Full Opinion

11/18/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs June 3, 2026 IN RE NIXON K., ET AL.1 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County No. 162067 Gregory S. McMillan, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01701-COA-R3-JV ___________________________________ This appeal arises from the adjudication of dependency and neglect against two minor children’s parents following an incident of domestic violence in the home. We now affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL MCBRAYER, and VALERIE L. SMITH, JJ., joined. Andrew Beamer, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Darlene B. and Seaton K. Jonathan R. Skrmetti, Attorney General & Reporter, and Allen T. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. OPINION I. BACKGROUND Nixon and Luigi (collectively “the Children”) were born to Darlene B. (“Mother”) and Seaton K. (“Father”), in 2018 and 2020, respectively. On November 2, 2024, Mother ran from the family home to a neighbor’s house and called 9-1-1, alleging that Father, who was intoxicated, had thrown her against the wall during an argument. The Children were asleep in the home during the incident. Father was arrested as a result of the incident and was directed not to return to the family home as a condition of his bond release. However, Mother retrieved Father and 1 This court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in certain proceedings by initializing the last name of the parties. brought him back to the family home. On November 7, 2024, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition for a restraining order, alleging that the Children were dependent and neglected and requesting an order limiting Father’s contact with the Children to supervised visitation by a third-party without Mother’s participation. The parents waived their right to a preliminary hearing and were advised at two separate hearings and through two orders2 that Father’s contact with the Children had been limited to supervised visitation and that Mother was unable to attend or facilitate such visitation. On December 2, a DCS case manager and the guardian ad litem visited the home. Mother advised that she did not know Father’s whereabouts; however, they later found him hiding outside in the backyard. The parents advised that they believed he was permitted to stay on the premises because Mother’s adult daughter was also present. They further noted that they had filed a petition for removal of the action to federal court.3 DCS informed them that Father was in violation of his bond conditions and the DCS restraining order. On December 3, DCS filed a petition for dependency and neglect and sought removal of the Children. DCS removed the Children by court order that night and placed them in foster care. The Children were later adjudicated as dependent and neglected by the Knox County Juvenile Court based upon the domestic violence incident and the violation of the restraining order. The parents appealed the decision to the Knox County Circuit Court. Meanwhile, the Children moved through a few foster homes before they were ultimately placed with their paternal grandparents in South Carolina in April 2025. During the pendency of the hearing, the parents began to cooperate with DCS. Father attended Alcoholics Anonymous and completed an alcohol and drug assessment, a batterer’s intervention program, and domestic violence, parenting, and anger management courses. He also completed a psychosocial exam and attended individual therapy. Mother completed a mental health assessment; her own domestic violence courses; and parenting, conflict, and anger management classes. She attended individual therapy as a recommendation of the assessment. Together, the parents visited the Children regularly with supervision, participated in Child and Family Team Meetings, enrolled in couples counseling, and have maintained employment and a residence for the Children. Despite their cooperation, the parents still heavily objected to the court’s finding of dependency and neglect. On July 23, 2025, the action finally proceeded to a hearing on their appeal. The parties presented evidence concerning the domestic violence incident, the violation of the restraining order, and the parents’ progress since that time. 2 These orders were not entered into the record until January 2025. 3 The action was ultimately remanded a few days later. -2- The parents admitted that there were instances of domestic violence between them prior to this incident; however, they maintained that their counseling and completion of other requirements have allowed them to improve themselves and their relationship. The parents maintained that the Children have suffered as a result of their foster care experience and that Luigi needed additional support for his autism diagnosis that was unavailable in South Carolina. The paternal grandmother confirmed that the Children were doing well but would benefit from a return to their parents and to the family home. She testified that the parents remained heavily involved and maintained a healthy relationship with the Children, who showed signs of confusion and anxiety at their separation from the parents. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudicated the Children as dependent and neglected based upon the parents’ prior conduct but found that the parents had evidenced the improvement necessary to sustain an immediate trial home placement. The court transferred temporary legal custody of the Children back to DCS but placed the Children into the family home on a trial basis. On October 8, 2025, the court restored full custody to the parents, following their successful completion of the trial home placement. This appeal of the court’s dependency and neglect finding followed. II. ISSUES We consolidate and restate the issues pertinent to this appeal as follows: A. Whether this appeal should be dismissed for failure to adhere to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. B. Whether clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s finding of dependency and neglect. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW On appeal, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless the evidence preponderates against them. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). “A determination that a child is dependent and neglected must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Emmalee O., 464 S.W.3d 311, 323–24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Evidence satisfying the clear and convincing evidence standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted). -3- IV. DISCUSSION A. As a threshold issue, DCS asserts that this appeal should be dismissed as a result of the parent’s failure to adhere to the briefing requirements contained in the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, DCS notes that the parents failed to cite legal authority in support of their argument as required by Rule 27(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.4 We agree that the appellate brief presented is lacking in citations to authority in support of the argument presented on appeal. Ordinarily, “failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules of this Court” constitutes a waiver of the issues raised by the appellant. Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “Courts have routinely held that the failure to make appropriate references to the record and to cite relevant authority in the argument section of the brief as required by Rule 27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue.” Id.; see also Hawkins v. Hart, 86 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[F]or an issue to be considered on appeal, a party must, in his brief, develop the theories or contain authority to support the averred position.”). “An issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7).” Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012). Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has directed this court “to excuse technical deficiencies that do not significantly impede the appellate process.” DiNovo v. Binkley, 706 S.W.3d 334, 336–37 (Tenn. 2025) (overruling this court’s dismissal of the appeal when the appellant provided record citations in the statement of the case and the statement of facts but not in the argument section of the brief); see also Trezevant v. Trezevant, 696 S.W.3d 527, 530–31 (Tenn. 2024) (overruling this court’s dismissal of an appeal when the arguments set forth in the appellate brief fell within the scope of the stated issues). Here, the parents provided numerous citations to the record in support of their factual claims but failed to present sufficient citations to authority in support of their argument. While regrettable, such oversight does not impede the appellate process in this case when the issue presented on appeal is limited to whether the court’s finding of dependency and neglect was supported by clear and convincing evidence. We decline to dismiss the appeal and will soldier on to consider whether the court’s finding under the circumstances presented is supported by established case law and statutory requirements. 4 Rule 27(a) requires the appellant’s brief to contain an argument section setting forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on[.]” -4- B. A biological parent’s right to the care and the custody of their child is among the oldest of the judicially recognized liberty interests protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). The Tennessee Constitution “provides for a parental right to privacy to care for children without unwarranted state intervention unless there is a substantial danger of harm to the child.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993)). The Tennessee legislature has established the circumstances under which the rights of the biological parent may be limited. In re Samaria S., 347 S.W.3d 188, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). These limitations include circumstances in which a child is deemed to be dependent and neglected. Id. “Parents have a duty to provide, and children have a corresponding right to be provided with a safe environment, free from abuse and neglect.” In re H.L.F., 297 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). The state, through its parens patriae power, has the duty to intervene and protect when the child’s well-being is threatened. As pertinent to this appeal, Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(13) defines a dependent and neglected child as a child: (B) Whose parent, guardian or person with whom the child lives, by reason of cruelty, mental incapacity, immorality or depravity is unfit to properly care for such child; (C) Who is under unlawful or improper care, supervision, custody or restraint by any person, corporation, agency, association, institution, society or other organization or who is unlawfully kept out of school; *** (F) Who is in such condition of want or suffering or is under such improper guardianship or control as to injure or endanger the morals or health of such child or others; (G) Who is suffering from abuse or neglect . . . . Effective July 1, 2024, the General Assembly amended Section 37-1-102(b)(13) to clarify that a court must consider the circumstances of the child “at the time of the filing of the petition” in determining whether such child is dependent and neglected. 2024 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 862 § 1 (S.B. 2349). This amendment, which applies to this action, is a statutory change to established case law that previously held that the dependency and neglect conditions must still exist at the time of the hearing, whether before the juvenile court or -5- in a de novo hearing before the circuit court, to sustain the petition. Green v. Green, No. M2007-01263-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 348289, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2009). The parents argue on appeal that the circumstances presented at the time of the filing of the petition were insufficient to sustain a finding of dependency and neglect by clear and convincing evidence. They assert that the Children were not harmed or even awakened during the domestic violence incident and that their breach of the restraining order did not endanger the Children when a third party was present to supervise. We disagree. Actual harm is not required to establish the dependency and neglect of a child. Here, Mother fled the home in fear of Father to seek help. As a result of Father’s violence toward Mother, the Children were left under improper guardianship. Father was unfit to care for the Children as a result of his inebriation and violent behavior. DCS attempted to allow Mother to retain custody of the Children while they addressed the circumstances that led to the restraining order. However, the parents refused to follow the guidelines set, requiring further intervention to ensure the continued safety of the Children when Father had not established his sobriety or addressed his violent behavior toward Mother. We commend the parents for working together to finally address the circumstances that led to the finding of dependency and neglect; however, the fact remains that the Children were dependent and neglected at the time of the filing of the petition. We affirm the trial court. V. CONCLUSION The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are taxed equally to the appellants, Darlene B. and Seaton K. s/John W. McClarty JOHN W. McCLARTY, JUDGE -6-