Putnam County, Tennessee v. Tennessee Health Facilities Commission

11/10/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE July 8, 2026 Session PUTNAM COUNTY, TENNESSEE V. TENNESSEE HEALTH FACILITIES COMMISSION ET AL. Appeal from the Chancery Court for Putnam County No. 2024-157 Ronald Thurman, Chancellor No. M2025-01961-COA-R10-CV The issue in this appeal is whether the Putnam County chancery court had jurisdiction to hear a common law writ of certiorari action brought by Putnam County against the Tennessee Health Facilities Commission to challenge the commission’s issuance of a certificate of need to a proposed health care facility in that county. We affirm the trial court’s determination that venue and jurisdiction were proper in Putnam County. Tenn. R. App. 10 Extraordinary Appeal; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined. Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Ryan Gallagher, Assistant Attorney General, and Eric Winters, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellant, Tennessee Health Facilities Commission. Travis B. Swearingen, Nashville, Tennessee, and Jeffrey G. Jones, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Putnam County, Tennessee. Jerry W. Taylor and Richard L. Colbert, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Cedar Recovery of Middle Tennessee, LLC. OPINION FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Tennessee Health Facilities Commission (“the THFC”) is an independent state agency created by the Tennessee General Assembly in 2022 whose authority includes administration of the certificates of need (“CON”) program applicable to health care facilities in Tennessee. See 2022 TENN. PUB. ACTS §1119; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-11- 203(a), -1605; STATE OF TENN. HEALTH FACILITIES COMM’N, Tennessee Health Facilities Commission Created by the Merger of the Health Services and Development Agency and the Department of Health’s Office of Health Care Facilities, https://perma.cc/9CXP-X2N8 (last visited Nov. 4, 2026). In June 2024, Cedar Recovery of Middle Tennessee, LLC (“Cedar Recovery”) filed an application to establish an opiate addiction treatment center in Putnam County. Putnam County opposed Cedar Recovery’s application at the THFC meeting in August 2024, but the THFC voted to issue a CON to Cedar Recovery. In October 2024, the County filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari against the THFC and Cedar Recovery in Putnam County Chancery Court. The THFC filed a motion to dismiss or transfer the case to Davidson County chancery court, arguing that the Putnam County chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that venue was improper. Cedar Recovery agreed with THFC’s motion to dismiss, and the County opposed the motion. On July 18, 2025, the trial court denied the motion, finding that venue and jurisdiction were proper under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322. The THFC and Cedar Recovery filed a joint motion to alter or amend asserting that Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 cannot provide jurisdiction or venue for a petition for writ of certiorari. On November 7, 2025, the trial court denied the motion “insofar as it requests dismissal or transfer” to Davidson County and clarified its determination that venue was proper in Putnam County pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. The THFC filed a Rule 10 application for an extraordinary appeal, which this Court granted. The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for writ of certiorari against the THFC. STANDARD OF REVIEW A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges a court’s “lawful authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it.” Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000). In moving for dismissal, the THFC presented a facial challenge1 to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, meaning that the facts in the complaint failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 445-446 (Tenn. 2012) (“[W]hen a defendant asserts a facial challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are presumed to be true.”). Therefore, the determination as to 1 By contrast, a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction “denies that the court actually has subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of fact even though the complaint alleges facts tending to show jurisdiction.” Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). -2- whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 446. ANALYSIS The question before this Court is whether the trial court erred in denying the County’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court determined that it had jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court was correct. The THFC2 argues that jurisdiction over this case resides in Davidson County, relying upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-4-104, which states that, “Each department shall maintain a central office at the capitol, which shall be the official residence of each commissioner, or head of department.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-4-104(a). As the THFC points out, this statute has generally been interpreted to establish venue for suits against certain state officials to be in Davidson County. See, e.g., Morris v. Snodgrass, 871 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Furthermore, as stated by THFC, the venue requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-4-104 “is jurisdictional because it implicates the State’s sovereign immunity.” Thus, THFC argues, the THFC may only be sued in Davidson County because, in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-4-104, “the General Assembly has ‘clearly prescribed’ that a suit against an agency of the State ‘must be brought in Davidson County.’” See Brief of THFC at 10 (quoting Sw. Williamson Cnty. Cmty. Ass’n v. Saltsman, 66 S.W.3d 872, 881 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). What neither the THFC nor Putnam County acknowledges, however, is the fact that the THFC is not part of any state department. The THFC is an independent state agency responsible for issuing CONs to healthcare institutions. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-11- 203(a), -1607. While there is no dispute that the agency’s main address is in Nashville, Davidson County, the parties have not cited any statute placing the residence of the agency in Davidson County. Under article I, section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, “Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.” Under the concept of sovereign immunity, “the State is immune from suit except as it consents to be sued.” Hawkins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 127 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). The state constitution provides that only the legislature “may direct the manner and the courts in which a lawsuit against the State may be brought,” and such legislation “must be so plain, clear, and unmistakable as to leave no doubt of the intention of the legislature that it should be done.” Id. We find the cases cited by the THFC for the proposition that Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 4-104(a) establishes venue in Davidson County distinguishable from the present case because they involved lawsuits against state departments or entities connected with a state 2 Cedar Recovery basically echoes the arguments of the THFC. -3- department. See Morris, 871 S.W.2d at 485 (involving a suit against the Comptroller of the Treasury, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, and the Attorney General); Saltsman, 66 S.W.3d at 881 (involving a suit against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Transportation). Cases involving independent state agencies or quasi- governmental entities have relied upon specific statutory provisions to determine whether the agency is subject to suit. See, e.g., Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 551 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tenn. 2018) (recognizing that the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 waived sovereign immunity with respect to certain claims against the state); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Closed Nashville, LLC, No. M2025-01214-COA-R10-CV, 2026 WL 1758570, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2026) (determining that the applicable statutes did not waive sovereign immunity to allow suits to reach the funds of the Tennessee Housing Development Agency); Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 310 S.W.3d 366, 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing claim under the Public Records Act on the ground that the CCA was “the functional equivalent of a governmental agency”). A predecessor entity to the THFC, the Health Services and Development Agency, was subject to lawsuits under the UAPA by applicants as well as cities and counties entitled to receive notice under the statute. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Health Servs. & Dev. Agency, 646 S.W.3d 475, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) (finding that the chancery court had subject matter jurisdiction over a claim by the City brought under the declaratory judgment provision of the UAPA); Middle Tenn. Rehab. Hosp., LLC v. Health Servs. & Dev. Agency, No. M2013-02180-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 4181074, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2014) (involving judicial review of contested case proceedings denying one and granting the other of two competing applications for certificates of need). The relevant portion of the statutes governing the THFC was amended in 2024 to eliminate the language allowing cities and counties to initiate a contested case hearing in cases involving CONs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1610(a).3 Recognizing that the THFC statutes no longer allowed the county to initiate a contesting case proceeding, Putnam County filed the present case as a petition for a common law writ of certiorari. Putnam County asserts that, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 9-101, “petitions for writ of certiorari are a mechanism specifically authorized by the Legislature to challenge decisions of Tennessee administrative agencies.” The broad language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 supports that proposition: “Anyone who may be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any board or commission functioning under the laws of this state may have the order or judgment reviewed by the courts, where not otherwise specifically provided, in the manner provided by this chapter.” Since their 3 The current statute further provides that local governmental officials may appear before the THFC but their testimony “is informational and advisory to the commission, and the support of the local governing body is not a requirement for the granting of a certificate of need by the commission.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1621. -4- lawsuit is brought under this provision, Putnam County argues, the subsequent provision should govern venue. Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102 states: Such party shall, within sixty (60) days from the entry of the order or judgment, file a petition of certiorari in the chancery court of any county in which any one (1) or more of the petitioners, or any one (1) or more of the material defendants reside, or have their principal office, stating briefly the issues involved in the cause, the substance of the order or judgment complained of, the respects in which the petitioner claims the order or judgment is erroneous, and praying for an accordant review. The application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 is disputed by the THFC based upon a line of cases, most notably Tennessee Real Estate Commission v. Potts, 428 S.W.2d 794, 796-97 (Tenn. 1968), that have interpreted this statutory provision as fixing “permissible venue” but not subject matter jurisdiction. After carefully analyzing the line of cases relied upon by the THFC, we conclude that these authorities are not on point here. We will discuss the cases in chronological order. McKee v. Board of Elections, 117 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. 1938), was a dispute between local election commissioners and the state board of elections (“the BOE”). The local officials filed a petition for certiorari and supersedeas in Shelby County circuit court, challenging the decision of the BOE to remove them from office. Id. at 753. The state commissioners then filed a petition for certiorari and supersedeas in the Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme Court granted the BOE’s petition and found that the writ of certiorari filed by the local officials in Shelby County circuit court was “in lieu of appeal,” meaning a statutory writ of certiorari.4 Id. The Court stated that, in cases where certiorari is a substitute for appeal, “it is the situs of the lower tribunal, and not the residence of the parties, that points out the proper appellate tribunal.” Id. at 754. As the Court explained, the reason underlying this rule is that “‘the general supervision of the circuit court over inferior tribunals must ordinarily be restricted to the tribunals within the limits of its jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Saunders v. Russell, 78 Tenn. 293, 296 (1882)). The BOE’s situs (pursuant to a specific statutory provision) was in Nashville, so the Shelby County circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 753-54. In its analysis, the Court specifically stated that section 9008 (the predecessor to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102) did not apply to a statutory writ of certiorari case. Id. at 754. 4 This Court has previously explained that, “‘The basic purpose of the common law writ of certiorari is to curb “illegal” actions by the inferior tribunal, while the basic purpose of the statutory writ is to correct mistakes and errors of inferior tribunals.’” State v. Farris, 562 S.W.3d 432, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Lawrence A. Pivnick, TENN. CIR. CT. PRAC. § 3:13 (2017)). The common law writ requires a deferential standard of review, whereas the statutory writ allows a de novo appeal. See Delta Loan & Fin. Co. of Tenn., Inc. v. Long, 336 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tenn. 1960). -5-  In Delta Loan & Finance Co. of Tennessee, Inc. v. Long, 336 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tenn. 1960), a loan company filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in Shelby County chancery court against the Commissioner of the State Department of Insurance and Banking asking the court to review and reverse the Commissioner’s cease and desist order prohibiting the loan company from “making any loan for a longer period than three years.” The Commissioner moved to quash the loan company’s petition on the ground that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction, and the chancery court overruled the motion. Id. On appeal, the Commissioner argued that his official residence was in Nashville and that the Shelby County chancery court therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court quoted Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-4-104, which it construed to fix the Commissioner’s official residence in Davidson County. Id. Therefore, the Court reasoned, “The situs of such department and official residence is . . . local like that of a municipal corporation.” Id. The Supreme Court characterized the loan company’s petition as one for a statutory writ (in lieu of appeal) and cited the rule from McKee concerning the revisory power of a higher court in statutory writ of certiorari cases. Id. at 7. As in McKee, the Court found § 9008 not applicable. The petitioners in Tennessee Real Estate Commission v. Potts, 428 S.W.2d at 795, sought review of the Tennessee Real Estate Commission’s decision to revoke their real estate licenses. In accordance with the specific statutes governing review of Commission decisions, the petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the chancery court in Bradley County (where the petitioners resided). Id. Thus, unlike in McKee and Delta Loan, the petitioners filed a common law writ of certiorari pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101. Id. The Commission moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the Bradley County court overruled the motion. Id. The Commission then filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Supreme Court on the ground that the action of the chancery court was “erroneous, illegal and void.” Id. The Court stated that the Commission was a division of the Department of Insurance and Banking and, concluded that, pursuant to case law interpreting Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-4-104, its situs was in Davidson County. Id. In Potts, the Bradley County court relied upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 in concluding that it had jurisdiction. Id. The Commission argued that the proceedings were local in nature, relying upon the McKee and Delta Loan line of authority, thereby fixing jurisdiction in Davidson County. Id. at 795. It is in that context that the language relied upon by the THFC (bolded below) appears: McKee v. Board of Elections, supra, Delta Loan & Finance Co. of Tenn., Inc. v. Long, supra, and other similar cases, have held that s 27-901 et seq., are not applicable to review actions of the particular Board or Commission there in issue. In the present case, the Legislature has made s 27-901 et seq., an appropriate proceeding to be followed in reviewing decisions of the Real Estate Commission. Nevertheless, no attempt was there made by the Legislature to change the application of those sections as made -6-  by prior decisions. Many of these decisions of this Court hold that s 27-901 et seq., do not enlarge or diminish the scope of review by certiorari, but, rather, that the chapter merely describes procedure. Real Estate Comm. v. McLemore (1957) 202 Tenn. 540, 306 S.W.2d 683; Hoover Motor Express Co., Inc. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm. (1953) 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233; McKee v. Board of Elections, supra. In our opinion, s 27-902, quoted supra, merely fixes permissible venue for review of Boards and Commissions. It does not have the effect of giving the trial court of any county wherein the party affected may have residence subject matter jurisdiction over the review of a Board or Commission exclusively located elsewhere. That section merely specifies the courts where the writ might be sought if other jurisdictional requirements are met. This Court has held that a suit against a Commissioner, or head of a department of state government having official residence, is not transitory and must be maintained in the county of that official residence. Delta Loan & Finance Co. of Tenn., Inc. v. Long, supra; Chamberlain v. Brown, supra. The official residence or situs of the Real Estate Commission is fixed in Davidson County. The action complained of here of revoking licenses occurred only at the official residence of the Commission. Thus, only the courts of Davidson County are invested with the necessary subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Tennessee Real Estate Commission. Id. at 796-97. How do the principles enunciated in this line of cases apply in the present case? McKee and Delta Loan are distinguishable because they were actions for a statutory writ of certiorari. Like the petitioners in Potts, the County brought its case as a petition for a common law writ of certiorari. However, unlike in Potts, there is no statute fixing the situs of the THFC in Davidson County. As the THFC acknowledges, state entities are subject to suit in counties other than Davidson County when the legislature makes specific provisions to that effect. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-4-107 (stating that “any action the subject matter of which involves real property in which this state, or any agency of this state, is a party, may be properly instituted in any county in which the property is located”). In Hawkins, 127 S.W.3d at 752, cited by the County, a petition for common law writ of certiorari was filed against the Department of Correction in Davidson County circuit court concerning the actions taken by a prison disciplinary board. Id. This Court determined that, under a specific statute applicable to the Department, venue (and jurisdiction) would lie in the county where the prison was located. In the present case, we do not have such a specific directive by the General Assembly. -7-  In the absence of another statute fixing the situs of THFC in Davidson County, we conclude that the proper venue and jurisdiction for cases against the THFC should be governed by the statutes allowing the common law writ to be brought against the state, namely Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-9-101—102. Therefore, venue and jurisdiction were proper in Putnam County. CONCLUSION The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant, the Tennessee Health Facilities Commission. /s/ Andy D. Bennett ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE -8-