Big Apple Tompkins Realty LLC, Mojahed H. Bhutta, Partnership Representative, Petitioner(s)

United States Tax Court 167 T.C. No. 7 BIG APPLE TOMPKINS REALTY LLC, MOJAHED H. BHUTTA, PARTNERSHIP REPRESENTATIVE, Petitioner(s) v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent ————— Docket No. 19040-23. Filed August 5, 2026. ————— R mailed a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment (FPA) to an entity (PS) treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes and subject to the partnership audit and litigation procedures of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 1101, 129 Stat. 584, 625–38, and its partnership representative (PR). PS, by and through PR, filed a Petition with this Court under I.R.C. § 6234. R moves to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Petition was not filed within the time prescribed by I.R.C. § 6234(a) or 7502. PS objects and argues that it did not receive the FPA until the I.R.C. § 6234(a) petition filing deadline had passed. Held: Whether an FPA is properly issued and mailed is determined in pari materia with our deficiency caselaw. Held, further, R properly issued and mailed the FPA to PS and PR. Held, further, the 90-day filing deadline in I.R.C. § 6234(a) is not jurisdictional. Held, further, R’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction will be denied. Served 08/05/26  2 ————— Mojahed H. Bhutta, pro se. Mimi M. Wong and Sharmila J. Porter, for respondent. OPINION MARVEL, Judge: This matter is before the Court on respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Motion) on the ground that the Petition was not filed within the time prescribed by section 6234(a)1 or 7502. Background The following facts are derived from the parties’ pleadings and Motion papers. They are stated solely for the purpose of resolving respondent’s Motion and not as findings of fact in this case. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). Big Apple Tompkins Realty, LLC (Big Apple), is treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes, and it is subject to the partnership audit and litigation procedures established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA), Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 1101, 129 Stat. 584, 625–38. 2 Mr. Bhutta is Big Apple’s partnership 1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. More specifically, references to sections 6221–6241 are references to the applicable BBA provisions, and references to former sections 6221–6234 are references to the TEFRA provisions. See infra note 2. 2 The BBA repealed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 401–407, 96 Stat. 324, 648–71. BBA § 1101(a), (c)(1), 129 Stat. at 625. BBA § 1101 (as amended by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (CAA 2016), Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, § 411, 129 Stat. 2242, 3121–22 (2015), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (CAA 2018), Pub. L. No. 115-141, div. U, §§ 201–207, 132 Stat. 348, 1171–83) applies to returns filed for partnership taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017. BBA § 1101(g)(1), 129 Stat. at 638; see also CAA 2016, div. Q, § 411(e), 129 Stat. at 3122 (“The amendments made by this section shall take effect as if included in section 1101 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of  3 representative. See § 6223(a); see also Rule 255.1(b)(3). Big Apple’s principal place of business was Staten Island, New York, when the Petition was filed. On November 13, 2023, Big Apple filed its Petition in this Court. The Petition arrived at the Court in an envelope bearing a printed U.S. Postal Service (USPS) stamp dated November 6, 2023, which partially obscures what is presumably a postmark beneath it. Big Apple attached to its Petition two copies of the Final Partnership Adjustment (FPA) dated August 11, 2022, one addressed to Big Apple and the other addressed to Mr. Bhutta. See §§ 6231(a)(3), 6234(a); Rules 255.1(b)(4), 255.2(b)(10). The FPA determined an imputed underpayment of $87,586 and a section 6662(d) accuracy-related penalty of $17,517 for tax year 2018. Respondent filed his Answer on January 24, 2024. On March 8, 2024, respondent filed the Motion. The Motion alleges that respondent sent the two copies of the FPA via certified mail on August 11, 2022, to Big Apple’s and Mr. Bhutta’s last known addresses. See § 6231(a) (flush language). Attached to the Motion are USPS Form 3877, Firm Mailing Book for Accountable Mail, and two USPS Forms 3800, Certified Mail Receipt. The Motion requests that the Court dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Petition was not filed within the time prescribed by section 6234(a) or 7502. On March 26, 2024, Big Apple filed its Objection to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Objection). The Objection states that an FPA “was not received by the Petitioner(s) or by the duly appointed Representative (Power of Attorney) until November, 2023. Petitioner(s) promptly filed a Petition with the United States Tax Court, as required.” The Objection “requests that the Motion . . . be denied and that the appeal be allowed to proceed.” On June 10, 2025, we ordered respondent to file a supplement to his Motion. We noted that respondent’s Motion referred to, but did not attach, certain “USPS.com tracking” information. We thus directed respondent to attach the tracking information or otherwise state whether it is in respondent’s possession. On June 27, 2025, respondent filed a First Supplement to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 2015.”); CAA 2018, div. U, § 207, 132 Stat. at 1183 (“The amendments made by this title shall take effect as if included in section 1101 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.”). The BBA applies in this case because the year before the Court is 2018.  4 stating that respondent is not in possession of any USPS tracking information other than the mailing information attached to the Motion. Discussion I. BBA Partnership Audit Procedures In 2015 Congress enacted the BBA, which repealed TEFRA. BBA § 1101(a), (c)(1), 129 Stat. at 625; see supra note 2. The BBA created a new set of rules for making adjustments to partnership-related items for tax years beginning after December 31, 2017. See BBA § 1101(g)(1), 129 Stat. at 638. The BBA applies to any entity that is required to file a partnership return under section 6031(a) or that files a partnership return. §§ 6221(a), 6241(1), (8); Treas. Reg. § 301.6241-5; cf. § 6221(b) (providing an election out of the BBA rules for certain eligible partnerships). An audit under the new procedures begins with the Commissioner’s mailing the partnership and the partnership representative a notice that he has initiated an administrative proceeding. § 6231(a)(1). During the audit the partnership is the sole party to appear before the Commissioner and is represented by the partnership representative, who has the sole authority to act on behalf of the partnership. § 6223(a). All partners are bound by the actions of the partnership during these proceedings. § 6223(b). The Commissioner determines partnership adjustments, if any, at the partnership level, and any tax attributable to those adjustments is also assessed and collected at the partnership level. § 6221(a); cf. Goldberg v. Commissioner, 73 F.4th 537, 539 (7th Cir. 2023) (explaining that, under TEFRA, assessment and collection of tax occurred at the partner level), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2021-119. A partnership adjustment comprises any adjustment to a partnership-related item, which includes (1) any item or amount with respect to the partnership that is relevant in determining the income tax liability of any person and (2) a partner’s distributive share of any such item. § 6241(2). To make those adjustments, the Commissioner must issue a Notice of Proposed Partnership Adjustment (NOPPA) within a specified time. §§ 6231(a)(2), (b)(1), 6235(a); see Mammoth Cave Prop., LLC v. Commissioner, No. 5401-24, 166 T.C., slip op. at 7 (Mar. 9, 2026); JM Assets, LP v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. 1, 10–11 (2025). The NOPPA includes the adjustments as well as the amount of any imputed underpayment due from the partnership. The imputed underpayment  5 is calculated by applying the highest marginal income tax rate to the net partnership adjustments. 3 § 6225(b). The default rule under the BBA is that an imputed underpayment is assessed and collected from the partnership in the adjustment year, not from the reviewed-year or adjustment-year partners. 4 See §§ 6221(a), 6225(a)(1), 6232(a); see also § 6225(d) (defining “adjustment year” as the year in which a decision made under section 6234 becomes final, a request for administrative adjustment is made under section 6227, or an FPA is mailed under section 6231, and “reviewed year” as the year to which the adjusted item relates). After the issuance of the NOPPA and before assessment, however, the partnership may submit a request to modify the imputed underpayment set forth in the NOPPA. § 6225(c). The partnership has 270 days from the date the Commissioner mails the NOPPA to submit a modification request to the Commissioner. § 6225(c)(7); Treas. Reg. § 301.6225-2(c)(3)(i). The Commissioner generally must wait 270 days after issuing the NOPPA before issuing the FPA, see § 6231(b)(2), and then has 60 days to do so, see § 6235(a)(3). 5 To make his final determination, the Commissioner must mail an FPA to the partnership and the partnership representative. § 6231(a)(3); Mammoth Cave, 166 T.C., slip op. at 7; JM Assets, LP, 165 T.C. at 9. From that FPA, the partnership may file a petition for judicial review with the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims, or the district court where the partnership’s principal place of business is located. § 6234(a). A petition must be filed within 90 days of the date the FPA is mailed. Id. An assessment of an imputed underpayment may be made after the close of that 90-day period or, if a petition is filed, upon final decision of the court. § 6232(b). If a petition 3 More precisely, an imputed underpayment is calculated by netting “positive adjustments,” defined as any adjustments that are not negative, against “negative adjustments,” defined as a decrease in an item of income, an increase in item of credit, a decrease in item of tax or penalty, or a decrease to an imputed underpayment. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6225-1(b), (d)(2). Adjustments are classified as positive or negative under the grouping rules in Treasury Regulation § 301.6225-1(c), and these grouping rules determine whether a negative adjustment may be netted against a positive adjustment. Id. para. (b)(2). 4 The BBA provides for alternative assessment and collection rules as well. See, e.g., § 6226 (providing an election for a partnership to cause partnership adjustments to be taken into account by reviewed-year partners); § 6221 (providing an election for the BBA to not apply); § 6232(f) (assessing on each adjustment-year partner a partner’s proportionate share of an imputed underpayment). 5 The Commissioner must wait 270 days from the issuance of the NOPPA and has at least 330 days to issue the FPA, providing a 60-day window.  6 is filed in accordance with section 6234(a), the court has jurisdiction to determine all partnership-related items, the proper allocation of such items, and the applicability of any penalty or addition to tax for the year to which the FPA relates. § 6234(c). Once the Commissioner makes an assessment and provides notice and demand for payment, the partnership has 10 days to pay the imputed underpayment, after which the Commissioner may assess on each adjustment-year partner a tax equal to his proportionate share of the imputed underpayment. § 6232(f)(1)(B). 6 II. Jurisdiction We are a court of limited jurisdiction and can exercise our jurisdiction only to the extent provided by Congress. See § 7442; Commissioner v. Zuch, 145 S. Ct. 1707, 1712 (2025) (citing Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987)); Judge v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175, 1180–81 (1987). Nonetheless, we have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction. See Bongam v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. 52, 54 (2016); Kluger v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 309, 314 (1984). Even when we lack jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction to determine the reason we lack jurisdiction. See Shelton v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 193, 194–95 (1974). Where this Court’s jurisdiction is duly challenged, our jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown by the party seeking to invoke it. See David Dung Le, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 268, 270 (2000), aff’d, 22 F. App’x 837 (9th Cir. 2001); Romann v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 273, 280 (1998); Fehrs v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 346, 348 (1975). To meet this burden, petitioner, as the party seeking to invoke our jurisdiction, “must establish affirmatively all facts giving rise to our jurisdiction.” David Dung Le, M.D., Inc., 114 T.C. at 270. The jurisdictional prerequisites to bring a section 6234 case in this Court are matters of first impression for us, and we now turn to them. III. FPA Issuance and Timeliness of the Petition We have held in the deficiency context that we have “no jurisdiction unless a proper notice of deficiency has been mailed in accordance with the provisions of law,” Heaberlin v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 58, 59 (1960), and that a “valid notice of deficiency has been issued if it is mailed to the taxpayer’s last known address by certified or 6 The Commissioner must make this assessment within two years of the date on which notice and demand for payment of the imputed underpayment is provided to the partnership and/or partnership representative. § 6232(f)(6); see also § 6231(a).  7 registered mail,” Pietanza v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 729, 736 (1989) (citing § 6212(a) and (b)), supplemented by T.C. Memo. 1990-524, aff’d, 935 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). After TEFRA’s enactment, we generally applied Notice of Deficiency issuance and mailing principles to Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAAs), albeit with appropriate adjustments for TEFRA’s terms. 7 See Wise Guys Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 193, 197 (2013) (stating, in connection with a question about whether a second FPAA was valid, that “we are mindful of the related law applicable to the mailing of two notices of deficiency”); Clovis I v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 980, 982 (1987) (“[T]he long established principle applicable to notices of deficiency, viz, that no particular form is necessary, should apply with equal force to a FPAA.”); cf. Triangle Invs. Ltd. P’ship v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 610, 613–17 (1990) (discussing the Commissioner’s obligation under TEFRA to use the names, addresses, and profit interests shown on the partnership return for the year at issue, as modified by additional information received in accordance with regulations, in issuing and mailing an FPAA). We applied these principles because, like a Notice of Deficiency, an FPAA “is the notice to affected taxpayers that respondent has made a final administrative determination for particular tax years,” and its issuance “is a prerequisite to an assessment.” Clovis I, 88 T.C. at 982; see also Mammoth Cave, 166 T.C., slip op. at 10. Similarly, under the BBA, an FPA provides notice of a final administrative determination for one or more tax years, 8 Mammoth Cave, 166 T.C., slip op. at 10, and is a prerequisite to assessment, see § 6232(b)(1). The statutory text concerning the issuance and mailing of a notice of deficiency is very similar to the text concerning the issuance and mailing of an FPA. 9 Compare § 6212(b)(1) (“[N]otice of a deficiency in respect of [income, gift, or certain excise taxes] . . . if mailed to the 7 TEFRA did not use the last known address rules. See § 6223(c)(1); see also Blum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-18, at *28 (“The last known address rules do not apply to FPAAs. . . . [T]he regulations provide specific, detailed instructions on the requirements for updating the address of a notice partner including what information taxpayers are required to provide.”). 8 The FPA in this case concerns respondent’s determination of an imputed underpayment and an accuracy-related penalty for 2018. 9 The BBA also adopts the concept of the last known address, which has a lengthy history in the deficiency context and is not specifically defined in section 6231 or Treasury Regulation § 301.6231-1. Cf. McCormick v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 138, 141–42 (1970); Treas. Reg. § 301.6212-2.  8 taxpayer at his last known address, shall be sufficient . . . even if such taxpayer is deceased, or is under a legal disability, or, in the case of a corporation, has terminated its existence.”), with § 6231(a) (flush language) (“Any notice of a final partnership adjustment shall be sufficient if mailed to the last known address of the partnership representative or the partnership (even if the partnership has terminated its existence).”). Additionally, we recently held in Mammoth Cave that a NOPPA under the BBA should be subject to the same “adequate or minimal notice” mailing standard as an FPAA under TEFRA. Mammoth Cave, 166 T.C., slip op. at 11. Applying the principle that “the Code must be given ‘as great an internal symmetry and consistency as its words permit,’” Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 304 (1961) (quoting United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, Inc., 349 U.S. 232, 236 (1955)), we conclude that the BBA’s provisions concerning the issuance and mailing of an FPA should, as with an FPAA under TEFRA, be construed in pari materia with the Code’s provisions concerning the issuance and mailing of a Notice of Deficiency. Big Apple has not disputed that the addresses shown for it and Mr. Bhutta on the two copies of the FPA are their respective last known addresses. 10 We therefore need address only the evidence of mailing. We have not previously considered which party should bear the burden of proving the date of mailing for an FPA. Generally, our caselaw provides that the Commissioner bears the burden of proving, by competent and persuasive evidence, the date that a notice was mailed. See Coleman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 82, 90 (1990); Magazine v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 321, 324–27 (1987); August v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1535, 1537 (1970). We apply this standard in deficiency cases, lien or levy cases under section 6320 or 6330, and section 7436 employment status redetermination cases. See, e.g., Belagio Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. 243, 248 (2024); Cataldo v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 522, 524 (1973), aff’d per curiam, 499 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1974); Portwine v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-29, at *10–11, aff’d, 668 F. App’x 838 (10th Cir. 2016). We recently discussed the factors bearing on the allocation of burden of proof in Belagio Fine Jewelry, 162 T.C. at 246, and stated that 10 In view of respondent’s averred use of certified mail to send the FPA at issue here, we need not decide whether it is necessary for the Commissioner to use certified or registered mail (as opposed to other modes of mailing) to obtain the benefits of the section 6231(a) safe harbor.  9 they include “which party’s motion we are presently considering and whether the information is peculiarly within the knowledge of one party.” Those factors counsel in favor of placing the burden on respondent here: We are considering respondent’s Motion, and the date of the FPA’s mailing is peculiarly within respondent’s knowledge. Our conclusion that the BBA’s provisions concerning the issuance and mailing of an FPA should be construed in pari materia with the deficiency and TEFRA provisions lends additional support. We place on respondent the burden of proving, by competent and persuasive evidence, the date he mailed the two copies of the FPA to Big Apple and to Mr. Bhutta. A properly completed USPS Form 3877 is direct evidence of the date and fact of mailing. Coleman, 94 T.C. at 90; Magazine, 89 T.C. at 324–27. Generally, if the Commissioner establishes that the notice existed and produces a properly completed USPS Form 3877 showing that the notice was sent to the taxpayer’s last known address, the Commissioner is entitled to a presumption of proper mailing. See Coleman, 94 T.C. at 91. A properly completed USPS Form 3877 is one completed in compliance with the Commissioner’s established procedure for mailing. See Lander v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 104, 118 (2020). Even without the presumption of proper mailing, the Commissioner may prevail by providing otherwise sufficient evidence of mailing. See Coleman, 94 T.C. at 91–92; Portwine, T.C. Memo. 2015-29, at *11. There is no dispute that the FPA exists because Big Apple attached two copies of it to its Petition. Respondent attached to his Motion a USPS Form 3877 related to the two copies of the FPA. The USPS Form 3877 includes a USPS date stamp for August 11, 2022, and lists tracking numbers for two articles of mail, along with Big Apple’s and Mr. Bhutta’s names and addresses, which match those shown on the two copies of the FPA. Nonetheless, the USPS Form 3877 is incomplete because it contains no indication of the number of articles received by USPS and is not signed or initialed by a USPS employee. See O’Rourke v. United States, 587 F.3d 537, 541 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); O’Neill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-49, at *2–3; Bobbs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-272, 2005 WL 3157919, at *2; Wheat v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-268, 1992 WL 95632, at *4. Therefore, respondent is not entitled to the presumption of proper mailing to prove that he mailed the two copies of the FPA on August 11, 2022.  10 While the USPS Form 3877 is insufficient to create a presumption of proper mailing, respondent may still satisfy his burden to show the date of mailing if the evidence of mailing is otherwise sufficient. See Coleman, 94 T.C. at 91–92; Bobbs v. Commissioner, 2005 WL 3157919, at *2–3. Although an incomplete USPS Form 3877 is insufficient to create a presumption of proper mailing, it nonetheless has probative value and may be combined with additional evidence to meet the Commissioner’s burden. See O’Rourke, 587 F.3d at 541–42; Coleman, 94 T.C. at 91–92; Portwine, T.C. Memo. 2015-29, at *11; Massie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-173, 1995 WL 225549, at *3, aff’d, 82 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). In this case the USPS Form 3877 bears a date stamp from the Dunn Loring, Virginia, Post Office reflecting the same issuance date shown on both copies of the FPA, August 11, 2022. The USPS Form 3877 lists Big Apple’s and Mr. Bhutta’s names and addresses, as well as the corresponding certified mail tracking numbers, exactly as they are listed on each respective copy of the FPA. Respondent has also provided two USPS Forms 3800 bearing August 11, 2022, date stamps by the Dunn Loring, Virginia, Post Office, which together reflect the same names, addresses, and tracking numbers. Cf. Keado v. United States, 853 F.2d 1209, 1213 (5th Cir. 1988). Big Apple has not disputed that the addresses used were the last known addresses. Nor has Big Apple argued that respondent failed to follow proper mailing procedures. We find that under the circumstances here, respondent has come forward with sufficient evidence to prove the August 11, 2022, mailing date. Cf. Bobbs v. Commissioner, 2005 WL 3157919, at *3 (finding an incomplete certified mailing list sufficient to establish the date of a notice’s mailing in view of the surrounding circumstances even absent corroborating USPS Forms 3800). The burden of production shifts to Big Apple to show that respondent did not mail the two copies of the FPA on August 11, 2022. See Coleman, 94 T.C. at 92. Although Big Apple asserts that it received them in November 2023, it has adduced no evidence of a mailing date other than August 11, 2022. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that respondent mailed the two copies of the FPA to Big Apple and to Mr. Bhutta on August 11, 2022. Thus, the deadline to file a petition with this Court was November 9, 2022. Big Apple’s Petition was mailed to the Court no earlier than November 6, 2023, the date on the printed stamp affixed to the envelope received by the Court, which is 452 days after the two copies of the FPA were mailed. Cf. Pearson v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 424, 440 (2017)  11 (Buch, J., concurring) (noting that dates printed on postage labels “do not guarantee the date on which the item is deposited with” USPS and instead indicate only “the day a customer purchased postage”). Regardless of whether the rule of section 7502(a) applies despite the partially obscured postmark, whose date we cannot discern, Big Apple did not timely file its Petition. IV. Whether the Section 6234(a) Filing Deadline is Jurisdictional There is no dispute that the FPA exists, and respondent has established that he properly mailed a copy of it to both Big Apple and Mr. Bhutta. We must now determine as a matter of first impression whether we have jurisdiction to readjust the Commissioner’s adjustments in an FPA when a partnership untimely files a petition in a section 6234 case. If a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction depends on the timely filing of a complaint or petition, “a litigant’s failure to comply with the bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a case.” United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408–09 (2015). Courts must enforce the deadline sua sponte, the deadline cannot be tolled or waived, and there is no room for equitable exceptions to be made on account of the specific facts of a case. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Instead, late-filed cases must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See id. Claim-processing rules, on the other hand, are those that “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011). The failure to meet a claim-processing rule “do[es] not deprive a court of authority to hear a case.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. “[F]iling deadlines . . . are quintessential claim-processing rules,” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435, and “ordinarily are not jurisdictional,” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 154 (2013). This is true “even when the time limit is important . . . and even when it is framed in mandatory terms.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Deadlines that are claim-processing rules are subject to the rebuttable presumption that they may be equitably tolled upon the particular facts of a case. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). A litigant’s failure to meet the deadline risks dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511–13. Nonetheless, the issue of the complaint’s or the petition’s timeliness may be waived. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 459–60 (2004).  12 Beginning in the early 2000s, the Supreme Court endeavored to “bring some discipline” to the use of the jurisdictional label. See Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435 (first citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161–62 (2010); and then citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510–11. It perceived a problem with “drive-by jurisdictional rulings,” see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)), and instructed that “[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority,” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455. “Congress is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to . . . a claim-processing rule.” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435. “[I]t is no less ‘jurisdictional’ when Congress prohibits federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate ‘class of cases’ after a certain period has elapsed . . . .” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007). “Congress must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. Congress, however, “need not use magic words,” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436, as a statutory deadline may be jurisdictional even without using the word “jurisdiction,” see, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 208–10 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and (c) to be jurisdictional). But the “traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 410. “To determine whether Congress has made the necessary clear statement, we examine the ‘text, context, and relevant historical treatment’ of the provision at issue.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 246 (2016) (quoting Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166). Statutes that provide jurisdictional deadlines share several qualities. They speak of a court’s power in jurisdictional terms or refer to a court’s jurisdiction. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982). They “define a federal court’s jurisdiction . . . , address its authority to hear untimely suits, [and] cabin its usual equitable powers.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 411. Finally, their context—such as their placement within a statutory regime, history of reenactments, or longstanding judicial interpretation—reflects that Congress imbued a deadline with jurisdictional consequences. See, e.g., id. at 410; Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439; Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209–13; Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394.  13 The clear-statement rule is a high bar to meet. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493, 1499 (2022). It is not enough that one interpretation is better than the other. Id. “To satisfy the clear- statement rule, the jurisdictional condition must be just that: clear.” Id. And “[w]here multiple plausible interpretations exist—only one of which is jurisdictional—it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdictional reading is clear.” Id. at 1498 (citing Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 287 (2011)). Recently, we held in North Wall Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. 143, 154 (2025), that the filing deadlines in section 6226 under TEFRA are jurisdictional because the statute imposes a highly detailed and technical regime consisting of coordinated deadlines that cannot be read to contain implicit exceptions and that would fail to function were equitable tolling applied. In our discussion, we noted that the Supreme Court has twice before addressed whether a particular deadline in the tax area is subject to equitable tolling: in United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997), which predated the mandate to bring discipline to the term “jurisdictional” made in Henderson and Arbaugh; and most recently in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493. Only in Boechler did the Supreme Court also address the question of whether the filing deadline at issue was jurisdictional. In Boechler, the Supreme Court reviewed section 6330(d)(1), which reads: “The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” Because the phrase “such matter,” notably contained in a parenthetical at the end of the statute at issue, had no clear antecedent in this context, there was no “clear tie” between the filing deadline and the Court’s jurisdiction. 11 Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1497–99. Since the decision in Boechler, this Court has reaffirmed the jurisdictional nature of the filing deadlines in section 6015(e)(1)(A) in Frutiger, 162 T.C. 98; and section 6213(a) in both Hallmark Research Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126 (2022), and Sanders v. 11 The Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion, in part, by comparing the text of section 6330(d)(1) to that of section 6015(e)(1)(A), which “much more clearly link[s] [its] jurisdictional grant[] to a filing deadline.” Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498–99. Although we cannot rely on this statement as constituting a precedential interpretation of section 6015(e)(1)(A) as jurisdictional, it is relevant and can be given weight in analyzing issues. Frutiger v. Commissioner, 162 T.C. 98, 105 (2024) (citing United States v. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000)).  14 Commissioner, 161 T.C. 112 (2023). 12 In contrast, we concluded in Belagio Fine Jewelry, 162 T.C. at 251–60, that the filing deadline in section 7436(b)(2) is not jurisdictional because it is not clearly linked to the grant of jurisdiction to the Court in section 7436(a). It is against this backdrop that we now review section 6234(a). A. Text of Section 6234(a) We begin with an analysis of the text of the statute itself. See Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1497–98; Frutiger, 162 T.C. at 103 (citing Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 653 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011)). If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms. Frutiger, 162 T.C. at 103 (first citing King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015); and then citing Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’g 78 T.C. 428 (1982)). When deciding whether the language is plain, we must read the words “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Id. (quoting King, 576 U.S. at 486). Oftentimes, the “meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” King, 576 U.S. at 486 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)). Our duty is “to construe statutes, not isolated provisions,” id. (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)), and our focus is on whether the statute expressly refers to the Court’s authority to hear a case rather than merely the consequences to the taxpayer, Belagio Fine Jewelry, 162 T.C. at 251–52 (first citing Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 144 S. Ct. 1178, 1183–84 (2024); then citing Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1500; then citing Wong, 575 U.S. at 411; then citing Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 610 (2010); then citing Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 161; and then citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)). The statute provides as follows: Sec. 6234. Judicial review of partnership adjustment (a) In general.—Within 90 days after the date on which a notice of a final partnership adjustment is mailed under section 6231 with respect to any partnership taxable 12 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits, in contrast, have held that the filing deadline in section 6213(a) is not jurisdictional post Boechler. See Buller v. Commissioner, 160 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2025); Oquendo v. Commissioner, 148 F.4th 820 (6th Cir. 2025); Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023).  15 year, the partnership may file a petition for a readjustment for such taxable year with— (1) the Tax Court, (2) the district court of the United States for the district in which the partnership’s principal place of business is located, or (3) the Court of Federal Claims. (b) Jurisdictional requirement for bringing action in district court or Court of Federal Claims.— (1) In general.—A readjustment petition under this section may be filed in a district court of the United States or the Court of Federal Claims only if the partnership filing the petition deposits with the Secretary, on or before the date the petition is filed, the amount of (as of the date of the filing of the petition) the imputed underpayment, penalties, additions to tax, and additional amounts with respect to such imputed underpayment if the partnership adjustment was made as provided by the notice of final partnership adjustment. The court may by order provide that the jurisdictional requirements of this paragraph are satisfied where there has been a good faith attempt to satisfy such requirement and any shortfall of the amount required to be deposited is timely corrected. (2) Interest payable.—Any amount deposited under paragraph (1), while deposited, shall not be treated as a payment of tax for purposes of this title (other than chapter 67). (c) Scope of judicial review.—A court with which a petition is filed in accordance with this section shall have jurisdiction to determine all partnership-related items for the partnership taxable year to which the notice of final partnership adjustment relates, the proper allocation of such items among the partners, and the applicability of any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount for which the partnership may be liable under this subchapter. (d) Determination of court reviewable.—Any determination by a court under this section shall have the force and effect of a decision of the Tax Court or a final judgment or decree of the district court or the Court of Federal Claims, as the case may be, and shall be reviewable as such. The date of any such determination  16 shall be treated as being the date of the court’s order entering the decision. (e) Effect of decision dismissing action.—If an action brought under this section is dismissed other than by reason of a rescission under section 6231(c), the decision of the court dismissing the action shall be considered as its decision that the notice of final partnership adjustment is correct, and an appropriate order shall be entered in the records of the court. By itself, section 6234(a), which provides the filing deadline, clearly contains a permissive grant for a partnership to file a c