Full Opinion

United States Tax Court T.C. Memo. 2026-122 PARK LAKE III, LLC, JAMES T. HOLLOWAY, TAX MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent __________ Docket No. 8018-21. Filed November 19, 2026. __________ Adam R. Young and Vivian D. Hoard, for petitioner. Anne M. Wurtzebach, Eric R. Skinner, Ashley M. Van Fleet, Patricia G. Donovan, and Andrew J. Lorenz, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION LAUBER, Judge: This case involves a charitable contribution de- duction claimed for 2017 by Park Lake III, LLC (Park Lake), for the donation of a conservation easement. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) disallowing the deduction and asserting penalties. Currently before the Court is respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Motion) contending that the IRS complied with the require- ments of section 6751(b)(1) by securing timely supervisory approval of the penalties at issue. 1 We agree and accordingly will grant the Motion. 1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Served 11/19/26 2 [*2] Background The following facts are derived from the Pleadings, the parties’ Motion papers, and the Declarations and Exhibits attached thereto. They are stated solely for purposes of deciding respondent’s Motion and not as findings of fact in this case. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Commis- sioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). Park Lake is an Alabama limited liability company that is treated as a TEFRA 2 partnership for Federal income tax purposes. James T. Holloway is its tax matters partner and petitioner in this case. Park Lake had its principal place of business in Alabama when the Petition was timely filed. Park Lake acquired a tract of land in Montgomery County, Ala- bama. In December 2017, after petitioner had solicited investors, Park Lake granted to the National Farmer’s Trust a conservation easement over the property. Park Lake timely filed Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for its 2017 tax year, claiming a charitable contri- bution deduction of $14.02 million for its donation of the easement. The IRS selected Park Lake’s 2017 return for examination. In March 2020 it assigned the case to Revenue Agent (RA) Timothy Neigh- bors. His case activity record shows that he devoted 217 hours to the audit, which lasted 11 months. RA Neighbors was assisted by RA John Jones, who devoted 72 hours to the audit. During the examination an IRS in-house appraiser prepared a “Limited Scope Appraisal Review” that analyzed the appraisal submitted with Park Lake’s return. That report was withdrawn and not refiled, and no other appraisal review was prepared during the examination. RA Neighbors was a member of Team 1124 in the IRS Large Busi- ness & International Division. At that time Supervisory RA Gregory Burris served as acting group manager of Group 1124. He was thus Mr. Neighbors’s immediate supervisor. In January 2021, as the examination neared completion, RA Neighbors recommended asserting a 40% penalty for gross valuation misstatement against Park Lake. See § 6662(h). In the alternative he recommended asserting a 20% penalty for substantial valuation 2 Before its repeal, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 401–407, 96 Stat. 324, 648–71, governed the tax treat- ment and audit procedures for many partnerships, including Park Lake. 3 [*3] misstatement, reportable transactions understatement, negligence, and/or substantial understatement of income tax. See §§ 6662(a), (b)(1)– (3), (c)–(e), 6662A(b). RA Neighbors’s recommendations to this effect were set forth in a civil penalty lead sheet and Form 886–A, Explanation of Items. Copies of both documents are included in the record. RA Neighbors’s team man- ager, Mr. Burris, digitally signed the penalty lead sheet on January 20, 2021. Mr. Burris verified that he was the “immediate supervisor” of RA Neighbors, who “made the initial determination to assert the penalties indicated on this form,” and that Mr. Burris “approve[d] that initial de- termination.” RA Neighbors has submitted a declaration averring un- der penalty of perjury that these facts are true and accurate. On February 4, 2021, RA Neighbors mailed petitioner a packet of documents that included Form 4605–A, Examination Changes, which set forth his proposed adjustments and penalty recommendations. This packet of documents constituted the first formal communication to peti- tioner that the IRS intended to assert the penalties discussed above, as recommended by RA Neighbors and approved by Mr. Burris. On Febru- ary 24, 2021, the IRS issued petitioner an FPAA, including a Form 886– A, disallowing in toto the $14.02 million deduction Park Lake claimed for the easement and asserting the aforementioned penalties. Petitioner timely petitioned this Court for readjustment of part- nership items. On July 28, 2026, respondent filed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking a ruling that he has complied with the sec- tion 6751(b) requirements for supervisory approval of all penalties at issue. On September 2, 2026, petitioner timely filed an Objection to the Motion, and on September 29, 2026, respondent filed a Reply. Discussion I. Summary Judgment Standard The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and avoid costly, unnecessary, and time-consuming trials. See FPL Grp., Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 73, 74 (2001). We may grant partial summary judgment regarding an issue as to which there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 121(a)(2); Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, we construe factual materials and inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. But where 4 [*4] the moving party makes and properly supports a motion for sum- mary judgment, “the nonmovant may not rest on the allegations or de- nials in that party’s pleading” but must set forth specific facts, by affi- davit or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Rule 121(d). We conclude that no material facts are in genuine dispute and that the question presented by respondent’s Motion may be decided summarily. II. Analysis Section 6751(b) provides that “[n]o penalty under this title shall be assessed unless the initial determination of such assessment is per- sonally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the indi- vidual making such determination.” In a TEFRA case such as this, “the Commissioner must secure written supervisory approval for the penalty before issuing an FPAA to the partnership.” Palmolive Bldg. Invs., LLC v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 75, 83 (2019). If supervisory approval is ob- tained by that date, our Court has held that the partnership must es- tablish that the approval was untimely, i.e., “that there was a formal communication of the penalty [to the partnership] before the proffered approval [was secured].” See Frost v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 23, 35 (2020). 3 Absent stipulation to the contrary, this case is appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and we thus follow its precedent. See § 7482(b)(1)(E); Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756–57 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). The Eleventh Cir- cuit has interpreted the term “assessment” to refer to the “ministerial” process by which the IRS formally records the tax debt. Kroner v. Com- missioner, 48 F.4th 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2022), rev’g in part T.C. Memo. 2020-73. The IRS thus satisfies section 6751(b) “so long as a supervisor approves an initial determination of a penalty assessment before [the IRS] assesses those penalties.” See Kroner v. Commissioner, 48 F.4th at 1276. Under a literal application of the standard enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit in Kroner, supervisory approval could seemingly be se- cured at any moment before actual assessment of the tax, which has not 3 Although the Commissioner does not bear a burden of production with respect to penalties in a partnership-level proceeding, a partnership may raise section 6751(b) as an affirmative defense. See Dynamo Holdings Ltd. P’ship v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. 224, 236–37 (2018); Sparta Pink Prop., LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-88, 124 T.C.M. (CCH) 121, 123 n.4. 5 [*5] yet occurred. But the Eleventh Circuit left open the possibility that supervisory approval in some cases might need to be secured sooner, i.e., before the supervisor “has lost the discretion to disapprove” assertion of the penalty. See id. at 1279 n.1; cf. Laidlaw’s Harley Davidson Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 29 F.4th 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2022) (treating su- pervisory approval as timely if secured before the penalty is assessed or “before the relevant supervisor loses discretion whether to approve the penalty assessment”), rev’g and remanding 154 T.C. 68 (2020); Chai v. Commissioner, 851 F.3d 190, 220 (2d Cir. 2017) (concluding that super- visory approval must be obtained at a time when “the supervisor has the discretion to give or withhold it”), aff’g in part, rev’g in part T.C. Memo. 2015-42. The record establishes that RA Neighbors, who conducted the Park Lake examination, made the “initial determination” to assert the penalties. Respondent has supplied copies of the civil penalty lead sheet and a declaration from RA Neighbors averring that he “perform[ed] the examination of Park Lake” and “made the initial determination” to as- sert the penalties. RA Neighbors’s signature appears on the bottom of the civil penalty lead sheet. The record establishes that Mr. Burris was RA Neighbors’s “im- mediate supervisor” at all relevant times. RA Neighbors has averred under penalty of perjury that Mr. Burris was his immediate supervisor during the examination. Mr. Burris has likewise averred under penalty of perjury that he was RA Neighbors’s “immediate supervisor” during the Park Lake audit. His signature appears on the penalty lead sheet, a copy of which is attached to respondent’s Motion. We conclude that Mr. Burris was RA Neighbors’s “immediate supervisor” within the meaning of section 6751(b)(1). See Sand Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 157 T.C. 136, 142 (2021) (holding that the “immediate supervisor” is the per- son who supervises the agent’s substantive work on an examination). The record establishes that Mr. Burris timely approved the pen- alties. He affixed his electronic signature to the penalty lead sheet on January 20, 2021, using Adobe software. On that form he listed his title as “Supervisory Revenue Agent Team 1124.” He has averred under pen- alty of perjury that he approved the determination to assert the afore- mentioned penalties. The FPAA was issued on February 24, 2021. As of January 20, the date on which Mr. Burris supplied his approval, the IRS examina- tion remained at a stage where he had discretion to approve or 6 [*6] disapprove the penalty recommendations. Therefore, under the reading of Kroner most favorable to petitioner, the IRS complied with section 6751(b)(1) because Mr. Burris timely approved the relevant pen- alties and did so in writing. Petitioner struggles in vain to gin up a dispute of material fact. Petitioner first challenges the status of RA Neighbors as the officer who made the “initial determination” to assert the penalties. Petitioner ar- gues that “the IRS asserts penalties in all conservation easement audits and treats all taxpayers subject to such audits the same.” From this premise petitioner concludes that RA Neighbors had no discretion re- garding the assertion of penalties against Park Lake. Rather, in peti- tioner’s view, someone other than the revenue agent who conducts the examination must be making penalty determinations in conservation easement cases. We have previously rejected the argument that penalties in fact recommended by an examining agent were in substance determined by someone else, e.g., by an unidentified higher level IRS official. See Park Lake II, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-11, at *4–5; Dorchester Farms Prop., LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-92, at *5 (rejecting the argument that the IRS categorically asserts “penalties based on the type of transaction”); Cattail Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-17, at *9–11. The “initial determination of [a penalty] as- sessment” is a formal action directed to a particular taxpayer by the Ex- amination Division. See Frost, 154 T.C. at 32; Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 1, 15 (2020); Park Lake II, T.C. Memo. 2025-11, at *4–5. The word “determination” has “an established meaning in the tax context” and denotes an action “with a high degree of concreteness and formality.” Nassau River Stone, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-36, at *6 (quoting Belair Woods, 154 T.C. at 15). It is the duty of the examining agent to determine penalties, and RA Neighbors was the examining agent here. See Cattail Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2023-17, at *11. Petitioner next argues that RA Neighbors did not “make the ini- tial determination to assert the valuation misstatement penalties” be- cause “IRS examiners are not appraisers, let alone qualified appraisers, with discretion to value real property.” Petitioner contends that “RA Neighbors had no discretion to determine a value for [Park Lake’s] do- nation” and “could not assert valuation penalties against [Park Lake].” The gist of petitioner’s argument seems to be that in-house IRS apprais- ers are the only IRS employees who can make “initial determinations” 7 [*7] to assert valuation misstatement penalties and that approval of such penalties must be therefore supplied by those employees’ supervi- sors. We disagree. In-house IRS appraisers do not have the authority to “determine” penalties; they simply offer an opinion as to value. Dur- ing an IRS examination it is the duty of a revenue agent to determine penalties, taking into account all the relevant facts and possible de- fenses the taxpayer may have. As explained above, the word “determi- nation” has “an established meaning in the tax context and denotes a communication with a high degree of concreteness and formality.” Belair Woods, 154 T.C. at 15. An “initial determination” thus signifies a “consequential moment” of IRS action. Ibid. (quoting Chai v. Commis- sioner, 851 F.3d at 221). Any preliminary analysis offered by an in- house appraiser to a revenue agent is simply not a “determination” within the meaning of section 6751(b)(1). Petitioner alternatively contends that, if RA Neighbors had dis- cretion to assert valuation misstatement penalties, he “disregarded the only appraiser qualified to opine on the correctness” of the appraisal at- tached to Park Lake’s return. Petitioner asserts that uncertainty sur- rounding how RA Neighbors determined the penalties without input from an appraiser creates a genuine dispute of material fact that pre- cludes summary judgment. 4 Again we disagree. RA Neighbors had been conducting the exam- ination of Park Lake for 11 months and was necessarily acquainted with the relevant facts. The in-house appraiser had withdrawn his “Limited Scope Appraisal Review,” and RA Neighbors cannot be said to have dis- regarded a report that was withdrawn. But even if the report were still in the file, RA Neighbors would be “free to disagree with any aspect” of the report, including its methodology, its selection of comparable trans- actions, and its bottom-line conclusion. See Cattail Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2023-17, at *10; see also Hancock Cnty. Land Acquisitions, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-50, at *11 (“The input supplied by 4 In advancing this argument petitioner speculates that a disagreement arose between RA Neighbors and the IRS in-house appraiser, which resulted in withdrawal of the appraisal review. The record contains, and petitioner has submitted, no evidence supporting the existence of such a dispute. In any event, even if there were a disagree- ment, it is the examining agent, not the in-house appraiser, who is granted the author- ity to make the initial determination whether to assert a penalty. 8 [*8] the in-house appraisers did not deprive [the revenue agents] of the discretion to make independent decisions regarding the penalties.”). More fundamentally, petitioner’s argument misapprehends the relevant statutory requirements. Section 6751 is captioned “Procedural Requirements [for IRS Penalties].” And section 6751(b) is captioned “Approval of Assessment,” not “Explanation of Assessment.” See Pick- ens Decorative Stone, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-22, 123 T.C.M. (CCH) 1127, 1130. This statute does not inquire into the exam- ining agent’s reasoning process or the substantive correctness of his in- itial determination to assert a penalty. We have repeatedly rejected any suggestion that a penalty approval form or other document must “demonstrate the depth or comprehensiveness of the supervisor’s re- view.” Belair Woods, 154 T.C. at 17. We do not second-guess the extent of the RA’s or the supervisor’s deliberations about whether penalties should be imposed. We confine our search to seeking evidence of written supervisory approval. See Raifman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018- 101, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 13, 27–28 (“The written supervisory approval re- quirement of section 6751(b)(1) requires just that: written supervisory approval.”). Uncertainty about the examining agent’s thought process is simply not a “material fact” in deciding whether the IRS has satisfied the requirements of section 6751(b)(1). Finally, assuming that RA Neighbors did make the “initial deter- mination,” petitioner contends that Mr. Burris—RA Neighbors’s imme- diate supervisor—had “no discretion to approve” the penalties. Rather, petitioner asserts that the Secretary has designated a higher level offi- cial—a Director of Field Operations—to approve penalties of this sort. This argument is frivolous. Section 6751(b) provides that the in- itial determination must be approved by “the immediate supervisor of the individual making such determination or such higher level official as the Secretary may designate.” (Emphasis added.) It suffices to say that the word “or” permits approval by either type of official. See Ivey Branch Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-63, at *8; Goddard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-96, 124 T.C.M. (CCH) 187, 197. Mr. Burris signed the penalty approval form and has averred that he was RA Neighbors’s “immediate supervisor” during the audit. The statute requires no more than this. See Park Lake II, T.C. Memo. 2025- 11, at *2–3, *7–8 (holding that the signature of the acting team manager on a penalty approval form satisfied the statutory requirements); Dor- chester Farms Prop., T.C. Memo. 2023-92, at *4–5 (same); Salacoa Stone Quarry, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2023-68, at *6 (same). 9 [*9] To reflect the foregoing, An appropriate order will be issued granting respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.