Wolford v. Lopez

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus WOLFORD ET AL. v. LOPEZ, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HAWAII CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 24–1046. Argued January 20, 2026—Decided June 25, 2026 For years, the State of Hawaii made it almost impossible to obtain a li- cense to carry a firearm. Four years ago, however, this Court held in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to carry hand- guns outside the home for self-defense. Hawaii responded by replacing its old law on carry permits with new laws that achieved a similar re- sult. At issue in this case is a Hawaii law that prohibits firearms on private property open to the public without the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. Hawaii’s new rule imposes severe re- strictions on the daily activities of residents who have satisfied the State’s rigorous requirements for the issuance of a carry permit. When these permit holders leave home, not only must they take care to avoid all the territory where the possession of a gun is prohibited outright, but they may also be barred from entering many places that people routinely visit in the course of their daily routines, such as gas sta- tions, restaurants, and stores. This law flips the default rule at com- mon law, under which anyone has an implied license to enter property held open to the public unless the property owner withdraws consent. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, with the Amendment’s “central” concern being the fundamental right of self-defense. Id., at 577. Heller instructed courts to ascertain the scope of the right by looking to history and emphatically rejected an ahistorical “judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry.’ ” Id., at 634. The Court later held in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, that the Second Amendment right applies equally to the Federal 2 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Syllabus Government and the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, set- tling the question whether the Second Amendment embodies a uni- form national standard or one that varies from one locale to another. In Bruen, the Court fleshed out the process of historical analysis re- quired in a Second Amendment case, holding that the analysis involves two steps. First, a court must determine whether the challenged law falls within the plain text of the Amendment’s language by asking whether the law applies to “the people” (i.e., all members of the politi- cal community) and restricts the “keep[ing]” (i.e., possession) or “bear[ing]” (i.e., carrying) of “Arms” (i.e., weapons customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes). If a challenged law falls within the plain text, it is presumptively unconstitutional—which means that it may violate the preexisting right that the Amendment codified. But the government may show that its challenged law did not infringe the historical understanding of the codified right. While a variety of sources may aid this inquiry, the best evidence is often what Bruen called historical analogues—old legal rules from which a court may draw a strong inference that the modern law at issue is consistent with the codified right. Bruen identified three important inquiries for eval- uating proffered historical analogues: the number of jurisdictions in which they were adopted, the extent to which they were well-accepted, and whether any analogue or collection of analogues is “relevantly sim- ilar” to the modern law in terms of “how” and “why” it restricted the keeping or bearing of arms. 597 U. S., at 29. Petitioners—three residents of Maui County who possess concealed- carry permits and an organizational plaintiff with members who have such permits—filed suit in federal court seeking temporary and per- manent injunctive relief, contending that the law at issue violates their constitutional rights. The District Court enjoined enforcement of the law as applied to private property open to the public, but the Ninth Circuit reversed that injunction. Held: Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 13–24. (a) The restrictions imposed by Hawaii’s challenged law fall within the plain text of the Second Amendment, so the law is presumptively unconstitutional. No party disputes that petitioners are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment or that they seek to “bear” “Arms.” Therefore, “the plain text of the Second Amendment protects” what petitioners want to do: carry handguns for self-defense. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 32. To be sure, owners of establishments that are open to the public can admit or exclude persons who are carrying guns for self- defense under either the common-law rule or Hawaii’s law. But  Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus Hawaii’s shift from the common-law rule unquestionably imposes a new and significant burden on the exercise of the right recognized in Bruen. For example, proprietors who do not object to entry by carry- permit holders may be reluctant to post welcoming signs for fear of alienating customers. So under Hawaii’s new default rule, a proprietor in this category may only be willing to consent discreetly to the entry of permit holders who make the effort to inquire. This arrangement imposes a new burden on permit holders who will have to somehow obtain permission to carry a firearm on the property before stepping foot on it. The law severely hampers the ability of law-abiding citizens to exercise the right Bruen recognized as they go about their daily lives. Pp. 13–16. (b) Hawaii’s proffered historical analogues do not support the consti- tutionality of its new default rule. Pp. 16–24. (1) Hawaii’s argument that its “particular customs and laws,” Brief for Respondent 24, support the new default rule fails because the Second Amendment has the same meaning in all parts of the United States. The Second Amendment cannot give way to “the spirit of Aloha” in Hawaii, contra, State v. Wilson, 154 Haw. 8, 27, 543 P. 3d 440, 459, any more than it can yield to the spirit of the Big Apple (Bruen) or the Windy City (McDonald). Merely local attitudes can nei- ther shrink nor inflate the meaning of fundamental Bill of Rights guar- antees that apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 16–19. (2) The State’s colonial and early state law analogues consist al- most entirely of laws that prohibited unauthorized hunting of deer or small game on someone else’s private property. These laws—including a 1721 Pennsylvania law, 1722 New Jersey statute, 1728 Maryland statute, 1763 New York law, and 1771 New Jersey law—targeted un- authorized hunting and applied to land where game could be found, not retail establishments that residents frequent as part of their daily routines. Those laws had little if any impact on the Second Amend- ment’s central objective of protecting the fundamental right to self-de- fense, and their obvious aim was to prevent the distinctive harms and risks associated with unauthorized hunting. The gap between the State’s anti-poaching analogues and its new rule is too wide. Pp. 19– 22. (3) The State’s remaining analogues are even weaker. An 1893 Oregon law prohibited armed trespass on “enclosed premises,” but it is unclear whether such premises included commercial establishments open to the public. Regardless, a lone statute adopted nearly a century after the adoption of the Second Amendment and well after the adop- tion of the Fourteenth Amendment sheds little if any light on the meaning of the Second Amendment right. 4 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Syllabus Hawaii also relies on an 1865 Louisiana statute enacted as part of the notorious Black Codes to disarm blacks and leave them defenseless against attacks. As the Court laid out in McDonald, the right to keep and bear arms was crucially important for vulnerable blacks during this period. See 561 U. S., at 757, 771, 776–779; id., at 843–846 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). This was well-understood by the Republicans in Congress who were responsible for drafting, approving, and securing the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Against this history, Hawaii’s claim that this tainted ar- tifact from Louisiana’s Black Code illuminates the original under- standing of the right to keep and bear arms cannot be taken seriously. And even setting aside this statute’s pedigree, it carries no weight be- cause it was neither widespread nor widely accepted. Pp. 22–24. 116 F. 4th 959, reversed and remanded. ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined as to Part II–B. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 24–1046 _________________ JASON WOLFORD, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ANNE E. LOPEZ, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HAWAII ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 25, 2026] JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. For years, the State of Hawaii made it almost impossible to obtain a license to carry a firearm. Four years ago, how- ever, this Court held in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (2022), that the Second and Four- teenth Amendments protect the right to carry handguns outside the home for self-defense. Hawaii responded by re- placing its old law on carry permits with new laws that achieved a similar result. On a large portion of the land within the State’s boundaries, possession of a firearm is now flatly prohibited. And the law now before us severely burdens the ability to carry a firearm in much of the rest of the State by prohibiting firearms on private property with- out the express and affirmative consent of the property owner. This law departs sharply from the standard common-law rule on access to private property held open to the public. Under that rule, everyone, including those lawfully carrying firearms, may enter unless expressly prohibited from doing so. By contrast, under the new Hawaii law, no one carrying a firearm may enter without the property owner’s express authorization. The effect of this new rule is to impose 2 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court severe restrictions on the daily activities of residents who have satisfied the State’s rigorous requirements for the is- suance of a carry permit. When these permit holders leave home in the morning, not only must they take care to avoid all the territory where the possession of a gun is prohibited outright, but they may also be barred from entering many places that people routinely visit in the course of their daily routines, such as gas stations, convenience stores, restau- rants, coffee shops, drug stores, grocery stores, “big box” stores, home improvement stores, barber shops or hair sa- lons, dry cleaners, and laundromats. This regime hobbles what the Second Amendment pro- tects: the right of Americans to carry arms for self-defense as they go about their daily lives. We hold that the law is unconstitutional. I When Hawaii adopted the law now before us, it did so against the backdrop of this Court’s Second Amendment de- cisions, and many of the arguments that the State1 now ad- vances were addressed in those decisions. We therefore begin with an overview of that body of law. A 1 The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Mi- litia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in- fringed.” For more than two centuries after the ratification of the Second Amendment, this Court had few occasions to examine its meaning. Such an occasion arose in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008). The case was brought by Dick Heller, a resident of the District of Columbia whose story highlighted the reason why the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense was —————— 1 For simplicity, we refer to respondent as “the State.”  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Opinion of the Court included in the Bill of Rights. Id., at 575. In light of the exceptionally high rate of violent crime in Washington, D. C.,2 Heller wanted to keep a firearm in his home to de- fend himself in case of a burglary or home invasion. Id., at 575–576. He had all the hallmarks of a citizen who would handle a firearm safely and responsibly. He was a special D. C. police officer who provided security at the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary Building and was authorized under D. C. law to carry a handgun while on duty. Ibid. But the District, which made it virtually impossible for a resident to keep a handgun at home for self-defense, denied his ap- plication for a permit. Ibid. Unwilling to accept this plight, Heller sued in federal court to vindicate his Second Amend- ment right. Ibid. When his case reached this Court, we provided our first thorough exploration of the Second Amendment’s meaning. We rejected the argument that the Second Amendment right extends only to members of a state militia and held instead that the Second Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, protects an individual right enjoyed by “ ‘the people.’ ” Id., at 579–581. Our opinion went on to ex- plain the meaning of the Second Amendment’s other key terms. The phrase “to keep and bear Arms,” we held, signi- fies what its terms mean in ordinary usage—that is, to “have” and “carry Arms.” Id., at 583–585. And “Arms,” we explained, refers to implements used for offense or defense. Id., at 581. We added that handguns, which are “over- whelmingly chosen by American society” for self-defense, fall squarely into this category. Id., at 628. We also identified the Amendment’s “central” concern: se- curing the fundamental right of self-defense. Id., at 577, 581, 599, 628, 635. In late 18th century America, the need —————— 2 See, e.g., Brief for Buckeye Firearms Foundation et al. as Amici Cu- riae 8–11, Brief for Criminologists et al. as Amici Curiae 6–17, and Brief for Academics as Amicus Curiae 5–17, in District of Columbia v. Heller, O. T. 2007, No. 07–290. 4 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court for firearms for self-defense was acute. There were no po- lice forces, and most Americans lived in rural areas, often in homes located miles from the closest neighbor.3 If these homes were attacked, the residents were on their own, and their survival might well depend on the availability of a firearm to ward off assailants. In light of this reality, it is not surprising that the right to keep and bear arms was in- cluded among the other treasured liberties protected by the Bill of Rights.4 But while the founding generation cherished the Second Amendment right, they did not think it was absolute. Hel- ler explained—and later cases have reiterated—that the Second Amendment “codified a pre-existing right.” Id., at 592. And this right, as understood at the time, was not an “unlimited” right “to keep and carry any weapon whatso- ever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id., at 592, 626. Similarly, Heller warned that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” Id., at 626; see also McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 786 (2010) (opinion of ALITO, J.); United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 699 (2024). 2 Because the Second Amendment protects a right that al- ready existed when the Amendment was adopted, Heller in- structed courts to ascertain the scope of the right by looking to history. And to emphasize the point, Heller emphatically —————— 3 See, e.g., C. Cramer, Armed in America: The Remarkable Story of How and Why Guns Became as American as Apple Pie 3 (2006). 4As Heller noted, most Americans in the late 18th century also “un- doubtedly thought” that the codified Second Amendment was “important for hunting,” 554 U. S., at 599, which, particularly for those moving west, was an important source of sustenance.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 5 Opinion of the Court rejected the ahistorical and “judge-empowering ‘interest- balancing inquiry’ ” suggested in the dissent. 554 U. S., at 634. Heller acknowledged that the history-based analysis it prescribed would not always be easy, but it found that mode of analysis necessary to prevent judges from balanc- ing away the right that the Second Amendment was adopted to protect, id., at 635—which is precisely what the dissent did.5 B Heller concerned an ordinance adopted by the District of Columbia, and therefore the decision did not govern the States. But since virtually all the provisions of the Bill of Rights had been held to apply equally to the Federal Gov- ernment and the States, it was inevitable that the Court would have to decide whether the Second Amendment right merited similar treatment. Two years after Heller, that question came before us in McDonald. The case was brought by residents of Chicago, a city, like Washington, D. C., with a high rate of violent crime.6 The lead plaintiff, Otis McDonald, was a man in his late seven- ties who lived in a dangerous neighborhood and had been subjected to violent threats from drug dealers. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 751. A city ordinance effectively barred McDonald and the other plaintiffs from possessing guns in their homes for self-defense, and they contended that the —————— 5 That dissent assumed for the sake of argument that the Second Amendment protects a private citizen’s right to keep a firearm in the home for self-defense, but then concluded that D. C. law, which made it virtually impossible to have a gun for that purpose, was nevertheless constitutional because it was adequately tailored to serve the District’s interest in protecting public safety. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 692–693 (opinion of Breyer, J.). 6 See Brief for Heartland Institute as Amicus Curiae 6–10, and Brief for Buckeye Firearms Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 8–15, in McDon- ald v. Chicago, O. T. 2008, No. 08–1521. 6 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court fundamental right recognized in Heller should apply throughout the country. 561 U. S., at 752–753. The city of Chicago opposed nationwide application of Heller, arguing that law enforcement needs and public atti- tudes about guns varied from State to State and city to city and that States and cities should have leeway to regulate gun possession as their lawmakers saw fit. See Brief for Respondent in McDonald v. Chicago, O. T. 2009, No. 08– 1521, pp. 24–31. The Court, however, disagreed. The plu- rality opinion, joined by four Justices, concluded that the Second Amendment right, like nearly all the rights pro- tected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, should apply equally to the Federal Govern- ment and the States. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 750. Follow- ing a body of precedent dating back more than a century, the plurality concluded that the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that did this work was the Due Process Clause. Id., at 767–787. JUSTICE THOMAS, who provided the deci- sive fifth vote, reached a similar result based on the Four- teenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id., at 805–806 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But either way, McDonald settled the question whether the Second Amendment embodies a uniform na- tional standard or one that varies from one locale to an- other. C After McDonald, 12 years elapsed before the Court’s next major Second Amendment decision: Bruen. In the interim, lower courts rejected nearly all Second Amendment claims based on reasoning that resembled that in Justice Breyer’s Heller dissent. See Bruen, 597 U. S., at 18–19, 26. In Bruen, we considered one such decision, which upheld a New York law that severely restricted the right to carry a handgun outside the home for self-defense. In doing so, we  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7 Opinion of the Court fleshed out the process of historical analysis required in a Second Amendment case. See id., at 10. That analysis, we held, involves two steps. First, a court must determine whether the law before it clashes with the “plain text” of the Amendment’s language. Id., at 24. This inquiry entails three subsidiary questions. First, does the law apply to “the people”—which is to say, to “all members of the political community”? Heller, 554 U. S., at 580. Sec- ond, does it concern any form of “Arms,” i.e., any weapon customarily used for offensive or defensive purposes? See id., at 584. Third, does the law place any restrictions on either the “keep[ing]” (i.e., possession) or the “bear[ing]” (i.e., carrying) of arms? See Bruen, 597 U. S., at 32–33. If a challenged law falls within the plain text of the Sec- ond Amendment, it is presumptively unconstitutional, id., at 24—which means that it may violate the preexisting right that the Amendment codified. But because that right was not in every way coterminous with the Amendment’s literal language, further analysis may be needed. Specifi- cally, the relevant government—federal, state, or local— may be able to show that its challenged law did not infringe the historical understanding of the codified right. See ibid. A variety of sources, including scholarship, may aid this inquiry. See id., at 34–60. But often, the best evidence may be what Bruen called historical analogues. Id., at 28. These are old legal rules from which a court may draw a strong inference that the modern law at issue is consistent with the codified right. A party defending against a Second Amendment claim may rely on a single analogue or a group of analogues. Bruen identified three important inquiries that courts should undertake in evaluating proffered ana- logues. The first is the number of jurisdictions in which they were adopted. See id., at 67 (“[W]e will not stake our interpretation . . . upon a law in effect in a single State, or a single city” (citing Heller, 554 U. S., at 632)). The second is the extent to which they were well-accepted. This 8 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court acceptance may be express, as when judicial decisions ex- plicitly acknowledged the rule’s legality. Or the acceptance may be tacit, as when a restriction on the keeping or carry- ing of arms was “open, widespread, and unchallenged.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). The third is whether any analogue or collection of ana- logues is “relevantly similar” to the modern law. Id., at 29. Determining whether this condition is met requires consid- eration of “how” the analogue restricted the keeping or bearing of arms—that is, whether it imposed a restriction similar to that imposed by the challenged law. Ibid. And a court must also consider “why” the analogue restricted the keeping or bearing of arms—that is, whether its rationale was similar to that of the new law. Ibid. In order to be sufficiently similar to the modern law being challenged, a putative analogue need not be a “dead ringer” or “historical twin.” Id., at 30. Particularly when the modern law ad- dresses a situation that could not have arisen when the Sec- ond or Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, it is too much to demand such a close match. But the “how” and “why” of the historical analogue and modern regulation must be close enough to enable a court to say: “Because this histori- cal law was understood to be compatible with the right cod- ified by the Second Amendment, we can infer that the re- striction imposed by the modern law is likewise consistent with that right.” Making this determination is far more dis- ciplined than the “interest-balancing,” “judge-empowering” standard that Heller emphatically rejected, but it is not me- chanical. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 22 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 634; internal quotation marks omitted). It undeniably necessitates an exercise of judgment. Applying this framework, Bruen held that the challenged New York law, which broadly prohibited law-abiding citi- zens from carrying commonly used firearms in public for self-defense, violated the Second and Fourteenth Amend- ments. 597 U. S., at 38. We found that the State’s proffered  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court analogues were critically different from the challenged law and that the “overwhelming weight” of historical evidence supported the “right of the public to peaceably carry hand- guns for self-defense.” Id., at 62, 66. In addition to holding that New York’s law violated the Second Amendment, we pointed out that six other jurisdic- tions had adopted statutory provisions like New York’s. See id., at 15, n. 2. One of those jurisdictions was Hawaii.7 D In Bruen, the law at issue concerned conduct that could have occurred when the Second and Fourteenth Amend- ments were adopted—carrying a handgun outside the home for self-defense. By contrast, in our most recent Second Amendment case, United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, the law in question, 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8), involved conduct that was distinctively modern: the possession of a firearm by a person against whom a domestic violence restraining order had been issued, see Rahimi, 602 U. S., at 684–685. Accordingly, application of step two of the Bruen framework called for a more difficult exercise of judgment. In the end, however, the majority was satisfied that the two analogues identified by the Federal Government, though not “dead ringers” of §922(g)(8), were sufficiently similar to support the provision’s constitutionality because the challenged regulation was “consistent with the principles that under- pin our regulatory tradition.” Rahimi, 602 U. S., at 692, 698–699. The dissent applied the same test but came to the oppo- site conclusion, see id., at 747 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), ex- hibiting how Heller’s history-based methodology—true to the warning contained in that ground-breaking decision— is not mechanical, see 554 U. S., at 626–628, 635. —————— 7 The other five were California, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 15, n. 2. 10 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court II A With this background in mind, we turn to the Hawaii law challenged in this case. Before Bruen, Hawaii issued fire- arms carry licenses only in “exceptional case[s].” Haw. Rev. Stat. §§134–2 (Cum. Supp. 2018), 134–9(a) (2011). Indeed, it appears that from 2000 to 2018, only four such licenses were issued. See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F. 3d 1044, 1071, n. 21 (CA9 2018), reh’g en banc, 992 F. 3d 765 (2021), cert. granted, judgt. vacated, 597 U. S. 916 (2022). After Bruen, Hawaii and four of the other five States called out by our decision adopted a new method of restricting law-abiding citizens from carrying firearms for self-defense by flipping the default rule on private property open to the public. At common law, opening up private property to the gen- eral public implies a “license to all persons to enter,” mean- ing that “no person is a trespasser by merely entering therein” unless the property owner has given “due notice” that such a person is banned. Commonwealth v. Power, 48 Mass. 596, 602 (1844); see also, e.g., State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 780–783, 11 S. E. 478, 484–485 (1890); Barney v. Oyster Bay & Huntington Steamboat Co., 67 N. Y. 301, 302– 303 (1876); Jencks v. Coleman, 13 F. Cas. 442, 443–444 (No. 7,258), (CC RI 1835) (Story, J.). After Bruen, Hawaii and four other States singled out in that decision flipped this default rule. Rather than allow- ing all to enter private property open to the public unless specifically prohibited, these new laws provided that no one carrying a firearm may enter without express authoriza- tion. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §26230(a)(26) (West Supp. 2026); Haw. Rev. Stat. §134–9.5(a) (2023); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §6–411(d) (Supp. 2025); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:58– 4.6(a)(24) (West 2024); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §265.01–d(1) (West 2025).  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 11 Opinion of the Court B Hawaii’s new default rule is part of a tight web of laws that severely restricts the carrying of firearms for self-de- fense. To start, carrying a handgun for self-defense re- quires a special license, and obtaining that license is a rig- orous process. Haw. Rev. Stat. §134–9. Applicants must first complete a detailed application that requires the dis- closure of medical information. §134–9(g).8 They must then successfully complete an extensive training course in which they demonstrate competency in firearm safety and live-fire shooting, as well as an understanding of the law and avail- able mental-health resources. §§134–9(d), (e). And they must demonstrate the “essential character or temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm.” §134–9(h). But even for those who fulfill these stringent require- ments, Hawaii imposes two additional restrictions on car- rying firearms. The first bans the possession of a firearm in significant categories of places: “[a]ny [state-owned] building” or “adjacent grounds and parking areas”; “[a]ny public or private hospital” or “other place at which medical or health services are customarily provided”; any “restau- rant serving alcohol”; any “stadium, movie theater, or con- cert hall”; any “public library property”; “any public or pri- vate” college or university; “any public school, charter school,” or private school; any “beach, playground,” or park; “any bank or financial institution”; any “amusement park, aquarium, carnival, circus, fair, museum, water park, or —————— 8 See Hawai’i Police Dept., Firearm Servs., https://www. hawaiipolice.gov/services/firearm-services/#license-to-carry (archived at https://perma.cc/A4G8-AEYB); License to Carry (Concealed and Uncon- cealed) Application Processing, https://www.hawaiipolice.gov/wp- content/uploads/PM-12.3-License-to-Carry-Concealed-and-Unconcealed- Application.pdf (archived at https://perma.cc/MX8Z-3DMC); Authoriza- tion for Use or Disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI), https://www.hawaiipolice.gov/wp-content/ uploads/ Authorization-for-Use- or-Disclosure-of-PHI.pdf (archived at https://perma.cc/H7AL-C8ED). 12 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court zoo”; and any “public gathering, public assembly, or special event conducted on property open to the public.” §134– 9.1(a).9 Some of these places are owned by the State, but many of the categories include privately owned property. So even if the owner of such a place wanted to admit indi- viduals who are carrying a gun for self-defense, the owner could not do so. The second restriction—the one at issue in this case— generally prohibits licensed individuals from carrying a firearm, even if unloaded or inoperable, “on private prop- erty of another.” §134–9.5(a). Certain categories of individ- uals, such as police officers, are exempt, §§134–9.5(d), 134– 11(a), but the ban otherwise applies unless “express author- ization” has been given “by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property,” §134–9.5(a). Such authorization must take one of two forms: “clear and conspicuous signage” that confers such consent or “[u]nambiguous written or ver- bal authorization” to carry a firearm on the premises from “the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property” or an agent of such a person. §134–9.5(b). III Petitioners—three residents of Maui County who possess concealed-carry permits and an organizational plaintiff with members who have such permits—contend that these restrictions violate their rights under the U. S. Constitu- tion, and they filed suit in federal court, seeking both tem- porary and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court declined such relief with respect to private property that is closed to the public, but it enjoined enforcement of the new —————— 9 In the decision below, six judges stated that “Hawaii’s law prohibits, presumptively or outright, the carrying of a handgun on 96.4% of the publicly accessible land in Maui County.” 125 F. 4th 1230, 1233 (CA9 2025) (VanDyke, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). The State challenges this figure, arguing that it includes “sensitive-place” re- strictions, such as those for public parks, beaches, and schools. Brief for Respondent 41.  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 13 Opinion of the Court default rule as applied to private property that is open to the public. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed that injunction, and the full Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Judge VanDyke, joined by five other judges, issued an opinion dis- senting from the denial of rehearing en banc. 125 F. 4th 1230, 1231 (2025). Judge Collins, joined by Judge Bress, likewise filed a dissent. Ibid. We granted certiorari to de- cide whether Hawaii may prohibit licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public unless the property owner gives express permission. 606 U. S. 1066 (2025). IV A As with any Second Amendment challenge, we began by asking whether the restrictions imposed by the challenged law fall within the plain text of the Second Amendment, see Bruen, 597 U. S., at 17, and we find that this requirement is easily met. No party disputes that petitioners are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment or that they seek to “bear,” i.e., to carry, “arms.” Therefore, “the plain text of the Second Amendment protects” what petitioners want to do: carry handguns for self-defense. Id., at 32. Petitioners and the United States argue that the new de- fault rule was enacted to undermine our decision in Bruen, but whatever the purpose of the new law, the shift from the old common-law rule unquestionably imposed a new and significant burden on the exercise of the right that this Court recognized in Bruen. To be sure, owners of establish- ments that are open to the public can admit or exclude per- sons who are carrying guns for self-defense under either the common-law rule or Hawaii’s substitute. As a practical matter, however, the choice between these two default rules is often outcome-determinative with respect to Hawaiians’ 14 WOLFORD v. LOPEZ Opinion of the Court Second Amendment rights. For establishments where the owner either pays no attention or does not care about such issues, the choice of default rule will determine where carry-permit holders may lawfully carry firearms. More broadly, Hawaii’s new default rule burdens those wishing to exercise their Second Amendment right. Some proprietors who do not themselves object to entry by carry- permit holders may be reluctant to post a sign welcoming such individuals for fear of alienating other customers. So under Hawaii’s new default rule, a proprietor in this cate- gory may only be willing to consent discreetly to the entry of permit holders who make the effort to inquire. This ar- rangement imposes a new burden on permit holders who will have to somehow obtain permission to carry a firearm on the property before stepping foot on it. To see what Hawaii’s new default rule means in practice, consider its impact on a resident of Hawaii whose situation is like that of Jaime Caetano, a young Boston woman who wanted to carry a weapon to defend herself from a violent ex-boyfriend but was criminally prosecuted when she used a non-lethal weapon to fend him off. See Caetano v. Mas- sachusetts, 577 U. S. 411, 412–413 (2016) (ALITO, J., con- curring in judgment). Suppose our hypothetical young woman, after clearing all the hurdles needed to get a Ha- waiian carry permit, leaves her home on a weekday morn- ing and carries a handgun on her person or in a purse. On the way to work, she intends to fill up her car at a gas sta- tion. During her lunch break, she plans to walk to a fast- food restaurant and then buy some items at a large drug store. After work, she wants to pick up clothes at a dry cleaner and then shop for groceries. Unless each of these establishments has posted a sign saying “Guns Welcome” or something to that effect, each visit could expose her to criminal liability. Imagine what our hypothetical young woman will have to do when she drives to the supermarket after work. When  Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 15 Opinion of the Court she arrives, she will violate the literal terms of the Hawaii law merely by pulling into the parking lot while having her handgun concealed on her person. She can minimize the length of her violation by disarming as soon as she arrives. But in removing the handgun from her person, she must take care not to let anyone see it for even a momen