Full Opinion

11/18/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE March 25, 2026 Session JACK PHILIP NYIRI v. CHERYL JANE NYIRI Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County No. 11CV-39636 David Henry Veile, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-00333-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ This appeal involves an obligor’s petition to modify his alimony obligation due to his retirement. The chancery court determined that the obligor’s retirement did not constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances because it was not objectively reasonable. The chancery court also found that, even if there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances, modification was not warranted. The obligor appeals. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which VALERIE L. SMITH, and STEVEN W. MARONEY, JJ., joined. Jacob T. Thorington and Kayla O. Redmon, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jack Philip Nyiri. Andrew M. Cate, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Cheryl Jane Nyiri. OPINION I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY Jack Nyiri and Cheryl Nyiri were divorced on November 2, 2012, by an order entered by the Williamson County Chancery Court.1 The chancery court determined that Ms. Nyiri was the economically disadvantaged spouse. Accordingly, it awarded Ms. Nyiri alimony in futuro in the amount of $2,000 per month. The court’s order provided that the alimony payments would be automatically “reduced by any additional amount of social 1 Nowhere in the technical record is the date of parties’ marriage provided. security” Ms. Nyiri became eligible to receive. Mr. Nyiri paid $2,000 of alimony per month consistently until sometime in 2019. At that point, the parties agreed for the payments to be reduced to $1,870.20 per month based on the operation of Ms. Nyiri’s social security benefit.2 Mr. Nyiri paid this amount monthly for several years. However, Mr. Nyiri was terminated from his employment as a hospital administrator in October 2023. Mr. Nyiri made his alimony payments in October and November 2023 but then stopped. He filed a petition to terminate his alimony obligations on January 30, 2024. Mr. Nyiri was 72 years old at the time he filed the petition and maintained that he was unable to obtain employment comparable to that which he had lost. He asserted that his “involuntary retirement” constituted a substantial and material change of circumstances. Likewise, he claimed that both his ability to pay alimony and Ms. Nyiri’s need for it had decreased. The petition stated that Ms. Nyiri began living with the parties’ adult son after the decree of divorce was entered and asserted “her financial situation ha[d] improved[.]” Ms. Nyiri responded to the petition and asserted that her need for alimony had not changed.3 She also sought an award of attorney’s fees. The matter proceeded to trial on December 3, 2024. Mr. Nyiri testified first. He explained that he moved to Maryland sometime in 2010 after the divorce proceedings were underway. He began working at a hospital as a “director of radiation therapy.” He also began renting a condominium. He stated that “several months” after the divorce decree was entered, he began dating his current girlfriend. His girlfriend moved in with him “four or five years” later and continued to reside with him at the time of trial. Mr. Nyiri stated that he holds a master’s degree in health care administration. He explained that he was terminated from his hospital administration job in October 2023, after a “merger.” He claimed that his termination came as a “surprise,” as he had planned to work at the hospital for at least three additional years. While Mr. Nyiri testified that he considered suing the hospital for age discrimination, he eventually signed a severance agreement and received a payout of $7,237. He noted that he also received a payout of $12,284.18 to compensate him for the paid time off he accrued prior to his termination. Mr. Nyiri claimed that he sought new employment after his termination. He testified that he “worked with the state of Maryland’s Unemployment Services Bureau,” attended meetings, applied for jobs, and “sent letters and called . . . other hospitals and other radiation therapy centers” in attempts to seek employment. However, these attempts were “to no avail.” Mr. Nyiri stated that he even applied for a job at Target but was informed he was not “a viable candidate for them.” Eventually, he obtained seasonal employment 2 Mr. Nyiri acknowledged at trial that he initially reduced his payment by too large of an amount and accrued a $5,000 arrearage. However, the parties agreed to waive that arrearage. 3 Ms. Nyiri’s response also included a prayer that she be permitted to file a counterclaim to recover the arrearage that had accrued since Mr. Nyiri’s last alimony payment in November 2023. However, no such counterclaim was filed. -2- as a part-time tennis instructor making $20 per hour. He stated that he had earned “a little bit over $4,000 gross” since starting this job. He stated that he also receives a social security benefit of $3,767.70 per month after his Medicare deduction. He indicated that he pays $230 per month for supplemental health insurance, $30.30 per month for prescription insurance, and $65 per month for dental insurance. Mr. Nyiri also explained that he and his girlfriend jointly purchased the condominium he had been renting since his move to Maryland shortly before he was terminated from his job. He stated that his monthly mortgage payment was $2,176.03. He discussed a number of other expenses associated with the condominium including a fee of $475 per month, a payment of $31.25 per month for “footage water,” and a condominium association fee of $46.36 per month. Notably, he testified that, while his girlfriend was a joint owner of the condominium, she had never contributed toward the mortgage payment or other expenses. He indicated that his girlfriend is employed and makes approximately $70,000 per year. Mr. Nyiri acknowledged that he purchased a new vehicle after losing his job. He claimed that his old car had required major repairs and had 120,000 miles “on it.” He stated that he liquidated approximately $35,000 from his retirement account to make a down payment on the vehicle and agreed to pay $342 per month for five years. Mr. Nyiri testified that he withdrew an additional $25,000 from his retirement account to pay his legal expenses and to make repairs to the condominium. He stated that the balance of his retirement account at the time of trial was “between $4 and $5,000.” Mr. Nyiri estimated that his monthly expenses totaled approximately $6,439.07 per month without including his alimony obligation. Mr. Nyiri noted that he and Ms. Nyiri had both received large distributions from a trust upon the divorce. He estimated that they each received $212,049.01. He testified that he used a large portion of his share to pay off marital debt in accordance with the chancery court’s divorce decree. He claimed that he did not recall how he spent the remainder. Ms. Nyiri also testified. She explained that she had dealt with a litany of health issues since the divorce. She had been diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and had undergone hospitalization and several surgeries due to the condition. Additionally, she had both knees replaced, had undergone surgery for a broken arm, and had arthritis “throughout [her] body.” She was 75 years old at the time of trial. She stated that she had been unable to work since the divorce. She acknowledged that she lived with the parties’ adult son, Christopher Nyiri. She explained that they lived in a studio apartment in Arlington, Virginia, that is “probably about 250 square feet.”4 She noted that she invested a majority of her trust distribution but lost it due to “the volatile stock market.” She testified that she spent the remainder on various surgeries, repairs to Christopher’s car, and to support the 4 It is unclear at what point Ms. Nyiri and Christopher moved to Virginia. -3- household from time to time. She explained that Christopher is an attorney but had been without work “[o]ff and on” since she began living with him. He was also unable to work during periods of time following her surgeries because he was required to serve as her caregiver. At the time of trial, he was working as a law clerk for the United States Department of Justice and was making approximately $80,000 per year. However, Ms. Nyiri claimed that she was not sure how long he would continue to work there due to “the change in government policies.” Ms. Nyiri’s statement of income and expenses indicated that she receives a social security benefit of $1,102.10 per month after her Medicare deduction. However, she testified that her medical expenses and payments for storage units “deplete[d] all of” her social security benefit. Her medical expenses were estimated at $785 per month in the form of supplemental insurance and other expenses. She paid approximately $450 per month to rent several storage units. Additionally, she listed $300 for food expenses and $260 for utility, internet, and telephone services. She contributed $1,200 toward apartment rent.5 She acknowledged that she sometimes paid more to maintain the storage units and had spent as much as $962 in one month to do so. Nevertheless, she estimated that her average total expenses were $3,850 per month. She stated that she relied heavily on the alimony payments she received to cover her expenses. The chancery court entered its final order on February 11, 2025. The chancery court found that Mr. Nyiri’s testimony regarding his attempts to find new employment was not credible. Rather, it found that he was “woefully underemployed in an effort to avoid paying alimony.” Accordingly, the court determined that Mr. Nyiri’s retirement was not objectively reasonable and did not constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances. The chancery court imputed Mr. Nyiri’s income at $167,540 per year, which was an average of the income he earned during the three years preceding his termination. It determined that he had the ability to pay his previously set alimony obligation. The chancery court also noted that Mr. Nyiri had not put forth evidence establishing his financial situation at the time the divorce decree was entered and therefore, had not established it had changed. Significantly, the court made an alternative finding that, even if a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred, “the totality of the circumstances would dictate that his alimony obligation remain unmodified.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i). The chancery court awarded Ms. Nyiri her reasonable attorney’s fees. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Mr. Nyiri filed a timely notice of appeal. II. ISSUES PRESENTED 5 Ms. Nyiri stated that her finances were “commingled” with Christopher’s. She indicated that they each paid various expenses. She explained that she would sometimes pay for certain items or expenses in lieu of rent, and “it just kind of equaled out.” Accordingly, while her bank statements did not contain a charge for rent, she explained that she paid for a portion of Christopher’s food or other expenses in lieu of that rent. -4- The appellant has presented several issues on appeal, which we have restated as the following three issues: 1. Whether the chancery court erred when it determined that there was not a substantial and material change in circumstances after the entry of the final divorce decree. 2. Whether the chancery court erred when it determined that, even if a substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred, the totality of the circumstances required the alimony award to remain unmodified. 3. Whether the chancery court erred when it awarded Ms. Nyiri attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed. III. DISCUSSION “On appeal, we are ‘generally disinclined to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal support decision.’” Malkin v. Malkin, 475 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011)). “Rather, ‘[t]he role of an appellate court in reviewing an award of spousal support is to determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not clearly unreasonable.’” Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 105 (quoting Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn. 2006)). Accordingly, “[a] trial court’s decision on a petition to modify alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Covarrubias v. Baker, 696 S.W.3d 598, 606-07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023). As our Tennessee Supreme Court explained: [a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice. This standard does not permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court but, reflects an awareness that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable alternatives, and thus envisions a less rigorous review of the lower court’s decision and a decreased likelihood that the decision will be reversed on appeal. Consequently, when reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, such as an alimony determination, the appellate court should presume that the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 105-06. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We review questions of fact de novo and afford a trial court’s findings a presumption of correctness “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Covarrubias, 696 S.W.3d at 606. However, “[w]hen a trial court’s factual finding is based on its assessment of a witness’s credibility, appellate courts afford great weight to that determination and -5- will not reverse it absent clear evidence to the contrary.” In re Markus E., 671 S.W.3d 437, 457 (Tenn. 2023). We review questions of law de novo, without a presumption of correctness. Covarrubias, 696 S.W.3d at 606. The present petition concerns a request to modify an award of alimony in futuro. This type of award “remain[s] in the court’s control for the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended or otherwise modified, upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 121(f)(2)(A). “The party seeking modification bears the burden of proving that a substantial and material change in circumstances has occurred.” Wiser v. Wiser, 339 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). A change is “substantial” if it significantly affects the obligor’s ability to pay alimony or the recipient’s need for it. Id. “A change is material if it was not ‘anticipated or [within] the contemplation of the parties at the time’ of the original divorce.” Id. (quoting Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 728 (Tenn. 2001). However, “‘[p]roving a substantial and material change [has occurred] is merely the first hurdle.’” Covarrubias, 696 S.W.3d at 608 (quoting Himes v. Himes, No. M2019-01344- COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1546961, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2021)). The party seeking a modification must also establish “‘that modification is warranted’” in accordance with the statutory factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(i). Id. (quoting Himes, 2021 WL 1546961, at *4). Significantly, “the two most important considerations in modifying a spousal support award are the financial ability of the obligor to provide for the support and the financial need of the party receiving the support.” Bogan, 60 S.W.3d at 730. These factors are to be “given at least equal consideration.” Id. Mr. Nyiri contends that the chancery court erred when it found there was not a substantial and material change in circumstances. Likewise, he claims that the chancery court abused its discretion when it determined his retirement was not objectively reasonable. He argues that his testimony demonstrates he was not voluntarily underemployed. Mr. Nyiri also maintains that the chancery court erred when it stated there was no evidence of the circumstances present at the time the divorce decree was entered contained in the record. While these arguments are presented as distinct issues in Mr. Nyiri’s brief, they each pertain to the determination of whether he established a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying a modification of the alimony award. Accordingly, we address the arguments in concert. It is well established “that when an obligor’s retirement is objectively reasonable, it does constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances—irrespective of whether the retirement was foreseeable or voluntary—so as to permit modification of the support obligation.” Bogan, 60 S.W.3d at 729. However, the mere utterance of “the word ‘retirement’” does not automatically result in a “finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances.” Id. To determine whether a retirement was objectively reasonable: -6- the trial court should examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the retirement to ensure that it is objectively reasonable. The burden of establishing that the retirement is objectively reasonable is on the party seeking modification of the award, and the trial court’s determination of reasonableness will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. . . . [I]n no case may a retirement be deemed objectively reasonable if it was primarily motivated by a desire to defeat the support award or to reduce the alimony paid to the former spouse. Id. (internal citations omitted). The chancery court held that Mr. Nyiri’s retirement was not “objectively reasonable” and deemed him “woefully underemployed in an effort to avoid paying alimony.” It considered his lack of savings or “assets to provide for continued income during his retirement to cover his monthly expenses” as a circumstance demonstrating his retirement was not reasonable. Additionally, the court determined that Mr. Nyiri’s decision to liquidate his retirement account in order to purchase a new vehicle and institute legal proceedings was tantamount to “dissipat[ion of] his savings.” The court also assigned great weight to its determination that Mr. Nyiri had not expended adequate effort to find new employment comparable to that from which he was terminated. Mr. Nyiri argues that the chancery court improperly considered the issue of voluntary underemployment when considering whether a substantial and material change of circumstances occurred. He asserts that, because Ms. Nyiri did not raise the argument in her response to the petition to modify, the chancery court erred when it considered whether he was voluntarily underemployed. He also claims that the evidence demonstrates he was not voluntarily underemployed. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(1) explicitly places the burden of proving that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred on the party seeking a modification. Therefore, by asserting that his retirement constituted a substantial and material change of circumstances, Mr. Nyiri placed whether his retirement was objectively reasonable at issue. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d at 729 (explaining that the mere utterance of “the word ‘retirement’” does not automatically result in a “finding of a substantial and material change in circumstances”). Likewise, a trial court is to “examine the totality of the circumstances” when assessing whether the retirement is objectively reasonable. Id. Accordingly, the chancery court acted within its discretion when considering whether Mr. Nyiri refrained from obtaining employment comparable to that which he lost or had a particular earning capacity when assessing whether his retirement was objectively reasonable. These matters are clearly components of “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. As noted above, a retirement will not “be deemed objectively reasonable if it was primarily motivated by a desire to defeat the support award or to reduce the alimony paid to the former spouse.” Id. We discern no error in the chancery court’s decision to assess whether Mr. Nyiri was voluntarily underemployed despite Ms. Nyiri not raising the argument in her brief. -7- Having determined that the chancery court did not err when it assessed whether Mr. Nyiri was voluntarily underemployed, we now consider whether the chancery court erred when it determined he was and found this demonstrated his retirement was not objectively reasonable. Mr. Nyiri argues that the “preponderance of the evidence presented at trial is against the conclusion that he was voluntarily underemployed” as he testified that he attempted to procure employment after his termination. He also claims that his failure to obtain new employment despite his attempts to do so demonstrates his retirement was objectively reasonable. To support both of these arguments, Mr. Nyiri relies on his own testimony. Importantly, the chancery court made an explicit credibility finding regarding Mr. Nyiri’s testimony. It found that Mr. Nyiri’s testimony concerning “his efforts to obtain employment” was not credible. This testimony is the only evidence Mr. Nyiri submitted regarding his attempts to obtain employment after his termination. As noted above, a trial court’s credibility findings regarding in-person witness testimony are entitled to substantial deference from this court and may only be reversed if clear evidence to the contrary is contained in the record. See In re Markus E., 671 S.W.3d at 457; Freeman v. Freeman, 147 S.W.3d 234, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). On appeal, Mr. Nyiri has simply not cited the type of clear evidence necessary to override the court’s factual findings based on its assessment of his testimony. He instead supports his arguments by citing the same lines of testimony submitted to the chancery court without pointing to additional evidence in the record supporting his underlying contentions. For example, Mr. Nyiri’s brief provides that “[h]e testified that he sent letters [to] recruiters and contacted hospitals” but was unable to procure a new position. However, he did not provide documentary evidence such as copies of letters or records of communications with recruiters or hospitals demonstrating he undertook substantial efforts to obtain employment in his field of hospital administration. See Easley v. City of Memphis, 699 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tenn. 2024) (explaining that this Court erred when it overruled a trial court’s credibility findings based on “purported inconsistencies” in testimony rather than documentary evidence such as phone records contradicting the witness’s testimony “which might [have] constitute[d] the type of clear evidence sufficient to override” a trial court’s factual finding predicated on its assessment of witness credibility). Accordingly, we will not disturb the chancery court’s factual findings predicated on this testimony. Therefore, as there is no other evidence contained in the record supporting Mr. Nyiri’s assertion that he attempted to obtain employment similar to that which he lost, we affirm the chancery court’s determination that Mr. Nyiri’s retirement was not objectively reasonable and did not constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances. See Bogan, 60 S.W.3d at 729. Mr. Nyiri also argues that the chancery court erred when it determined there was no evidence in the record establishing his ability to pay alimony at the time the divorce decree was entered. Essentially, the court stated that it could not opine as to whether a change in Mr. Nyiri’s ability to pay existed because his ability to do so in 2012 was not adequately -8- established. However, as we have determined that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion when it found Mr. Nyiri’s retirement was not objectively reasonable, resolution of this issue would not affect our decision in this case. Accordingly, the issue is pretermitted. Likewise, having decided that the chancery court did not err when it determined there was not a substantial and material change in circumstances, we need not address whether the chancery court erred when it assessed the factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(i). Accordingly, that issue is pretermitted.6 6 Mr. Nyiri also argues in this section of his brief that the chancery court erred when it did not consider the presumption of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(2)(B). The statute provides that: [i]n all cases where a person is receiving alimony in futuro and the alimony recipient lives with a third person, a rebuttable presumption is raised that: (i) The third person is contributing to the support of the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of support previously awarded, and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse; or (ii) The third person is receiving support from the alimony recipient and the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded and the court should suspend all or part of the alimony obligation of the former spouse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(B). Nowhere in his petition to modify did Mr. Nyiri specifically cite this provision of the statute as the basis for modification. He did point out that Ms. Nyiri had begun living with Christopher after the divorce decree was entered and claimed her financial position had improved. However, he did not specifically cite this subsection of the statute or otherwise rely on its presumption as a basis for the modification of the alimony award. Nowhere in his petition or elsewhere in the record presented did Mr. Nyiri argue that the presumption arose or that Ms. Nyiri held the burden to rebut it. It is therefore unsurprising that the presumption was not addressed in the chancery court’s order. Mr. Nyiri’s counsel did state at trial that “[u]nder the alimony statutes, clearly, somebody else is providing for her support[.]” Counsel did not discuss the language of the statute or note that the presumption existed. Instead, Mr. Nyiri merely argued at trial and in his petition that Ms. Nyiri’s decision to reside with Christopher lessened her need for support. Accordingly, the chancery court simply addressed Mr. Nyiri’s argument as it was presented in his petition in its alternative holding regarding the application of the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(i). We discern no error in the chancery court’s decision to address the argument Ms. Nyiri presented rather than the one that he could have presented. Likewise, because Mr. Nyiri did not rely on the presumption created by the statute at the trial court level, we will not consider his arguments pertaining to it on appeal. See Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) (explaining that “questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained on appeal); Hoering v. Hoering, No. E2021-00529-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 987094, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2022) (declining to consider the presumption of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(2)(B) where “Husband did not invoke it” and did not “argue to the trial court that the presumption should [have been] applied”). Notably, because the argument was framed as an argument pertaining to her need for alimony, it only concerned the second requirement of the statute. Therefore, because Mr. Nyiri has not established that a substantial and material change in circumstance occurred, the argument is pretermitted. -9- Mr. Nyiri also seeks to have the award of attorney’s fees to Ms. Nyiri vacated. We review an award made pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) according to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Strickland v. Strickland, 644 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021). Mr. Nyiri asks for the award to be vacated either because the reversal of the modification order renders Ms. Nyiri not the prevailing party or, in the alternative, because the evidence did not demonstrate he had the ability to pay. As we have affirmed the chancery court’s holding that modification of alimony was not warranted, Mr. Nyiri’s first argument is without merit. As to his remaining argument, Mr. Nyiri again relied on his testimony regarding his purported attempts to obtain employment after his termination to demonstrate the chancery court erred because he “does not have any ability to pay an award of attorney[’s] fees.” As we determined that the chancery court did not err when it determined Mr. Nyiri was voluntarily underemployed, we find this argument is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the chancery court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Jack Philip Nyiri, for which execution may issue if necessary. s/ Carma Dennis McGee CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE - 10 -