Shannon Leigh Smith v. State of Tennessee

07/06/2026 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE May 20, 2026 Session SHANNON LEIGH SMITH v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Criminal Court for Union County No. 5347 Ryan M. Spitzer, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-00858-CCA-R3-PC ___________________________________ Petitioner, Shannon Leigh Smith, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying her claim that trial counsel was ineffective in 1) failing to uncover evidence of a detective’s sexual relationship with a State’s witness and the same detective’s termination from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission for misconduct; 2) failing to file a motion to suppress searches of Petitioner’s cell phone and Facebook account; 3) inadequately cross-examining the victim’s sister-in-law; 4) failing to put forth evidence to support self-defense; 5) failing to call defense witnesses including an expert on battered woman syndrome; 6) and withdrawing motions to disqualify the clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office. She further argues that she is entitled to relief based on the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s alleged errors. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post- conviction court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., and MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., joined. T. Scott Jones 1, Baylee M. Brown, and Jordan D. Davis, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Shannon Leigh Smith. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jared Effler, District Attorney General; and Rondeau T. Laffitte, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 1 T. Scott Jones is also listed as Petitioner’s attorney on direct appeal. The post-conviction petition attached a waiver of conflict signed by Petitioner. See Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d 674 (Tenn. 2010).  OPINION Factual and Procedural Background Trial The case arose from the fatal shooting of Timothy Smith by Petitioner, who was the victim’s wife, on July 23, 2017. Petitioner was indicted for second degree murder. 2 See State v. Smith, No. E2021-00821-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 405372 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 13, 2023). At the time of the shooting, Petitioner and the victim lived in a camper on the property on which they were building a house. Id. at *1. Petitioner and the victim were experiencing significant marital strain in the year preceding the shooting. Id. The victim’s coworkers and acquaintances testified that Petitioner believed the victim was having an affair. Id. Two witnesses described their separate experiences in which Petitioner repeatedly and baselessly accused them of having an affair with the victim. Id. Digital evidence recovered from Petitioner’s phone reflected this suspicion. Petitioner had written several lengthy notes expressing distress over the victim’s perceived infidelity, was tracking the victim’s location using the “Find My iPhone” feature, and had searched the victim’s Facebook page 127 times. Id. at *3. Petitioner also searched and took multiple screenshots of the Facebook page of one of the two women Petitioner alleged was having an affair with the victim. Id. The day before the shooting, Petitioner posted twenty-five social-media memes in thirty-five minutes concerning cheating, heartbreak, lying, and betrayal. Id. Petitioner recorded the events leading up to and including the shooting on her cell phone. Id. The roughly hour-long recording captured an escalating argument during which the victim repeatedly instructed Petitioner to stop touching him and to move out of the way, while Petitioner persistently questioned why he was angry. Id. Petitioner then cried out in pain amid a crashing sound, followed by the victim’s statements, “Now get off of me” and “I hope you die.” Id. Petitioner was then described as “whimpering,” followed by a brief silence marked by the sound of a door opening or closing, and then a single gunshot. Id. Petitioner’s breathing was characterized as distressed as she called 911 to report that she had shot the victim because he had hit her and knocked her down. Id. She later told one of the responding officers that she and the victim had gotten into a 2 The post-conviction court took judicial notice of the trial records, and this court does the same of the records on direct appeal. State v. Lawson, 291 S.W.3d 864, 869-70 (Tenn. 2009) (holding that an appellate court may take judicial notice of an earlier proceeding in the same case). -2- fight, that the victim grabbed her when she tried to leave, and that the gun suddenly discharged when she turned around. Id. Responding officers observed injuries to Petitioner and found the victim dead on the ground near the driver side of a pickup truck. Id. Petitioner had a bruise under her eyes and was bleeding from a cut above her right eye. Id. The victim was holding keys to the truck in his right hand and a cell phone charger in his left hand. Id. The truck held trash bags filled with the victim’s clothing and medication. Id. An autopsy showed the victim died from “a single gunshot wound to the right side of his face.” Id. He had been shot from an “intermediate range of fire[,] which is between one foot to two to three feet.” Id. A firearms expert testified that the Glock pistol Petitioner used to shoot the victim was functioning normally and would not fire if dropped. Id. at *4. Randy Summers was the on-call detective in the Union County Sheriff’s Office (“UCSO”) and the lead detective at the scene. By the time he arrived, deputies had already secured the scene and moved the firearm away from Petitioner for officer safety. Before she was transported for medical treatment, Petitioner signed a waiver and consent to search the truck and the camper. Photographs were taken of her hands and her injuries, and Detective Summers photographed the truck, the camper, and the victim’s injuries; he also collected blood evidence and the victim’s personal effects. Blood found inside and outside the camper and in the truck was determined to belong solely to Petitioner. Id. at *3. Detective Summers waited for Special Agent Nick Brown of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) to arrive before further processing the scene. Special Agent Brown received a briefing from Detective Summers and Sheriff William Breeding, 3 and then conducted a systematic walk-through of the scene with Detective Summers, photographing and documenting the scene and collecting blood samples from the truck and the camper, the victim’s personal items, the victim’s and Petitioner’s cell phones, Petitioner’s gun, and a spent shell casing. Petitioner was not at the scene when Special Agent Brown arrived. He encountered her later at the UCSO where he photographed her injuries and received her clothing as evidence. All communication with Petitioner was through counsel. Special Agent Brown conducted and supervised forensic extractions on Petitioner’s and the victim’s phones and recovered and authenticated the hour-long recorded argument between Petitioner and the victim. The recording captured the events leading up to and including the shooting and was played at trial. 3 The summary of the testimonies of Special Agent Brown, Kim Cook, and Amanda Atchley were gleaned from the trial transcript. -3-  Kim Cook, the victim’s sister-in-law, testified that at the victim’s graveside funeral on July 28, 2017, Petitioner told her, “I wasn’t going to let him leave again.” She also testified that Petitioner admitted she “shot him” and “killed him.” Ms. Cook waited fourteen months before reporting the statement to law enforcement or the prosecutor. She said she did not immediately reveal Petitioner’s statement because she was in shock and unsure of what to do. She was interviewed by Special Agent Brown shortly after the funeral but did not tell him what Petitioner had said at the funeral. She disclosed the statement only after she had filed a complaint about the prosecutor’s handling of the case. When she was interviewed again by Special Agent Brown in September 2018, she revealed Petitioner’s statement. Ms. Cook denied that she discussed Petitioner’s statement with her daughter, Amanda Atchley. Ms. Atchley testified that during the victim’s funeral visitation, Petitioner told her she “wasn’t going to let him leave again.” Like her mother, Ms. Atchley waited fourteen months before telling law enforcement. She waited because of fear, uncertainty, and shock. Ms. Atchley testified that she was unaware Petitioner said the same thing to her mother. Ms. Atchley denied talking to her mother about Petitioner’s statement before reporting it to law enforcement. Both gave their statements independently on the same day to Special Agent Brown. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury convicted Petitioner of second degree murder as charged, and the court sentenced her to seventeen years’ incarceration. At the close of sentencing, trial counsel informed the trial court that Petitioner had retained new counsel to represent her moving forward. Motion for New Trial Petitioner filed a motion for new trial asserting a variety of issues. Smith, 2023 WL 405372, at *4. In a second amended motion for new trial, Petitioner alleged for the first time that the State failed to disclose evidence of a sexual relationship between Detective Summers and Ms. Atchley. Id. In support of the motion, Petitioner submitted affidavits from the victim’s two daughters stating Ms. Atchley had told them about the affair, as well as an affidavit from trial counsel confirming the State had not disclosed this information. Id. Petitioner filed two additional amended motions for new trial. Id. Attached to one of the motions was a copy of a letter dated January 30, 2015, from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (“TABC”) terminating Detective Summers. Id. In the termination letter, the TABC director stated that Detective Summers’ conduct and lack of candor during an investigation of his conduct had “caused [his] credibility to be in question[,] and as such, [his] credibility if called to testify in a criminal case is hampered[,] if not destroyed.” Id. The investigation stemmed from Detective Summers allegedly smoking marijuana with an informant or observing her smoke marijuana. Id. -4- The letter also accused Detective Summers of engaging in a sexual relationship with the informant which he had not disclosed during the TABC investigation. Id. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Detective Summers testified, consistent with his trial testimony that he arrived at the scene between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. Id. at *4. Other officers had already secured the scene, including the gun. Id. He processed the scene with Special Agent Brown who arrived after him. Detective Summers took all the crime scene photographs, collected the gun, a spent shell casing, and Petitioner’s and the victim’s cell phones, and took swabs of blood droplets. Id. Detective Summers testified that he had worked for the TABC and his employment was terminated on January 30, 2015, for the reasons set out in the termination letter. Id. at *4. At the motion for new trial hearing, Detective Summers maintained that the reasons for his termination and the language of the termination letter were “false.” Id. Detective Summers testified that when he rejoined the UCSO in 2017, he informed the UCSO Sheriff William Breeding and prosecutors in general about his termination from the TABC but did not provide the letter. Id. 4 Detective Summers met Ms. Atchley in late spring or summer 2018 while visiting his friend, fellow UCSO Detective Eddie Simpson. Id. He denied any sexual relationship with Ms. Atchley but acknowledged socializing with her. Id. at *5. He also acknowledged using Detective Simpson’s phone to contact Ms. Atchley. Id. He denied that he discussed the case with Ms. Atchley although she asked him about the case. Id. He served her with the subpoena to appear at Petitioner’s trial. Id. He did not disclose to prosecutors that he had socialized with Ms. Atchley. Id. Detective Summers testified that he was interviewed by TBI Special Agent Michael O’Keefe after the district attorney general initiated an inquiry into his relationship with Ms. Atchley. Id. at *5-6. Detective Summers acknowledged he did not initially tell Agent O’Keefe he knew Ms. Atchley would be a trial witness, that he had served her with the subpoena, or that he had spoken with her by phone. Id. at *5. He only became forthcoming about these details after he read the transcripts of Agent O’Keefe’s interviews of Detective Simpson and Ms. Atchley. Id. He agreed he told Agent O’Keefe he could not recall whether he had given an opinion about the case because he was “caught off guard” by the situation. Id. 4 The State agreed that had it received a copy of the termination letter, it would have turned it over to the defense “without hesitation.” Id. at *7. -5-  At the motion for new trial hearing, Ms. Atchley refused to answer any questions about whether she had a sexual relationship with Detective Summers, but she said she was truthful when interviewed by Agent O’Keefe. Id. at *6. In a recorded TBI interview admitted into evidence, Ms. Atchley said she had sex with Detective Summers “a couple of times” over two days and that she asked him repeatedly about Petitioner’s case, though he refused to discuss it with her. Id. She met Detective Summers the summer of 2018 and spent time with him and Detective Simpson during the period between the victim’s death and Petitioner’s trial. Id. Detective Summers was “adamant” that they not talk about the case and said he could not and would not say anything about the case. Id. At the hearing, she denied talking to Detective Summers about the case but was aware Detective Summers was the lead investigator. Id. Agent O’Keefe testified that he interviewed Detective Summers, Detective Simpson, and Ms. Atchley as part of the investigation concerning Detective Summers’ relationship with Ms. Atchley. Id. Ms. Atchley was interviewed first and admitted to having had a sexual relationship with Detective Summers. Id. at *6. Detective Summers denied their relationship was sexual, but Agent O’Keefe believed Detective Summers was not being truthful. Id. Phone records showed extensive communication between Ms. Atchley and Detective Simpson, and some contact with Detective Summers. Id. Detective Simpson’s then estranged wife signed an affidavit stating that while reviewing Detective Simpson’s text message history on their joint cell phone bill, she saw the text messages between him and Ms. Atchley. He denied that he was having an affair with Ms. Atchley and told her Detective Summers was using his phone to communicate with Ms. Atchley. Agent O’Keefe obtained Detective Summers’ termination letter from TABC and included it in his report to the district attorney general. Id. Trial counsel testified he was unaware before trial of the romantic relationship between Detective Summers and Ms. Atchley. Id. at *7. Both witnesses were central to the State’s case: Detective Summers as the primary investigator who introduced most exhibits, and Ms. Atchley as a source of Petitioner’s alleged incriminating statement used to establish intent. Id. Trial counsel explained that knowledge of their relationship, as well as post-trial revelations that TABC deemed Detective Summers not credible and had terminated him for dishonesty, would have provided significant impeachment material. Id. He testified he would have cross-examined both witnesses on these issues, pursued TABC records, and argued that Ms. Atchley fabricated the statement after beginning her relationship with Detective Summers. Id. at *8. He further noted that this information could have affected whether Petitioner testified. Id. Trial counsel believed that impeaching both witnesses could have altered the jury’s verdict on intent. Id. Sheriff Breeding testified he was unaware of the termination letter and acknowledged that credibility issues with an officer would be cause for concern. Id. -6- Special Agent Brown testified that Detective Summers’ conduct did not affect the integrity of the crime-scene processing and that Detective Summers did not handle the digital evidence that was important to the State’s theory. Id. The trial court found that the State withheld favorable impeachment evidence but concluded it was immaterial. Id. The court reasoned that neither Detective Summers nor Ms. Atchley exchanged case-related information, that the relationship occurred one year after the homicide, and that the State’s case rested primarily on the audio recording and digital evidence rather than their testimony. Id. The court found that the withheld information would have had “minimal impact on the outcome of the case.” Id. Direct Appeal On direct appeal, Petitioner’s sole issue was the Brady violation related to Detective Summers’ TABC termination letter and his relationship with Ms. Atchley. This court held that the undisclosed relationship between Detective Summers and Ms. Atchley, as well as the TABC termination letter, were not material and did not undermine confidence in the verdict. Id. at *9-11. The court emphasized that Ms. Atchley’s account of Petitioner’s incriminating funeral statement was independently corroborated by Ms. Cook, and there was no evidence of collusion; their delayed reporting did not suggest a conspiracy. Id. at *10. This court further concluded that cross-examining either witness about a relationship that began a year after the victim’s death would not have affected Ms. Cook’s separate testimony or the verdict, nor could the relationship have influenced Detective Summers’ crime-scene work. Id. Petitioner’s claims related to Detective Summers’ TABC termination were also rejected on the grounds that the termination involved unrelated misconduct years before the offense and had no bearing on the investigation. Id. Other officers observed Detective Summers’ evidence collection, and Special Agent Brown confirmed the crime scene was processed appropriately. Id. The court further noted that the State only briefly mentioned Petitioner’s funeral statement and relied on independent evidence developed by Special Agent Brown such as audio recordings, digital data, and social media activity. Id. Even substantial impeachment would not have altered the outcome. The court noted some evidence Detective Summers collected actually supported aspects of Petitioner’s self-defense claim. Id. Petitioner filed an application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court which was denied on June 13, 2023. -7- Post Conviction Proceedings Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which she reframed the Brady issue as part of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Specifically, she alleged that trial counsel should have discovered information about Detective Summers’ relationship with Ms. Atchley and his termination from the TABC prior to trial. Petitioner also asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file motions to suppress the search of her cell phone and Facebook account, in failing to conduct a “robust” cross-examination of Ms. Cook, in failing to offer evidence to support her self- defense theory, and in withdrawing motions seeking to disqualify the clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office. At the evidentiary hearing, Sheriff Breeding testified he had previously worked with Detective Summers and considered him to be a good officer. In 2015, Detective Summers approached him about returning to the UCSO and disclosed “there was an issue with [T]ABC and he was let go[.]” Detective Summers told Sheriff Breeding that he had passed a polygraph examination regarding the allegations, and another UCSO officer “basically confirmed” that account. Sheriff Breeding explained that he had not reviewed the full TABC file when Detective Summers returned to the UCSO. He later learned – during the hearing on the motion for new trial – that the TABC had issued a January 30, 2015 termination letter stating that Detective Summers had engaged in conduct damaging to the agency’s reputation and had provided incomplete and untruthful information during the investigation, undermining his credibility as a witness. The letter revealed that an investigation was initiated into Detective Summers’ involvement with an informant. The letter detailed the incident in which the informant used marijuana in front of Detective Summers, as well as a sexual encounter between another agent and the informant that occurred while Detective Summers was present. Sheriff Breeding confirmed the letter was not in Detective Summers’ UCSO personnel file in 2017 and would not have been produced had trial counsel requested the file before trial. Sheriff Breeding also acknowledged that Detective Summers’ UCSO personnel file did contain a November 7, 2024 letter from District Attorney General Jared Effler advising that the District Attorney’s Office would no longer prosecute cases requiring testimony from Detective Summers. Sheriff Breeding read the letter into the record and noted that this decision occurred after Petitioner’s conviction. Regarding the investigation in this case, Sheriff Breeding confirmed he was present while Detective Summers processed the crime scene. He testified, consistent -8- with his trial testimony, that Special Agent Brown worked closely with Detective Summers in photographing the scene and collecting evidence. Sheriff Breeding also testified that at the time of the post-conviction hearing, Detective Summers was still employed by the UCSO, serving in an administrative capacity at the same rate of pay, and that his investigative duties had been limited following the letter from the district attorney general. TBI Agent O’Keefe’s testimony was consistent with his testimony at the motion for new trial hearing. Agent O’Keefe was not involved in the investigation of the shooting but was asked by the prosecutor, Jared Effler, to investigate allegations that Detective Summers was “having [sexual] relations with one of the witnesses in the trial.” Agent O’Keefe first interviewed Ms. Atchley at the TBI Office in Knoxville. During the interview, Ms. Atchley confirmed she had a sexual relationship with Detective Summers. Based on Ms. Atchley’s interview, Agent O’Keefe then interviewed Detective Simpson and Detective Summers. He also subpoenaed Detective Summers’ personnel files from the TABC and the UCSO. The TABC file contained the letter from Keith Bell, the Executive Director, terminating Detective Summers following an internal investigation. After Agent O’Keefe obtained the TABC dismissal letter, he questioned Detective Summers about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Atchley. He did not believe Detective Summers when he denied having a sexual relationship with Ms. Atchley. Agent O’Keefe opined that in his professional opinion, he would have serious misgivings about working on a case with Detective Summers. Consistent with his testimony at trial, Detective Summers testified that he was the on-call investigator the day of the shooting and was the first investigator to arrive at the scene, where he helped secure and photograph the scene and handled early physical evidence, including the collection and packaging of the victim’s and Petitioner’s cell phones and other items. Detective Summers acknowledged his termination from TABC, but he minimized the circumstances that led to his termination and maintained that he had done nothing wrong. Detective Summers denied the allegations against him involved “dishonesty and sexual impropriety.” When asked whether he had participated in a sexual encounter as described in the TABC letter, Detective Summers declined to respond. He confirmed that trial counsel did not question him about his termination from the TABC or any matters from his UCSO personnel file at trial. Detective Summers denied he had a sexual relationship with Ms. Atchley. He testified that he had discussed his TABC termination with the district attorney general’s office before trial, although he could not recall whether he disclosed the existence of the -9- TABC Director’s formal written findings. Detective Summers said he would not have spoken with trial counsel pre-trial even if he had been approached. Trial counsel testified that he had decades of experience in criminal practice and that his experience included substantial homicide trial work on both the prosecution and defense sides. He was retained after Petitioner’s first trial counsel withdrew from representation. His practice included investigation, witness preparation, cross-examination, and the development of trial strategy, including the pursuit of self-defense theories. As a matter of routine practice, he did not subpoena law-enforcement personnel files absent a specific reason to believe they contained relevant impeachment material, nor did he typically inquire into the sexual history of officers or witnesses without a factual basis to do so. Trial counsel stated he had no knowledge of a sexual relationship between Detective Summers and Ms. Atchley before or during trial; nothing in discovery provided by the State suggested such a relationship. He was unaware of the TABC findings concerning Detective Summers or that the agency had questioned his credibility. The personnel file he received from the UCSO did not contain the TABC letter, and he had no reason to suspect additional undisclosed materials existed. He testified that, had the information been disclosed, he would have used it for impeachment and believed it would have affected the outcome of the trial. Trial counsel reviewed the search warrants for Petitioner’s cell phone and Facebook account; and based on the law at the time, he concluded that a suppression motion would not have succeeded. He acknowledged that later case law changed the legal landscape, but those developments were not foreseeable at the time of trial. With respect to the cross-examination of Ms. Cook, trial counsel testified that he questioned her consistent with his trial strategy. He did not have impeachment evidence beyond what was presented at trial and believed his cross-examination was appropriate under the circumstances. Trial counsel testified that he advanced Petitioner’s self-defense theory and did not believe expert testimony was necessary to present that; he focused on the physical evidence and eyewitness accounts. Trial counsel did not hire an investigator, did not request a mental health evaluation, and did not consult an expert on battered woman syndrome. He did not believe the evidence would support a battered woman syndrome defense. Additionally, he was concerned that asserting the defense could potentially elevate the charge to first degree murder. His strategy was to pursue self-defense relying heavily on photographic evidence showing Petitioner’s injuries. Trial counsel requested, and the trial court gave a self-defense instruction at trial. - 10 -  Trial counsel acknowledged that Petitioner’s first trial counsel filed motions to disqualify the local circuit court clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office based on potential conflicts of interest. He withdrew the motions because he believed they lacked legal merit. Regarding a motion to change venue based on concerns about juror bias or the influence of a small community, trial counsel testified that such issues are typically explored and addressed during voir dire, which he conducted in this case and during which he used all of his peremptory strikes. He also acknowledged that he did not interview all civilian witnesses, did not file motions to suppress statements or searches, and presented no defense witnesses at trial. Petitioner presented testimony from two expert witnesses. Anthony Craighead, who testified as an expert in criminal prosecution, was a former career prosecutor with more than three decades of experience in homicide and major felony litigation. Robert Willis White, Sr., testified as an expert in criminal defense, drawing on his extensive experience in homicide defense work. Both witnesses recounted their lengthy careers handling criminal cases and described “good practices” governing pretrial investigation, motions practice, attorney preparation, impeachment of law-enforcement witnesses, and the development of trial strategy in homicide litigation. Mr. Craighead explained that homicide cases require substantially heightened preparation because “[t]he consequences of losing a murder case are vastly different than the consequences of losing a DUI or shoplifting case[.]” While Mr. Craighead acknowledged he did not frequently observe requests to subpoena officer personnel files, he testified that he had seen subpoenas in cases “of this level, of this consequence,” where credibility concerns are central. Both experts agreed that any indication of a personal relationship between a lead investigator and a key witness, as well as evidence of prior disciplinary action – such as the matters referenced in the TABC letter concerning Detective Summers – would constitute significant impeachment material that diligent counsel would pursue. Mr. White emphasized that credibility was central to this case, and that information concerning Detective Summers and his relationship with Ms. Atchley and his prior termination from the TABC were key to meaningfully testing his credibility. They stressed the importance of cross-examination but acknowledged that effective cross-examination is shaped by the impeachment evidence available to counsel. Regarding trial strategy, both experts agreed that if counsel had access to proof such as photographs to support a defense, they would expect that proof to be used. Mr. White added that evidence bearing on the defendant’s perceptions and the circumstances of the confrontation should be exhibited. In cases involving domestic violence dynamics, they noted that counsel often considers consulting an expert on battered woman syndrome to assist the jury in understanding the defendant’s perceptions and reactions. - 11 -  Both experts were concerned by the lack of pretrial motions filed by trial counsel. They testified that reviewing digital search warrants is standard practice in homicide cases and that suppression motions are commonly filed. Mr. Craighead said he would have expected a search warrant for a defendant’s phone to be challenged in a suppression motion. Mr. White testified that the search warrant for Petitioner’s phone was “overly broad” and that it would have constituted “good practice” for a suppression motion to have been filed just on that factor alone. Each expert also expressed concern that motions to disqualify the clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office were withdrawn. Mr. Craighead stated in his experience, in a situation where a defendant previously worked in the clerk’s office in a small county, he would have expected a motion to be filed so that any potential conflict could be addressed on the record in open court. Mr. White agreed that given Petitioner’s prior employment in the clerk’s office, he would have litigated a motion to disqualify that office. When informed that the public defender’s office had initially recused itself from Petitioner’s case, Mr. White testified that this development strengthened the rationale for pursuing the motion to disqualify the district attorney general’s office as well. Both experts noted that withdrawing these motions limited Petitioner’s ability to challenge potential conflicts or institutional bias and to ensure a fair trial. The parties also stipulated that Stephen Ross Johnson, an attorney with Ritchie, Johnson and Stovall and the Innocence Project, was an expert in criminal defense. While he was unable to testify at the hearing, Mr. Johnson would have testified that he would expect a substantial number of pretrial motions to be filed in a homicide case to test the sufficiency of the evidence; he would also expect the use of an investigator. He would have offered testimony similar to Mr. White’s regarding the two motions to disqualify the clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office. The post-conviction court entered a written order denying post-conviction relief concerning each claim raised by Petitioner. The post-conviction court ultimately credited trial counsel’s testimony as a matter of strategy and found that Petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to prove either deficient performance or prejudice. It is from this judgment that Petitioner now appeals. Analysis Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred in finding she did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to uncover evidence of Detective Summers’ sexual relationship with Ms. Atchley and Detective Summers’ termination from the TABC; for failing to file a motion to suppress the search of Petitioner’s cell phone and Facebook - 12 - account; for inadequately cross-examining Ms. Cook; for failing to put forth evidence or call witnesses to support the self-defense claim; for failing to call defense witnesses including an expert witness on battered woman syndrome; and for withdrawing motions to disqualify the clerk’s office and the district attorney general’s office. She further argues that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s error entitles her to relief. I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a criminal defendant may seek relief from a conviction or sentence that is “void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103. The right to effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded by the Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Tennessee. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. As such, “[t]he deprivation of effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional claim cognizable under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.” Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 418 (Tenn. 2016)). When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is made, the burden is on the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993); Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2015). Deficient performance is representation that falls below “an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured by prevailing professional norms, and courts begin with “the strong presumption” that counsel exercised professional reasonable judgment. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 457-58 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688); see also Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 932-33 (Tenn. 1975). In assessing deficiency, the Court must evaluate counsel’s actions from counsel’s perspective at the time and avoid using hindsight to second-guess reasonable tactical decisions, even if another strategy might have produced a different outcome. Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 458. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Reasonable probability is a lesser burden of proof than preponderance of the evidence. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 458 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 405-06 (2000)). - 13 -  When a petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness, the same witness must be called to testify at the post-conviction hearing. Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. 1999). A petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice if an omitted witness is not produced because “neither a trial judge nor an appellate court can speculate or guess on the question of whether further investigation would have revealed a material witness or what a witness’s testimony might have been if introduced by defense counsel.” Id. at 757-58. Furthermore, when the proof of guilt is overwhelming, proving prejudice is exceedingly difficult. See Proctor v. State, 868 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); Bray v. State, No. M2011-00665-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 1895948, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2012) (finding that, in light of overwhelming evidence, petitioner could not demonstrate prejudice); McNeil v. State, No. M2010-00671-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 704452, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 2011) (finding that overwhelming evidence of guilt precluded showing of prejudice from admission of evidence at trial). Failure to satisfy either prong results in the denial of relief. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 786-87 (Tenn. 2014). Accordingly, if either factor is not satisfied, there is no need to consider the other factor. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 316 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Carpenter v. State, 126 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tenn. 2004)). “[T]he petitioner is required to prove the fact of counsel’s alleged error by clear and convincing evidence.” Phillips v. State, 647 S.W.3d 389, 401 (Tenn. 2022) (quoting Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 294) (Tenn. 2009)); see also T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f); Tenn. Sup. Ct. 28, § 8(D)(1). “Appellate review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact that this Court reviews de novo.” Phillips, 647 S.W.3d at 400 (citing Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 294). As an appellate court, we are bound by the factual findings of the post-conviction court unless the evidence in the re