Custom Remodeling, LLC v. Tamira D. Wesley

11/04/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs July 24, 2026 CUSTOM REMODELING, LLC v. TAMIRA D. WESLEY Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. CT-0826-24 Felicia Corbin Johnson, Judge ___________________________________ No. W2026-01123-COA-T10B-CV ___________________________________ This accelerated interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal, which was brought pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and Remanded STEVEN W. MARONEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined. Tamira D. Wesley, Collierville, Tennessee, appellant, pro se. Michelle S. Crawford, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Custom Remodeling, LLC OPINION I. Background The underlying case involves Appellant Tamira D. Wesley’s claim that Appellee Custom Remodeling, LLC breached the parties’ contract for roofing at Ms. Wesley’s home. The case was filed in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“trial court”). Following a February 11, 2026 bench trial, the trial court found that Appellee breached the parties’ contract but that Appellant failed to prove damages. As such, the court ordered an inspection to determine whether defective shingles or improper installation caused the condition of Appellant’s roof. The inspection procedure evolved over subsequent orders, including an initial directive for the shingle manufacturer to inspect the roof and later modifications limiting Appellee’s involvement.  On July 13, 2026, Appellant filed a motion seeking the trial judge’s recusal. As discussed in further detail below, and although somewhat convoluted, Appellant asserted ten grounds for recusal, which are best placed into three broad categories: (1) alleged general comments attributed to the trial judge; (2) the court’s handling of alleged racially- charged communications directed to a co-owner of Appellant’s property, Joe Black, III; and (3) numerous adverse rulings and procedural decisions. Appellant’s motion largely complies with the mandates of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B; however, we note at the outset that the record does not contain a transcript of the trial court’s comments from the bench. By order of July 13, 2026, the trial court denied the motion for recusal. The court: (1) found no factual or legal basis for recusal; (2) determined that several of Appellant’s allegations were untimely; and (3) concluded that Appellant filed the motion “for an improper purpose, to interrupt and delay these proceedings.”1 Appellant timely filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal, renewing her ten grounds for recusal and asserting seven additional challenges to the trial court’s amended order denying recusal. II. Issue When reviewing a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B appeal, the only order this Court may review is the trial court’s order denying the motion to recuse. Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“Pursuant to [Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B], we may not review the correctness or merits of the trial court’s other rulings[.]”). Further, we will not consider additional allegations of bias raised on appeal when not included in the initial motion for recusal filed in the trial court. See Malone v. Malone, No. W2023-00843-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 8457951, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023); see also McKenzie v. McKenzie, No. M2014-00010-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 WL 575908, at *6 n. 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2014). III. Standard of Review Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B governs appeals from orders denying motions to recuse. Pursuant to § 2.01 of Rule 10B, a party is entitled to an “accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right” from an order denying a motion for disqualification or recusal. The appeal is perfected by filing a petition for recusal appeal with the appropriate appellate court. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.02. “The party seeking recusal bears the burden of proof.” In re Samuel P., No. W2016- 01592-COA-T10B-CV, 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016) (citing 1 The trial court filed an amended order denying the motion for recusal, also on July 13, 2026, for the purpose of correcting typographical errors in the original order. However, the substantive rulings were unchanged. -2- Williams ex rel. Rezba, 2015 WL 2258172, at *5; Cotham v. Cotham, No. W2015-00521- COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 1517785, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015)). Specifically, “[a] party challenging the impartiality of a judge ‘must come forward with some evidence that would prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to believe that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Id. (quoting Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)). Our standard of review in a Rule 10B appeal is de novo. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.01. “De novo is defined as ‘anew, afresh, a second time.’” Simms Elec., Inc. v. Roberson Assocs., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9011-CV-00407, 1991 WL 44279, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 1991) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 392 (5th ed. 1979)). If, after reviewing the petition and supporting documents, we determine that no answer is needed, we may act summarily on the appeal. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05. Otherwise, this Court must order an answer and may also order further briefing by the parties. Id. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.06 also grants this Court the discretion to decide the appeal without oral argument. Following a review of the petition for recusal appeal, we have determined that neither an answer, additional briefing, nor oral argument is necessary, and we elect to act summarily on the appeal in accordance with Rule 10B §§ 2.05 and 2.06. IV. Pro Se Status Before turning to the merits of Appellant’s claim, we recognize that she is representing herself in this appeal. This Court has held that “[p]arties who choose to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts.” Hodges v. Tenn. Att’y Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). Nevertheless, “courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.” Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Edmundson v. Pratt, 945 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 733 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). V. Analysis A. Scope of Review With these principles in mind, we turn to the legal framework that governs recusal motions. Section 1.01 of Rule 10B specifies how a motion for recusal is to be presented to the trial court: Any party seeking disqualification, recusal, or a determination of constitutional or statutory incompetence of a judge of a court of record, or a -3-  judge acting as a court of record, shall do so by a written motion filed promptly after a party learns or reasonably should have learned of the facts establishing the basis for recusal. The motion shall be filed no later than ten days before trial, absent a showing of good cause which must be supported by an affidavit. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit under oath or a declaration under penalty of perjury on personal knowledge and by other appropriate materials. The motion shall state, with specificity, all factual and legal grounds supporting disqualification of the judge and shall affirmatively state that it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. A party who is represented by counsel is not permitted to file a pro se motion under this rule. Tenn. S. Ct. R. 10B, § 1.01. “A motion to recuse should be granted when judges have any doubt about their ability to preside impartially in a case or when ‘a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.’” Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, 557 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2001)). As noted above, “The party seeking recusal bears the burden of proof.” In re Samuel P., 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (citation omitted). However, when alleged bias arises from events occurring during the litigation, the party seeking recusal bears a greater burden and must establish bias “so pervasive that it is sufficient to deny the litigant a fair trial.” Id., at *6. The terms “bias” and “prejudice” typically refer to a state of mind or attitude that works to predispose a judge for or against a party. Stark v. Stark, No. No. W2019-00901- COA-T10B-CV,, 2019 WL 2515925, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2019) (citing Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). However, not every unfavorable disposition toward a party or a case constitutes bias or prejudice. Id. With the foregoing in mind, we turn to review the Appellant’s numerous allegations of bias, which we have determined fall into three broad categories: (1) Judicial Comments; (2) Handling of Racially Charged Communications; and (3) Adverse Rulings. We address each of these categories of alleged bias in turn. B. Judicial Comments Appellant’s recusal motion lists several of the trial judge’s alleged comments, which Appellant asserts constitute bias. Although Appellant submitted affidavits recounting the comments, the appendix contains no transcript of the proceedings in which the judge allegedly made them. Rule 10B places the burden on the petitioner to provide the portions -4- of the trial-court record necessary for determination of the appeal. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.03. We evaluate judicial remarks in the context of the surrounding facts and circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would construe them as demonstrating partiality on the merits. Cain-Swope v. Swope, 523 S.W.3d 79, 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). Because no transcript is provided, we are unable to evaluate the trial court’s remarks in their full context. Specifically, Appellant alleges that the trial judge asked whether she wanted the Appellee to “come take the roof off” and described the proceedings as neither “Judge Judy” nor “The People’s Court.” Appellant further alleges that, after Mr. Black questioned the fairness of the trial, the judge admonished him to be careful about “casting aspersions on the Court,” referenced her eleven years on the bench, and stated that the proceeding would be fair “from this perspective.” Assuming, arguendo, these allegations are true for purposes of this review, such remarks do not reflect bias. “An opinion formed on the basis of what a judge properly learns during judicial proceedings, and comments that reveal that opinion, are not disqualifying unless they are so extreme that they reflect an utter incapacity to be fair. . . .” Caine-Swope, 523 S.W.3d at 89 (citation omitted). “Judicial expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger towards counsel, the parties, or the case, will not ordinarily support a finding of bias or prejudice unless they indicate partiality on the merits of the case.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the alleged comments, at most, reflect impatience or frustration on the part of the judge. Taken both alone and cumulatively, the trial court’s comments do not demonstrate that it prejudged a disputed issue, harbored personal animus toward Appellant, or lacked the capacity to decide the case fairly. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s comments do not warrant recusal. C. Handling of Alleged Racially Charged Communications We next consider Appellant’s allegations concerning the court’s handling of racially charged communications. In her motion for recusal, Appellant asserts, among other things, that: During the February 11, 2026, bench trial, Mr. Black testified that on his personal mobile telephone, text messages that were intimidating and racially charged in character, including a message from a telephone number identifiable as belonging to Anthony “Tony” Vita, the principal of Custom Remodeling, LLC, referring to Mr. Black by a demeaning acronym, and at least one additional message of extreme racial hostility sent from an unidentified number. . . . The content of the racially hostile message from the unidentified number was raised in open court during the April 2, 2026, -5-  conference, and Mr. Vita did not personally deny sending it. Mr. Black personally heard the Court, addressing Ms. Wesley on the record, acknowledge that the statements made by Mr. Vita to Mr. Black “should have never been said.”2 In the first instance, recusal focuses on the impartiality of the judge, not the alleged misconduct or prejudice of a litigant or third party. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10. Thus, Appellant must identify words or conduct attributable to the trial judge that would cause a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. Taking Appellant’s averments as true, the offensive comments were made by Mr. Vita, not the trial judge. Although the trial judge acknowledged the texts and stated that the alleged offensive comments “should never have been said,” Appellant contends that the trial judge perpetuated the effects of the offensive communications by requiring an inspection of her property after learning of them. As set out in her motion for recusal, Appellant asserts: Notwithstanding this on-the-record acknowledgment, the Court during that same April 2, 2026, conference and continuing through the June 16, 2026, Order on Motion to Enforce Order directed Ms. Wesley to permit an inspection of her home to be conducted at the direction of and requiring the coordination of Custom Remodeling, LLC, and its affiliated contractor Elite Roofing Solutions, the same entity whose principal directed intimidating and racially charged conduct at the co-owner of her home. Following the February 11, 2026 bench trial, the trial court sought to determine whether the condition of the roof resulted from defective shingles or improper installation. The trial court initially directed Appellee to contact the shingle manufacturer, Owen’s Corning, for an inspection. Then, the trial court amended its order to exclude Appellee from the initial inspection. Neither the inspection order, nor the subsequent amended inspection order, relates to any personal animus or extrajudicial source of bias. It is plausible that the trial court’s orders for inspection worked a benefit to Appellant insofar as it allowed additional opportunity for her to prove damages. Regardless, the amended order negated the basis of Appellant’s allegation of bias, i.e., that the trial court “permit[ted] an inspection of her home to be conducted at the direction of and requiring the coordination of Custom Remodeling, LLC, and its affiliated contractor Elite Roofing Solutions.” Rather, the trial court held that, only if the manufacturer determined that the shingles were not defective and were properly installed 2 The record does not contain copies of the offensive texts, nor does it include the exact content of those texts. -6- would Appellee have the right to conduct its own inspection, and Appellant was permitted to arrange for a third-party to be present. The court later directed Appellant to coordinate with the nonparty contractor, Elite Roofing Solutions, to obtain a shingle sample required for the manufacturer’s warranty process. In short, Appellant was not ordered to work with Appellee directly. Viewed objectively, these orders addressed causation and damages after the court ruled in Appellant’s favor on the issue of breach. They also limited Appellee’s participation in the inspection process. The court’s continued administration of the parties’ contract dispute, including its ruling concerning access to the property, does not indicate that the court condoned Mr. Vita’s offensive comments, and, in fact, it clearly stated that they should not have been made. In sum, these allegations do not provide a reasonable basis for questioning the trial judge’s impartiality. As a result, we turn to Appellant’s remaining category of allegations, adverse rulings. D. Adverse Rulings Finally, Appellant alleges bias arising from the trial court’s adverse rulings and management of the proceedings. This Court has explained that the mere fact that a judge rules adversely to a party or witness does not, individually or collectively, establish bias. “Consistent adverse rulings may lead a party to wish for another trial judge, but they do not provide a basis for requiring the trial judge’s recusal from the case.” In re Samuel P., 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (citing Runyon v. Runyon, No. W2013-02651-COA-T10B, 2014 WL 1285729, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014)); see also Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tenn. 2023); Duke, 398 S.W.3d at 671; Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Therefore, Appellant’s assertion that the trial court’s repeated unfavorable rulings demonstrate bias requires additional evidence of partiality. With these principles in mind, we examine Appellant’s objections. 1. Notice of June 5, 2026 Hearing Appellant’s principal procedural complaint concerns the June 5 hearing conducted in her absence. Specifically, Appellant contends that she lacked notice because the court did not place the hearing on its official docket. The record, however, establishes that opposing counsel transmitted a written notice of hearing to Appellant by email stating that the motions would be heard by Zoom on June 5, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. Indeed, Appellant’s June 1, 2026 response and cross-motion acknowledged that those matters would be heard contemporaneously with Appellee’s motions on the same date and time. Thus, although Appellant disputes whether the court properly placed the hearing on its docket, the record establishes that she received written notice of the proposed setting. There is no bias arising from any lack of notice. 2. Absence of Court Reporter at June 5, 2026 Hearing -7-  Appellant also relies on the absence of a recording of the June 5, 2026 proceeding. Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-9-101 provides that, at the request of either party, the trial court shall appoint a court reporter to record the testimony and court’s rulings. A trial court is not required to record these hearings absent a request. Here, there is nothing to indicate that either party requested a court reporter, much less that the trial court denied a court reporter at the hearing. Thus, there is no bias arising from the absence of a court reporter. 3. Rulings Concerning Mr. Black Appellant next challenges several rulings related to Mr. Black’s participation in the proceedings, including the denial of his motion to intervene, the exclusion of portions of his proposed testimony, and his exclusion from the courtroom under the rule of sequestration. Whether the trial court decided those matters correctly is not before us because, as we have noted above, “[i]n a Rule 10B appeal, the only order properly before the reviewing court is the recusal order.” Adams, 674 S.W.3d at 880. Appellant identifies no extrajudicial source of bias connected to these rulings and no conduct, beyond the comments already addressed, suggesting that the trial judge made the rulings based on any personal animus toward Appellant, or Mr. Black. Accordingly, the rulings concerning Mr. Black do not establish bias. Furthermore, Appellant alleges that the trial judge made erroneous rulings concerning (1) the applicable law regarding the cost of the roofing project, and (2) its jurisdiction over her federal claims. “Rulings of a trial judge, even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification.” Adams, 674 S.W.3d at 880 (citing Alley, 882 S.W.2d at 821). We express no opinion concerning the legal correctness of these rulings; whether these underlying rulings were erroneous is beyond the limited scope of this Rule 10B appeal. Id. at 879. 4. Trial Court’s Order Denying Recusal Finally, Appellant identifies several alleged defects in the amended order denying recusal, including: (1) the trial court’s findings concerning the timing of Appellant’s motion for recusal (after trial) and that it was for improper purpose (delay); (2) the trial court’s finding that its June 16, 2026 orders (concerning a motions hearing on June 5, 2026) were valid and properly entered, despite Appellant’s objection; and (3) the trial court’s alleged failure to individually address each ground for recusal asserted by Appellant. As noted above, we review the denial of a recusal motion de novo. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, 10B § 2.01. Accordingly, we independently consider whether the facts presented require recusal, and we are not required to adopt every aspect of the trial court’s reasoning to affirm its decision. Even if Appellant disagrees with the trial court’s findings or characterizes them as erroneous, those findings do not, ipso facto, demonstrate -8- extrajudicial bias or an inability to adjudicate the underlying case fairly, and that is our conclusion here. As noted above, adverse rulings alone do not constitute grounds for recusal. We have reviewed Appellant’s entire petition and appendices, including the allegations not specifically discussed above (but which are properly placed in one of the three broad categories of grounds we have cited above), her challenges to the amended recusal order, and the combined effect of all asserted ground.3 The allegations of bias that are not specifically discussed herein identified no extrajudicial source of bias and no pattern of judicial conduct so pervasive that it would prevent Appellant from receiving a fair trial. Viewed separately and cumulatively, the allegations would not cause a person of ordinary prudence, knowing all the facts known to the trial judge, to find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality. VI. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order denying recusal is affirmed, and the case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Tamira D. Wesley. Execution for costs may issue if necessary. s/ Steven Maroney STEVEN W. MARONEY, JUDGE 3 Appellant’s petition included 29 appendices. Together, the petition and appendices totaled nine hundred sixty (960) pages. -9-