Heather Rohmfeld Neisen v. Matthew Rohmfeld

11/12/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs August 4, 2025 HEATHER ROHMFELD NEISEN v. MATTHEW ROHMFELD Appeal from the Chancery Court for Rutherford County No. 18CV-1946 Bonita Jo Atwood, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2024-00784-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to modify the existing parenting plan. She concedes that a material change in circumstances existed sufficient to warrant a change in the primary residential parent. But she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the statutory best interest factors to the evidence at trial and adopting a parenting plan that failed to maximize her parenting time. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the court’s decision as modified. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed as Modified W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., joined. Adam Zanetis, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Heather Neisen. Allison Renfro, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Matthew Rohmfeld. OPINION I. A. A Texas district court issued a final divorce decree for Heather Rohmfeld Neisen (“Mother”) and Matthew Rohmfeld (“Father”) in 2017. The decree incorporated an agreed parenting plan for their three minor children, Cailin, Kylie, and Miranda. During the divorce proceedings, Mother and the children moved to Tennessee, where Mother’s boyfriend lived. Father remained in Texas. Under the Texas parenting plan, Mother had primary custody of the children. Father had residential parenting time one weekend per month, every spring break, 42 days during the summer, and specified holidays. If he chose to exercise his parenting time in Texas, the parents agreed to split the children’s travel costs. Once the divorce was final, Mother married her boyfriend (“Stepfather”) and had another child, Hallie. Contrary to the agreed parenting plan, Mother insisted that Father exercise his parenting time with her new family in Tennessee. Although Father complied with this demand, he still had trouble exercising his parenting time. As he later explained, he often arrived for a scheduled visit only to discover that the children were unavailable. And his phone calls went unanswered. Father sought to enforce his visitation rights in both Texas and Tennessee. In 2018, a Texas court held Mother in criminal contempt for interference with Father’s parenting time. As this was Mother’s first criminal contempt conviction, the Texas court suspended her sentence, conditioned on future compliance. Father also registered the Texas custody decree for enforcement in Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-229, -230 (2026). Yet, according to Father, nothing changed. The conflict escalated a few years later. As the plan allowed, Father notified Mother that he planned to take the children to Texas for his spring break visitation. She immediately filed an emergency petition in Tennessee court seeking a temporary modification of the Texas plan.1 She allegedly feared for the children’s safety if Father exercised his visitation in Texas. According to her petition, Father only had sporadic contact with the children since the divorce; he had a history of alcohol abuse and erratic behavior; and he frequently associated with known sex offenders and other unsavory individuals. Based on Mother’s allegations, the Tennessee court issued an ex parte restraining order derailing Father’s spring break plan. But the court dissolved the order a few days later at the evidentiary hearing. It found Mother failed to show a likelihood of substantial harm to the children that would warrant a temporary modification of the current plan. See 1 Registration only empowered the Tennessee court to recognize and enforce the foreign decree. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-230(b). Except in emergencies, a Tennessee court may not modify another state’s child-custody determination unless certain statutory requirements are met. Id. §§ 36-6-218, -219 (2026); Kelso v. Decker, 262 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming the registration of a foreign custody decree but vacating its modification for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Here, those requirements were met. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-218. The children lived in Tennessee for five years before a modification petition was filed. See id. § 36-6-205(7) (2026) (defining a child’s home state). And the Texas court determined that Tennessee would be a more convenient forum. See id. § 36-6-218(1). So it ceded jurisdiction over this custody dispute to the Tennessee court. 2 id. § 36-6-405(b) (2026) (permitting a temporary modification if “the court finds that the child will be subject to a likelihood of substantial harm absent the temporary modification”); id. § 36-6-219(a) (2026) (granting temporary emergency jurisdiction to modify a foreign custody decree to protect the child). The court dismissed Mother’s petition and ordered her to have the children ready at 10 a.m. the next day for Father’s weekend visitation. Mother did not comply with the court’s directive. A few months later, Father petitioned the Tennessee court to hold Mother in criminal contempt for willful interference with his parenting time. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mother willfully interfered with Father’s parenting time in April, May, June, and July 2021. She did not have the children ready for Father’s April visit. And her phone communications with the children during the visit upset them so much that Father brought them home early. In May and June, Mother disrupted the scheduled weekend exchanges with more hostile outbursts. She accused Father of “legalized child abuse” and “legalized kidnapping” and made other inappropriate comments in front of the children. In July, Father took the children to Texas for his summer visitation. Mother instigated a welfare check at Father’s home, which revealed no cause for concern. Unconvinced, she then drove to Texas and demanded to see the children for herself. The court held Mother in criminal contempt and sentenced her to 40 days in jail. All but two days of her sentence were suspended. Based on Mother’s recent conduct, Father petitioned to modify the current plan. He asserted that Mother’s conduct constituted a material change of circumstances warranting a change in custody. While Father’s modification petition was pending, Mother’s latest counsel withdrew. She represented herself for about three months. In a flurry of perplexing pro se filings, she accused Father of psychologically abusing the children, claiming they showed signs of “Stockholm Syndrome,” “Residual Electra Complex Syndrome,” and/or “Domestic Abuse by Proxy.” She insisted that her ex-husband had “an extensive history of domestic abuse, histrionic behaviors, and substance abuse” as well as a “diagnosed personality disorder.” While in Father’s care, she maintained, the children were exposed “to batterers, sex offenders and drug manufacturers and traffickers.” She demanded the children’s immediate return and asked the court to restrict Father to supervised visitation in Tennessee. The court summarily denied those requests. Concerned about Mother’s increasingly erratic behavior, Father asked the court to order a Rule 35.01 examination to determine Mother’s mental and emotional fitness to parent. He also filed an emergency motion for temporary custody of the children, claiming the children were subject to emotional harm if returned to Mother’s custody. 3  The court issued an ex parte restraining order granting Father temporary custody of the children, effective July 15, 2022. After an evidentiary hearing,2 the court ruled that the restraint would remain in place pending the final hearing. The court found Father met his burden of proving a likelihood of substantial harm if the children were returned to Mother’s custody. In the court’s view, Mother’s abusive use of conflict created a danger of damage to the children’s emotional and psychological development. Proof at the hearing showed that Mother made false accusations of child sexual abuse against Father in Texas, prompting an unnecessary investigation. She made false statements to the police causing them to make multiple unfounded welfare checks while the children were with Father. Mother repeatedly disparaged Father and his new wife (“Stepmother”) to the children. She sent Father threatening messages. She prevented the children from contacting Father when they were in her custody. Yet during Father’s parenting time, she called and texted the children at all hours. This behavior continued even after the children asked her to stop. The court was concerned that Mother failed to recognize that her behavior was causing the children “some real emotional distress.” The court set parameters on the timing and content of Mother’s communication with children and Father. It also ordered Mother to submit to a Rule 35 evaluation with Dr. Stephen A. Montgomery, a psychiatrist at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, within thirty days. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 35.01 (permitting a court to order a party “to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner” under specified circumstances). Months later, Mother, through counsel, asked the court to reconsider its ruling. The court declined. It noted that Mother had made no effort in the ensuing months to address her emotional and mental instability. She had not submitted to the Rule 35 examination. She continued to disobey court orders and harass Father and the children. Given the tenor of her recent communiques, the court limited her to five messages to Father per day and warned her against any further disparagement, threats, and harassment. The court granted Mother eleven hours of supervised visitation in Texas, explaining that additional visitation was behavior dependent. Yet problems persisted. Father filed another petition for criminal contempt, complaining that Mother violated the court’s latest directive. Based on the proof presented at the hearing, the court held Mother in contempt for willfully violating its previous orders. It found proof that Mother violated the court-imposed constraints on her messages to Father and her statements to the children. The court sentenced Mother to 40 days in jail with credit for five days served. 2 Mother represented herself at the evidentiary hearing. She did not seek a continuance until the hearing concluded. Even then, she “informed the Court that she wanted [it] to go ahead and rule.” 4  B. Father gave extensive testimony at trial, supported by documentary evidence, about Mother’s hostility toward him and Stepmother and her persistent interference with his parenting time. Mother blocked his calls and confiscated the children’s phones to keep them from contacting him. She had emotional outbursts when he tried to exercise his parenting time unless he agreed to abide by her limitations. She told the children that their lives were at risk in Father’s care. She called him a narcissist and a monster in front of the children. The names she used for Stepmother were even worse. During Father’s parenting time, she followed the children to Texas and tracked their movements via their cell phones. She berated the children for spending time with Stepmother. She sent hateful, disturbing messages to Father and Stepmother. She called in multiple unnecessary welfare checks, disrupting the children’s activities. She made false allegations of child neglect and sexual abuse to the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, prompting an investigation. She filed multiple unfounded pleadings in Texas and Tennessee, seeking to restrict Father’s contact with the children. Father conceded that Mother’s behavior had improved after the last contempt ruling. Still, he was unsure whether that trend would continue. In Father’s view, the children were happy in Texas, where they lived in their childhood home. The family enjoyed boating, fishing, and participating in fun runs together. The children were comfortable with Stepmother, especially Miranda. They had plenty of friends and enjoyed participating in track and cross-country. According to Father, he encouraged the children to spend time with Mother’s extended family. The children were particularly close to their maternal grandmother. He also tried to foster their relationship with Mother. He insisted they call or text her every day. When they needed help with schoolwork, he suggested they contact Mother, who was a former schoolteacher. He tried to keep Mother updated on the children’s lives, sending her progress reports and pictures from track, cross-country, and other events. He knew Mother also followed the girls on social media. Although she denied or failed to recall some of her contemptuous conduct, Mother admitted that she had not followed the court’s directives “to a T.” She explained that she violated the orders because she did not agree with them. She described the court proceedings as an “attack” and “reactive abuse.” She denied having any emotional or psychological issues. She did not view her behavior as problematic or as a reflection of her parenting ability. She blamed Father, Stepmother, and the court system for the loss of her children. Mother insisted that the children had thrived in her care, forming positive bonds with Stepfather and their half-sister. She claimed that the children left behind a close group of friends and cross-country teammates in Tennessee. She cast Father as an uncooperative 5 parent with questionable motives, blaming him for disrupting her relationship with the children. Mother complained that Father intruded on her phone conversations with the children, offered her few opportunities to visit, and failed to keep her adequately apprised of important events in the children’s lives. Yet she hoped that he could be “rehabilitated” so that they could have a healthy co-parenting relationship. The court spoke with the two older children, ages 14 and 16, in chambers. They confirmed Father’s story. The children described life with Mother as stressful. Her conduct embarrassed and upset them. They knew that she did not want them to visit or contact Father. They recounted times when she confiscated their phones and hid them in hotels to avoid contact with Father. When they returned from visiting Father, Mother made them feel like they had done something wrong. They preferred to live with Father. They felt he understood them and listened to their concerns, unlike Mother. The children claimed that they did not miss Mother or their lives in Tennessee, but they were not opposed to visits. The court also heard from two mental health experts, Dr. Montgomery and Dr. Shirley Saar. After a lengthy delay, Mother arranged for a Rule 35 evaluation with Dr. Montgomery, as ordered. Dr. Montgomery believed that Mother showed signs of an unspecified personality disorder. In his opinion, the multiple episodes of contemptuous behavior indicated that Mother did not fully understand the court’s instructions or was simply unable to control her behavior. He recommended psychotherapy to help Mother understand and control her behavior. As he explained, intense emotions can sometimes interfere with a person’s rational ability to comply with a court order. Because Mother’s misconduct appeared to be linked to her emotional response to an ex-spouse she perceived as abusive, he hoped her behavior would stabilize after the litigation was over. Mother offered the competing testimony of Dr. Saar, a clinical psychologist she retained to assess her parenting skills. In Dr. Saar’s opinion, Mother had adequate parenting skills. Her parental assessment did not show signs of a personality disorder, just some mild paranoia. Dr. Saar attributed Mother’s paranoia to the normal stressors associated with a contentious custody proceeding. Still, Dr. Saar conceded that she did not perform a Rule 35 evaluation. She acknowledged that Dr. Montgomery had access to more information when forming his opinions, such as Mother’s medical records and pro se court filings. Cross-examination also revealed that Mother failed to disclose the full extent of her contemptuous conduct to Dr. Saar. C. The court found that Mother’s hostile behavior constituted a material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in custody. Specifically, the court cited Mother’s interference with Father’s visitation, her repeated violations of the parenting plan and subsequent court orders, and her unfounded accusations and harassment of Father. 6  After considering the relevant statutory factors, the court found that it was in the children’s best interest to modify the primary residential parent in the current parenting plan. The court relied heavily on Mother’s hostile behavior, the emotional toll on the children, and Mother’s failure to recognize her emotional issues and take corrective action. Based on the existence of several statutory limiting factors, the court determined that Mother’s parenting time should be limited in the modified plan. Finding that Mother’s emotional abuse of the children and abusive use of conflict endangered the children’s emotional health and psychological development, the court determined that her visitation should be supervised, at least temporarily, to protect the children. The court created a three-phase residential schedule with an automatic reversion provision. For the first six months, the court allowed Mother 70 days of visitation in Texas, to be supervised by her mother or sister. The court removed the supervision requirement for the next six-month period. If Mother successfully completed these first two phases, the court granted her 84 days of unsupervised residential parenting time in Tennessee. But if Mother failed to “strictly comply with the court’s orders” or to “ensure a timely and peaceful exchange of the children,” then the modified plan provided that Mother’s visitation would either “remain supervised” or “revert to supervised residential time as set forth in Phase One, pending further orders.” As Dr. Montgomery had recommended, the court ordered Mother to complete 28 weeks of psychotherapy with a licensed psychiatrist to help her understand the impact of her behavior and improve her self-control. If Mother failed to comply with this requirement, the modified plan specified that her visitation would cease immediately pending further orders. II. We apply the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review to parenting plan decisions. Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tenn. 2013). A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard, reaches “an illogical or unreasonable decision,” or bases its decision “on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc., v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010) (citations omitted). We review the court’s findings of fact using the preponderance of the evidence standard. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d); Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692. Evidence preponderates against a finding of fact when it “support[s] another finding of fact with greater convincing effect.” Phillips v. Hatfield, 624 S.W.3d 464, 474 (Tenn. 2021) (citations omitted). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692. 7  A. Tennessee courts apply a two-step analysis for requests to modify a permanent parenting plan. C.W.H. v. L.A.S., 538 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tenn. 2017); Brunetz v. Brunetz, 573 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). The threshold issue is whether a material change in circumstance has occurred since the court adopted the current parenting plan. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i), (C) (2026). If a material change has occurred, the court must then determine whether modifying the parenting plan is in the child’s best interest by examining the statutory best interest factors. Brunetz, 573 S.W.3d at 179; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (2017). Mother “does not challenge the trial court’s finding that a material change in circumstances occurred significant enough to order a change in custody.” She argues that “the trial court err[ed] in its application and consideration of the best interest factors and fail[ed] to enter a parenting plan that maximizes [her] parenting time.” The determination of a child’s best interest is a question of fact. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 692; In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Best interest decisions “often hinge on subtle factors, including the parents’ demeanor and credibility during the . . . proceedings.” Gaskill v. Gaskill, 936 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). In weighing the preponderance of the evidence, findings of fact based on witness credibility are given great weight, and they will not be overturned “absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007) (citation omitted). The court engaged in a detailed analysis of the applicable statutory factors. It recognized that both parents loved the children and were capable and willing to provide for them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(1), (6). But the proof showed that the children’s relationship with Father was stronger and more stable. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(1). The two older children stated their preference was to live with Father, who made them feel safe and understood. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(13). The court found that Mother’s hostile behavior and abusive use of conflict had damaged her relationship with the children. Id. § 36-6- 106(a)(1), (6). Her conduct caused the children emotional distress, endangering their emotional health and psychological development. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(7). She involved them in visitation issues and exposed them to her negative opinions of Father and Stepmother, a form of alienation. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(2), (7). She willfully interfered with Father’s visitation and repeatedly violated court orders. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(2). She made “false, misleading, unfounded, unsubstantiated, perplexing, fictitious, dishonest accusations and allegations,” causing the court to question her mental and emotional fitness to parent. See id. § 36-6-106(a)(8). Although she had been the children’s primary caregiver for five years, her home was volatile. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(5), (10). She was emotionally abusive to the children. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(7), (11). She “exhibited obsessive hypervigilance for no reason.” If her behavior continued, the court feared the consequences could be severe. Id. 8 § 36-6-106(a)(7). Even at trial, Mother refused to take any responsibility for her actions, blaming Father, Stepmother, and the court system instead. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(15). Mother’s conduct evidenced an unwillingness to facilitate the children’s relationship with Father, giving the court little confidence in her ability to comply with future directives. Id. § 36- 6-106(a)(2). Despite Mother’s behavior, Father encouraged the children to call her. He allowed Mother to spend time with the children in Texas. He facilitated the children’s relationship with Mother’s family. Id. § 36-6-106(a)(2). The evidence does not preponderate against these findings. Mother contends that the court ignored or improperly discounted the evidence in her favor. In her view, analyzed correctly, “some factors should have favored her over Father, and some factors should have been more evenly applied to weigh equally between the parties.” Mother emphasizes her five years as the children’s primary caregiver, the children’s ties to their Tennessee friends and family, and what she sees as Father’s parental shortcomings. See id. § 36-6-106(a)(1), (2), (5), (9), (10). Mother relies primarily on her own testimony, which the court did not find credible. We discern no basis to disturb findings of fact based on witness credibility. In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 809. And we cannot fault the court’s analysis of Mother’s tenure as primary caregiver. The proof showed that while the children were in her care, Mother exposed them to her negative feelings for Father and Stepmother and her lack of self-control. She interfered with Father’s phone calls and parenting time. Her conduct caused the children significant emotional distress, which she failed to recognize. Father, in his relatively short time as primary caregiver, provided the children with a safe and stable home environment. Without citing to any legal authority, Mother asserts that the court’s finding of emotional abuse “was not supported by an expert report or testimony.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a)(11). As this Court has said before, the trier of fact “is not required to check his or her common sense at the door when considering evidence.” Eberting v. Eberting, No. E2010-02471-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 605512, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2012). Here, there was ample evidence to support the court’s finding of emotional abuse. As Dr. Montgomery explained, exposure to parental conflict and negativity are known to be harmful to children. The proof showed that Mother actively involved the children in her conflict with Father. She hid them in hotel rooms, refused to bring them to exchanges, repeatedly instructed them to return home during Father’s parenting time, and subjected them to repeated unfounded welfare checks and child safety investigations. Father testified that the children were visibly upset by Mother’s angry outbursts and communications. The older children told the court that Mother’s behavior distressed, 9 embarrassed, and saddened them.3 She berated the children for spending time with Father and Stepmother, making them feel like they had done something wrong. They no longer felt they could be honest with Mother about their feelings. B. Mother contends that the trial court erred in adopting a modified parenting plan that failed to maximize her parenting time. The best interest statute directs courts to fashion parenting schedules with an eye toward maximizing both parents’ participation in the child’s life, if possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a); Gooding v. Gooding, 477 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). But the “maximum participation” goal is not the court’s primary concern. Flynn v. Stephenson, No. E2019-00095-COA-R3-JV, 2019 WL 4072105, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2019); In re Cannon H., No. W2015-01947-COA- R3-JV, 2016 WL 5819218, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2016). The “overarching standard” remains the best interest of the child. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693 (internal citation and quotation omitted); Flynn, 2019 WL 4072105, at *7. Unless the statutory limiting factors are dispositive, the court’s decision should be based on the best interest factors in Tennessee Code § 36-6-106(a). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404(b) (2026). The trial court determined that the statutory limiting factors applied on these facts. See id. § 36-6-406 (2021). It found, based on the proof at trial, that Mother had been emotionally abusive to the children, a mandatory limiting factor. See id. § 36-6-406(a)(2) (requiring the court to limit parenting time if it found, based on reliable evidence, that a parent had engaged in a “pattern of emotional abuse” of the child). It also found the existence of several discretionary limiting factors. The court found Mother engaged in the abusive use of conflict creating a danger of damage to the children’s psychological development. Id. § 36-6-406(d)(5). Her actions had taken an emotional toll on the children and substantially impaired her emotional ties with them. Id. § 36-6-406(d)(4). It also found that Mother’s refusal or inability to recognize her problematic behavior interfered with her performance of parenting responsibilities, specifically her ability to ensure the children’s mental health and emotional safety. Id. § 36-6-406(d)(2). The court also cited the visitation statute. Id. § 36-6-301 (2026). The visitation statute directs courts to grant a noncustodial parent “such rights of visitation as will enable the child and the noncustodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.” Id. The same statute allows a court to order supervised visitation upon finding that “the noncustodial parent has physically or emotionally abused the child.” Id. The trial 3 Mother complains that the court assumed, without proof, that Miranda suffered the same emotional distress as her older siblings. In Mother’s eyes, there was no proof at trial that her bond with Miranda had weakened. Yet the evidence showed that all three children were exposed to Mother’s hostile, negative behavior. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding. 10 court found that Mother’s emotional abuse of the children was likely to endanger their emotional health and her abusive use of conflict created a danger of damage to the children’s psychological development. So it imposed a supervision requirement to ensure the children’s physical and emotional safety. Mother contends that the court lacked sufficient definite evidence that unsupervised visitation would subject the children to emotional or psychological harm. See Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (recognizing that a parent’s visitation may be limited or even eliminated if the record contains “definite evidence” that visitation would endanger the child (internal citation and quotation omitted)). But this record contains ample proof that Mother’s statements to the children and abusive use of conflict jeopardized their emotional and psychological development. Her negative comments, threats, and harassment had already taken an emotional toll on the children. The children reported that Mother made them uncomfortable. They did not feel safe sharing their feelings and concerns with her, believing she would not listen or understand. Blinded by her intense emotions, Mother could not see the negative impact of her behavior on her children. Left unchecked, the children were subject to further emotional and psychological damage. Even so, Mother asserts that “[c]ertainly” it was “possible” for the court to enter a less restrictive visitation plan. See Rudd v. Rudd, No. W2009-00251-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4642582, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2009) (reasoning that courts should adopt “the least restrictive visitation plan as available and practical” (citation omitted)). On this record, we do not view the court’s three-phase residential schedule as unduly restrictive. The supervision requirement is temporary. With good behavior, Mother should quickly progress to more liberal visitation rules. That said, we conclude that the automatic reversion provisions within the modified residential schedule are impermissible. In each phase of the residential schedule, the modified plan provides that if Mother “fails to strictly comply with the court’s orders” or “does not ensure a timely and peaceful exchange of the children,” her “residential time shall revert to [or remain] supervised residential time as set forth in Phase One, pending further orders of this court.” Tennessee law recognizes a nonresidential parent’s fundamental right to visit his or her children. See Suttles, 748 S.W.2d at 429; Melvin v. Melvin, 415 S.W.3d 847, 851 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Wix v. Wix, No. M2000-00230-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 219700, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2001); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-301. A court may only interfere with that right when necessary to protect the child. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-301, - 406; Suttles, 748 S.W.2d at 429; Wix, 2001 WL 219700, at *10; Helson v. Cyrus, 989 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Harm cannot be presumed. The court’s decision must be based on definite, reliable evidence showing that continued visitation would jeopardize the child. See Suttles, 748 S.W.2d at 429; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-301, -406. 11  While we appreciate the court’s desire to protect the children, the automatic provisions eliminate critical safeguards, contrary to the statutory requirements. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-301, -406. The provisions allow Father to restrict Mother to supervised visitation without a court hearing, impermissibly delegating judicial authority to Father. See Whitaker v. Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 838-39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (vacating plan provision that impermissibly delegated visitation decision to guardian ad litem). The provisions also restrict Mother’s visitation based solely on the specified conduct without requiring a showing of harm to the children. See Suttles, 748 S.W.2d at 429; Kershaw v. Kershaw, No. M2009-00151-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4039262, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2009) (concluding that plan provision suspending parent’s visitation based solely on intentional violation of the plan was inconsistent with Tennessee law). So we find it necessary to delete these provisions from the modified plan.4 C. Mother also asks this Court to adjust other provisions of the modified plan that she finds onerous. In her view, these “untenable” provisions effectively preclude her from participating in the children’s lives. She faults the court’s choice of supervisors, arguing that it would be easier for her to exercise parenting time under Stepfather’s supervision. She complains that it is “impossible” to comply with the psychotherapy requirement as it is currently worded because she “may” not be able to find a willing provider that she can afford. She suggests a less stringent therapy requirement would be “a more appropriate way to address the trial court’s concerns.” Citing her modest income, she also seeks a more affordable, pro rata division of various costs in the plan, such as the costs of long-distance travel, the children’s extracurricular activities, and uncovered medical expenses. We entrust these details to the sound discretion of the trial court. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693. It is not our role “to tweak” the court’s plan “in the hopes of achieving a more reasonable result.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). Thus, we will not “second-guess” the court’s choices or “substitute [our] discretion for the lower court’s.” Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 524 (citations omitted). While we might have made some different choices, we cannot say that the court erred in adopting these provisions. The court’s decision falls within the “spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the 4 The automatic restrictions appear four times in the modified residential schedule. As discussed above, the plan automatically restricts Mother to supervised parenting if she fails to strictly comply with the plan or ensure a peaceful exchange. This language is repeated in each phase of the residential schedule. In addition, the modified plan specifies that if Mother fails to complete psychotherapy within the mandated 28-week period, her “visitation shall cease immediately pending further orders of the court.” Mother did not challenge this last provision until her reply brief. See Hughes v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 514 S.W.3d 707, 724 (Tenn. 2017) (“Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.” (citations omitted)). Even so, we deem it advisable to delete all four automatic provisions from the modified plan. 12 record.” Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d at 88 (citation omitted). III. Both parties request an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. Mother’s request is based on Tennessee Code § 36-5-103(c) (2026). This statute authorizes this Court to award reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal to the “prevailing party” in a modification proceeding. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) (2026). While Mother achieved a small measure of success on appeal, when we consider all the relevant factors in this case, we decline to award her fees on this basis. See Colley v. Colley, 715 S.W.3d 293, 316 (Tenn. 2025). Father requests an award of damages for defending against a frivolous appeal. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2017). A frivolous appeal is one “utterly devoid of merit.” Combustion Eng’g, Inc. v. Kennedy, 562 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tenn. 1978). This appeal was not devoid of merit; it was unsuccessful, not frivolous. See Coolidge v. Keene, 614 S.W.3d 106, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020). So we decline to award damages for a frivolous appeal. IV. We affirm the court’s decision as modified. The court did not abuse its discretion in adopting a modified parenting plan that awarded custody to Father and limited Mother’s residential parenting time based on the existence of limiting factors. We delete the plan provisions automatically restricting Mother’s parenting time based on future conduct because they are inconsistent with Tennessee law. This case is remanded for further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion. s/ W. Neal McBrayer W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE 13