Muhammad Tahir & Samina Kousar
CourtUnited States Tax Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket18410-24
JudgeJenkins
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo. 2026-119
MUHAMMAD TAHIR AND SAMINA KOUSAR,
Petitioners
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent
__________
Docket No. 18410-24. Filed November 19, 2026.
__________
Muhammad Tahir and Samina Kousar, pro sese.
John T. Arthur, Timothy A. Griffis, and Brianna B. Taylor, for
respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
JENKINS, Judge: In a statutory Notice of Deficiency dated
August 30, 2024 (SNOD), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
determined federal income tax deficiencies and accuracy-related
penalties under section 6662 1 with respect to federal income tax returns
filed jointly by petitioners, Muhammad Tahir and Samina Kousar, for
tax years 2020 and 2021 (years at issue) and an addition to tax under
section 6651(a)(1) for tax year 2021.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue
Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are
to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times,
and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Monetary
amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
Served 11/19/26
2
[*2] The amounts determined were as follows:
Deficiency Penalty Addition to Tax
§ 6662 § 6651(a)(1)
2020 $109,540 $21,908 —
2021 73,632 14,726 $3,602
After concessions, 2 the issues are whether petitioners (1) failed to
report constructive dividend distributions from their wholly owned
corporations, Amazing Deals, Inc., and Samz Online, Inc.
(Corporations); (2) failed to report other income from unrelated third
parties; (3) are liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662;
and (4) are liable for an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following facts are derived from the pleadings, the parties’
stipulation of facts, and the documents and testimony admitted into
evidence at trial. Petitioners resided in Georgia when their Petition was
timely filed.
During the years at issue, petitioners deposited funds from the
Corporations and other sources into their personal bank accounts.
During its examinations of petitioners’ returns, the IRS determined
through a bank deposits analysis that petitioners had received amounts
that were required to be, but were not, reported as income on their
federal tax returns. Petitioners argue that the deposits are not taxable
and that they are entitled to offsetting deductions under section 162, as
discussed herein.
Many of petitioners’ arguments rest on their claims that certain
transactions related to business of the Corporations. However, the IRS
also issued Notices of Deficiency for the years at issue to the
Corporations, in response to which the Corporations filed petitions to
begin the cases under Docket Nos. 18408-24 and 18409-24. The parties
settled those cases before trial. See Leyshon v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2015-104, at *16 (stating that the Court may take judicial notice
of other Tax Court proceedings “if those proceedings have a direct
relation to matters at issue” (quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887
2 The parties stipulated that certain amounts determined in the SNOD to be
income did not need to be reported as income for the years at issue. See, e.g., infra
Findings of Fact Part I.B.
3
[*3] F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989))), aff’d, 649 F. App’x 299 (4th Cir.
2016); see also § 7453; Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1); Rule 143(a).
I. Deposits
A. Deposits from Corporations
During the years at issue, the Corporations operated online
storefronts. Petitioners and/or the Corporations would buy a variety of
products from warehouse clubs and other retailers at discounted prices,
and the Corporations would resell these products online. Mr. Tahir
testified that it was petitioners’ practice to use their personal credit
cards and their daughter-in-law’s credit card to buy the products that
their Corporations would sell and that petitioners would then deposit
money from their business accounts into their personal accounts to pay
the credit card balances. Mr. Tahir explained that petitioners used their
daughter-in-law’s credit card because they were having issues with their
personal credit.
Consistent with Mr. Tahir’s testimony, petitioners provided
monthly statements for Mr. Tahir’s credit card and what he indicated
was petitioners’ daughter-in-law’s credit card, showing multiple
generally small-value purchases from retailers. Additionally,
petitioners’ personal bank statements show multiple payments to the
credit card account attributed to their daughter-in-law. However, none
of the credit card statements has any information beyond the date of the
purchase, how much was spent, and the vendor. And petitioners
provided no evidence that ties the purchases to items that petitioners or
their Corporations sold.
Petitioners also argue that funds flowed both ways between
petitioners and the Corporations. In support thereof, they highlight a
personal bank account statement that reflects a $6,000 transfer to Samz
Online, Inc., with the note “Borrow 04/03/21” on April 5, 2021, followed
by a $6,000 transfer from Samz Online, Inc., with the note “Borrow
Return 4/5/2021” on April 8, 2021. Those transfers were followed by a
$15,965 transfer to Samz Online, Inc., on April 15, 2021, with no
transaction description or corresponding transfer from Samz Online,
Inc. 3
3 Petitioners also provided a bank account statement, not mentioned on brief,
for Samz Online, Inc., emphasizing a $25,000 transfer from “Tahir M” on November
4
[*4] In the SNOD, the IRS determined that petitioners received
constructive dividend distributions of $124,531 from Amazing Deals,
Inc., and of $124,471 from Samz Online, Inc., for total dividend income
from the Corporations of $249,002 for tax year 2020. The IRS further
determined that petitioners received constructive dividend distributions
of $28,581 from Amazing Deals, Inc., and of $169,072 from Samz Online,
Inc., for total dividend income from the Corporations of $197,653 for tax
year 2021. The parties have stipulated that transfers were made from
the Corporations to petitioners’ personal accounts in the foregoing
amounts.
B. Rebates
Mr. Tahir testified that some of the deposits made into
petitioners’ bank accounts were attributable to rebates received with
respect to goods purchased and resold by or on behalf of the
Corporations. Petitioners provided copies of checks from BeFrugal
spanning the first four months of 2020, which correspond to deposits
taken into account as income in the SNOD, totaling $19,252 for the 2020
tax year. BeFrugal provides cash back for shopping online. BeFrugal –
About Us, https://www.befrugal.com/aboutus (last visited Sep. 28, 2026).
Meanwhile, the SNOD indicates that petitioners received other amounts
from “Capital Intellec Befrugal” or just “Capital Intellec” later in 2020
and in 2021; some of those amounts were treated as nontaxable in the
SNOD, and the remainder were among the amounts that the parties
stipulated were not taxable before trial.
C. Green Links Services, Inc. Checks
Some of the deposits into petitioners’ bank accounts during
January 2020 were attributable to checks from Mr. Tahir’s employer
during 2019, Green Links Services, Inc. (Green Links). The checks,
which correspond to deposits treated as income in the SNOD, total
$35,807. Mr. Tahir testified that the payments were for his car during
that year because he used his vehicle for business purposes. However,
the checks, dated from July through December 2019, include notes for
“Honda Payment,” “Other,” “Car Exp,” and (apparently) “Payroll.” On
the basis of the notations, the overlap among the periods covered, and
the amounts of the checks, the reimbursements do not appear to be only
for car payments. Mr. Tahir testified that Green Links kept track of how
30, 2020. However, there is no transaction description included, and there is nothing
in the record clearly identifying a corresponding transfer to petitioners.
5
[*5] much it owed him and closed out that accounting when he stopped
working for the company during 2019. That testimony raises some
questions about whether the dates on the checks accurately reflect when
they were given to Mr. Tahir and about when Mr. Tahir was actually
authorized to deposit them, but Mr. Tahir testified credibly that he was
paid in 2019.
D. Advances from Friends
Mr. Tahir testified that, during the years at issue, friends made
loans to him. According to Mr. Tahir, his oral loan agreements with his
friends were memorialized in writing in February 2026 in five separate
documents (Loan Documents) in response to a request for
documentation from respondent. The Loan Documents are identical in
their terms except for the lender, the dates that they indicate loans were
provided to Mr. Tahir, the amounts of the loans, and the dates on which
the documents were signed. Each of the Loan Documents indicates that
the loans were between Mr. Tahir and a business entity. The Loan
Documents indicate that the loans are demand obligations with no
repayment schedule. No interest was provided for because, Mr. Tahir
indicated, the loans were a type of Islamic loan. Mr. Tahir further
testified that the expectation between him and his friends was that he
would repay the money as soon as he had it.
The Loan Documents indicate that Mr. Tahir received 11 loans in
2020 totaling $48,543 and 5 loans in 2021 totaling $26,714. Mr. Tahir
has not made any repayments on the purported loans.
E. Rotating Savings and Credit Association Funds
On January 9, 2020, petitioners received a deposit of $14,000 into
their bank account. Mr. Tahir stated that this was money from a
rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA), which he described as
a pool created by a group of friends; Mr. Tahir testified that each month
the members contribute money to the ROSCA from which they take
turns drawing. Mr. Tahir further testified that petitioners had been
contributing to the ROSCA each month, and it was their turn to receive
the lump sum pooled that month. Petitioners provided copies of checks
with dates in December 2019 totaling $5,500 made out to Mr. Tahir that
state “Committee” or “Money Return” on the “For” line. Mr. Tahir did
not explain how to reconcile the discrepancy between the $14,000
deposit amount and the $5,500 aggregate amount of the checks, nor did
petitioners provide documentation of contributions to the ROSCA.
6
[*6] F. Economic Incentive Payments
Mr. Tahir identified one of the deposits into petitioners’ bank
account as “IRS refund checks for COVID relief.” Petitioners provided
copies of checks from the U.S. Treasury that state “Economic Impact
Payment.” The checks, which correspond to deposits taken into account
as income in the SNOD, total $2,400 for the 2020 tax year.
II. Expenses
A. Payments to PAKCO
Mr. Tahir testified that some of the Corporations’ online
marketplace work was outsourced to a company called PAKCO
Consulting (PAKCO). Petitioners provided a statement from PAKCO
dated December 5, 2025, reporting that over $275,000 was received from
the Corporations in 2020 and over $100,000 was received in 2021.
Without indicating what such payments were for, the statement
separately indicates in a general manner that PAKCO receives
payments in exchange for consulting and account management services,
which it describes as including product listing management, account
health monitoring, marketplace compliance, customer service
coordination, and overall operational support. Another statement from
PAKCO dated February 13, 2026, provides “confirmation” that
payments sent during the years at issue by the Corporations and
petitioners via Xoom (a money transfer service) were received by
PAKCO’s representative.
Petitioners also provided a printout of what Mr. Tahir testified
are payments via Xoom, including to PAKCO, although the printout
does not indicate that it is a Xoom statement, does not show petitioners’
names, and does not reflect payments to PAKCO or the individuals
associated with PAKCO according to the PAKCO statements. 4
Furthermore, the printout shows less than $30,000 of uncanceled
payments in 2020 and no payments in 2021, with the remainder
reflected as either being canceled or occurring in 2019, 2022, or 2024.
Petitioners also provided bank account statements showing payments
via Xoom from Mr. Tahir’s account corresponding with the payments
reflected on the printout, but they do nothing to substantiate to whom
the payments were made. Mr. Tahir acknowledged that the purported
Xoom printout also showed payments for personal expenses and did not
4 The printout does show one canceled payment to an individual whose name
is stamped on the PAKCO statements as the proprietor.
7
[*7] explain how to reconcile the discrepancies among the various
statements that petitioners argue corroborate business expenses that
they paid.
B. Credit Card Payments
Petitioners also provided documentation of payments to various
credit card companies, including bank account statements showing
credit card company payments. Petitioners highlight an April 13, 2021,
payment of $45,000 to American Express that was followed by an April
21, 2021, transfer from Samz Online, Inc., the transaction detail for
which indicates “Payment Amex Card 4/13/21.” Petitioners also
provided copies of checks from a law firm to various credit card
companies with notes indicating that they are to pay off debts.
Consistent with Mr. Tahir’s testimony, the stubs accompanying the
checks indicate that they relate to a mortgage on which petitioners were
borrowers.
III. Tax Returns
A. 2020 Tax Year
On October 13, 2021, after obtaining an extension, petitioners
jointly filed Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the tax
year ending December 31, 2020. For tax year 2020, Mr. Tahir received
Forms W–2, Wage and Tax Statement, from the Corporations. The wage
income that Mr. Tahir received from the Corporations was the only
income that petitioners reported on their Form 1040 for tax year 2020.
B. 2021 Tax Year
On November 1, 2022, petitioners jointly filed Form 1040 for the
tax year ending December 31, 2021. Petitioners did not provide any
explanation for their delay in filing their 2021 tax return. For tax year
2021, petitioners received Forms W–2 from the Corporations. The wage
income that petitioners received from the Corporations was the only
income that petitioners reported on their Form 1040 for tax year 2021.
OPINION
I. Burden of Proof and Production
Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations in a Notice of
Deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of
8
[*8] proving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a);
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In cases of unreported
income, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that
the Commissioner must establish an evidentiary foundation connecting
the taxpayer with the income-producing activity. See Blohm v.
Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1549 (11th Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo.
1991-636. Once the Commissioner makes the required threshold
showing, the presumption of correctness applies and the burden of
production shifts to the taxpayer to rebut that presumption by
establishing that the Commissioner’s determination is arbitrary or
erroneous. Id. And, because deductions are a matter of legislative grace,
the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction
claimed. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79,
84 (1992).
In the case of the section 6662 accuracy-related penalty and the
section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, the Commissioner bears the burden
of production. § 7491(c). To satisfy that burden, the Commissioner must
offer sufficient evidence to indicate that imposing the penalty or addition
to tax is appropriate. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001).
II. Deposits
A. Bank Deposits Analysis
Section 61(a) defines gross income as “all income from whatever
source derived,” including income derived from business. A taxpayer
must maintain books and records establishing the amount of his or her
gross income. See § 6001; Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a). If the taxpayer fails
to do so, the Commissioner may reconstruct income through any
reasonable method that clearly reflects income. See Petzoldt v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 693 (1989). The reconstruction need only be
reasonable in view of the surrounding facts and circumstances. See id.
at 687; see also Langille v. Commissioner, 447 F. App’x 130, 132 (11th
Cir. 2011), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2010-49.
The bank deposits method is an accepted method for
reconstructing income. See Langille v. Commissioner, 447 F. App’x
at 132; Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645–46 (1994); DiLeo v.
Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 867 (1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992).
The bank deposits method assumes that all deposits are taxable, but the
IRS must account for any nontaxable source of which it has knowledge.
See Clayton, 102 T.C. at 645–46; DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 868. Nontaxable
9
[*9] amounts include transfers between bank accounts, loans,
repayments of loan principal, and returns of capital. See DiLeo, 96 T.C.
at 884; Burgo v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 729, 743 n.14 (1978); Anyanwu
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-123, at *11–12.
Petitioners did not maintain adequate books and records to
establish the amounts of their gross income for the years at issue. As a
result, the IRS was authorized to reconstruct income through the bank
deposits method. See Petzoldt, 92 T.C. at 693. The IRS’s bank deposits
analysis identified substantial amounts deposited into petitioners’
personal accounts that petitioners did not report as income on their
federal tax returns for the years at issue. (Petitioners did not contend
that the computations of the bank deposits were incorrect, and, in fact,
stipulated the amounts received from “various sources” as well as the
amounts received from the Corporations. See supra Findings of Fact
Part I.A. 5) That analysis constitutes a sufficient evidentiary foundation
connecting petitioners with income-producing activity. See Blohm v.
Commissioner, 994 F.2d at 1549. Petitioners bear the burden of
demonstrating that any remaining deposits represent nontaxable
sources. See id. At trial, petitioners asserted a variety of types of
nontaxable receipts: (1) reimbursements for buying inventory for the
Corporations; (2) third-party rebates with respect to such inventory;
(3) payments from Green Links; (4) loans from friends; (5) a payment
from a ROSCA; and (6) economic incentive payments. 6 This Opinion
addresses each in turn.
5 Nevertheless, in its review, this Court has identified one error in the
computations. The SNOD set forth one analysis of deposits solely from the
Corporations and a separate analysis of deposits generally, in which deposits from the
Corporations were generally treated as nontaxable so as to avoid duplication. However,
the computation of deposits from the Corporations includes a $6,000 deposit from
Amazing Deals, Inc., listed as on January 3, 2020, while a $6,000 deposit from “AMAZ”
into the same petitioner account is listed as on January 2, 2020, but not reflected as a
nontaxable amount. Given that there is no other corresponding entry in the general
deposits analysis, this Court concludes that the failure to exclude it from income
computed therein is an error, and petitioners’ income for the 2020 tax year, as the IRS
computed it, should be reduced by $6,000. (With regard to the amount stipulated, it
should be noted that the amounts received from the Corporation and the amounts
received from “various sources” are not described as mutually exclusive. However, even
if they could be so understood, the Court can permit relief from the binding effect of a
stipulation where justice so requires. See Rule 91(e).)
6 On the basis of a spreadsheet that petitioners provided, it seems that they
may also dispute the taxability of three transfers totaling $25,500 made to one of their
accounts on December 8 and 14, 2020, from two accounts that are not otherwise
reflected in the bank deposits analysis. Petitioners’ spreadsheet indicates that the
10
[*10] B. Deposits from the Corporations
A constructive dividend arises if a corporation diverts corporate
income to a shareholder or confers an economic benefit on a shareholder
without expectation of repayment. See Hood v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.
172, 179 (2000); DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 883; Magnon v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.
980, 993–94 (1980). The burden is on the taxpayer to establish that
payments from a corporation to a shareholder should not be treated as
a constructive dividend. See DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 884–85; cf. Strong v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-125, 2005 WL 1244684, at *14.
Petitioners contend that certain deposits that respondent identified as
constructive dividends from the Corporations represent
reimbursements for purchases of inventory for the Corporations to resell
on their online storefronts. In support thereof, petitioners have provided
credit card statements that purportedly reflect the purchases for which
they were reimbursed. The question is whether the credit card
statements, taken together with Mr. Tahir’s testimony, are sufficient to
establish that the deposits at issue were made to reimburse legitimate
corporate business expenses so as not to constitute constructive
dividends.
However, the statements do not indicate what the purchases that
they reflect are for, and petitioners have provided no records linking the
purchases to goods sold by them or the Corporations. Accordingly, it is
impossible to determine from the statements whether any given charge
represents an inventory purchase. Cf. Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2026-34, at *11 (finding that testimony that credit cards were
used for business and submitted card statements were insufficient given
that the taxpayer could not identify specific examples of business
spending and could not provide evidence resolving commingling
concerns, leaving the Court without a basis to estimate any business
portion of expenses under Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1930)). Furthermore, petitioners have not explained how to reconcile
their position in this case with the position with respect to the
Corporations’ inventory that was the basis for the settlement between
the Corporations and respondent. Accordingly, petitioners have not
carried their burden of establishing that the deposits in question
transferring accounts are petitioners’ personal accounts. However, petitioners make
no argument about these transfers on brief, such that any possible argument is deemed
waived, see Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. 171, 202 n.21 (2025); in any event,
petitioners provided no evidence that these accounts were their accounts.
11
[*11] represent reimbursements of legitimate corporate business
expenses rather than constructive dividend distributions.
Petitioners did, however, also highlight a transaction in which
they received $6,000 from Samz Online, Inc., three days after they had
transferred the same amount to Samz Online, Inc., in transactions
labeled to reflect borrowing and repayment. This Court concludes that
petitioners have established that the $6,000 was a loan repayment;
accordingly, the dividends that respondent determined that petitioners
received should be reduced by $6,000. However, petitioners did not tie
the remaining transfers to Samz Online, Inc., that they highlighted with
transfers to them and accordingly have not carried their burden of
establishing that the transfers to them should be characterized as other
than a dividend from Samz Online, Inc.
C. Rebates
As a general rule, when a payment is made to a customer as an
inducement to purchase property, the payment does not constitute
income but is instead treated as an adjustment that reduces the
purchase price of the acquired property. See Pittsburgh Milk Co. v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C. 707, 717 (1956); see also Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1
C.B. 23. The Court has accordingly held that credit card reward dollars
earned on purchases of goods and services were nontaxable reductions
in purchase price rather than accessions to wealth. See Anikeev v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-23, at *20–21. Because the BeFrugal
rebates relate to purchases of goods—whether inventory purchased for
resale by the Corporations, as Mr. Tahir testified, 7 or otherwise—the
proper treatment of the rebates is as a reduction in the purchase price
of those goods, not as income. Accordingly, the $19,252 of BeFrugal
rebates that respondent maintains should be included in petitioners’
2020 income is excluded. 8
7 If the Corporations had purchased goods for which petitioners received
rebates, it might be appropriate to treat the rebates as reducing the Corporations’ cost
of goods sold and the payment thereof to petitioners as constituting constructive
dividends to petitioners. However, because the record supports a finding that
petitioners purchased the goods, any rebates for such goods would not be treated as
income to the purchasers, petitioners.
8 This treatment is consistent with respondent’s treatment of other BeFrugal
rebates. See supra Findings of Fact Part I.B. On brief, respondent includes no
explanation of the treatment of rebates, much less an explanation for inconsistent
treatment.
12
[*12] D. Green Links Checks
The Green Links payments are compensation for Mr. Tahir’s
services that are includible in gross income, see § 61(a)(1), and, standing
alone, Mr. Tahir’s testimony that some of them may have constituted
reimbursement for vehicle use is insufficient to establish otherwise, cf.
Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(c)(4). However, although Mr. Tahir deposited the
Green Links checks into his bank account in 2020, he received them in
2019. The Court has held that an individual who receives a check in one
taxable year but deposits it in the subsequent taxable year generally
must include the check in income in the first taxable year. See Kahler v.
Commissioner, 18 T.C. 31, 34–35 (1952). An exception could apply if the
payor and payee had an agreement that the payee would delay the
deposit, see Fischer v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 792, 801–02 (1950), but
Mr. Tahir gave no indication that was the case; and, having completely
failed to address the Green Links checks in briefing, respondent gives
no reason to suggest that that was the case. Accordingly, the Green
Links checks do not constitute gross income to petitioners for the 2020
tax year, and petitioners’ 2020 income, as the IRS determined it, must
be reduced by the $35,807 in Green Links payments.
E. Advances from Friends
A transfer between two parties constitutes a loan when a bona
fide debtor-creditor relationship exists between the transferor and the
transferee. See Fisher v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 905, 909 (1970). The
Court looks at the facts and circumstances of the transfer, considering a
variety of factors with “[n]o one factor” being necessarily determinative.
Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 26, 37 (2010) (citing Ellinger v.
United States, 470 F.3d 1325, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2006)), aff’d, 691 F.3d
1315 (11th Cir. 2012). The factors include (1) the names on the
documents evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a
fixed maturity date; (3) the source of payments; (4) the right to enforce
payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management
flowing as a result; (6) the status of the contribution in relation to
regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or
adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest; (10) the source of
interest payments; (11) the ability to obtain loans from outside lending
institutions; (12) the extent to which the advance was used to acquire
capital assets; and (13) the failure of the debtor to repay on the due date
or to seek a postponement. Ellinger, 470 F.3d at 1333–34.
13
[*13] With respect to the alleged loans, petitioners offered five Loan
Documents, each executed in February 2026, years after the purported
transactions in 2020 and 2021. The Loan Documents reflect no fixed
repayment schedule, no maturity date, and no interest obligation. The
purported loans are characterized as demand obligations with
repayment solely at petitioners’ discretion, and no repayment has yet
occurred. Further, there is no evidence indicating that petitioners
provided any collateral to their alleged lenders. For these reasons, this
Court finds that petitioners have not established that they received
loans, and, accordingly, the funds petitioners received from purported
lenders cannot be excluded from their income on that basis.
F. ROSCA Funds
As noted, see supra Opinion Part II.A, nontaxable sources of
income to be excluded in a bank deposits analysis include loans,
repayments of loan principal, and returns of capital. See DiLeo, 96 T.C.
at 884; Anyanwu, T.C. Memo. 2014-123, at *11–12. Thus, the $14,000
that petitioners claim they received from a ROSCA could potentially be
nontaxable if they could substantiate the nature of the payment.
However, they have not. They have not produced records of the amounts
they advanced before receiving their share, evidence of the ROSCA’s
terms, the remaining contribution schedule, or documents showing their
commitment to continuing to pay into the ROSCA. With no
corroboration of Mr. Tahir’s testimony other than a few checks that are
not wholly consistent with petitioners’ claims, petitioners have not
carried their burden of proving that any portion of the $14,000 is
excludable from gross income altogether.
However, although Mr. Tahir deposited the purported ROSCA
checks into his bank account in 2020, the record indicates that he
received them in 2019. As discussed supra Opinion Part II.D, checks are
generally includible in income for the year when received. See Kahler,
18 T.C. at 34–35. Mr. Tahir gave no indication that he was restricted
from depositing the checks in December 2019, see Fischer, 14 T.C. at
801–02, and, again, having declined to make any argument regarding
the purported ROSCA checks on brief, respondent has not suggested
otherwise. Accordingly, the $5,500 of purported ROSCA checks dated in
December 2019 do not constitute gross income to petitioners for the 2020
tax year, and petitioners’ 2020 income, as the IRS determined it, must
be reduced accordingly.
14
[*14] G. Economic Incentive Payments
Economic impact payments were issued under section 6428, as
promulgated by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2201, 134 Stat. 281, 335–40 (2020). They were
advance refunds of a recovery rebate credit allowed against the
recipient’s income tax liability. § 6428(a), (f). The recovery rebate credit
is treated as an overpayment of tax, see §§ 6428(b), 37, 6401, and not
income. Having declined to address the economic impact payment
checks on brief, respondent has identified no basis for treating them as
giving rise to gross income, and none exists. Accordingly, the amount of
gross income the IRS determined for 2020 must be reduced by the $2,400
of economic incentive payments.
III. Expenses
A. Payments to PAKCO
Petitioners argue that they should be permitted to deduct some
unspecified amount attributable to payments made through Xoom to
PAKCO on the basis that they are ordinary and necessary expenses
directly related to carrying on a business. 9 However, their
substantiation of payments to PAKCO is sorely lacking, consisting, as it
does, of a much belated conclusory summary by PAKCO of payments
purportedly made by the Corporations (not petitioners) and a purported
Xoom printout corresponding to payments by Mr. Tahir but with no
information identifying PAKCO as a payee. Moreover, petitioners have
not established that any payments that they may have made to PAKCO
relate to a trade or business undertaken by them, as opposed to the
Corporations. And the (again belated and conclusory) statements they
provided from PAKCO suggest that payments may in fact have related
to the Corporations but are not even explicit that they related to
ordinary and necessary expenses of the Corporations’ businesses.
Accordingly, petitioners have not carried their burden of establishing
entitlement to any deductions with respect to purported payments to
PAKCO.
9 They assert that the payments identified on the purported Xoom payout total
$46,330, but do not address the fact that many payments were apparently canceled
and some of the payments relate to other years, resulting in a lower amount reflected
as paid during 2020. Additionally, they fail to address the fact that Mr. Tahir himself
testified that not all of the payments were made to PAKCO.
15
[*15] B. Credit Card Payments
Petitioners identify $53,795 of attorney checks to petitioners’
credit card companies as made to reduce outstanding credit obligations
in connection with a family home transaction; they also focus on the
$45,000 payment made to American Express on April 13, 2021. They
argue that the credit card accounts on which the payments were made
were used in the operation of the Corporations’ businesses. Petitioners
also reference $21,965 of reimbursements received by the Samz Online,
Inc., business account during April 2021 and argue that those
reimbursements demonstrate that money flowed in both directions
between petitioners and the Corporations. Petitioners appear to contend
that the credit card payments (and perhaps also the reimbursement to
Samz Online, Inc.) should therefore be deductible.
As discussed supra Opinion Part II.B, the credit card bills
petitioners provided reflect only dates and merchants, and petitioners
have provided no evidence to corroborate the position that the purchases
were for business purposes. Because petitioners have not established
that the purchases were business purchases, the payments of the credit
card bills reflecting the purchases are not deductible business expenses.
IV. Accuracy-Related Penalties
A. Section 6662 Generally
Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes an accuracy-related
penalty of 20% of the portion of an underpayment of tax required to be
shown on a return that is attributable to, among other things, negligence
or disregard of rules or regulations and any substantial understatement
of income tax. The accuracy-related penalty, however, does not apply to
any part of an underpayment if it is shown that the taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to that portion.
§ 6664(c)(1).
B. Supervisory Approval
The SNOD encloses a Civil Penalty Approval Form, signed March
20, 2024, that approves penalties for substantial understatements and
asserts negligence in the alternative, consistent with the SNOD’s
assertion of penalties on those bases. Petitioners do not dispute that
respondent met the requirements of section 6751(b) that the initial
determination of the penalties have been personally approved in writing
by an immediate supervisor or other such official designated by the
16
[*16] Secretary to give such approval. Accordingly, this Court holds that
respondent has satisfied the burden of production with regard to the
section 6662(a) penalties.
C. Applicability of Section 6662 Penalties
A substantial understatement of income tax is defined as an
understatement of tax that exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax
required to be shown on the tax return or $5,000. See § 6662(d)(1)(A).
The understatement is reduced to the extent that the taxpayer has
(1) adequately disclosed his or her position and has a reasonable basis
for such position or (2) has substantial authority for the tax treatment
of the item. See § 6662(d)(2)(B). Negligence includes any failure to make
a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Code.
§ 6662(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1).
If the Rule 155 computations show underpayments and
substantial understatements, even taking into account respondent’s
concessions and the amounts that this Opinion concludes are not
included in petitioners’ income, respondent’s burden of production with
respect to the section 6662 penalties will be satisfied. Even if not, the
penalties apply on the basis of negligence. Petitioners received
substantial distributions from their Corporations as well as significant
funds from third parties. They failed to document or account for any of
those funds. A reasonable and prudent person who operates a business
and receives regular deposits from business activities into personal bank
accounts would recognize the obligation to keep records addressing the
treatment of those funds and potentially report those amounts as
income. Petitioners’ failure to do so, without any apparent effort to
inquire into the proper tax treatment, indicates negligence. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii).
D. Reasonable Cause and Good Faith
The Court determines whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable
cause and in good faith on a case-by-case basis. See Higbee, 116 T.C.
at 448; Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). The most important factor is the extent
of the taxpayer’s effort to assess the proper tax liability. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6664-4(b). Petitioners make no argument concerning their eligibility
for an exception from the application of the section 6662 penalties. There
is no evidence that petitioners undertook any effort to assess the proper
treatment of the distributions they received from the Corporations.
Petitioners reported only wage income on their 2020 and 2021 returns
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[*17] and have offered no credible explanation for why a reasonable and
prudent person would have believed that hundreds of thousands of
dollars in deposits, including direct transfers from corporate accounts to
personal accounts, did not need to be accounted for. Accordingly, section
6662(a) applies with respect to the full amounts of the underpayments
for the years at issue.
V. Addition to Tax
Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for the failure to file
an income tax return by the due date (including extensions). To sa