Lochton Bass v. Dareth Bass

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS Lochton Bass SCT-Civ-2025-0033 Appellant/Plaintiff, Re: ST-1996-DI-00001 v. Dareth Bass Appellee/Defendant. NOTICE OF ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT/ORDER TO: Justices of the Supreme Court Judges and Magistrate Judges of the Superior Court Robert A. Leycock, Esquire Clive C. Rivers, Esquire Dalila E. Patton, Esq., Clerk of the Supreme Court Tamara Charles, Clerk of the Superior Court Supreme Court Law Clerks Supreme Court Secretaries Order Book West Law Lexis/Michie Please take notice that on November 5, 2026, a(n) Order dated November 5, 2026, was entered by the Clerk in the above-entitled matter. Dated: November 05, 2026 DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ. Clerk of the Court By: Deputy Clerk II For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS LOCHTON BASS ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Appellant/Plaintiff, ) Re: Super. Ct. DI. No. 001/1996 (STT) ) Vv ) ) DARETH BASS ) Appellee/Defendant ) On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas & St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Debra S. Watlington Argued: July 14, 2026 Filed: November 5, 2026 BEFORE IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice; HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS Associate Justice; and DENISE M. FRANCOIS, Associate Justice APPEARANCES Robert A. Leycock, Esquire Law Offices of Robert A. Leycock St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellant, Clive C. Rivers, Esquire Law Offices of Clive Rivers St. Thomas, U.S. V.I Attorney for Appellee ORDER FRANCOIS, Associate Justice AND NOW, consistent with the reasons in the Opinion of even date, it is hereby ORDERED that the portion of the Superior Court’s May 28, 2025 Enforcement Order that denied Lochton Bass’ claim for equitable partition and directed the Clerk of the Court to execute and record a quitclaim deed transferring all of Lochton Bass’ right, title, and interest in the real Bass v. Bass S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Order Page 2 of 3 property known as 394-18 Anna’s Retreat, St. Thomas, VI to Dareth Bass is AFFIRMED; and it is further ORDERED that the portion of the Superior Court’s May 28, 2025 Enforcement Order directing the quitclaim deed executed by Dareth Bass and filed on March 7, 2025, conveying all rights, title, and interest in 394-17 Estate Ann’s Retreat, St. Thomas, VI to Lochton Bass be recorded with the Record of Deeds is AFFIRMED; and it is further ORDERED that the portion of the Superior Court’s May 28, 2025 Enforcement Order that denied, without explanation, the remaining claims in Lochton Bass’ Cross Motion to Enforce Divorce Decree; For An Equitable Partition; And For Reimbursement From Defendant is VACATED, and it is further ORDERED that the matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing, consistent with this opinion addressing Lochton Bass’: (1) claims seeking enforcement of Dareth Bass’ reciprocal obligations; (2) equitable defense of unclean hands on the part of Dareth Bass; and (3) request for an equitable accounting with respect to contributions to the former marital property Dated this 5th day of November, 2026 BY THE COURT DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ Associate Justice Clerk of the Z By ~ Deputy Clerk II Dated “> = Ads Bass v. Bass S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Order Page 3 of 3 Copies (with accompanying Opinion of the Court) to Justices of the Supreme Court Judges and Magistrate Judges of the Superior Court Robert A. Leycock, Esquire Clive C. Rivers, Esquire Dalila E. Patton, Esq., Clerk of the Supreme Court Tamara Charles, Clerk of the Superior Court Supreme Court Law Clerks Supreme Court Secretaries Order Book Westlaw Lexis/Michie For Publication IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS LOCHTON BASS ) S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Appellant/Plaintiff. ) Re: Super. Ct. DI. No. 001/1996 (STT) ) Vv ) ) DARETH BASS ) Appellee/Defendant ) On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St. Thomas & St. John Superior Court Judge: Hon. Debra S. Watlington Argued: July 14, 2026 Filed: November 5, 2026 Cite as: 2026 VI 23 BEFORE IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice) HAROLD W.L. WILLOCKS Associate Justice; and DENISE M. FRANCOIS, Associate Justice APPEARANCES Robert A. Leycock, Esq Law Offices of Robert A. Leycock St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellant Clive C. Rivers, Esq Law Offices of Clive Rivers St. Thomas, U.S.V.I Attorney for Appellee OPINION OF THE COURT FRANCOIS, Associate Justice q1 Lochton R. Bass (“Lochton”)' appeals a May 28, 2025 enforcement order of the Superior Court granting a “Motion To Re-Open Real Property Distribution and Violation Of Divorce Terms ' Because the parties have the same last name, they are referred to by their first names to avoid confusion Bass v. Bass 2026 V1 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 2 of 20 filed by his ex-wife, Dareth L. Bass (“Dareth”), which the Superior Court treated as a motion to enforce terms merged into the parties’ 1999 divorce decree. Lochton also appeals the enforcement order to the extent it denied his cross-motion to enforce other portions of the decree, as well as his claims for equitable partition, and for reimbursement of expenses he claims to have incurred in repairing and maintaining the parties’ former martial home located at 394-18 Anna’s Retreat, St Thomas, V.1. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the portion of the enforcement order denying Lochton’s claim for equitable partition and directing the Clerk of the Court to execute and record a quitclaim deed transferring all of Lochton’s right, title, and interest in the real property known as 394-18 Anna’s Retreat to Dareth 12 With respect to the Superior Court’s denial, without explanation, of the remaining claims in Lochton’s “Cross Motion to Enforce Divorce Decree; For An Equitable Partition; And For Reimbursement From Defendant,” this Court vacates the portions of the enforcement order denying the cross-motion and remands this matter for an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in his cross-motion as well as enforcement of those portions of the divorce decree that imposed obligations upon Dareth and which may still be outstanding I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. The Marriage and Subsequent Dissolution 43 Lochton and Dareth (collectively, “the parties”) were married on October 27, 1984, and purchased the real property known as 394-18 Anna’s Retreat (hereafter “394-18” or “the property”) on May 12, 1992. The parties purchased the property for $155,000.00, subject to a mortgage loan for $124,000.00 Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 3 of 20 94 In September 1995, Hurricane Marilyn struck the Virgin Islands, causing substantial structural damage to the property and forcing the parties to relocate to 394-17 Anna’s Retreat (hereafter *394-17”), a neighboring parcel that they co-owned with Lochton’s father q5 By November 1995, the parties had separated, and in January 1996, Lochton filed for divorce in the Superior Court. In the same month, the parties signed a second moratorium agreement with the bank, establishing the new principal balance of the mortgage on 394-18 as of March 31, 1996, was $136,581.70 with a payoff date of February 1, 2023 B. The 1997 Stipulation 416 On March 7, 1997, the parties signed a handwritten stipulation (‘settlement agreement” o1 “agreement”), at mediation, which addressed alimony, child custody, visitation, and support, and the division of marital property. In the settlement agreement the parties agreed that Dareth would quitclaim her interest in 394-17 to Lochton, and Lochton would quitclaim his interest in 394-18 to Dareth, The settlement agreement also provided that Lochton would “assign all rights to [the] balance of [the] insurance proceeds” pertaining to 394-18 to Dareth C. The 1999 Divorce Decree {7 By decree issued on May 10, 1999, the parties were divorced. The decree incorporated the settlement agreement in its entirety, making the settlement “fully enforceable as a judgment.” The decree also explicitly authorized the Clerk of Court to execute the quitclaim deeds if the parties failed to do so, and further ordered Dareth to pay Lochton $9,047.97. The decree also provided that in the event that the bank refused to release any portion of insurance proceeds from claims concerning the property arising from Hurricane Marilyn, Lochton could request that Dareth execute a construction agreement with him in the amount of $140,000 to complete repairs on the home, restoring the home to a habitable condition Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 4 of 20 {8 The settlement agreement further provided that Dareth would indemnify and hold Lochton harmless from any claims by the bank regarding its mortgage on 394-18. The decree did not provide specific dates by which each party was expected to perform or complete their respective obligations D. The Intervening 24-Year Period q9 Lochton asserts that by September 1999, he had restored 394-18 from the damage caused by Hurricane Marilyn using a combination of his personal resources in addition to the insurance proceeds. Dareth returned to 394-18 sometime in 1999 after the finalization of the parties’ divorce and lived there until the early 2000s when she relocated to Las Vegas, Nevada, where she remained for over two decades. Dareth left St. Thomas with the understanding that she would return to the property at some undetermined date in the future. After her departure, Dareth’s brother, Elvis Dore rented the downstairs apartment at 394-18. The top portion of 394-18 was rented to tenants who still currently reside there. Lochton resides at 394-17 10 Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck the Virgin Islands in September 2017, damaging 394-18 again. According to Dareth she never received any insurance proceeds from Hurricanes Marilyn, Irma, or Maria. However, Lochton asserts that both he and Dareth reccived the insurance money because the checks from the insurance company had to be endorsed by both of them. Lochton states he used a combination of approximately $77,000.00 in Hurricane Irma insurance proceeds and his personal resources to repair the property and add an addition onto it. Dareth never claimed that she was unaware of Lochton’s continued repair and management of 394-18, though the parties disagree on the extent to which Lochton actually repaired the property. E. The 2023 Action for Forcible Entry, Detainer and Restitution Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 5 of 20 {11 On December 30, 2022. Lochton paid off the mortgage on the property. In March 2023, both parties claimed ownership to 394-18. On March 22, 2023, Dareth made her plans to return to St. Thomas explicit when she wrote to the tenants currently living in the top portion of the property, instructing them to vacate the property by May 31, 2023. Lochton then sent an eviction notice to Dore on March 27, 2023. Dareth filed an action for forcible entry and detainer on July 14, 2023 after the upstairs tenants refused to vacate 394-18 412 By order issued on August 17, 2023, the Superior Court dismissed Dareth’s eviction action with prejudice for want of jurisdiction, concluding that Lochton “presented sufficient evidence of a facially bona fide and good faith claim of equitable right to possession of the Property.” Dareth was thus unable evict the tenants occupying the upper level of 394-18 F. The October 3, 2024 Hearing and Motion to Enforce the 1999 Divorce Decree 413 On February 27, 2024, Dareth filed her “Motion To Re-Open Real Property Distribution And Violation Of Divorce Terms” to enforce terms incorporated in the parties’ 1999 divorce decree. Dareth’s motion only sought to enforce the portion of the parties’ divorce decree requiring Lochton to quitclaim his interest in 394-18 to her. On October 3, 2024, the parties returned to court for a hearing addressing Dareth’s motion and the ongoing dispute over possession and ownership of 394-18. At the hearing, Dareth advised the court that she had executed a quitclaim deed transferring her interest in 394-17 to Lochton. Lochton appeared at the October 3, 2024 hearing unrepresented by legal counsel G. The Cross-Motion to Enforce the 1999 Divorce Decree §14 On November 13, 2024, Lochton filed “Plaintiff's Cross Motion To Enforce Divorce Decree; For An Equitable Partition: And For Reimbursement From Defendant” seeking: (1) enforcement of the divorce decree and stipulation; (2) an equitable partitioning of the marital real Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 6 of 20 property based upon the parties’ original intent, their respective contributions, and changed circumstances; and (3) reimbursement for “roughly 27 years of mortgage payments, major structural repairs, and upkeep of 394-18 Anna’s Retreat H. The 2025 Enforcement Order and Appeal £15 On May 28, 2025, the Superior Court granted Dareth’s motion, treating it as a motion to enforce terms merged into the parties’ 1999 divorce decree. The order directed the Clerk of the Superior Court to execute a quitclaim deed transferring all right. title, and interest in 394-18 to Dareth and record said deed with the Recorder of Deeds. The order also required that the quitclaim deed executed by Dareth conveying all right, title, and interest in 394-17 to Lochton be recorded with the Recorder of Deeds. The enforcement order denied Lochton’s cross-motion in its entirety {16 On June 11, 2025, Lochton filed his notice of appeat with this Court. He then filed an amended notice of appeal on June 13, 2025. On November 12, 2025, the Superior Court granted Lochton’s June 17, 2025 motion to stay the enforcement order pending appeal, subject to compliance with Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b), and upon Lochton posting a supersedcas bond in the amount of $189,000.00. On December 12, 2025, Lochton filed a motion for an extension of time to post the supersedeas bond. The court ultimately did not rule on this motion, but previously specified in its November 12, 2025 order that ‘enforcement of the Court's Order shall proceed without further action,” if the bond was not posted within 30 days of entry of the order. The Superior Court has not issued an order staying the enforcement order. Ii. JURISDICTION 917 The Revised Organic Act of 1954 grants this Court appellate jurisdiction over “all appeals from the decisions of the courts of the Virgin Islands established by local law[.J” 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). Title 4, subsection 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code empowers this Court with Bass v, Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 7 of 20 jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law.” 4. V.ILC. § 32(a) 418 The May 28, 2025 order granted Dareth’s motion and with respect to Lochton’s cross motion, denied, with reasons, his partition and co-tenancy arguments. However, in denying Lochton’s cross-motion, the Superior Court did not provide an explanation for the concomitant rejection of the other arguments and claims raised, to wit: assertion of the doctrine of unclean hands to bar Dareth’s motion, enforcement of Dareth’s obligations in the divorce decree, and the equitable-reimbursement theory. Nonetheless, the May 28, 2025 order disposed of all claims and issues then presented to the court. See Ottley v. Estate of Bell, 61 V.1. 480, 487 (V.I. 2014) (“(T]he Supcrior Court's ... order constitutes a final appealable judgment because it resolved all issues against Appellees by dismissing all of Ottlcey's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”); see also Allen v. HOVENSA, L.L.C., 59 V1. 430, 434 (V.I. 2013) (stating an order “resolving all outstanding claims between the partics” ts a final order for purposes of 4 V.I.C. § 32(a)). The order ended with: “ORDERED that this matter shall be CLOSED...” further signaling the finality of the court’s decision, Such a denial in its entirety disposes of a claim for finality purposes even though the denial is unexplained Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW 419 In his first notice of appeal Lochton presents the following issues: (1) “[w]hether the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to re-open and enforce the real property distribution provisions in a 1999 judgment of divorce, given the 20-year limitations period in 5 V.LC. § 31(a)(1) for the recovery of real property and the enforcement of judgments?”; (2) “{w]hether, assuming that the Superior Court has jurisdiction, it erred in refusing to re-equitably distribute the real property, pursuant to 16 V.I.C. § 106, or order reimbursement, in light of the Bass y, Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 8 of 20 unequal contributions of the parties in maintaining and preserving the real property during the intervening 26 years since the judgment of divorce was entered?”; (3) “[w]hether, assuming that the Superior Court had jurisdiction, it erred in refusing to enforce the other provisions in the 1999 judgment of divorce, including, but not limited to Appeilee’s obligation to pay Appellant an amount fixed by the Court?”; and (4) “[w]hether, assuming that the Superior Court had jurisdiction it erred in failing to consider Appellant’s equitable defenses such as Appellee’s unclean hands and the doctrine of laches.” Lochton’s amended notice of appeal raises a fifth issue: “[w]hether assuming the Superior Court had jurisdiction, it abused its discretion in not continuing the evidentiary hearing considering the absence of Appellant's counsel due to illness?” However. Lochton did not brief the equitable defense of laches argument. nor the fact that the October 3 2024 evidentiary hearing proceeded as scheduled.’ Because he has briefed neither, those two issues are waived. V.I. R. App. P. 22(m). His unclean-hands contention is addressed in 937, infra £20 This Court exercises plenary review over the Superior Court’s application of law, Evans Freke v. Evans-Freke, 2021 V1 25,49, as well as questions relating to the Superior Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Demming v. Demming, 66 V.1. 502, 507 (V.I. 2017). To the extent the Superior Court's decision is not based on legal conclusions or factual findings, we review enforcement of the 1999 decree for abuse of discretion. See Garcia v. Garcia, 59 V.1. 758, 767 (V.I. 2013); see also Victor v. Todman, 2024 VI 18, 4 58. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's ruling “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of * The Superior Court’s certified docket shows entry 27, a Notice of Appearance by Robert A. Leycock docketed October 8, 2024, and entry 28, a “Motion To Continue” filed by Leycock on Lochton’s behalf on October 9, 2024 The evidentiary hearing was held October 3, 2024, and the minute entry records Lochton appearing pro se. Counsel for Lochton appeared five days after the hearing and moved to continue six days after it. No pre-hearing motion to continue appears on the docket, and no ruling on the post-hearing one appears. Amended issue (5) thus asks this Court to review the denial of a motion that did not exist when the hearing was held Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 9 of 20 law to fact.” Smith v. Henley, 67 V1. 965, 978 (V.1. 2017) (quoting Stevens v. People, 55 V.1. 550 556 (V.I. 2011)) IV. DISCUSSION A. Lochton’s Limitations Defense Was Not Raised Before the Superior Court and is Waived 421 Lochton argues that the Superior Court was without authority to enforce the parties’ May 10, 1999 divorce decree because it was subject to the 20-year limitations period for execution of judgments under 5 V.I.C. § 31(a)(1) 422 Raising the issue of statute of limitations is an affirmative defense; it is not a limitation on the Superior Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See V.I. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(L) (listing the statute of limitations among the affirmative defenses); Palton v. VI. Govt Hosps. & Health Facilities Corp 2026 V1 4, Y§t8-19; Govt of the VI. v. United Indus., 64 V.I. 312, 320 (V.L. 2016); Alexander v. Wilson, 73 V.1. 528, 536 (V.I. 2020). Lochton did not assert the statute of limitations defense before the Superior Court. Neither his cross-motion nor his argument at the October 3, 2024 hearing mentions a limitations period, and the enforcement order addresses none; the contention first appears in his notice of appeal. (J.A. 2, 5.) It is therefore waived — the disposition Dareth asks of us. (Appellee’s Br. 31.); VI. R. App. P. 4(h), 22(m). That Dareth proceeded by motion rather than by complaint does not preserve the defense: an affirmative defense that cannot be pleaded in an answer must be raised at the earliest practicable moment thereafter, and Lochton raised this one for the first time on appeal. See Robinson v. Johnson. 313 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc) Because the defense is waived, we do not reach whether 5 V.LC. § 31(a)(1)(B) governs a post judgment motion to enforce a decree of the Superior Court B. The 1999 Decree Was a Final Judgment Subject To Continuing Enforcement Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 20 423 Lochton’s primary argument on appeal asserts that the Superior Court “re-opened,” rather than enforced, the parties’ divorce decree. During oral argument, counsel for Lochton denied that his position was affected by the merger and incorporation of the parties’ agreement into the Superior Court’s 1999 decree. However, as explained below, these doctrines carry significant enforcement consequences that refute Lochton’s position, and thus, the remedy Lochton seeks on appeal is foreclosed by the finality of the 1999 decree 424 When a settlement agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree by reference and integrated into that decrec, the contractual obligations are converted into obligations based upon the decree itself through merger. See Statzer v. Statzer, No. D168/80, 1984 WL 1075151, at *2 (V.J. Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting HOMER H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 16.12, at 554 (1968)); cf id. (finding no merger where the decree contained no order of performance and the agreement expressly survived it). Such agreements are, in any event, “binding when approved by the court and embodied or merged in the decree entered by the court in a divorce proceeding unless it appears that the decree was procured through fraud.” Edney v. Edney, 64 V.1. 661, 666 (V.I. 2016) (quoting 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 928). Paragraph 7 of the Bass’ divorce decree states, The Stipulation dated March 7, 1998 entered into between the parties at Mediation shall have full force and effect and its terms shall be fully enforceable as a judgment” (emphasis added). Further, the decree stated specifically that ‘Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, the parties are to execute Quitclaim Deeds to accomplish the transfer and division of the property. Should either party fail to execute the Quitclaim deed as provided for in the Stipulation dated March 7 1998, the Clerk of the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands shall do so Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the 1999 decree did more than approve the parties’ agreement: it directed performance and directed the Clerk of the Court to execute the respective quitclaim deeds should either party fail to do so Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 11 of 20 425 Because the decree, which approved, incorporated and merged by reference the parties’ settlement agreement, had never been challenged, appealed, or modified, it operated as a final adjudication of the issue of property distribution between the parties. 16 V.ILC. § 111; Prosser 1 Prosser, 33 V1. 32 (VI. Super. Ct. 1995). As an order of the court, the decree is also a final judgment subject to execution,’ and the principle of res judicata bars any attempts to disturb its allocation of the marital property. Pfister v. Pfister, 21 V.1. 533, 536 (V.1. Super. Ct. 1985) (“Thus a final and valid judgment rendered in a suit for separation operates as a bar to any subsequent action for an absolute divorce based upon the same cause, and both parties are alike concluded by the judgment.”) (citing 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 508 (1966)) {26 As for the “equitable partition” sought by Lochton, it is barred by the Virgin Islands partition statute itself. Partition in the Virgin Islands is not discretionary: 28 V.I.C. § 457 allows the parties’ title rights to “be put in issuc, tried, and determined in a partition action,” and § 458 directs that “upon the requisite proofs being made, the court shall adjudge a partition according to the respective rights of the parties, as ascertained by the court.” In Martin v. Martin, 54 V.1. 379, 392-93 (V.I. 2010) this Court read those sections to mean that the Superior Court “may not ordet partition without first determining whether the claimant has title to the property,” and vacated a partition ordered without that determination. Here title was determined in 1999 by the divorce decree. As a result, partition is foreclosed by statute in addition to the bar of res judicata C. Sections 109 and 110 of Title 16 of the Virgin Islands Code Do Not Apply to Previously Adjudicated Property Distributions * A divorce decree entered by the court is, for all intents and purposes, a judgment of the court, subject to execution See 16 VLC. $ LE1; Prosser, 33 V.I. at 35-36. Critically, the Prosser court stated that for purposes of execution, no distinction is made between a moncy judgment in an action for damages and any other kind of judgment under 5 V.I.C § 471, entitled “Right to Execution.” 5 V.LC. § 471; Prosser, 33 VI. at 35-38 (“The Virgin Islands Code makes no distinction between a decree and a judgment. On the contrary, the Virgin Islands Code uses the words decree and judgment interchangeably.”) Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 12 of 20 4,27 Lochton requests that this Court vacate the May 28, 2025 enforcement order. Vacating the order, however, would not disturb the May 10, 1999 divorce decree, leaving the parties in their original positions. Lochton secks to relitigate settled questions of property distribution while simultaneously asking this Court to enforce Dareth’s reciprocal obligations under that same judgment. Relying upon V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 109-110, Lochton asserts that the Superior Court erred in failing to equitably redistribute the property based on changed circumstances caused by years of mutual non-compliance 428 Prior to December 2014, section 109 of title 16 of the Virgin Islands Code authorized a divorce court to equitably dispose of the personal property of a marital estate, while section 2305 of title 33 authorized the court to dispose of the marital homestead according to the parties circumstances. Fuentes v. Fuentes, No. D89/1995, 1997 WL 34901027, at *4 (V.I. Super. Ct. Sept 8, 1997). Before 2014, real property other than the marital homestead had to be divided by partition in a separate civil action. /d. On December 19, 2014, the Virgin Islands Legislature passed Act No 7702 which amended 16 V.L.C. § 109 to add subsection (a)(7). Drayton v. Drayton, 65 V1. 325 335 (V.I. 2016). The amendment expanded the Family Court's jurisdiction to distribute "all marital property, in accordance with principles of equitable distribution,” and was intended to apply to distributions made on or after that date. /d. Conversely, the statutory authority to modif\ a decree under 16 V.I.C. § 110 is, by its terms, confined to factors such as alimony, the appointment of trustees, the care and custody of minor children, their nurture and education, and the maintenance of either party. Marsh v. Marsh, No. 1993-179, 1995 WL 809880, at *4 n.3 (D.V.I. Nov. 8, 1995).4 “While the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands’ decision in Marsh is not binding on this Court. itis viewed as persuasive authority providing guidance in its analysis of similar circumstances. Jud? s of St Croix Car Rental v. Weston, 49 V.1 396, 402 .7 (VL. 2008) Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 13 of 20 £29 In Marsh, the court reasoned that the marital homestead was not among the factors section 110 addresses and “is not mentioned in section 110,” id., but held that a divorce court nonetheless has “discretion to amend or modify a distribution of the marital homestead” under 33 V.I.C. § 2305(d). fd. at *4. Lochton has not asked this Court to modify the 1999 distribution under § 2305(a), and we do not sua sponte consider whether that section would permit it. See id. at *2 D. The Superior Court’s Inherent Authority To Enforce Its Judgment 4,30 We find that the Superior Court properly drew on its inherent authority to enforce its own orders, rather than “re-opening” the matter as Lochton contends. While Dareth’s motion was mischaracterized as a “Motion To Re-Open Real Property Distribution and Violation Of Divorce Terms,” the true effect and purpose of the enforcement order was to enforce the parties’ divorce decree. It is well-established that this Court will look beyond the label that a litigant gives to a motion or other filing, and treat it instead according to its substance. See Anthony v. FirstBank VI 58 V.I. 224, 228 n.5 (V1. 2013) (observing that “the substance of a motion, and not its caption shall determine [how] that motion is construed’”) (quoting {sland Tile & Marble, LLC v. Bertrand, 57 VI. 596, 6E1-12 (V.1. 2012) and Joseph v. Bureau of Corr., 54 V1. 644, 648 n.2 (V1. 2011)) Toussaint v. Stewart, 67 V.1. 931, 947 (V.1. 2017) (“Courts should look beyond the nominal label given by a party to the substance of what is being asked.’’) 4/31 The primary source for the Supcrior Court’s power to enforce its judgments is found in 4 V.I.C. § 243(4), which provides that every court shall have power “[t]o compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in all actions, or proceedings pending therein.” Additionally, 4 V.I.C. § 281(2) provides that every judicial officer shall have power “[t]o compel obedience to his lawful orders.” Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure 70(a) provides the precise mechanism for enforcing judgments involving specific acts Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ, No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 14 of 20 Ifa judgment requires a party to convey land, to deliver a deed or other document or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may order the act to be done - at the disobedient party's expense by another person appointed by the court. When done, the act has the same effect as if done by the party V.I. R. Civ. P 70(a) 4/32 Although the 1999 divorce decree did not articulate a specific deadline for compliance, where a court order lacks an express timeframe, the law implies a requirement to perform within a reasonable time. See Muze, Inc. v. Digital On Demand, Inc., 356 F.3d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The omission of a time limit for a permitted or required task normally means that the task is to be performed within a reasonable time.”); Hadiv v. Caruso, 465 F. Supp. 2d 776, 801 (W.D. Mich 2006) (‘An order absent a deadline is not meaningless. Rather, the best construction of such an order is that it requires action within a ‘reasonable time.’”). The parties’ failure to execute the deeds for over two decades satisfies the non-compliance prerequisites of the rule. To remedy this, Rule 70 states that “[i]f the reat or personal property is within the Virgin Islands, the court - instead of ordering a conveyance - may enter a judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others That judgment has the effect of a legally executed conveyance.” V.I. R. Cv. P. 70(b) 4,33 Here, the record indicates that Dareth and her counsel appeared at the October 3, 2024 hearing prepared to cooperate with Lochton in exchanging the respective property decds. At the same hearing, Lochton indicated to the court that he would not execute the deed to 394-18 to Dareth. Faced with this direct refusal to abide by the court’s prior decree, the Superior Court acted entirely within authority by stating it would direct the Clerk of the Court to execute the deed transferring title to 394-18 to Dareth. The enforcement order following this hearing was thus an exercise of enforcement powers under 4 V.I.C. § 243 and Rule 70, demonstrating the failure of Lochton’s primary argument that the court improperly re-opened a closed case Bass v. Bass 2026 VI 23 S. Ct. Civ. No. 2025-0033 Opinion of the Court Page 15 of 20 434 Jn addition to its inherent authority to enforce its own judgments, the court found that Lochton failed to respond to Dareth’s motion, and that his own cross-motion was filed 5 weeks after the deadline the Superior Court set. Specifically. the October 3, 2024 record of proceedings states; “THE COURT GAVE PARTIES A DEADLINE OF OCTOBER 7', 2024 TO FILE ANYTHING IN THIS MATTER.” The cross-motion was docketed November 13, 2024. The May 28, 2025 enforcement order notes the sequence: “The Plaintiff, Lochton Bass, failed to respond to the Defendant’s motion. Instead, subsequent to the hearing, Mr. Bass’ Cross Motion . . . was filed November 13, 2024.” Neither party briefed this issue. However, the Court’s denial of Lochton’s motion must be accompanied by the grounds therefor. Garcia, 59 V.1. at 771-72 (citations omitted) E. Failure to Address All Arguments and Claims Raised in Lochton’s Cross-Motion Constituted Reversible Error 4135 Lochton contends that the Superior Court committed reversible error by failing to evaluate, address, and enforce the reciprocal provisions of the divorce decree. Specifically, he argues that once the Superior Court chose to enforce the deed directives, it was legally bound to simultaneously evaluate Dareth’s concurrent obligations as sought by his cross