Full Opinion

11/10/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON September 16, 2026 Session ETHEL RICHARDS BEAVER ET AL. v. JOHN RUFF Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County No. 101674 RD James R. Newsom, Chancellor ___________________________________ No. W2025-01049-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ This case concerns Appellant’s attempt to dissolve a permanent injunction entered against him in 1993 and affirmed by this Court on appeal. Upon review, we conclude that Appellant’s new challenges to the injunction are barred by the finality of the original judgment. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed VALERIE L. SMITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CARMA DENNIS MCGEE and STEVEN W. MARONEY, JJ., joined. John David Ruff, Memphis, Tennessee, appellant, pro se. Bruce M. Smith, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Ethel Beaver, and Jeremy Beaver. OPINION I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1992, Appellee, Ethel Richards Beaver and husband/co-Appellee, Jeremy Beaver (collectively “the Beavers”), sought injunctive relief against Appellant, John Ruff, based on his repeated unwanted attempts to contact Mrs. Beaver.1 On February 24, 1993, the 1 The original complaint alleged that Mr. Ruff remained fixated on Mrs. Beaver despite her repeated rebuffs and her June 1992 marriage to Jeremy Beaver. It described continuing attempts to contact her and alleged statements that caused the Beavers to fear for her physical and emotional well-being. Mr. Ruff had never had a relationship with Mrs. Beaver, would not accept her requests to be left alone, and continued to question whether she was truly married to Mr. Beaver . The chancery court held hearings on temporary and -1- chancery court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Mr. Ruff from communicating with or approaching Mrs. Beaver. Mr. Ruff appealed and this Court affirmed the injunction in August 1994. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied Mr. Ruff’s application for additional review. Approximately thirty years later, on October 25, 2023, Mr. Ruff filed a petition in the original action to dissolve the permanent injunction. He asserted that the chancery court never had jurisdiction to enter the injunction against him due to a lawsuit he previously filed in circuit court against the Raleigh Assembly of God Church. He further asserted that the injunction and this Court’s opinion affirming the injunction had expired because it was not renewed within ten years, as well as claiming misconduct by the Beavers’ attorney. Further, Mr. Ruff argued that he was entitled to dissolution of the injunction based on a letter from the chancery court clerk in 2005 stating that the case had been “judicially disposed.” He also asserted that Mrs. Beaver had been voluntarily contacting him since 2021. The Beavers filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition was an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment and that the claims had been decided or could have been raised in the original litigation. On August 19, 2024, the trial court held a hearing in which it declined to allow Mr. Ruff to call witnesses he subpoenaed, concluding that the testimony was unnecessary to resolve the threshold issue of whether Mr. Ruff’s petition should be dismissed because it was an attempt to relitigate a final judgment that remained in effect. On March 3, 2025, the trial court entered an order dismissing Mr. Ruff’s petition, holding that the claims in his petition asserted errors related to the original proceedings, which were subsumed in the final judgment and that the permanent injunction remained in force. Mr. Ruff timely filed a motion to alter or amend the dismissal, seeking to vacate the dismissal and filing an affidavit alleging recent encounters with Mrs. Beavers in support. Among other things, he alleged she approached him at a restaurant in 2023 and came to his apartment in February 2025, which the Beavers dispute. Following a May 27, 2025 hearing, the court denied Mr. Ruff’s motion to alter or amend, stating that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred his challenges and that he had not established a legal basis for amending the court’s dismissal of his petition. Mr. Ruff timely appealed to this Court. II. ISSUES PRESENTED Mr. Ruff raises ten issues on appeal, which are taken directly from his brief: permanent relief before entering the final injunction against Mr. Ruff. This Court affirmed both the trial court’s injunction and a finding of contempt against Mr. Ruff. -2- 1. Whether the prior-suit-pending doctrine deprived the chancery court of authority to enter the 1993 permanent injunction because Mr. Ruff’s 1991 circuit-court action against the church was filed first. 2. Whether the 1993 permanent injunction expired under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 110(a)(2) because it was not renewed within ten years. 3. Whether the 1994 appellate judgment affirming the injunction likewise expired after ten years. 4. Whether alleged misconduct or unclean hands by the Beavers’ counsel requires relief from the injunction. 5. Whether the trial court erred by denying the Petition to Dissolve Injunction. 6. Whether the trial court erred by denying Mr. Ruff's Rule 59 motion to vacate. 7. Whether refusing to hear Mr. Ruff’s subpoenaed witnesses at the August 19, 2024 hearing denied due process. 8. Whether the original injunction was invalid because the court allegedly failed to apply the standards governing permanent injunctive relief and make adequate findings. 9. Whether a 2005 clerk’s letter stating that the case was judicially disposed established that the injunction had ended. 10. Whether the trial court was required to receive evidence and make findings concerning Mr. Ruff’s alleged contacts with Mrs. Beaver since 2021. The Beavers raise one issue: “Whether the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed?” Upon review, we determine the answer to that question to be dispositive of this appeal. III. LAW AND ANALYSIS As an initial matter we recognize that Mr. Ruff is proceeding in this matter pro se. Although we afford pro se litigants some measure of latitude, they are still required to comply with procedural and substantive rules of this Court that apply to represented parties. See Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Rule 27(a)(7) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant’s brief to include an argument of their issues on appeal supported by citations to the appellate record and -3- relevant legal authority. Tenn. R. App. P. (27)(a)(7). Similar standards for an appellant’s brief are also included in Rule 6 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. Tenn. R. Ct. App. R. (6). Failure to comply with these rules may result in waiver of an appellant’s issues presented. See Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 301 S.W. 3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010); Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55-56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Mr. Ruff’s brief contains substantial deficiencies, including undeveloped allegations of error and a lack of citations to the appellate record or legal authority to support his propositions. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to excuse Mr. Ruff’s briefing deficiencies and consider the merits of his arguments on appeal to the best we comprehend them. See Tenn. R. App. P. 2; Tenn. Ct. App. R. 1(b). Mr. Ruff’s allegations of error relate to the trial court’s dismissal of his petition. We have explained the nature of appellate review of a such a dismissal as follows: A Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss “seeks only to determine whether the pleadings state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Edwards v. Allen, 216 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tenn. 2007). The motion “tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint” rather than “the strength of plaintiff's proof.” Smith v. Benihana Nat’l Corp., 592 S.W.3d 864, 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (citations omitted). A trial court’s decision to grant a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is a question of law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). We uphold a trial court’s decision to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) “only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim that will entitle him or her to relief.” Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Robinson v. City of Clarksville, 673 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023). As we set forth below, we agree with the trial court that Mr. Ruff could prove no set of facts in his petition that would entitle him to relief. A. Dismissal of Petition As the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he prime function and purpose of the judicial system is to settle, determine and end differences between contending parties.” Childress v. Bennett, 816 S.W2d 314, 316 (Tenn. 1991). To that end, the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents parties from relitigating claims that were or could have been litigated in a prior suit. Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W. 3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012). Additionally, the “law-of-the-case” doctrine generally provides that an appellate court’s decision on an issue of law will govern any subsequent proceedings in that same -4- case. See Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998). In this case, the chancery court originally entered a permanent injunction against Mr. Ruff on February 24, 1993. In 1994, this Court affirmed the entry of the injunction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review. See Beaver v. Ruff, No. 02A01- 9303-CH-00051, 1994 WL 440266 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1994). That judgment has now been final for more than 30 years. Several of Mr. Ruff’s arguments on appeal directly challenge the validity of the original injunction. Specifically, he contends that the chancery court lacked authority to enter the injunction against him because of his previously-filed circuit court action, that there was insufficient proof to support the initial entry of the injunction, that the court failed to apply the proper legal analysis for permanent injunctive relief, and that misconduct by the Beavers’ attorney affected the outcome of the original proceedings. Mr. Ruff also asserts the doctrine of unclean hands as a basis for relief. Each of these arguments concerns alleged errors arising from the original litigation. Mr. Ruff either raised or could have raised these issues during the original proceedings and subsequent appeal. He cannot obtain reconsideration of the final judgment by again presenting those same challenges in a subsequent petition to dissolve the injunction. Mr. Ruff also contends that the injunction and this Court’s judgment affirming the same have expired because neither were renewed within ten years pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110(a)(2). Although portions of his argument are difficult to follow, Mr. Ruff relies on this statute for the proposition that the permanent injunction is no longer enforceable. Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-110(a)(2), however, sets forth a limitations period for actions on judgments – it does not provide that a permanent injunction automatically expires after ten years. He further relies on a letter sent from the chancery court clerk in 2005 indicating that his case had been “judicially disposed.” However, Mr. Ruff has failed to explain or otherwise provide any legal basis to support his contention that these instances dissolve or terminate a permanent injunction. The final disposition of the underlying litigation did not, by itself, terminate the continuing obligations the court imposed upon Mr. Ruff under the injunction. Finally, Mr. Ruff asserts that Mrs. Beaver has voluntarily contacted him since 2021 and that the trial court should have heard from the witnesses he subpoenaed regarding the alleged encounters. As opposed to his challenges to the original judgment, these assertions concern events alleged to have occurred after the entry of the injunction and are not themselves barred merely by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Nevertheless, the existence of Mrs. Beaver’s alleged subsequent contact (which again, she disputes) does not invalidate the substance or finality of the original judgment. Although we agree with Mr. Ruff that changes in circumstances may, in certain cases, provide grounds for modification or dissolution of prospective injunctive relief, Mr. Ruff has failed to articulate how, even -5- if proven to be true, such encounters warrant dissolution of the injunction or would otherwise entitle him to relief. As we discussed above, several legal doctrines exist to promote the finality of a dispute between parties. The injunction against Mr. Ruff has been litigated both at trial and on appeal. He is, therefore, precluded from now relitigating the same claims. Moreover, do not establish a basis for dissolving the injunction. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. B. Other Issues Pretermitted As set forth above, Mr. Ruff has raised ten issues on appeal, the majority of which are predicated on assertions not grounded in either law or fact. Nevertheless, because we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Ruff’s petition, all remaining issues are pretermitted. See Miller v. Miller, No. W2022-0017-COA-R3-CV, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2023). C. Motion to Continue Oral Argument Denied On January 21, 2026, Mr. Ruff filed his appellate brief requesting oral argument of in this case. On August 3, 2026, the Clerk of this Court notified the parties that oral argument had been set for September 16, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. Mr. Ruff failed to appear on that date. At that time, this Court orally ruled that Mr. Ruff’s argument would be submitted on his brief. Counsel for the Beavers was present at oral argument and chose to proceed. See Tenn. R. App. P. Rule 35(g) (“If a party fails to appear for argument, the appellate court will hear argument on behalf of the parties present.”). On September 17, 2026, which was the day after his failure to appear at oral argument, Mr. Ruff filed a written motion requesting a continuance of the argument. Rule 35(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] request for postponement of the argument must be made by motion filed reasonably in advance of the date fixed for hearing.” Upon due consideration, Mr. Ruff’s motion to continue oral argument is respectfully denied. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Appellant’s motion to continue oral argument is denied. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant, John Ruff, for which execution may issue, if necessary. s/ Valerie L. Smith VALERIE L. SMITH, JUDGE -6-