Fair Lane Properties, LLC v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketM2025-01495-COA-R3-CV
JudgeJudge Andy D. Bennett
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/16/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
September 1, 2026 Session
FAIR LANE PROPERTIES, LLC V. THE METROPOLITAN
GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
No. 24-1403-IV Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor
No. M2025-01495-COA-R3-CV
A property owner brought multiple claims against a city based upon the city’s imposition
of paving conditions on the owner’s building permit. The trial court concluded that the
claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. We have determined that the
trial court erred in dismissing the property owner’s claims.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed
and Remanded
ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,
JR., C.J., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.
Dominick R. Smith and David Randolph Smith, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,
Fair Lane Properties, LLC.
J. Brooks Fox and Benjamin A. Puckett, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee,
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.
OPINION
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fair Lane Properties, LLC (“Fair Lane”) owned real property at 760, 762, 764, and
766 Alloway Street in Davidson County. On November 22, 2024, Fair Lane filed a
complaint against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
(“Metro”) alleging unconstitutional permitting conditions and asserting the following
causes of action: (1) declaratory relief for an unconstitutional taking without just
compensation, and (2) a common law writ of certiorari requesting an order for the return
of construction costs pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-303(b)(4), (d)(1). The complaint
alleged the following key facts:
As a condition of building permit numbers 2022040409, 2022040413,
2022040126 and 2022040122, Metro unlawfully required Fair Lane
Properties, LLC, through its contractor, Haven Builders, LLC to pay over
$69,000 to pave: the entire street/right-of-way in front of the property
(Alloway Street); the entire alley to the west of the property (Alley No. 402);
and the entire alley to the north of the property (Alley No. 656).
The complaint also included a photograph of a portion of a permitting document referred
to by the parties as “the Revetta Markup,” which includes a construction drawing of Fair
Lane’s project with notations by Metro of paving requirements.
On March 3, 2025, Fair Lane filed a first amended complaint adding the following
causes of action: (3) violation of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, (4) violation of the takings clause of the Tennessee Constitution, (5)
inverse condemnation, and (6) unjust enrichment. Metro then filed a motion to dismiss the
first amended complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), asserting that Fair Lane’s
constitutional claims and common law writ of certiorari were time-barred and that the claim
for unjust enrichment was barred by sovereign immunity. In opposing dismissal, Fair Lane
argued that its claims were timely and viable; in the alternative, it argued that the court
should remand its claims to the board of zoning appeals.
After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on August 27, 2025, granting Metro’s
motion to dismiss. The court considered the full version of the Alloway Street plan
referenced by Fair Lane in its complaint, and reasoned that, “because the Alloway Street
plan was referred to in the Complaint, it is a part of the pleadings.” The court determined
that count I (declaratory judgment), count III (federal law taking), count IV (state law
taking), and count V (inverse condemnation) were barred by the applicable one-year statute
of limitations. Further, the court decided that count II (common law writ of certiorari) was
barred by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102, which requires a petition for writ of certiorari to
be filed within sixty days from the relevant order or judgment. Finally, the trial court
concluded that count IV (unjust enrichment) was barred by sovereign immunity. Therefore,
the court dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
Fair Lane appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in
considering matters outside the pleadings without converting the Rule 12 motion to a Rule
56 motion; (2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing Fair Lane’s state law takings
claim based on the statute of limitations; (3) whether the trial court erred in dismissing Fair
Lane’s federal takings claim based on the statute of limitations; (4) whether the trial court
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erred in dismissing Fair Lane’s restitution claim as time-barred; (5) whether the trial court
erred in failing to remand this case to the Board of Zoning Appeals, Planning Commission,
or other final decision maker within Metro. Metro raises the additional issue of whether
the trial court correctly concluded that Fair Lane’s petition for common law writ of
certiorari under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-303 was untimely and jurisdictionally defective
because it was not filed within sixty days of any Metro Nashville decision and was not
verified as required by law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The propriety of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim presents a question of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of
correctness. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 894-95 (Tenn. 2011).
ANALYSIS
We must determine whether the trial court erred in dismissing Fair Lane’s first five
claims.1
Metro moved to dismiss Fair Lane’s claims as time-barred under the applicable
statutes of limitations, a defense that may be raised under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength
of the plaintiff’s case. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Human., Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422,
426 (Tenn. 2011); Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tenn.
2002). In filing a motion to dismiss, a defendant “‘admits the truth of all of the relevant
and material allegations contained in the complaint, but . . . asserts that the allegations fail
to establish a cause of action.’” Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426 (quoting Brown v. Tenn. Title
Loans, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tenn. 2010)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss,
courts are to “‘construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true
and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’” Id. (quoting Tigg v. Pirelli
Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31-32 (Tenn. 2007)). A motion to dismiss should be granted
“‘only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.’” Id. (quoting Crews v. Buckman Lab’ys Int’l, Inc.,
78 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tenn. 2002)).
1
Neither party has challenged the propriety of the trial court’s ruling that count VI, for unjust
enrichment, was barred by sovereign immunity.
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I. State law taking claims
In counts IV and V of its complaint, Fair Lane asserted state law claims for an
unconstitutional taking pursuant to article I, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution2 and
the statutes governing inverse condemnation. The trial court determined that Fair Lane’s
state law taking claims accrued on October 4, 2022, “when Metro finalized the plans and
communicated them to Fair Lane,” and therefore dismissed these claims as barred by the
statute of limitations.
Our Supreme Court determined, in Phillips v. Montgomery County, 442 S.W.3d
233, 236 (Tenn. 2014), that article I, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution
“encompasses regulatory takings in the same manner as the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” The concept of a regulatory taking is that
“governmental action which diminishes private property rights, but which does not amount
to a direct appropriation or physical invasion of private property, may constitute a taking
that necessitates the payment of ‘just compensation.’” Id. at 239 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)). Tennessee’s inverse condemnation statute, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-16-123, was enacted to implement the protections of article I, section 21
to enable a landowner to “recover[ ] just compensation for a taking of property when
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted.” See Phillips, 442 S.W.3d at 243 n.12
(citation modified).
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-124 provides the statute of limitations for
claims of inverse condemnation:
All actions that could be brought under § 29-16-123(a), regardless of the
cause of action or remedy sought, including actions for trespass or nuisance,
shall be commenced within twelve (12) months after the land has been
actually taken possession of, and the work of the proposed internal
improvement begun; saving, however, to unknown owners and nonresidents,
twelve (12) months after actual knowledge of such occupation, not exceeding
three (3) years, and saving to persons under the disabilities of infancy and
unsoundness of mind, twelve (12) months after such disability is removed,
but not exceeding ten (10) years.
Thus, “landowners have twelve months from the triggering event to commence an action
for inverse condemnation.” B & B Enters. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, No.
M2008-00572-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 130188, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009), aff’d,
318 S.W.3d 839 (Tenn. 2010). This Court has previously stated that, “The triggering event
2
Article I, § 21 of the Tennessee Constitution states: “That no man’s particular services shall be
demanded, or property taken, or applied to public use, without the consent of his representatives, or without
just compensation being made therefor.”
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in a regulatory takings case is the date the landowner knew that the government was
depriving it of the economic use of its property.” STS/BAC Joint Venture v. City of Mt.
Juliet, No. M2003-00171-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2752809, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 1,
2004). A landowner “must file their suit within one year after they know or reasonably
should have known that a taking has occurred.” B & B Enters. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City
of Lebanon, 318 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Tenn. 2010).
Fair Lane and Metro present differing arguments as to when the taking occurred in
this case. Fair Lane asserts that it was not deprived of the economic use of its property
until, at the earliest, the date when the paving work began. Metro takes the position that
the taking occurred on October 4, 2022, the date upon which the Revetta Markup was
signed by Jacob Revetta, a technical specialist with Metro’s Department of Transportation.
The Revetta Markup shows at least some of the paving requirements placed upon Fair
Lane’s project by Metro. The document includes a notation that, “This check is only for
general conformance with the requirements of the Nashville Department of
Transportation.”
Only a portion of the Revetta Markup appears in Fair Lane’s complaint, and the
parties disagree as to whether the trial court erred in considering the entirety of this
document. We need not address that issue because, even if the trial court properly
considered the entire Revetta Markup, the document does not establish that Fair Lane knew
or should have known on October 4, 2022, that it had been deprived of the economic use
of its property (namely, the cost of paving the alleys at issue). Mr. Revetta signed the
markup on October 4, 2022, but the document gives no indication of when the paving
requirements were communicated to Fair Lane. Therefore, the allegations in the complaint
do not establish that the statute of limitations barred Fair Lane’s state law taking claims,
and the trial court erred in granting Metro’s motion to dismiss these claims.3 See Jackson
v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491-92 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Estate
of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 404 (Tenn. 2002)) (“For a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion
to be used as a vehicle to assert an affirmative defense, the applicability of the defense must
‘clearly and unequivocally appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.’”).
II. Federal law taking claim
Fair Lane also claimed a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s taking clause pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court again relied upon October 4, 2022, “when Metro
finalized the plans and communicated them to Fair Lane without contemporaneous
compensation,” as the accrual date for the statute of limitations and dismissed the § 1983
claim.
3
Fair Lane also argues that the Revetta Markup was not a final decision by Metro and, therefore, does
not mark the date of accrual. Given our determination that the Revetta Markup did not evidence notice to
Fair Lane, we need not consider Fair Lane’s other arguments.
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The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is determined by the state statute of
limitations for personal injury claims. Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d
631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). In this case, the applicable statute of limitations is one year
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The accrual date for § 1983 claims is a matter of
federal law. Beaver St. Invs., LLC v. Summit Cnty., Ohio, 65 F.4th 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2023).
As a general rule, the statute of limitations for such claims begins to run “when a ‘“plaintiff
has a complete and present cause of action.”’” Id. (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
388 (2007) (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp.
of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997))). The plaintiff’s cause of action is complete ‘“when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’” Id.
(quoting Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Fair Lane and Metro take the same positions with respect to the accrual of the federal
taking claim as they did for the state law taking claims. And, we reach the same
conclusion—namely, that the trial court erred in dismissing this claim because, contrary to
the trial court’s characterization, the Revetta Markup does not show that it was
communicated to Fair Lane.
III. Declaratory judgment claim
In count I of its complaint, Fair Lane sought a declaratory judgment that the paving
conditions imposed by Metro violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and article I, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. Declaratory
judgment actions are subject to the same statute of limitations applicable to the underlying
claims. Elvis Presley Enters. v. City of Memphis, No. W2109-00299-COA-R3-CV, 2022
WL 854860, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2022). Therefore, for the same reasons
discussed above, the trial court erred in dismissing the declaratory judgment action as time-
barred.
IV. Common law writ of certiorari
In count II of its amended complaint, Fair Lane petitioned for a common law writ
of certiorari pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-303(d)(1),4 and requested “an order
requiring return of construction costs incurred in violation of this section.”
As the trial court discussed in its order, a common law writ of certiorari is appellate
in nature and requires “the record of the inferior tribunal [to be] brought before the court
to determine whether the inferior tribunal proceeded according to the applicable law.” State
4
In both the original complaint and the amended complaint, Fair Lane cited “Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-
303(b)(4)(d)(1).” From the context, we infer that the intended citation was to Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-
303(d)(1).
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v. Farris, 562 S.W.3d 432, 442, 447-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). The purpose of the common
law writ of certiorari is to “curb ‘illegal’ actions by the inferior tribunal.” Id. at 441 (citing
Lawrence A. Pivnick, TENN. CIR. CT. PRAC. § 3:13 (2017)). The statute cited by Fair Lane
concerns a planning commission’s adoption of subdivision regulations and provides, in
pertinent part:
the planning commission shall not require an owner of private property to
dedicate real property to the public, or pay money to a public entity in an
amount that is determined on an individual and discretionary basis, unless
there is an essential nexus between the dedication or payment and a
legitimate local governmental interest and the dedication or payment is
roughly proportional both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
use or development of the property. An owner of private property required
to make a dedication or pay money in violation of this subdivision (d)(1) may
seek relief through a common law writ of certiorari in chancery court.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-4-303(d)(1). This provision contemplates use of the common law
writ of certiorari to examine the propriety of the planning commission’s actions. In the
present case, there is no action by a planning commission or other tribunal and, therefore,
no record to be brought before the chancery court.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102 requires that a party seeking a common
law writ of certiorari file it “within sixty (60) days from the entry of the order or judgment.”
Relying on this statute, the trial court found Fair Lane’s claim barred and dismissed it on
that basis. We cannot agree with the trial court’s conclusion that, for purposes of filing an
action for a common law writ of certiorari, Metro’s decision regarding the paving
conditions was final on October 4, 2022. There was no decision by a planning commission
or a board or tribunal of any kind for the chancery court to review on that date. Moreover,
as previously discussed, Fair Lane’s complaint does not establish that it was notified of
Metro’s decision on that date. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in
dismissing the claim for a common law writ based on the statute of limitations.
We find it significant that, before dismissing Fair Lane’s common law writ claim as
barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court stated: “Being presented with an
improperly joined original action with an appellate action, the Court could sever the actions
or dismiss the original action.” We agree with the trial court that Fair Lane’s inclusion of
original claims (all of the other claims included in its complaint) in conjunction with the
writ of certiorari action is problematic. Because of the appellate nature of the common law
writ of certiorari, Tennessee courts have generally held that “a litigant may not bring claims
invoking the original jurisdiction of the Chancery Court when he or she has initiated the
proceedings by seeking a writ of certiorari.” Farris, 562 S.W.3d at 447. Thus, in State v.
Farris, this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s regulatory taking
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claim because it had been joined with a common law writ of certiorari. Id. On remand, the
trial court will need to address this issue.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded. Costs of this
appeal are assessed against the appellee, the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and
Davidson County.
/s/ Andy D. Bennett
ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE
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