Otay Project LP, Oriole Management LLC, Tax Matters Partner
CourtUnited States Tax Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket6819-20
JudgeWeiler
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo. 2026-120
OTAY PROJECT LP,
ORIOLE MANAGEMENT LLC, TAX MATTERS PARTNER,
Petitioner
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent 1
__________
Docket No. 6819-20. Filed November 19, 2026.
__________
George M. Gerachis, Adriana L. Wirtz, Matthew C. Hoffman, Kylan A.
Kinkade, Elizabeth A. Matthews, and Zachary M. Willis, for petitioner.
H. Barton Thomas, Matthew D. Thom, Jan M. Geht, and Henry C.
Bonney, for respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
WEILER, Judge: This case is before the Court on petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration of Findings or Opinion Pursuant to Rule 161
(Motion for Reconsideration). 2 In Otay I, T.C. Memo. 2026-21, at *46, we
held that Otay Project, LP (OPLP), incorrectly determined a basis
adjustment under section 743(b) with respect to its limited partner,
Otay Project, LLC (OPLLC), that arose in 2007. On the termination and
liquidation of OPLP, on October 3, 2012, OPLP claimed a deduction of
more than $743 million (Basis Deduction) principally attributable to
1 This Opinion supplements our previously filed opinion, Otay Project, LP v.
Commissioner (Otay I), T.C. Memo. 2026-21.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue
Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.), in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are
to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times,
and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Served 11/19/26
2
[*2] that basis adjustment. We sustained respondent’s disallowance of
$713,759,615 with respect to the claimed Basis Deduction reported on
OPLP’s Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income, for the short
2012 tax year ending on October 3, 2012. Further, in the alternative, we
determined that the transactions at issue should not be respected under
the common law economic substance doctrine.
In its Motion for Reconsideration petitioner seeks reconsideration
of our conclusions as to the Basis Deduction calculation made under
section 743(b). Petitioner, however, does not seek reconsideration as to
whether the transactions at issue lack economic substance. 3
Background
We adopt the findings of fact set forth in Otay I, repeating such
facts only as necessary for clarity and convenience. Defined terms used
herein are taken from Otay I.
Discussion
As applicable here, reconsideration under Rule 161 serves the
limited purpose of correcting substantial errors of law or fact. Estate of
Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 440, 441 (1998), supplementing 110
T.C. 172 (1998); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Reconsideration is not the
appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected legal arguments or
tendering new legal theories to reach the result desired by the moving
party. Estate of Quick, 110 T.C. at 441–42. Whether to grant a motion
for reconsideration rests within the discretion of the Court and generally
requires a showing of unusual circumstances or substantial error. CWT
Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1054, 1057 (1982), supplementing
79 T.C. 86 (1982), aff’d, 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1985). Absent a
stipulation to the contrary, an appeal in this case would lie in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(E), (2);
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
Respondent contends that the Court should not grant
reconsideration as it does not affect the disposition of the case since
petitioner challenged only one of two independent grounds of the Court’s
holding. Further, respondent argues that Otay I does not contain
substantial errors or unusual circumstances to merit reconsideration.
Ultimately, respondent contends that petitioner’s Motion for
3 Petitioner has preserved its right to appeal.
3
[*3] Reconsideration inappropriately attempts to retroactively rebrief
the case. However, respondent does agree that the Finco distributions,
see Otay I, T.C. Memo. 2026-21, at *28, did not result in OPLLC’s having
a deficit restoration obligation.
Petitioner contends that reconsideration is necessary because the
original opinion contains substantial errors of law and fact. Specifically,
petitioner contends that the figures used in Otay I do not reflect
OPLLC’s section 704(b) book capital account balance, and the Court’s
reliance on these figures led it to incorrectly reject OPLP’s section 743(b)
Basis Deduction calculation. Moreover, petitioner argues that the Court
incorrectly determined that OPLLC had a negative capital account and
that OPLLC had an unconditional obligation to restore its negative
capital account. Otay I, T.C. Memo. 2026-21, at *30–31.
In sum, the parties disagree as to whether the Court’s conclusions
as to OPLLC’s negative capital account balance and its resulting deficit
restoration obligation was substantial error. See Rule 161. We
determine that our conclusions as to OPLLC’s negative capital account
balance and its deficit restoration obligation ultimately do not affect the
disposition of the case since there are two independent holdings of the
Court. See Otay I, T.C. Memo. 2026-21, at *46.
However, as respondent acknowledges, we have confirmed on
reconsideration that OPLLC had a positive book capital balance and
hence it did not have an unconditional obligation to restore its capital
account. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3). To correct our prior
conclusions as to OPLLC’s unconditional obligation to restore its
negative capital account and other related conclusions, we will grant in
part petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, withdraw Part II.B. of
Otay I, T.C. Memo. 2026-21, at *25–31, and refrain from deciding
whether (or not) OPLP erred in calculating its section 743(b) basis
adjustment and the resulting Basis Deduction, since deciding the issue
is not necessary.
However, this change does not alter our analyses and conclusions
as to the application of the economic substance doctrine. As we held in
Otay I, we continue to conclude that the transactions discussed in Otay I
are shams and lack economic substance. Otay I, T.C. Memo. 2026-21,
at *41, *46. Accordingly, and for the reasons detailed in Otay I, T.C.
Memo. 2026-21, at *31–41, we continue to sustain respondent’s
disallowance of $713,759,615 of a more than $743 million Basis
Deduction.
4
[*4] Given the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be issued, and decision will be entered
under Rule 155.