Harsha Vardhan Jagan Mohan Rao Borra v. Jaahnavi Arja

11/10/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE July 8, 2026 Session HARSHA VARDHAN JAGAN MOHAN RAO BORRA v. JAAHNAVI ARJA Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County No. 22CV-52064 Joseph A. Woodruff, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-01099-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. The wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for a continuance of the trial and the exclusion of one of her proffered witnesses. Discerning no error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W. NEAL MCBRAYER and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined. Shannon L. Crutcher, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jaahnavi Arja. Adam Zanetis, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Harsha Vardhan Jagan Mohan Rao Borra. OPINION BACKGROUND Harsha Vardhan Jagan Mohan Rao Borra (“Husband”) and Jaahnavi Arja (“Wife”) were born in India and married there in 2019. They relocated to Franklin, Tennessee in 2020 and have a minor child who was born in Tennessee during the marriage (the “Child”). On December 15, 2022, Husband filed a complaint for divorce in the Williamson County Chancery Court (the “trial court”). While the case was pending, Wife relocated to Texas, and Husband relocated to Georgia. On January 9, 2023, Attorney Michal Durakiewicz entered an appearance as counsel for Wife. On March 23, 2023, Mr. Durakiewicz withdrew, and Attorney Jonathan W. Turner entered an appearance as counsel for Wife. On April 3, 2023, the trial court entered an order setting a temporary parenting schedule and awarded each party unsupervised parenting time. On April 14, 2023, Wife filed a notice of her intent to relocate to Texas and asked the trial court to amend the temporary parenting schedule. The trial court granted Wife leave to relocate and entered an order on May 4, 2023, amending the temporary parenting schedule to provide that Wife would exercise parenting time for three consecutive weeks and Husband would exercise parenting time for two consecutive weeks. The Child would then return to Wife, and the schedule would continue as such.1 The parties were to exchange the Child at the airport closest to the receiving parent’s residence. On July 11, 2023, Mr. Turner withdrew, and Attorneys Kristen B. Amonette and Rylie L. Newell entered an appearance as counsel for Wife. On October 25, 2023, Ms. Amonette and Ms. Newell withdrew, and Attorney Venus Niner entered an appearance as counsel for Wife. On December 22, 2023, Wife filed a motion seeking an order requiring Husband to submit to a mental evaluation and requiring that his parenting time be supervised. In her motion, Wife alleged that Husband abused her emotionally, physically, and sexually during the marriage, sometimes in the Child’s presence. On January 11, 2024, Husband responded and denied Wife’s abuse allegations. He noted that Wife had never made these allegations during the “several contested hearings” conducted by the trial court regarding the parenting schedule and other parenting issues. Husband revealed that in the summer of 2023, a detective with the Franklin Police Department (“FPD”) informed him that Wife had accused him of abusing her in 2021. Husband also revealed that around that same time in the summer of 2023, a detective from New Jersey informed him that Wife had accused him of abusing her in 2016. Husband averred that he submitted to an interview with the FPD detective, and the local district attorney thereafter declined to prosecute the case. He also stated that there had been no further action taken against him by the State of New Jersey. On January 18, 2024, the trial court heard Wife’s motion and denied it due to Wife’s failure to comply with the relevant local rules of practice; however, the trial court stated that Wife could refile her motion should she wish to do so. The trial court entered an order to that effect on March 5, 2024. On February 21, 2024, Ms. Niner filed a motion to withdraw as Wife’s counsel and stated that “communication has broken down such that it is not appropriate for counsel to continue representing” Wife. Ms. Niner’s motion was heard on March 28, 2024, and the trial court entered an order on May 6, 2024, explaining that Ms. Niner had stated “that she had ethical reasons for her withdrawal from this matter” and finding that “although Ms. Niner’s withdrawal will be prejudicial in some ways to Wife, that prejudice is in large part self-inflicted by Wife[.]” The trial court sua sponte set the case as a first setting for a two-day bench trial to be held on July 23–24, 2024. On April 15, 2024, Attorney Catherine T. Mekis entered an appearance as counsel for Wife. 1 The child was not yet of school age. -2-  On July 15, 2024, Wife filed an emergency motion to continue the trial because her father, Veera Bhardra Rao Arja, whom she identified as “a key witness in this matter[,]” was hospitalized in Texas. An agreed order was entered on July 23, 2024, resetting the case as a first setting for a two-day bench trial to be held on October 7–8, 2024. On September 23, 2024, Husband filed an emergency motion asking the trial court to make a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) determination regarding the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction and for instructions after Wife obtained an ex parte temporary protective order in Georgia awarding her sole physical custody of the Child and prohibiting Husband from coming within 500 yards of Wife and the Child. Attached to Husband’s motion was a petition for temporary protective order filed by Wife with the Georgia court on September 19, 2024. In her petition, Wife referenced the incidents that she alleges occurred in New Jersey in 2016 and in Tennessee in 2021. She also alleged that Husband had “made unwanted physical contact with [her] during child custody exchanges[.]” A police report was also attached to Wife’s petition reflecting that on January 23, 2024, Wife reported to the Gwinnett County (Georgia) Police Department that Husband had raped her in Georgia on June 12, 2019. Nowhere in the petition does Wife inform the Georgia court that there was ongoing litigation involving the parties and the Child in Tennessee. Instead, Wife’s petition states that the Child was currently in her custody and control. In reality, Husband was exercising parenting time at his home in Georgia when he was served with Wife’s petition on September 19, and law enforcement officers removed the Child from Husband’s home and delivered him to Wife, who had traveled to Georgia to file the petition. The trial court heard Husband’s emergency motion on October 1, 2024, and entered an order memorializing its rulings on October 7, 2024. The Georgia trial court judge joined the hearing electronically and indicated that she intended to modify the temporary protective order (1) to allow the parties to be present in the courthouse together for purposes of the divorce trial, and (2) to strike those portions of the order granting Wife temporary sole custody of the Child and prohibiting Husband from having contact with the Child. Accordingly, the Tennessee trial court ordered that Wife bring the Child with her when she traveled to Tennessee for the trial so the Child could be delivered to Husband and remain in his physical custody pending further orders. On October 7, the first day of trial, the trial court heard preliminary matters, opening statements, and the direct examination of Husband. On the morning of October 8, the trial court allowed Wife to call her father as a witness out of turn. However, Wife’s counsel was suffering from a stomach virus that morning and was only able to make it through sixteen minutes of questioning Wife’s father before the trial court recessed the trial indefinitely due to counsel’s illness. The trial court entered an order on October 8 granting Husband sole legal and physical custody of the Child. -3-  On November 7, 2024, the trial court entered a Case Management Order scheduling the bench trial to resume on December 9, 2024. Notably, the order also stated: At the time this case recessed, Wife’s father was testifying. He was doing so with the assistance of a legal interpreter because he is not a native English speaker and his facility with the English language is insufficient for him to testify under oath. He is also a citizen and resident of the Republic of India. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(a), and Rule 32.01(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, Wife’s father is unavailable as a witness to testify in person at the resumption of the trial. Therefore, the parties have leave to take the deposition of Wife’s father for any lawful use permitted by law including as a substitute for his in-person testimony at trial. Nothing in this order shall be construed to prohibit the parties from reaching a stipulation of expected testimony for Wife’s father. This finding that Wife’s father was unavailable appears to have been made sua sponte;2 however, the record does not reflect that Wife asked the trial court to amend the order or otherwise objected to it. The parties agreed to depose Wife’s father on December 2, 2024, one week before the trial was scheduled to resume. This deposition ultimately never occurred. Instead, on November 21, 2024, Ms. Mekis filed a motion to withdraw as Wife’s counsel. The motion stated that Ms. Mekis’s request was “required by the Rules of Professional Conduct” and asked that Wife be granted thirty days to obtain new counsel or prepare to proceed pro se. Husband responded to Ms. Mekis’s motion on December 2, 2024. He explained that he had been arrested in Georgia on November 26, 2024, after Wife reported to law enforcement in Texas that Husband had assaulted her during a custody exchange at a Texas airport on August 24, 2024. As a result, on November 27, 2024, Husband was charged with indecent assault and stalking under Texas law and was being held in Georgia awaiting extradition to Texas. Husband opposed Wife’s request for a continuance and requested that Ms. Mekis be required to disclose additional information regarding her request to withdraw in the event she was aware that Wife was attempting to perpetrate fraud upon the court. The trial court heard the motion to withdraw on December 5, 2024, just four days before trial was scheduled to resume. During the hearing, it became evident that Wife did not notify Ms. Mekis of the alleged assault in a Texas airport until November 21, 2024. The trial court and Husband’s counsel repeatedly asked Ms. Mekis about the timing of her motion and whether it related to Wife’s most recent allegations, but Ms. Mekis would only respond that the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited her from answering their 2 This order was apparently the result of a case management conference between the trial court and the parties’ respective counsel, but the record does not include a transcript of that conference. -4- questions. The trial court then began questioning Wife, and the following exchanges occurred: THE COURT: Are there any questions, the answers to which you want to make sure are in the record, for purposes of me deciding Ms. Mekis’ Motion to Withdraw? [WIFE]: I do not have any questions. I asked her the questions I wanted to during our conversations before she made -- after she made the decision. THE COURT: Okay. But understand, I don’t know what those answers were, so I have to make my decision based only on what’s presented to me, . . . if you think that what Ms. Mekis said to you is relevant, and would help me decide the motion, the only way for you to inform me of what those facts are is to ask Ms. Mekis questions so that she can answer them. Obviously, I don’t have any knowledge of what the two of you-all talked about, but if you think that what you-all talked about is relevant, and if you think it’s something that I need to know, this is your only opportunity to present it to me. [WIFE]: Well, obviously I did tell [] Ms. Mekis about the arrest warrant prior, and I think that’s one of the reasons that drove her to withdraw herself. MS. MEKIS: Your Honor, can I just state for the record that any of those communications would be covered under attorney-client privilege and therefore, I don’t believe -- THE COURT: Well, Ms. Mekis [], the privilege belongs to [Wife]. It doesn’t belong to you. *** [WIFE]: -- after the protection order -- the temporary protection order was granted, and the way that you have reacted, giving away the temporary sole custody to the father without even letting me talk on what has happened, it did concern [Ms. Mekis] on how you would react if you get to know about the arrest warrants on him. And she said they could put her in adverse position if she continues to represent me in my case, and I think she probably was doing it for the sake of time -- well, I don’t know the legalities or any of the rules that are being spoken about, but it is that explanation that was given to me. -5-  THE COURT: All right. So did Ms. -- now please understand, you do not have to tell me anything that you and Ms. Mekis discussed. That’s between you and Ms. Mekis. It’s confidential, and the confidentiality of that belongs to you. [WIFE]: Okay. Yeah. I just want to say that because I know the previous attorney I had with -- who withdrew, also had the similar reason like this, and I know the reasons that they have on the motions are very vague. It kind of looks bad on me even though -- yeah, I don’t -- I don’t think [Ms.] Mekis was necessarily trying to take any position that would impact me in a negative way, but it’s -- it’s just what has happened. *** [HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: Ms. Mekis, when did [Wife] tell you about the Texas charges? MS. MEKIS: Again, Your Honor, I believe, even with [Wife’s] statements, I do not believe that I can answer that question pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct. *** THE COURT: Well Ms. Mekis, I’ve -- I conclude, as a matter of law, that with respect to a conversation between [Wife] and you on the topic of the “arrest warrants,” she has waived the attorney-client privilege, at least with respect to when that conversation occurred. And I’m going to order you to answer that question, if you remember the date, or if you can reconstruct that date. When did that conversation occur? MS. MEKIS: And Your Honor, I’m not trying to be difficult, but I am -- *** MS. MEKIS: -- I am running a very thin line. Could I request just a brief recess so that I can get clarification from the board about whether or not I’m allowed to answer that question? THE COURT: You may. The trial court then recessed Ms. Mekis’s testimony but continued with the hearing. The court stated, “I do have a couple of questions that I want to get the answers to, that do -6- not involve Ms. Mekis[,]” and asked if Husband objected to Wife’s motion for a continuance. Husband objected to the continuance because the parties were already in the middle of trial and because Ms. Mekis is wife’s fifth attorney in this matter. Her fourth attorney withdrew under similar circumstances, after filing a motion for a mental evaluation and supervised parenting time by [Husband]. And then the Court denied that motion, gave [Wife] an opportunity to refile properly that motion. Instead of refiling that motion -- it was Ms. Niner at the time -- filed a motion to withdraw, also citing mandatory ethical reasons. . . . To the extent that there is any prejudice in this matter, [Wife] has caused this prejudice for herself, by her own actions that have put her able counsel, . . . in a position where she can no longer ethically continue representing her because of [Wife’s] actions. Judge, I am asking that we go forward on Monday and Tuesday, because . . . if the Court makes credibility findings, those are vitally important for my client. The prejudice is with my client right now. He is sitting in jail in Georgia. . . . After some additional back and forth about Wife’s request for a continuance, Ms. Mekis returned to the hearing and the following exchange occurred: MS. MEKIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you for permitting me that opportunity. Upon speaking with the board, I am able to answer your question that you had -- or actually, I guess it was [Husband’s counsel’s] question -- that that phone conversation, the date of that phone conversation was November 21st. THE COURT: Okay. [HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: The date of your conversation with [Wife] when she informed you about the Texas warrants was November 21st; is that right? MS. MEKIS: I had a phone conversation with her on November 21st. The trial court orally granted Ms. Mekis’s motion to withdraw and denied Wife’s motion for a continuance. The trial court noted that Wife’s father had not been deposed -7- and that no stipulation of his anticipated testimony had been filed but reminded the parties that a stipulation could be filed prior to the trial resuming on December 9. The trial court then conducted a hearing on its sua sponte motion regarding temporary pendente lite custody of the parties’ child, during which Wife testified about her various abuse allegations against Husband. On December 9, 2024, the trial court entered a written order, nunc pro tunc to December 5, memorializing its rulings from the hearing and finding in relevant part: 1. Ms. Mekis’s Motion to Withdraw is granted effective immediately pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(f). Ms. Mekis shall, consistent with any ethical obligations she has, produce her file to Wife. 2. Wife’s oral motion for a continuance of the trial is denied. To the extent that there is any prejudice to Wife as a result of her attorney’s withdrawal in the middle of trial, that prejudice has been brought upon by Wife’s own actions which Wife knew would preclude her attorney from being able to ethically continue representing her. Nor is this the first time Wife has placed her counsel in such a position, as a prior counsel has also been forced to withdraw for mandatory ethical reasons. *** 11. The Court had at least two conferences pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 16 with counsel to get the case situated so trial could be completed on December 9 and 10, 2024. Counsel for both parties were working together cooperatively and collegially to bring the case to trial, when once again the Court’s custody orders were disrupted again by Wife’s actions. This time it was her initiating criminal charges against Husband in the state of Texas. *** 13. This Court heard the sworn testimony of Wife . . . . Specifically, Wife was questioned about the allegations she made against Husband in Tarrant County, Texas to the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Police Department regarding the charges of indecent assault [] and stalking []. 14. The Court finds that Wife is incapable of credibly relaying the events that form the basis of her allegations against Husband in Texas. 15. In response to a careful examination, it is clear that Wife has over the course of several years made allegations of sexual assault, each of which occurred several years prior to the date of the accusation. To wit, in -8-  summer 2023, Wife accused Husband of sexual abuse that allegedly occurred in 2016 in New Jersey; in summer 2023, Wife accused Husband of sexual abuse that allegedly occurred in 2021 in Tennessee; in January 2024, Wife accused Husband of sexual abuse that allegedly occurred in 2019 in Georgia. 16. It is also clear to this Court that Wife’s allegations of indecent assault in Texas are unsupported by any credible evidence. *** 23. On November 21, 2024, Wife informed her lawyer that she intended to make, or had already made, the criminal accusations against Husband in Texas. This is the same day that the ethical conflict arose for Ms. Mekis. 24. The temporal sequence of events supports the circumstantial inference that Wife is motivated for an improper purpose, and that the actions in Texas are in retaliation for what she perceived as Husband’s ostensible withdrawal of a contact visit [with the Child] on October 16, 2024. 25. The evidence also supports the reasonable inference that Ms. Mekis’s withdrawal for ethical reasons arises out of, or is related to, Wife’s swearing initiating criminal complaints against Husband in Texas. On December 8, 2024, the day before trial resumed, Wife’s current counsel, Attorney Shannon L. Crutcher, entered a Notice of Limited Scope Representation stating that Wife would proceed pro se at the bench trial and that counsel would only participate in the trial “to provide Wife advice on evidentiary and procedural matters.” Wife renewed her motion for continuance at the beginning of the day on December 9, denied making any false allegations against Husband, and argued that she was incapable of representing herself. After hearing arguments of Wife and Husband’s counsel, the trial court orally denied the motion and stated that it would “enter a written order laying out in greater detail the reasons for that” denial. No such order was ever entered. At the beginning of Wife’s case-in-chief, she stated that she intended to call herself and her father to testify, which led to the following exchange: THE COURT: Well, I’ve already determined that your father is not available. [WIFE]: We have an interpreter available, Judge. -9-  THE COURT: Ma’am, look, I’ve already determined that it is not reasonably practicable for the Court to receive your father’s testimony in open court, and I’m not going to go back and revisit that. Nothing has materially changed since then so I’m not -- I’m just not going to do it. . . . The trial court asked Wife again whether she had a deposition transcript or stipulation of her father’s expected testimony to offer the court. She did not. On April 4, 2025, the trial court entered a detailed Memorandum and Order granting the parties a divorce, awarding Husband various monetary judgments against Wife, and designating Husband as the Child’s primary residential parent. Wife timely appeals to this Court. ISSUES Wife raises two issues on appeal, which we restate slightly: 1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Wife’s motions to continue the trial. 2. Whether the trial court erred by finding that Wife’s father was unavailable to testify at trial. Husband raises one issue on appeal, which we restate slightly: Whether he should be awarded his appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c). STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court. In re Anna W., No. W2022-00657-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 17820763, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2022) (citing State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. V.N., 279 S.W.3d 306, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). Therefore, we review such a decision for an abuse of discretion. Likewise, we review a trial court’s determination that a witness is unavailable to testify for an abuse of discretion. Buckley v. Carlock, 652 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Hicks v. State, 490 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972)). The abuse of discretion standard of review “reflects an awareness that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable alternatives.” Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)). Accordingly, “[u]nder the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s ruling ‘will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to propriety of the decision made.’” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tenn. 2000)); State v. - 10 - Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tenn. 2000)). “Indeed, when reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, the ‘appellate courts should begin with the presumption that the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision.’” Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)). This presumption notwithstanding, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it causes an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaching an illogical decision, or by resolving the case ‘on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 524). Finally, we give great deference to a trial court’s credibility findings: When credibility and weight to be given testimony are involved, considerable deference must be afforded to the trial court when the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and to hear in-court testimony. Estate of Walton v. Young, 950 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. 1996)). Because trial courts are able to observe the witnesses, assess their demeanor, and evaluate other indicators of credibility, an assessment of credibility will not be overturned on appeal absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Wells v. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999). Walker v. Pawlik, No. M2013-00861-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5781565, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2013) (quoting Hughes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tenn. 2011)). DISCUSSION a. It is well-settled in Tennessee that [d]ecisions regarding the granting or denial of a continuance are fact-specific and should be viewed in the context of all existing circumstances present at the time of the party’s request for continuance. In order to prove that a requested continuance is justified, the party requesting the continuance must supply some strong excuse for postponing the trial date. When considering a motion for continuance, the following factors are relevant to the trial court’s decision: (1) the length of time the proceeding has been pending, (2) the reason for the continuance, (3) the diligence of the party seeking the continuance, and (4) the prejudice to the requesting party if the continuance is not granted. - 11 - Holley v. Ortiz, No. M2015-01432-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 729754, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2017) (quoting Tidwell v. Burkes, No. M2015-01270-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 3771553, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016)). It is also “well-settled that there is no absolute right to counsel in a civil trial.” Bell v. Todd, 206 S.W.3d 86, 92 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Knight v. Knight, 11 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Memphis Bd. of Realtors v. Cohen, 786 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). Wife argues that (1) it was not her fault that the trial had previously been continued in July 2024 and again in October 2024, (2) she had no control over when the trial court heard Ms. Mekis’s motion to withdraw, (3) she acted diligently in seeking a continuance, and (4) Husband would not have been prejudiced by the grant of a continuance, but Wife was prejudiced because English is not her native language and she was “nervous, unprepared and intimidated by the process.” Despite having elbow counsel, Wife argues that she “was at a significant disadvantage at trial.” We view these facts in a different light. Although the proceeding had only been pending for two years, Wife’s hostility toward Husband throughout the proceeding ramped up with every additional delay in the case. Wife’s newly asserted allegations against Husband culminated in him being arrested and jailed in Georgia for over three weeks while he awaited extradition to Texas. In fact, Wife’s allegations resulted in the Child being removed from Husband’s physical custody twice: first when she traveled to Georgia to obtain the ex parte temporary protective order and again when Husband was arrested due to her report to Texas law enforcement. Although the trial court will ultimately retain jurisdiction to continue hearing any parenting issues that arise between these parties, Husband and the Child were entitled to the level of finality that a trial would bring. Moreover, Wife requested a continuance because her counsel was forced to withdraw only days before trial was to resume due to ethical reasons created by Wife. We note that Ms. Mekis was Wife’s fifth attorney in the two years this litigation was pending, and both Wife’s fourth attorney and fifth attorney were forced to withdraw for ethical reasons: Ms. Niner in February 2024 and Ms. Mekis in November 2024. Any prejudice that Wife suffered as a result of her counsel’s withdrawal was by her own design. Wife’s pattern of obtaining new counsel every few months and then ultimately creating ethical conflicts requiring her last two attorneys to withdraw does not constitute a strong excuse for postponing the trial date. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion to continue, and we affirm. b. Wife next argues that the trial court erred in finding that her father was unavailable to testify. As the Tennessee Supreme Court recently reiterated, - 12 -  [a]n erroneous exclusion of evidence requires reversal only if the evidence would have affected the outcome of the trial had it been admitted. Pankow v. Mitchell, 737 S.W.2d 293, 297–98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). Reviewing courts cannot make this determination without knowing what the excluded evidence would have been. Stacker v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 106 Tenn. 450, 61 S.W. 766, 766 (1901); Davis v. Hall, 920 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Pendergrass, 795 S.W.2d 150, 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). Accordingly, the party challenging the exclusion of evidence must make an offer of proof to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the trial court’s exclusion of proffered evidence was reversible error. Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); State v. Goad, 707 S.W.2d 846, 853 (Tenn. 1986); Harwell v. Walton, 820 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Appellate courts will not consider issues relating to the exclusion of evidence when this tender of proof has not been made. Dickey v. McCord, 63 S.W.3d 714, 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 971 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Shepherd v. Perkins Builders, 968 S.W.2d 832, 833–34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Schuchardt v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 740 S.W.3d 899, 923 (Tenn. 2026) (emphasis added). Here, Wife made no offer of proof as to her father’s excluded testimony. Accordingly, we are unable to review the excluded evidence and thus cannot determine whether its exclusion would have affected the outcome of the trial had it been admitted. In the absence of this tender of proof, this issue has been waived. c. Finally, Husband argues that he is entitled to his attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c): A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees, which may be fixed and allowed in the court’s discretion, from the nonprevailing party in any criminal or civil contempt action or other proceeding to enforce, alter, change, or modify any decree of alimony, child support, or provision of a permanent parenting plan order, or in any suit or action concerning the adjudication of the custody or change of custody of any children, both upon the original divorce hearing and at any subsequent hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). This statute also applies to attorney’s fees incurred on appeal in such actions. Strickland v. Strickland, 644 S.W.3d 620, 635–36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Paschedag v. Paschedag, No. M2016-00864-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2365014, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2017)). Although Wife does not directly appeal the trial court’s child custody determination, Wife asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s - 13 - judgment altogether and remand this matter for a new trial. Because a reversal in this matter would require the trial court to once again adjudicate custody of the Child, this appeal qualifies as an action concerning the adjudication of child custody. Husband asserts that the trial court’s conclusion as to the merits of the underlying case was correct, but he does not argue that Wife’s appellate arguments are frivolous or made in bad faith. Although Wife does not prevail on appeal, her arguments were not so baseless as to be deemed frivolous. Moreover, as the parties note in their briefs, Husband’s gross monthly income exceeds Wife’s by $1,309, and Wife is already obligated to pay Husband $220 per month in child support and $1,000 per month to liquidate the judgment awarded to Husband by the trial court. “In determining whether an award for attorney’s fees is warranted, we should consider, among other factors, the ability of the requesting party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees, the requesting party’s success on appeal, and whether the requesting party has been acting in good faith.” Shofner v. Shofner, 181 S.W.3d 703, 719 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Parchman v. Parchman, No. W2003-01204-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2609198, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov.17, 2004)). In exercising our discretion in light of the record and arguments before us, we conclude that this is not a case in which an award of appellate attorney’s fees to Husband is warranted. CONCLUSION The judgment of the Chancery Court for Williamson County is hereby affirmed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Jaahnavi Arja, for which execution may issue if necessary. _________________________________ KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE - 14 -