In Re Conservatorship of Mary Gonia Pigford
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketW2026-01300-COA-T10B-CV
JudgeJudge Steven W. Maroney
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/16/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs August 27, 2026
IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP OF MARY GONIA PIGFORD
Appeal from the Probate Court for Shelby County
No. PR-27185-I Kathleen N. Gomes, Judge
___________________________________
No. W2026-01300-COA-T10B-CV
___________________________________
This accelerated interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court
erred in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal, which was brought pursuant to Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we
affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.
Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Affirmed and Remanded
STEVEN W. MARONEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY USMAN and
WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, II, JJ., joined.
Michael V. Pigford, Memphis, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.
Kevin Eugene Childress, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Susan Pigford-Dease.
OPINION
I. Background
On November 3, 2023, the Probate Court for Shelby County (“trial court”)
appointed Susan Pigford-Dease (“Conservator”) Conservator over the Person and Estate of
Mary Gonia Pigford (the “Conservatorship”). In 2019, before the Conservatorship was
established, Ms. Pigford executed quit-claim deeds conveying, to certain family members,
her ownership interests in several parcels of property. Ms. Pigford retained possession of
these deeds, which were to be recorded only after her death (as of the filing of this appeal,
Ms. Pigford was living and under the Conservatorship).
Giving rise to the underlying lawsuit, approximately two years after the
Conservatorship was opened, Appellant Michael Pigford, Ms. Pigford’s son, obtained one
of the quit-claim deeds executed by Ms. Pigford for property located at 4632 Windward
Drive in Memphis (the “Windward Deed”). The following was noted in the trial court’s
amended order denying recusal:
[t]he [Windward] Deed had the names of Donald C. Pigford, Jr. and
[Appellant]. On its face, it appears that [Appellant’s] name was added. His
name is in a different font and handwriting. Donald Pigford is deceased.
Appellant recorded the Windward Deed on July 15, 2025.
In May of 2026, the trial court found that Ms. Pigford needed funds for her care and
ordered her properties to be sold. On June 18, 2026, the Conservator filed a motion to set
aside the Windward Deed. Appellant was notified of the hearing on the Conservator’s
motion, and he appeared pro se.1 As discussed below, there is no transcript of the hearing
on the motion seeking to set aside the Windward Deed.
On or about July 22, 2026, Appellant filed his initial motion for recusal of Judge
Kathleen N. Gomes. By order of July 23, 2026, Judge Gomes summarily dismissed the
recusal motion because Appellant failed to comply with the technical requirements of
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 1.01.
On July 27, 2026, Appellant filed an amended motion for recusal. As grounds for
recusal, Appellant alleged that: (1) Judge Gomes’ dismissal of the original motion for
recusal “provide[s] evidence [that] the [amended motion] [would not be fairly considered
by the trial court]”; (2) the fact that the Conservator’s attorney, Kevin Childress, had sat
for Judge Gomes as a substitute judge “adds even more strong evidence of the treatment
that I have been receiving”; (3) Judge Gomes “never let [Appellant] interject, [or] present
all [of his] evidence as she would cut [Appellant] off”; (4) Judge Gomes did not “allow
any consideration of [Appellant] being Pro/Se”; and (5) Judge Gomes engaged in “biased
treatment” and acted “[with partiality,] unethical[ly], [and] unprofessional[ly].”
The trial court initially dismissed the amended motion on its finding that “the
Amended Motion did not attach an affidavit as required by the Rule.” However, on August
11, 2026, the trial court entered an amended order. Therein, the trial court cited this Court’s
recent opinion in In Re Maddex B., No. M2026-01001-COA-T10B-CV, 2026 WL
2168749 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2026), for the proposition that the absence of an affidavit
1
In his petition for recusal appeal, Appellant asserts that Conservator and Attorney Childress
“delayed” mailing the notice of the hearing such that he received it only one day prior to the hearing date.
This allegation, even if true, does not implicate the trial court in any way, and it is not a proper ground for
recusal.
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is not fatal to a motion for recusal if the motion is accompanied by a declaration. Id. at *2
(citing State v. Loredo, No. W2023-00088-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 912486, at *6 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2024)) (“[D]ue to [the] submission of a declaration, the absence of an
affidavit was not fatal, and the motion was not subject to dismissal on that basis.”).
Accordingly, the trial court addressed Appellant’s amended motion for recusal on the
merits and denied it by order of August 11, 2026. On August 27, 2026, Appellant filed this
accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.
II. Issue
When reviewing a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B appeal, the only order this
Court may review is the trial court’s order denying the motion to recuse. Duke v. Duke,
398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“Pursuant to [Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
10B], we may not review the correctness or merits of the trial court’s other rulings[.]”).
Accordingly, the sole issue is whether the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s
motion for recusal. Williams by & through Rezba v. HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. N., No.
W2015-00639-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 2258172, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2015).
III. Pro Se Status
Before turning to the issue, we note that, while we are cognizant of the fact that
Appellant is representing himself in this appeal, it is well-settled that “pro se litigants are
held to the same procedural and substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere.”
Brown v. Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). This Court has
held that “[p]arties who choose to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal
treatment by the courts.” Hodges v. Tenn. Att’y Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2000) (citing Paehler v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1997)). Nevertheless, “courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with
the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.”
Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Edmundson v. Pratt,
945 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 733 n. 4
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).
IV. Standard of Review
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B governs appeals from orders denying motions
to recuse. Our standard of review in a Rule 10B appeal is de novo. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
10B, § 2.01. “De novo is defined as ‘anew, afresh, a second time.’” Simms Elec., Inc. v.
Roberson Assocs., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9011-CV-00407, 1991 WL 44279, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 3, 1991) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 392 (5th ed. 1979)).
V. Rule 10B Appellate Procedure
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Pursuant to section 2.01 of Rule 10B, a party is entitled to an “accelerated
interlocutory appeal as of right” from an order denying a motion for disqualification or
recusal. The appeal is perfected by filing a petition for recusal appeal with the appropriate
appellate court. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.02.
“The party seeking recusal bears the burden of proof.” In re Samuel P., No. W2016-
01592-COA-T10B-CV, 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016) (citing
Williams ex rel. Rezba, 2015 WL 2258172, at *5; Cotham v. Cotham, No. W2015-00521-
COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 1517785, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015)). Specifically,
“[a] party challenging the impartiality of a judge ‘must come forward with some evidence
that would prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to believe that the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.’” Id. (quoting Duke, 398 S.W.3d at 671). This requires,
inter alia, the timely filing of a motion in the trial court that “shall state, with specificity,
all factual and legal grounds supporting disqualification of the judge[.]” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R.
10B, § 1.01.
If, after reviewing the petition and supporting documents, we determine that no
answer is needed, we may act summarily on the appeal. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05.
Otherwise, this Court must order an answer and may also order further briefing by the
parties. Id. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2.06 also grants this Court the
discretion to decide the appeal without oral argument. Following a review of the petition
for recusal appeal, we have determined that neither an answer, additional briefing, nor oral
argument is necessary, and we elect to act summarily on the appeal in accordance with
Rule 10B, sections 2.05 and 2.06.
VI. Analysis
Section 1.01 of Rule 10B specifies how a motion for recusal is to be presented to
the trial court:
Any party seeking disqualification, recusal, or a determination of
constitutional or statutory incompetence of a judge of a court of record, or a
judge acting as a court of record, shall do so by a written motion filed
promptly after a party learns or reasonably should have learned of the facts
establishing the basis for recusal. The motion shall be filed no later than ten
days before trial, absent a showing of good cause which must be supported
by an affidavit. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit under oath or
a declaration under penalty of perjury on personal knowledge and by other
appropriate materials. The motion shall state, with specificity, all factual and
legal grounds supporting disqualification of the judge and shall affirmatively
state that it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. .
..
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“A motion to recuse should be granted when judges have any doubt about their
ability to preside impartially in a case or when ‘a person of ordinary prudence in the judge’s
position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for
questioning the judge’s impartiality.’” Boren v. Hill Boren, PC, 557 S.W.3d 542, 548
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn.
2001)). As noted above, “The party seeking recusal bears the burden of proof.” In re
Samuel P., 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (citation omitted). However, when alleged bias arises
from events occurring during the litigation, the party seeking recusal bears a greater burden
and must establish bias “so pervasive that it is sufficient to deny the litigant a fair trial.”
Id., at *6.
The terms “bias” and “prejudice” typically refer to a state of mind or attitude that
works to predispose a judge for or against a party. Stark v. Stark, No. W2019-00901-COA-
T10B-CV, 2019 WL 2515925, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2019) (citing Alley v. State,
882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). However, not every unfavorable
disposition toward a party or a case constitutes bias or prejudice. Id.
With the foregoing in mind, we turn to review Appellant’s allegations of bias, which
fall into two broad categories: (1) Attorney Kevin Childress’ service as a substitute judge;
and (2) the trial court’s conduct, and rulings. We address each of these categories of alleged
bias in turn.
A. Attorney Childress’ Service as a Substitute Judge
Appellant first contends that Judge Gomes’ impartiality might reasonably be
questioned because Attorney Childress, Counsel for the Conservator, occasionally serves
as a substitute judge when Judge Gomes is unavailable. In its order denying recusal, the
trial court noted:
[l]awyers are periodically asked by both Probate Judges to sit as a substitute
Judge in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-2-118.2 The
appointment of any lawyer to sit as a substitute judge does not make the Court
bias[ed] in their favor. Mr. Pigford does not specifically state how this affects
his case or how this Court is biased.
From our review of Appellant’s amended motion for recusal, we agree with the trial
2
Tennessee Code Annotated section 17-2-118 provides, in relevant part, that:
(a) If, for good cause, including, but not limited to, by reason of illness, physical
incapacitation, vacation or absence from the city or judicial district on a matter related to
the judge's judicial office, the judge of a state or county trial court of record is unable to
hold court, the judge shall appoint a substitute judge to hold court, preside and adjudicate.
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court’s statement that Appellant fails to “specifically state how [the fact that Attorney
Childress sat for Judge Gomes in other cases] affects his case,” or shows “how [the trial
court] is biased.” The amended motion contains no specific statements or actions by Judge
Gomes that would show partiality toward Attorney Childress. Nonetheless, Appellant’s
petition to this Court broadly argues that
statutory authority to appoint a substitute judge and the ethical appearance
created when a particular substitute later appears as counsel before the
appointing or regularly relieved judge are distinct questions. [Tennessee
Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 2, Rule 2.11] does not require proof that the
arrangement caused actual favoritism. It asks whether a reasonable, fully
informed observer could question impartiality. The order did not examine the
frequency, recency, scope, or ongoing nature of Attorney Childress’
substitute service, the professional trust inherent in selecting him to exercise
the court’s authority, or how that relationship would appear to a self-
represented opposing litigant. Petitioner does not contend that every
authorized substitute appointment automatically disqualifies a judge
whenever the substitute lawyer later appears. He contends that the admitted
relationship required a fact-specific objective analysis. By treating statutory
authorization as dispositive and actual bias as the benchmark, the order
applied too narrow a standard.
Respectfully, we disagree. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, section 2.11(A)
provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” and then lists several non-exclusive
circumstances in which this may occur. Although not expressly stated by Appellant, it
appears his objection concerning Attorney Childress’ service as a substitute judge for the
trial court references the circumstance listed in Rule 2.11(A)(1), which states that “[t]he
judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal
knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.”
As noted above, the burden to show bias is on Appellant. In re Samuel P., 2016
WL 4547543, at *2 (citations omitted) (“The party seeking recusal bears the burden of
proof.”). Appellant argues that the trial court failed to “examine the frequency, recency,
scope, or ongoing nature of Attorney Childress’s service,” yet Appellant fails to present
any evidence on the subject. The burden is not on the trial court to make the record or to
prove that it is not biased.
Rather, Appellant’s burden was to “come forward with some evidence that would
prompt a reasonable, disinterested person to believe that the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” Duke, 398 S.W.3d at 671 (emphases added). This is where
Appellant’s amended motion falls short. He broadly references “the professional trust
inherent in selecting [Attorney Childress] to exercise the court’s authority,” but he fails to
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cite any specific actions by Judge Gomes that would cause a disinterested person to
question her impartiality. In determining whether a judge’s professional relationship with
an attorney appearing before the court provides a reasonable basis for questioning the
judge’s impartiality, this Court has considered “(1) the nature and extent of the prior
association, (2) the length of time since the association was terminated, (3) the possibility
that the judge might continue to benefit from the relationship, and (4) the existence of
personal or social relationships springing from the professional relationship.” Duke, 398
S.W.3d at 672 (citing Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 229 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)).
Here, the record reflects a professional association limited to Attorney Childress’
occasional service as a substitute judge in the trial court. There is no evidence of any
personal or social relationship between Judge Gomes and Attorney Childress. Although
the professional association appears to be ongoing, Appellant has presented no evidence
that the professional association between Judge Gomes and Attorney Childress has
developed into a social or personal relationship. Viewed objectively, the circumstances of
Attorney Childress’ occasional work as a substitute judge in Judge Gomes’ court do not
demonstrate a relationship of such nature or extent as to demonstrate bias or a lack of
impartiality on the part of Judge Gomes in this case.
B. The Trial Court’s Conduct and Rulings
Appellant raises several other grounds for recusal based on Judge Gomes’ alleged
conduct and rulings. These allegations include that Judge Gomes: (1) denied recusal based
“solely” on her finding that adverse rulings will not support recusal; (2) failed to “allow
any consideration of [Appellant] being Pro/Se”; (3) “never let [Appellant] interject, [or]
present all [of his] evidence as she would cut [Appellant] off”; and (4) engaged in “biased
treatment” and acted “[with partiality], unethical[ly], [and] unprofessional[ly].” We
address these allegations in turn.
1. Adverse Rulings
In his petition for recusal appeal, Appellant states that Judge Gomes’ denial of
recusal rested on her erroneous conclusion that
the motion was “solely” based on an adverse ruling[, and] therefore
overlooks distinct grounds that the order itself addressed. This
mischaracterization matters because it allowed the court to apply the adverse-
ruling rule without completing the cumulative appearance analysis
demanded by Rule 2.11.
We have reviewed the trial court’s amended order denying recusal and conclude that
Appellant’s characterization of the trial court’s reliance on the adverse-ruling rule is
mistaken. The trial court merely set out the law on adverse rulings in the context of recusal
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motions, stating:
An adverse ruling by a trial judge is not sufficient ground to establish bias.
The mere fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a party or
witness . . . is not grounds for recusal. Given the adversarial
nature of litigation, trial judges necessarily assess the
credibility of those who testify before them, whether in person
or by some other means. Thus, the mere fact that a witness
takes offense at the court’s assessment of the witness cannot
serve as a valid basis for a motion to recuse. If the rule were
otherwise, recusal would be required as a matter of course
since trial courts necessarily rule against parties and witnesses
in every case, and litigants could manipulate the impartiality
issue for strategic advantage, which the courts frown upon.
Davis v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 565 (Tenn. 2001).
The trial court also stated that, “Mr. Pigford’s recusal is solely based on this Court’s
adverse ruling.”
However, the trial court did not actually limit its analysis to, nor base its decision
solely on, application of the law on adverse rulings. The Appellant’s petition itself makes
this point by suggesting an inconsistency between the “solely based” language and the fact
that the trial court’s order addressed the distinct grounds set forth in his motion. Simply
stated, as discussed below, the trial court addressed each of Appellant’s allegations of bias
in turn before reaching its conclusion that recusal was unwarranted Accordingly, the
Appellant’s argument on this point is unavailing.
2. Treatment as Pro Se Litigant
Appellant next contends that the trial court demonstrated bias by failing to afford
proper consideration to his pro se status. As discussed above, Appellant’s decision to
proceed without counsel entitled Appellant to fair and equal treatment, but it did not relieve
Appellant of the substantive and procedural requirements applicable to represented
litigants. Brown, 428 S.W.3d at 46; Hodges, 43 S.W.3d at 920 (citation omitted).
In its amended order denying recusal, the trial court explained:
After the Court swore [Appellant] in [at the hearing on the motion seeking to
set aside the Windward Deed], the Court asked if he had an attorney. He
advised the Court that he had not been able to find an attorney. The Court
specifically asked him if he wanted to proceed pro se and he verified that he
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would represent himself. This Court then advised Mr. Pigford that he would
have to present his case and that the Court could not advise or help him. Mr.
Pigford continued to state that he would represent himself.
We acknowledge that there is no transcript of the hearing on the motion seeking to
set aside the Windward Deed. This fact limits our ability to review the trial court’s actual
statements. However, once the trial court established that it was Appellant’s wish to
proceed pro se, it had no obligation to aid and assist Appellant in presenting his case. Thus,
the trial court’s treatment of Appellant as a pro se litigant does not provide a basis for
recusal.
3. Presentation of Appellant’s Case
Appellant asserts that the trial court demonstrated bias because it “never let
[Appellant] interject, [or] present all [of his] evidence as she would cut [Appellant] off.”
In the trial court’s amended order denying recusal, it noted:
While the Court was attempting to rule, Mr. Pigford became quite disruptive
and threatened Mr. Childress and the Conservator. Because of his behavior,
the Court had him escorted out of the courtroom.
***
This Court can state unequivocally that Mr. Pigford was given every
opportunity to state his case. Mr. Pigford was allowed to present his case . .
. and presented no witnesses. During his presentation he told the Court, in no
uncertain terms, that all of his mother’s properties belonged to him, and if
the Court wanted any of them sold, the Court had to ask his permission.
In his petition for recusal appeal, Appellant asserts that the foregoing rulings are
merely
the judge’s own categorical recollection that [Appellant] received every
opportunity to present his case, presented no witnesses, became disruptive,
and made threats. Rule 10B necessarily requires the challenged judge to
explain the denial, but a court’s own recollection cannot substitute for
objective consideration of the record when the circumstances of the hearing
are themselves asserted as grounds for recusal.
Again, there is no transcript of the hearing. Rule 10B places the burden on the
petitioner to provide the portions of the trial-court record necessary for review. Tenn. Sup.
Ct. R. 10B § 2.03. In the absence of a transcript, we cannot evaluate the trial court’s
statements in context.
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However, Appellant’s allegations concerning his presentation of evidence and his
removal from the courtroom arise from the trial court’s administration of the pending
litigation. Whether the trial court decided those matters correctly is not before us because
the only order properly before the reviewing court in a Rule 10B appeal is the order denying
recusal. Duke, 398 S.W.3d at 668. Appellant identifies no additional extrajudicial source
of bias connected to these rulings. Accordingly, these allegations do not establish a
reasonable basis for questioning Judge Gomes’ impartiality.
Even accepting Appellant’s allegations concerning the trial court’s management of
the hearing as true, the alleged conduct does not demonstrate that Judge Gomes prejudged
a disputed issue, harbored personal animus toward Appellant, favored Attorney Childress,
or lacked the capacity to decide the case fairly. At most, Appellant’s allegations reflect
disagreement with the manner in which the trial court conducted the hearing and ruled on
matters before it.
4. Other Allegations of Bias
Finally, Appellant broadly asserts that the trial court engaged in “biased treatment”
and acted “[with partiality,] unethical[ly], [and] unprofessional[ly].” However, Appellant
fails to set out specific examples of such partiality. When addressing these vague
assertions, the trial court noted:
Mr. Pigford’s final complaint was merely a general statement that the Court
was biased without listing any specific facts or legal grounds as required by
Rule 10B § 1.01. Therefore, this Court cannot respond other than to state that
this Court decides all cases on the merits regardless of who the lawyer or the
litigant is.
***
Michael Pigford does not assert any specific circumstances identified in
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 2, 2.11, nor does he allege actual
bias or prejudice. He merely questions the Court’s impartiality which this
Court has addressed.
As noted above, when evaluating a motion for recusal, the question is whether the
facts presented would cause a reasonable, disinterested person to question the judge’s
impartiality. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 10, RJC 2.11(A); Duke, 398 S.W.3d at 671. General claims
of bias, without supporting facts, do not permit this objective inquiry to be made.
From our review, we agree that, in the absence of specific examples, Appellant’s
broad statements that the trial court was biased, unethical, and unprofessional are merely
conclusory allegations that cannot form the basis for recusal. In short, Appellant’s
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allegations do not reveal a pattern of judicial bias “so pervasive that it is sufficient to [show
he was denied] a fair trial.” In re Samuel P., 2016 WL 4547543, at *6. Viewed separately
and cumulatively, Appellant’s allegations would not cause a reasonable, disinterested
person of ordinary prudence to find a reasonable basis for questioning Judge Gomes’
impartiality.
VII. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order denying recusal is affirmed, and
the case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent
with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Michael V. Pigford.
Execution for costs may issue if necessary.
s/ Steven Maroney
STEVEN W. MARONEY, JUDGE
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