In the Matter of Jason F. Taylor
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
Date FiledOctober 21, 2026
Docket2026-000382
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
In the Matter of Jason F. Taylor, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2026-000382
Opinion No. 28353
Submitted September 25, 2026 – Filed October 21, 2026
DISBARRED
Disciplinary Counsel William M. Blitch, Jr., and
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Connor J. Parker, both of
Columbia, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
Barbara Marie Seymour, of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, Respondent and the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admits misconduct, agrees to pay
costs, and consents to any sanction in Rule 7(b), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. We
accept the Agreement and disbar Respondent from the practice of law in this state
retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.
I.
Respondent was admitted to practice law in South Carolina in 2012. On
November 3, 2020, Respondent was placed on interim suspension, and the
Receiver was appointed to protect his clients' interests the following day. In re
Taylor, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated Nov. 3, 2020; In re Taylor, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order
dated Nov. 4, 2020. This Agreement involves four disciplinary matters, two of
which are practice-related and two of which involve Respondent pointing and
presenting a firearm.
Matter A
On March 13, 2018, W.L., a member of the South Carolina Bar, associated
Respondent on a products liability case involving injuries sustained by A.S., a
minor. Respondent informed W.L. that Respondent would locate and retain an
expert witness for the case, and W.L. agreed to split the cost of the expert with
Respondent 50/50. In March 2018, Respondent consulted with pyrotechnics expert
J.D. as a potential expert witness. J.D. emailed Respondent materials about his
services, but J.D. declined the engagement at the consultation, charged no fee, and
rendered no services. Respondent nevertheless forwarded W.L. the materials from
J.D., including a resume, cost schedule, case questionnaire, and completed W-9
form.
On September 28, 2018, Respondent told W.L. that J.D. needed to be disclosed as
an expert in the federal court's local rule interrogatories. That same day,
Respondent also told W.L. that Respondent had paid the initial $5,000 portion of
J.D.'s retainer, which had been spent, and requested W.L. write a $5,000 check to
replenish the retainer. In support of this request, Respondent forwarded to W.L. a
W-9 form containing J.D.'s taxpayer information and with Respondent's firm's
name as the requestor. W.L. issued Respondent a $5,000 check for replenishment
of the retainer, and Respondent deposited the check in his operating account.
Respondent then used those funds to pay himself, his office rent, and expenses for
other cases.
On October 18, 2018, Respondent filed in federal court, pursuant to the local rule,
answers to interrogatories indicating no expert witness had been retained. By May
2019, the case had fully settled. Respondent prepared and reviewed a
disbursement sheet with A.S.'s guardian and obtained authorization to settle.
Because A.S. was a minor, the settlement required court approval. Respondent
filed a motion for approval of the settlement in federal court and included a copy of
the disbursement sheet as an exhibit. In the motion, Respondent represented to the
federal court that he incurred $2,500 in expenses for an "Expert Witness/File
Consult," along with a $160 expense for service of process, administrative costs of
$150, and $111.03 in costs for another co-counsel. In total, Respondent sought
court approval of a disbursement of $8,000 for attorney fees and $3,101.35 in
expenses. However, Respondent's financial records reveal he incurred only a $60
process service fee, and there was no contractual basis in the relevant attorney-
client engagement agreement for a $150 administrative fee. Nevertheless,
Respondent's bank records demonstrate that he transferred the entire amount of
fees and costs to his operating account and used those funds for his personal and
business use. Respondent did not disburse the agreed-upon split of the attorney's
fees to W.L. and did not promptly pay costs to third parties.
Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated the following Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.5(c) (requiring that a contingency
fee agreement must clearly notify the client of any expenses the client is expected
to pay); Rule 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver to a client or third
person any funds that person is entitled to receive); and Rule 8.4(d) (prohibiting
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
Matter B
In November 2018, Respondent and co-counsel S.L.L.F. began joint representation
of an incarcerated individual S.M. as a plaintiff in a personal injury case. On
January 14, 2019, S.M. accepted a settlement offer of $27,500. On February 13,
2019, Respondent deposited the $27,500 check into his firm's trust account but did
not disburse any funds to S.M. Instead, Respondent used those settlement
proceeds for personal and business use. By July 2019, Respondent's trust account
balance was below $27,500, and by August 2020, Respondent's trust account
balance was $50.
On July 26, 2021, the Receiver submitted information to ODC indicating
Respondent had failed to disburse settlement proceeds to his client, and ODC
issued a notice of investigation on August 4, 2021. On August 17, 2021,
Respondent paid all amounts owed to S.M. and S.L.L.F. from Respondent's
personal funds.
On September 21, 2021, Respondent responded to the notice of investigation and
represented that he had turned over S.M.'s entire case file to the Receiver on
August 19, 2021. However, the case file Respondent provided the Receiver did
not contain a letter notifying S.M. of Respondent's interim suspension as required
by Rule 30(a), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. Respondent later provided ODC with
letters that were not included in the case file given to the Receiver but that
Respondent represents were mailed to S.M. and S.L.L.F. within two days of his
November 3, 2020 interim suspension. Although these letters advised S.M. and
S.L.L.F. of the still-outstanding need to disburse the settlement proceeds to S.M.,
Respondent represents that he forgot to notify the Receiver of the outstanding
disbursements when he turned over his files and law office accounts to the
Receiver in November and December 2020.
Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated Rule 30(g), RLDE (requiring
a suspended lawyer to cooperate and comply with the Receiver's requests regarding
client files and law office accounts), as well as the following Rules of Professional
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold funds
belonging to others in account separate from the lawyer's own business and
personal funds); Rule 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver to a client or
third person any funds that person is entitled to receive); and Rule 8.4(d)
(prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
Matter C
Around 6:30 p.m. on December 10, 2019, G.H., a personal process server retained
by opposing counsel, attempted to serve Respondent at Respondent's home with
notice of an emergency hearing in a domestic matter in which Respondent was an
attorney of record. At the time, Respondent was hosting a dinner party with guests
who were socializing on Respondent's front porch. G.H. walked up and greeted
Respondent's guests. G.H. asked for Respondent and Respondent's guests advised
G.H. that Respondent was down the driveway at the back of the house. G.H.
proceeded in that direction, and the guests returned to socializing on the front
porch.
G.H. continued down the driveway and approached Respondent, who was walking
up the driveway and talking on the telephone. Respondent ended the call and
continued walking by G.H. without acknowledging him. Respondent entered his
home briefly and exited through a side door with a handgun drawn on G.H.
Respondent shouted commands at G.H. to put his hands on a car in the driveway.
G.H. did not immediately identify himself, but after complying with Respondent's
commands at gunpoint, G.H. identified himself as a process server. Respondent
told G.H. to hand him the papers, but G.H. refused to lower his hands to remove
the papers out of fear of being shot. G.H. asked one of Respondent's guests to
remove the paperwork from G.H.'s pocket. The guest removed the papers and
gave them to Respondent. Respondent read the papers, apologized to G.H. and
hugged him. G.H. left the property and contacted police, who responded and
investigated but did not bring charges against Respondent.
Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated Rule 8.4(e), RLDE, Rule
413, SCACR (prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice).
Matter D
Around 8:30 p.m. on October 6, 2020, a Charleston City Police Officer (Officer)
and a Police Cadet trainee (Cadet) were investigating a noise complaint in the
vicinity of Respondent's home in downtown Charleston. Respondent was
approximately 30 feet down his driveway which runs along the length of his home.
Respondent saw the Cadet on the sidewalk, unholstered his handgun, and advanced
toward the Cadet while pointing the gun in the direction of the officers and
commanding that the Cadet stop and explain what he was doing there. The Cadet
did not enter upon Respondent's driveway or property. After a few paces of
advancing toward the Cadet with the firearm extended in front of him, Respondent
lowered his handgun to his side and continued advancing toward the Cadet. The
Cadet and the Officer ordered Respondent to put the gun down, and Respondent
complied.
The next day, Respondent was arrested and charged with one felony count of
pointing and presenting a firearm at another person pursuant to section 16-23-410
of the South Carolina Code. Respondent timely self-reported his arrest to ODC on
October 12, 2000. As noted above, Respondent was placed on interim suspension
on November 3, 2020, and the Receiver was appointed to protect his clients'
interests the following day. Respondent's criminal charge was subsequently
dismissed by the Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office after Respondent successfully
completed a pre-trial intervention program.
We find Respondent's conduct in this matter violates Rule 8.4(b) (prohibiting a
lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law).
II.
Respondent admits his misconduct as set forth above constitutes grounds for
discipline under the following Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule
413, SCACR: Rule 7(a)(1) (providing a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct is a ground for discipline); and Rule 7(a)(5) (providing conduct tending to
bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute or conduct demonstrating an
unfitness to practice law is a ground for discipline).
In the Agreement, Respondent agrees to any sanction set forth in Rule 7(b), RLDE,
as punishment for his misconduct. As a condition of discipline, Respondent agrees
to pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by
ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. He also agrees to complete the
Legal Ethics and Practice Program Trust Account School prior to seeking any
reinstatement in the future.
In mitigation, Respondent submitted an affidavit setting forth the personal
obstacles he overcame early in life to attend law school and become a successful
lawyer. He also detailed his current and prior legal and non-legal service to the
community, including programs supporting veterans and first responders in
particular. Respondent also explained that at the time of the misconduct at issue,
he was in the midst of a highly contested and public divorce, was isolated as a
result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and had recently realized his solo practice
would not survive the economic downturn. As a result, Respondent states that he
relied on alcohol as an unhealthy coping mechanism during this time.
Respondent also explained that he lived in a transitional area of downtown
Charleston and that he had been the victim of a crime on numerous occasions,
including experiencing a home invasion by an armed individual while Respondent
was in his home. Respondent explained that these incidents gave him a sense of
insecurity and victimization and that he instinctively relied on his firearm, which
he was licensed to possess and trained to use. Respondent acknowledged that in
both gun-related incidents in the Agreement, his conduct created unnecessarily
dangerous decisions and that he should have handled them differently. Respondent
noted that in the time since these incidents, he has been faced with similar
circumstances and handled them differently. Specifically, he witnessed someone
stealing the car from his driveway and saw a violent attack in his neighborhood
while walking his dog. In each instance, instead of confronting the perpetrator,
Respondent remained in or retreated to a place of safety and called the police.
As for the practice-related misconduct, Respondent explains that he should have
paid more careful attention to the financial and recordkeeping rules and to his
obligation to safekeep client funds. Respondent explains that he has voluntarily
attended various continuing legal education courses regarding ethics, trust
accounting, and law practice management, and that he is now fully aware of how
his conduct fell short of his professional obligations. Respondent expresses
remorse and regret for his actions. Respondent also explains that he voluntarily
sought out counseling for the post-traumatic stress disorder he experienced as a
result of being the victim of various acts of violence. He also sought assistance for
his alcohol abuse through Lawyers Helping Lawyers and has now been sober since
August 3, 2023. Respondent also reports that during the five years he has been on
interim suspension, he has encountered various other issues including situational
depression, a battle with cancer, a debilitating back injury, and the burden of being
a caretaker to an elderly relative.
In light of all these factors, Respondent asks the Court to impose a six-month
definite suspension retroactive to his interim suspension on November 3, 2020. In
seeking this lenient sanction, Respondent emphasizes his lack of prior disciplinary
history, his acknowledgement of his mistakes and expression of genuine remorse,
his reputation for good character and skill in the law,1 and the length of time he has
remained on interim suspension. The Commission on Lawyer Conduct
recommends that the Court accept the Agreement and disbar Respondent
retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.
III.
Although we are sensitive to the factors that impacted Respondent's behavior,
"[t]his Court has never regarded financial misconduct lightly, particularly when
such misconduct concerns expenditure of client funds or other improper use of
trust funds." In re Wern, 431 S.C. 643, 649, 849 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2020) (citation
and quotations omitted). Accordingly, we find disbarment is the appropriate
sanction for Respondent's admitted misconduct. See, e.g., In re Blincow, 445 S.C.
268, 914 S.E.2d 119 (2025) (disbarring an attorney for misappropriating client
funds); In re Webb, 444 S.C. 216, 906 S.E.2d 584 (2024) (disbarring an attorney
for a pattern of misappropriating client funds); In re Lynn, 439 S.C. 118, 886
S.E.2d 215 (2023) (disbarring an attorney for financial misconduct); and In re
Craig, 344 S.C. 646, 545 S.E.2d 823 (2001) (disbarring an attorney who
committed financial misconduct and engaged in criminal acts that reflected
adversely upon her fitness as an attorney).
We accept the Agreement and disbar Respondent from the practice of law in this
state retroactive to November 3, 2020, which is the date of his interim suspension.
Within fifteen days, Respondent shall surrender his Certificate of Admission to the
Practice of Law to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Within thirty days,
1
Attached to his affidavit, Respondent submitted letters from twenty individuals
attesting to Respondent's integrity, good character, and skill in the law.
Respondent shall pay or enter into a repayment plan with the Commission on
Lawyer Conduct to pay the costs of the investigation and prosecution of this matter
by ODC and the Commission.
DISBARRED.
KITTREDGE, C.J., JAMES, HILL and VERDIN, JJ., concur.