tenn. 2024). Accordingly, Father’s notice of appeal was timely. See, e.g., State v. Couch, No. E2024-01655-CCA-R3- CD, 2025 WL 3731518, at *2 n.1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26, 2025). During oral argument in this Court, Father’s counsel requested permission to supplement the appellate record to include the paternal grandparents’ motion to continue filed during the trial court proceedings. -8-  II. Issues Presented Father presents the following issues for our review, which we have restated slightly: 1. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to conduct a preliminary hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-117(b) after assuming jurisdiction over “all other pending matters concerning the child,” based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-116(f), and thereby denying Father the opportunity to challenge the ex parte protective custody order. 2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating Father’s parental rights allegedly based on an ex parte custody order from pending dependency and neglect proceedings that were never adjudicated. 3. Whether the trial court erred by determining that two statutory grounds for termination were proven when the evidence purportedly demonstrated that Father’s inability to support or exercise custody regarding the Child was caused by the ex parte custody order. 4. Whether the trial court erred by determining that Father failed to financially support the Child when no support order had been entered. 5. Whether the trial court erred by determining that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Grandparents raise the following additional issue: 6. Whether the trial court erred by determining that Father’s failure to visit the Child was not willful. III. Standard of Review In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine “whether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also In re -9- Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 523-24 (Tenn. 2016); In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 (citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial court’s determinations regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002). “Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). As our Supreme Court has explained: The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky [v. Kramer], 455 U.S. [745,] 758-59 [(1982)]. Termination of parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a complete stranger and of [“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decision terminating parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to “fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair procedures). Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010). “Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact- finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re Audrey S., 182 - 10 -  S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). *** In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-24. “[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental] rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,” including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010). IV. Ex Parte Order and Preliminary Hearing For his first two issues, Father argues that the trial court erred by refusing to conduct a preliminary hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-117(b) after assuming jurisdiction over “all other pending matters concerning the child,” based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-116(f). According to Father, the trial court thereby denied Father the opportunity to challenge the ex parte custody order, which he asserts “became the factual and legal foundation for terminating his parental rights.” The ex parte order of which Father complains was entered on March 17, 2023, by the juvenile court. We reiterate that Father initially waived his right to a timely preliminary hearing pursuant to § 37-1-117(b) in the juvenile court proceedings, as he acknowledges in his brief. Father only attempted to “revoke” this waiver following Petitioners’ filing of a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights in the trial court. The trial court, however, denied Father’s request to resume the juvenile court’s preliminary hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-116(f) (West July 1, 2023, to current), which provides in pertinent part: (1) Upon the filing of the petition [for termination], the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the child, including the establishment of paternity of a child pursuant to chapter 2, part 3 of this title, except for allegations of delinquency, unruliness or truancy of the child pursuant to - 11 -  title 37; provided, that, unless a party has filed an intervening petition to an existing adoption petition concerning a child who is in the physical custody of the original petitioners, the court shall have no jurisdiction to issue any orders granting custody or guardianship of the child to the petitioners or to the intervening petitioners or granting an adoption of the child to the petitioners or to the intervening petitioners unless the petition affirmatively states, and the court finds in its order, that the petitioners have physical custody of the child at the time of the filing of the petition, entry of the order of guardianship, or entry of the order of adoption, or unless the petitioners otherwise meet the requirements of § 36-1- 111(d)(6). (2) Except for proceedings concerning allegations of delinquency, unruliness, or truancy of the child under title 37, any proceedings that may be pending seeking the custody or guardianship of the child or visitation with the child who is in the physical custody of the petitioners on the date the petition is filed, or where the petitioners meet the requirement of § 36- 1-111(d)(6), shall be suspended pending the court’s orders in the adoption proceeding, and jurisdiction of all other pending matters concerning the child and proceedings concerning establishment of the paternity of the child shall be transferred to and assumed by the adoption court; provided, that until the adoption court enters any orders affecting the child’s custody or guardianship as permitted by this part, all prior parental or guardian authority, prior court orders regarding custody or guardianship, or statutory authority concerning the child’s status shall remain in effect. Actions suspended by this section, regardless of the stage of adjudication, shall not be heard until final adjudication of the action for termination of parental rights or adoption regarding the same child, even if such adjudication of the termination of parental rights or adoption will render the custody, guardianship, or visitation action moot. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the trial court maintained exclusive jurisdiction concerning “all matters pertaining to” the Child. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 116(f)(1). As the trial court correctly determined, the juvenile court proceedings concerning custody and visitation were suspended upon Petitioners’ filing of the termination petition. See § 36-1-116(f)(2). Thus, the juvenile court proceedings could not be heard until final adjudication of the termination action even though the - 12 - termination action could possibly (and ultimately did) render the juvenile court proceedings moot. See § 36-1-116(f)(2); see also In re K.A.Y., 80 S.W.3d 19, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that based on § 36-1-116(f)(2), the trial court was not required to decide the former foster parents’ previously filed custody petition before ruling on the adoptive parents’ termination petition). Therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to hear the juvenile court proceedings after the termination petition was filed. V. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (West July 1, 2023, to current)3 lists the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part: (a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4. *** (c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon: (1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and (2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child. The trial court concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly supported two statutory grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights: (1) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or 3 Unless otherwise noted, all citations to any section within Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1- 113 and 36-1-102 shall be made in reference to the version that was effective on the date the operative termination petition was filed and not to any other version of the statute. See, e.g., In re Zakary O., No. E2022-01062-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5215385, at *4 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2023). In some instances, the subsection that was in effect at the time the operative termination petition was filed has not changed and therefore remains current. - 13 - financial responsibility for the Child and (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the Child. We will address each statutory ground in turn. A. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody of or Financial Responsibility for the Child The trial court found clear and convincing evidence establishing that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. Regarding this statutory ground, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) provides that a parent’s rights may be terminated when: [a] parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child[.] To prove this ground, Petitioners were required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Father failed to manifest either an ability or willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child and (2) returning the Child to Father’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Child’s welfare. See In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674, 677 (Tenn. 2020); In re Jeremiah S., No. W2019-00610-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 1951880, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020) (“Under this ground for termination, the petitioner must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.”). As to the first prong of this statutory ground, our Supreme Court has instructed: [S]ection 36-1-113(g)(14) places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a person seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing proof that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied. In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 677 (citing In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866- COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018)). Concerning the “substantial harm” requirement of the second prong, this Court has observed: - 14 -  The courts have not undertaken to define the circumstances that pose a risk of substantial harm to a child. These circumstances are not amenable to precise definition because of the variability of human conduct. However, the use of the modifier “substantial” indicates two things. First, it connotes a real hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While the harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not. In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018) (quoting Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)) (footnotes omitted in Maya R.). Here, the trial court found that the first prong of this ground had been established by clear and convincing evidence as to Father based upon Father’s failure to provide financial support for the Child during the fifteen-month period that the Child had been in Grandparents’ custody. Father acknowledged at trial that he had paid nothing to Grandparents during the entire time they had maintained custody of the Child beginning in March 2023. Father also acknowledged that during that same timeframe, he h