Full Opinion

United States Tax Court T.C. Memo. 2026-119 MUHAMMAD TAHIR AND SAMINA KOUSAR, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent __________ Docket No. 18410-24. Filed November 19, 2026. __________ Muhammad Tahir and Samina Kousar, pro sese. John T. Arthur, Timothy A. Griffis, and Brianna B. Taylor, for respondent. MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION JENKINS, Judge: In a statutory Notice of Deficiency dated August 30, 2024 (SNOD), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined federal income tax deficiencies and accuracy-related penalties under section 6662 1 with respect to federal income tax returns filed jointly by petitioners, Muhammad Tahir and Samina Kousar, for tax years 2020 and 2021 (years at issue) and an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for tax year 2021. 1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar. Served 11/19/26 2 [*2] The amounts determined were as follows: Deficiency Penalty Addition to Tax § 6662 § 6651(a)(1) 2020 $109,540 $21,908 — 2021 73,632 14,726 $3,602 After concessions, 2 the issues are whether petitioners (1) failed to report constructive dividend distributions from their wholly owned corporations, Amazing Deals, Inc., and Samz Online, Inc. (Corporations); (2) failed to report other income from unrelated third parties; (3) are liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662; and (4) are liable for an addition to tax under section 6651(a)(1). FINDINGS OF FACT The following facts are derived from the pleadings, the parties’ stipulation of facts, and the documents and testimony admitted into evidence at trial. Petitioners resided in Georgia when their Petition was timely filed. During the years at issue, petitioners deposited funds from the Corporations and other sources into their personal bank accounts. During its examinations of petitioners’ returns, the IRS determined through a bank deposits analysis that petitioners had received amounts that were required to be, but were not, reported as income on their federal tax returns. Petitioners argue that the deposits are not taxable and that they are entitled to offsetting deductions under section 162, as discussed herein. Many of petitioners’ arguments rest on their claims that certain transactions related to business of the Corporations. However, the IRS also issued Notices of Deficiency for the years at issue to the Corporations, in response to which the Corporations filed petitions to begin the cases under Docket Nos. 18408-24 and 18409-24. The parties settled those cases before trial. See Leyshon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-104, at *16 (stating that the Court may take judicial notice of other Tax Court proceedings “if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue” (quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 2 The parties stipulated that certain amounts determined in the SNOD to be income did not need to be reported as income for the years at issue. See, e.g., infra Findings of Fact Part I.B. 3 [*3] F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989))), aff’d, 649 F. App’x 299 (4th Cir. 2016); see also § 7453; Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1); Rule 143(a). I. Deposits A. Deposits from Corporations During the years at issue, the Corporations operated online storefronts. Petitioners and/or the Corporations would buy a variety of products from warehouse clubs and other retailers at discounted prices, and the Corporations would resell these products online. Mr. Tahir testified that it was petitioners’ practice to use their personal credit cards and their daughter-in-law’s credit card to buy the products that their Corporations would sell and that petitioners would then deposit money from their business accounts into their personal accounts to pay the credit card balances. Mr. Tahir explained that petitioners used their daughter-in-law’s credit card because they were having issues with their personal credit. Consistent with Mr. Tahir’s testimony, petitioners provided monthly statements for Mr. Tahir’s credit card and what he indicated was petitioners’ daughter-in-law’s credit card, showing multiple generally small-value purchases from retailers. Additionally, petitioners’ personal bank statements show multiple payments to the credit card account attributed to their daughter-in-law. However, none of the credit card statements has any information beyond the date of the purchase, how much was spent, and the vendor. And petitioners provided no evidence that ties the purchases to items that petitioners or their Corporations sold. Petitioners also argue that funds flowed both ways between petitioners and the Corporations. In support thereof, they highlight a personal bank account statement that reflects a $6,000 transfer to Samz Online, Inc., with the note “Borrow 04/03/21” on April 5, 2021, followed by a $6,000 transfer from Samz Online, Inc., with the note “Borrow Return 4/5/2021” on April 8, 2021. Those transfers were followed by a $15,965 transfer to Samz Online, Inc., on April 15, 2021, with no transaction description or corresponding transfer from Samz Online, Inc. 3 3 Petitioners also provided a bank account statement, not mentioned on brief, for Samz Online, Inc., emphasizing a $25,000 transfer from “Tahir M” on November 4 [*4] In the SNOD, the IRS determined that petitioners received constructive dividend distributions of $124,531 from Amazing Deals, Inc., and of $124,471 from Samz Online, Inc., for total dividend income from the Corporations of $249,002 for tax year 2020. The IRS further determined that petitioners received constructive dividend distributions of $28,581 from Amazing Deals, Inc., and of $169,072 from Samz Online, Inc., for total dividend income from the Corporations of $197,653 for tax year 2021. The parties have stipulated that transfers were made from the Corporations to petitioners’ personal accounts in the foregoing amounts. B. Rebates Mr. Tahir testified that some of the deposits made into petitioners’ bank accounts were attributable to rebates received with respect to goods purchased and resold by or on behalf of the Corporations. Petitioners provided copies of checks from BeFrugal spanning the first four months of 2020, which correspond to deposits taken into account as income in the SNOD, totaling $19,252 for the 2020 tax year. BeFrugal provides cash back for shopping online. BeFrugal – About Us, https://www.befrugal.com/aboutus (last visited Sep. 28, 2026). Meanwhile, the SNOD indicates that petitioners received other amounts from “Capital Intellec Befrugal” or just “Capital Intellec” later in 2020 and in 2021; some of those amounts were treated as nontaxable in the SNOD, and the remainder were among the amounts that the parties stipulated were not taxable before trial. C. Green Links Services, Inc. Checks Some of the deposits into petitioners’ bank accounts during January 2020 were attributable to checks from Mr. Tahir’s employer during 2019, Green Links Services, Inc. (Green Links). The checks, which correspond to deposits treated as income in the SNOD, total $35,807. Mr. Tahir testified that the payments were for his car during that year because he used his vehicle for business purposes. However, the checks, dated from July through December 2019, include notes for “Honda Payment,” “Other,” “Car Exp,” and (apparently) “Payroll.” On the basis of the notations, the overlap among the periods covered, and the amounts of the checks, the reimbursements do not appear to be only for car payments. Mr. Tahir testified that Green Links kept track of how 30, 2020. However, there is no transaction description included, and there is nothing in the record clearly identifying a corresponding transfer to petitioners. 5 [*5] much it owed him and closed out that accounting when he stopped working for the company during 2019. That testimony raises some questions about whether the dates on the checks accurately reflect when they were given to Mr. Tahir and about when Mr. Tahir was actually authorized to deposit them, but Mr. Tahir testified credibly that he was paid in 2019. D. Advances from Friends Mr. Tahir testified that, during the years at issue, friends made loans to him. According to Mr. Tahir, his oral loan agreements with his friends were memorialized in writing in February 2026 in five separate documents (Loan Documents) in response to a request for documentation from respondent. The Loan Documents are identical in their terms except for the lender, the dates that they indicate loans were provided to Mr. Tahir, the amounts of the loans, and the dates on which the documents were signed. Each of the Loan Documents indicates that the loans were between Mr. Tahir and a business entity. The Loan Documents indicate that the loans are demand obligations with no repayment schedule. No interest was provided for because, Mr. Tahir indicated, the loans were a type of Islamic loan. Mr. Tahir further testified that the expectation between him and his friends was that he would repay the money as soon as he had it. The Loan Documents indicate that Mr. Tahir received 11 loans in 2020 totaling $48,543 and 5 loans in 2021 totaling $26,714. Mr. Tahir has not made any repayments on the purported loans. E. Rotating Savings and Credit Association Funds On January 9, 2020, petitioners received a deposit of $14,000 into their bank account. Mr. Tahir stated that this was money from a rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA), which he described as a pool created by a group of friends; Mr. Tahir testified that each month the members contribute money to the ROSCA from which they take turns drawing. Mr. Tahir further testified that petitioners had been contributing to the ROSCA each month, and it was their turn to receive the lump sum pooled that month. Petitioners provided copies of checks with dates in December 2019 totaling $5,500 made out to Mr. Tahir that state “Committee” or “Money Return” on the “For” line. Mr. Tahir did not explain how to reconcile the discrepancy between the $14,000 deposit amount and the $5,500 aggregate amount of the checks, nor did petitioners provide documentation of contributions to the ROSCA. 6 [*6] F. Economic Incentive Payments Mr. Tahir identified one of the deposits into petitioners’ bank account as “IRS refund checks for COVID relief.” Petitioners provided copies of checks from the U.S. Treasury that state “Economic Impact Payment.” The checks, which correspond to deposits taken into account as income in the SNOD, total $2,400 for the 2020 tax year. II. Expenses A. Payments to PAKCO Mr. Tahir testified that some of the Corporations’ online marketplace work was outsourced to a company called PAKCO Consulting (PAKCO). Petitioners provided a statement from PAKCO dated December 5, 2025, reporting that over $275,000 was received from the Corporations in 2020 and over $100,000 was received in 2021. Without indicating what such payments were for, the statement separately indicates in a general manner that PAKCO receives payments in exchange for consulting and account management services, which it describes as including product listing management, account health monitoring, marketplace compliance, customer service coordination, and overall operational support. Another statement from PAKCO dated February 13, 2026, provides “confirmation” that payments sent during the years at issue by the Corporations and petitioners via Xoom (a money transfer service) were received by PAKCO’s representative. Petitioners also provided a printout of what Mr. Tahir testified are payments via Xoom, including to PAKCO, although the printout does not indicate that it is a Xoom statement, does not show petitioners’ names, and does not reflect payments to PAKCO or the individuals associated with PAKCO according to the PAKCO statements. 4 Furthermore, the printout shows less than $30,000 of uncanceled payments in 2020 and no payments in 2021, with the remainder reflected as either being canceled or occurring in 2019, 2022, or 2024. Petitioners also provided bank account statements showing payments via Xoom from Mr. Tahir’s account corresponding with the payments reflected on the printout, but they do nothing to substantiate to whom the payments were made. Mr. Tahir acknowledged that the purported Xoom printout also showed payments for personal expenses and did not 4 The printout does show one canceled payment to an individual whose name is stamped on the PAKCO statements as the proprietor. 7 [*7] explain how to reconcile the discrepancies among the various statements that petitioners argue corroborate business expenses that they paid. B. Credit Card Payments Petitioners also provided documentation of payments to various credit card companies, including bank account statements showing credit card company payments. Petitioners highlight an April 13, 2021, payment of $45,000 to American Express that was followed by an April 21, 2021, transfer from Samz Online, Inc., the transaction detail for which indicates “Payment Amex Card 4/13/21.” Petitioners also provided copies of checks from a law firm to various credit card companies with notes indicating that they are to pay off debts. Consistent with Mr. Tahir’s testimony, the stubs accompanying the checks indicate that they relate to a mortgage on which petitioners were borrowers. III. Tax Returns A. 2020 Tax Year On October 13, 2021, after obtaining an extension, petitioners jointly filed Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for the tax year ending December 31, 2020. For tax year 2020, Mr. Tahir received Forms W–2, Wage and Tax Statement, from the Corporations. The wage income that Mr. Tahir received from the Corporations was the only income that petitioners reported on their Form 1040 for tax year 2020. B. 2021 Tax Year On November 1, 2022, petitioners jointly filed Form 1040 for the tax year ending December 31, 2021. Petitioners did not provide any explanation for their delay in filing their 2021 tax return. For tax year 2021, petitioners received Forms W–2 from the Corporations. The wage income that petitioners received from the Corporations was the only income that petitioners reported on their Form 1040 for tax year 2021. OPINION I. Burden of Proof and Production Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations in a Notice of Deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of 8 [*8] proving that those determinations are erroneous. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). In cases of unreported income, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that the Commissioner must establish an evidentiary foundation connecting the taxpayer with the income-producing activity. See Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 1542, 1549 (11th Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1991-636. Once the Commissioner makes the required threshold showing, the presumption of correctness applies and the burden of production shifts to the taxpayer to rebut that presumption by establishing that the Commissioner’s determination is arbitrary or erroneous. Id. And, because deductions are a matter of legislative grace, the taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction claimed. See Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). In the case of the section 6662 accuracy-related penalty and the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax, the Commissioner bears the burden of production. § 7491(c). To satisfy that burden, the Commissioner must offer sufficient evidence to indicate that imposing the penalty or addition to tax is appropriate. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). II. Deposits A. Bank Deposits Analysis Section 61(a) defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived,” including income derived from business. A taxpayer must maintain books and records establishing the amount of his or her gross income. See § 6001; Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a). If the taxpayer fails to do so, the Commissioner may reconstruct income through any reasonable method that clearly reflects income. See Petzoldt v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 661, 693 (1989). The reconstruction need only be reasonable in view of the surrounding facts and circumstances. See id. at 687; see also Langille v. Commissioner, 447 F. App’x 130, 132 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’g T.C. Memo. 2010-49. The bank deposits method is an accepted method for reconstructing income. See Langille v. Commissioner, 447 F. App’x at 132; Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645–46 (1994); DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 867 (1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992). The bank deposits method assumes that all deposits are taxable, but the IRS must account for any nontaxable source of which it has knowledge. See Clayton, 102 T.C. at 645–46; DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 868. Nontaxable 9 [*9] amounts include transfers between bank accounts, loans, repayments of loan principal, and returns of capital. See DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 884; Burgo v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 729, 743 n.14 (1978); Anyanwu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-123, at *11–12. Petitioners did not maintain adequate books and records to establish the amounts of their gross income for the years at issue. As a result, the IRS was authorized to reconstruct income through the bank deposits method. See Petzoldt, 92 T.C. at 693. The IRS’s bank deposits analysis identified substantial amounts deposited into petitioners’ personal accounts that petitioners did not report as income on their federal tax returns for the years at issue. (Petitioners did not contend that the computations of the bank deposits were incorrect, and, in fact, stipulated the amounts received from “various sources” as well as the amounts received from the Corporations. See supra Findings of Fact Part I.A. 5) That analysis constitutes a sufficient evidentiary foundation connecting petitioners with income-producing activity. See Blohm v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d at 1549. Petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that any remaining deposits represent nontaxable sources. See id. At trial, petitioners asserted a variety of types of nontaxable receipts: (1) reimbursements for buying inventory for the Corporations; (2) third-party rebates with respect to such inventory; (3) payments from Green Links; (4) loans from friends; (5) a payment from a ROSCA; and (6) economic incentive payments. 6 This Opinion addresses each in turn. 5 Nevertheless, in its review, this Court has identified one error in the computations. The SNOD set forth one analysis of deposits solely from the Corporations and a separate analysis of deposits generally, in which deposits from the Corporations were generally treated as nontaxable so as to avoid duplication. However, the computation of deposits from the Corporations includes a $6,000 deposit from Amazing Deals, Inc., listed as on January 3, 2020, while a $6,000 deposit from “AMAZ” into the same petitioner account is listed as on January 2, 2020, but not reflected as a nontaxable amount. Given that there is no other corresponding entry in the general deposits analysis, this Court concludes that the failure to exclude it from income computed therein is an error, and petitioners’ income for the 2020 tax year, as the IRS computed it, should be reduced by $6,000. (With regard to the amount stipulated, it should be noted that the amounts received from the Corporation and the amounts received from “various sources” are not described as mutually exclusive. However, even if they could be so understood, the Court can permit relief from the binding effect of a stipulation where justice so requires. See Rule 91(e).) 6 On the basis of a spreadsheet that petitioners provided, it seems that they may also dispute the taxability of three transfers totaling $25,500 made to one of their accounts on December 8 and 14, 2020, from two accounts that are not otherwise reflected in the bank deposits analysis. Petitioners’ spreadsheet indicates that the 10 [*10] B. Deposits from the Corporations A constructive dividend arises if a corporation diverts corporate income to a shareholder or confers an economic benefit on a shareholder without expectation of repayment. See Hood v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 172, 179 (2000); DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 883; Magnon v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 980, 993–94 (1980). The burden is on the taxpayer to establish that payments from a corporation to a shareholder should not be treated as a constructive dividend. See DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 884–85; cf. Strong v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-125, 2005 WL 1244684, at *14. Petitioners contend that certain deposits that respondent identified as constructive dividends from the Corporations represent reimbursements for purchases of inventory for the Corporations to resell on their online storefronts. In support thereof, petitioners have provided credit card statements that purportedly reflect the purchases for which they were reimbursed. The question is whether the credit card statements, taken together with Mr. Tahir’s testimony, are sufficient to establish that the deposits at issue were made to reimburse legitimate corporate business expenses so as not to constitute constructive dividends. However, the statements do not indicate what the purchases that they reflect are for, and petitioners have provided no records linking the purchases to goods sold by them or the Corporations. Accordingly, it is impossible to determine from the statements whether any given charge represents an inventory purchase. Cf. Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2026-34, at *11 (finding that testimony that credit cards were used for business and submitted card statements were insufficient given that the taxpayer could not identify specific examples of business spending and could not provide evidence resolving commingling concerns, leaving the Court without a basis to estimate any business portion of expenses under Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930)). Furthermore, petitioners have not explained how to reconcile their position in this case with the position with respect to the Corporations’ inventory that was the basis for the settlement between the Corporations and respondent. Accordingly, petitioners have not carried their burden of establishing that the deposits in question transferring accounts are petitioners’ personal accounts. However, petitioners make no argument about these transfers on brief, such that any possible argument is deemed waived, see Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. 171, 202 n.21 (2025); in any event, petitioners provided no evidence that these accounts were their accounts. 11 [*11] represent reimbursements of legitimate corporate business expenses rather than constructive dividend distributions. Petitioners did, however, also highlight a transaction in which they received $6,000 from Samz Online, Inc., three days after they had transferred the same amount to Samz Online, Inc., in transactions labeled to reflect borrowing and repayment. This Court concludes that petitioners have established that the $6,000 was a loan repayment; accordingly, the dividends that respondent determined that petitioners received should be reduced by $6,000. However, petitioners did not tie the remaining transfers to Samz Online, Inc., that they highlighted with transfers to them and accordingly have not carried their burden of establishing that the transfers to them should be characterized as other than a dividend from Samz Online, Inc. C. Rebates As a general rule, when a payment is made to a customer as an inducement to purchase property, the payment does not constitute income but is instead treated as an adjustment that reduces the purchase price of the acquired property. See Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 707, 717 (1956); see also Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23. The Court has accordingly held that credit card reward dollars earned on purchases of goods and services were nontaxable reductions in purchase price rather than accessions to wealth. See Anikeev v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-23, at *20–21. Because the BeFrugal rebates relate to purchases of goods—whether inventory purchased for resale by the Corporations, as Mr. Tahir testified, 7 or otherwise—the proper treatment of the rebates is as a reduction in the purchase price of those goods, not as income. Accordingly, the $19,252 of BeFrugal rebates that respondent maintains should be included in petitioners’ 2020 income is excluded. 8 7 If the Corporations had purchased goods for which petitioners received rebates, it might be appropriate to treat the rebates as reducing the Corporations’ cost of goods sold and the payment thereof to petitioners as constituting constructive dividends to petitioners. However, because the record supports a finding that petitioners purchased the goods, any rebates for such goods would not be treated as income to the purchasers, petitioners. 8 This treatment is consistent with respondent’s treatment of other BeFrugal rebates. See supra Findings of Fact Part I.B. On brief, respondent includes no explanation of the treatment of rebates, much less an explanation for inconsistent treatment. 12 [*12] D. Green Links Checks The Green Links payments are compensation for Mr. Tahir’s services that are includible in gross income, see § 61(a)(1), and, standing alone, Mr. Tahir’s testimony that some of them may have constituted reimbursement for vehicle use is insufficient to establish otherwise, cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(c)(4). However, although Mr. Tahir deposited the Green Links checks into his bank account in 2020, he received them in 2019. The Court has held that an individual who receives a check in one taxable year but deposits it in the subsequent taxable year generally must include the check in income in the first taxable year. See Kahler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 31, 34–35 (1952). An exception could apply if the payor and payee had an agreement that the payee would delay the deposit, see Fischer v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 792, 801–02 (1950), but Mr. Tahir gave no indication that was the case; and, having completely failed to address the Green Links checks in briefing, respondent gives no reason to suggest that that was the case. Accordingly, the Green Links checks do not constitute gross income to petitioners for the 2020 tax year, and petitioners’ 2020 income, as the IRS determined it, must be reduced by the $35,807 in Green Links payments. E. Advances from Friends A transfer between two parties constitutes a loan when a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship exists between the transferor and the transferee. See Fisher v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 905, 909 (1970). The Court looks at the facts and circumstances of the transfer, considering a variety of factors with “[n]o one factor” being necessarily determinative. Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 26, 37 (2010) (citing Ellinger v. United States, 470 F.3d 1325, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2006)), aff’d, 691 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2012). The factors include (1) the names on the documents evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) the source of payments; (4) the right to enforce payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management flowing as a result; (6) the status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest; (10) the source of interest payments; (11) the ability to obtain loans from outside lending institutions; (12) the extent to which the advance was used to acquire capital assets; and (13) the failure of the debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a postponement. Ellinger, 470 F.3d at 1333–34. 13 [*13] With respect to the alleged loans, petitioners offered five Loan Documents, each executed in February 2026, years after the purported transactions in 2020 and 2021. The Loan Documents reflect no fixed repayment schedule, no maturity date, and no interest obligation. The purported loans are characterized as demand obligations with repayment solely at petitioners’ discretion, and no repayment has yet occurred. Further, there is no evidence indicating that petitioners provided any collateral to their alleged lenders. For these reasons, this Court finds that petitioners have not established that they received loans, and, accordingly, the funds petitioners received from purported lenders cannot be excluded from their income on that basis. F. ROSCA Funds As noted, see supra Opinion Part II.A, nontaxable sources of income to be excluded in a bank deposits analysis include loans, repayments of loan principal, and returns of capital. See DiLeo, 96 T.C. at 884; Anyanwu, T.C. Memo. 2014-123, at *11–12. Thus, the $14,000 that petitioners claim they received from a ROSCA could potentially be nontaxable if they could substantiate the nature of the payment. However, they have not. They have not produced records of the amounts they advanced before receiving their share, evidence of the ROSCA’s terms, the remaining contribution schedule, or documents showing their commitment to continuing to pay into the ROSCA. With no corroboration of Mr. Tahir’s testimony other than a few checks that are not wholly consistent with petitioners’ claims, petitioners have not carried their burden of proving that any portion of the $14,000 is excludable from gross income altogether. However, although Mr. Tahir deposited the purported ROSCA checks into his bank account in 2020, the record indicates that he received them in 2019. As discussed supra Opinion Part II.D, checks are generally includible in income for the year when received. See Kahler, 18 T.C. at 34–35. Mr. Tahir gave no indication that he was restricted from depositing the checks in December 2019, see Fischer, 14 T.C. at 801–02, and, again, having declined to make any argument regarding the purported ROSCA checks on brief, respondent has not suggested otherwise. Accordingly, the $5,500 of purported ROSCA checks dated in December 2019 do not constitute gross income to petitioners for the 2020 tax year, and petitioners’ 2020 income, as the IRS determined it, must be reduced accordingly. 14 [*14] G. Economic Incentive Payments Economic impact payments were issued under section 6428, as promulgated by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2201, 134 Stat. 281, 335–40 (2020). They were advance refunds of a recovery rebate credit allowed against the recipient’s income tax liability. § 6428(a), (f). The recovery rebate credit is treated as an overpayment of tax, see §§ 6428(b), 37, 6401, and not income. Having declined to address the economic impact payment checks on brief, respondent has identified no basis for treating them as giving rise to gross income, and none exists. Accordingly, the amount of gross income the IRS determined for 2020 must be reduced by the $2,400 of economic incentive payments. III. Expenses A. Payments to PAKCO Petitioners argue that they should be permitted to deduct some unspecified amount attributable to payments made through Xoom to PAKCO on the basis that they are ordinary and necessary expenses directly related to carrying on a business. 9 However, their substantiation of payments to PAKCO is sorely lacking, consisting, as it does, of a much belated conclusory summary by PAKCO of payments purportedly made by the Corporations (not petitioners) and a purported Xoom printout corresponding to payments by Mr. Tahir but with no information identifying PAKCO as a payee. Moreover, petitioners have not established that any payments that they may have made to PAKCO relate to a trade or business undertaken by them, as opposed to the Corporations. And the (again belated and conclusory) statements they provided from PAKCO suggest that payments may in fact have related to the Corporations but are not even explicit that they related to ordinary and necessary expenses of the Corporations’ businesses. Accordingly, petitioners have not carried their burden of establishing entitlement to any deductions with respect to purported payments to PAKCO. 9 They assert that the payments identified on the purported Xoom payout total $46,330, but do not address the fact that many payments were apparently canceled and some of the payments relate to other years, resulting in a lower amount reflected as paid during 2020. Additionally, they fail to address the fact that Mr. Tahir himself testified that not all of the payments were made to PAKCO. 15 [*15] B. Credit Card Payments Petitioners identify $53,795 of attorney checks to petitioners’ credit card companies as made to reduce outstanding credit obligations in connection with a family home transaction; they also focus on the $45,000 payment made to American Express on April 13, 2021. They argue that the credit card accounts on which the payments were made were used in the operation of the Corporations’ businesses. Petitioners also reference $21,965 of reimbursements received by the Samz Online, Inc., business account during April 2021 and argue that those reimbursements demonstrate that money flowed in both directions between petitioners and the Corporations. Petitioners appear to contend that the credit card payments (and perhaps also the reimbursement to Samz Online, Inc.) should therefore be deductible. As discussed supra Opinion Part II.B, the credit card bills petitioners provided reflect only dates and merchants, and petitioners have provided no evidence to corroborate the position that the purchases were for business purposes. Because petitioners have not established that the purchases were business purchases, the payments of the credit card bills reflecting the purchases are not deductible business expenses. IV. Accuracy-Related Penalties A. Section 6662 Generally Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes an accuracy-related penalty of 20% of the portion of an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return that is attributable to, among other things, negligence or disregard of rules or regulations and any substantial understatement of income tax. The accuracy-related penalty, however, does not apply to any part of an underpayment if it is shown that the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to that portion. § 6664(c)(1). B. Supervisory Approval The SNOD encloses a Civil Penalty Approval Form, signed March 20, 2024, that approves penalties for substantial understatements and asserts negligence in the alternative, consistent with the SNOD’s assertion of penalties on those bases. Petitioners do not dispute that respondent met the requirements of section 6751(b) that the initial determination of the penalties have been personally approved in writing by an immediate supervisor or other such official designated by the 16 [*16] Secretary to give such approval. Accordingly, this Court holds that respondent has satisfied the burden of production with regard to the section 6662(a) penalties. C. Applicability of Section 6662 Penalties A substantial understatement of income tax is defined as an understatement of tax that exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the tax return or $5,000. See § 6662(d)(1)(A). The understatement is reduced to the extent that the taxpayer has (1) adequately disclosed his or her position and has a reasonable basis for such position or (2) has substantial authority for the tax treatment of the item. See § 6662(d)(2)(B). Negligence includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Code. § 6662(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1). If the Rule 155 computations show underpayments and substantial understatements, even taking into account respondent’s concessions and the amounts that this Opinion concludes are not included in petitioners’ income, respondent’s burden of production with respect to the section 6662 penalties will be satisfied. Even if not, the penalties apply on the basis of negligence. Petitioners received substantial distributions from their Corporations as well as significant funds from third parties. They failed to document or account for any of those funds. A reasonable and prudent person who operates a business and receives regular deposits from business activities into personal bank accounts would recognize the obligation to keep records addressing the treatment of those funds and potentially report those amounts as income. Petitioners’ failure to do so, without any apparent effort to inquire into the proper tax treatment, indicates negligence. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1)(ii). D. Reasonable Cause and Good Faith The Court determines whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith on a case-by-case basis. See Higbee, 116 T.C. at 448; Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to assess the proper tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). Petitioners make no argument concerning their eligibility for an exception from the application of the section 6662 penalties. There is no evidence that petitioners undertook any effort to assess the proper treatment of the distributions they received from the Corporations. Petitioners reported only wage income on their 2020 and 2021 returns 17 [*17] and have offered no credible explanation for why a reasonable and prudent person would have believed that hundreds of thousands of dollars in deposits, including direct transfers from corporate accounts to personal accounts, did not need to be accounted for. Accordingly, section 6662(a) applies with respect to the full amounts of the underpayments for the years at issue. V. Addition to Tax Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for the failure to file an income tax return by the due date (including extensions). To sa