United States v. Jocelyn Benson

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 26a0233p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ┐ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ │ v. > No. 26-1225 │ │ JOCELYN BENSON, in her official capacity as Secretary │ of the State of Michigan; STATE OF MICHIGAN, │ Defendants-Appellees, │ │ │ MICHIGAN ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS; │ DONALD DUQUETTE; KEELY CRIMANDO, │ Intervenors-Appellees. │ ┘ On Petition for Rehearing En Banc Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. No. 1:25-cv-01148—Hala Y. Jarbou, Chief District Judge. Argued: May 13, 2026 Decided and Filed: August 14, 2026 Before: COLE, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC and MOTION TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF THE PETITION: Kelsey E. McGee, David N. Goldman, Andrew G. Braniff, Jesus A. Osete, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. ON RESPONSE: Heather S. Meingast, Erik A. Grill, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Defendants-Appellees. Aria C. Branch, Joshua C. Abbuhl, Branden D. Lewiston, Derek A. Zeigler, ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP, Washington, D.C., Sarah Prescott, SALVATORE PRESCOTT PORTER & PORTER,  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 2 Northville, Michigan, for Intervenors-Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jason B. Torchinsky, HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK PLLC, Washington, D.C., Abhishek Kambli, HOLTZMAN VOGEL BARAN TORCHINSKY & JOSEFIAK PLLC, New York, New York, Ronald D. Coleman, COLEMAN LAW FIRM, PC, Newark, New Jersey, for Amici Curiae. The court delivered an order denying the petition for rehearing en banc. MURPHY, J. (pp. 3–11), delivered a separate statement concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, in which SUTTON, C.J., and LARSEN, J., concurred, and READLER, J., concurred in all but Part II.C. GRIFFIN, J. (pp. 12–19), delivered a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, in which BUSH, J., concurred. THAPAR, J. (pp. 20–30), delivered a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, in which GRIFFIN, BUSH, NALBANDIAN, and HERMANDORFER, JJ., concurred. _________________ ORDER _________________ The court received a petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to expedite consideration of the petition. The motion to expedite is granted in part. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision. Judge Nalbandian would grant the petition for panel rehearing for the reasons stated in his dissent to the court’s opinion of June 24, 2026. The petition was also circulated to the full court. Less than a majority of the judges voted in favor of rehearing en banc. Therefore, the petition is denied.  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 3 _________________ CONCURRENCE _________________ MURPHY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc. This case involves important legal issues about the United States’ ability to obtain voting records from the States under Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960. See United States v. Benson, 179 F.4th 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2026). And I likely would have agreed with much of Judge Nalbandian’s dissent if I had sat on the panel. So the legal issues may well justify en banc review at some point. But now is not the proper time. I read the panel opinion as denying relief to the United States based on curable procedural problems—not incurable limits on the United States’ right to voter records. In particular, the panel opinion and dissent primarily disagreed over how to interpret the specific letters that the Department of Justice (DOJ) sent to Michigan’s Secretary of State: Did the DOJ request only the statewide voter-registration list? Or did the DOJ’s request impliedly include a demand for the underlying voter-by-voter records? The majority interpreted the letters narrowly, while the dissent interpreted them broadly. Yet nothing in the majority opinion prevents the DOJ from sending a fresh letter leaving no doubt that it demands the “individual voter records used to create the voter list.” Id. at 482. That path strikes me as more efficient than an en banc rehearing in which some 17 judges might spend more time parsing the meaning of the letters than the meaning of the law. On this understanding, I concur in the denial of rehearing en banc. I At the outset, I agree that two factors might well point in the direction of our full court’s review. For one thing, the United States serves “a compelling interest” when it seeks to ensure “the integrity” of federal elections. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989)). “[I]nflated voter rolls” containing individuals who are ineligible to vote increase the risk of voter fraud and decrease the public’s confidence in an election’s validity. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196–97 (2008) (opinion of Stevens, J.). Congress recognized this concern when it passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). See 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(3)–(4).  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 4 The NVRA requires States to “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists” of voters. Id. § 20507(a)(4); see Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756, 761–62 (2018). And Congress recognized the concern again when it passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA compelled States to use “a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list[.]” 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A). It added that the States must establish “[a] system of file maintenance that makes a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote from” this list. Id. § 21083(a)(4)(A). So both caselaw and legislation support the government’s position that this case touches issues of “exceptional importance” to the country. Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(2)(D). For another thing, there is room for doubt over the panel opinion’s interpretation of the phrase “come into his possession” in Title III. This title generally requires an “officer of election” to “retain and preserve” records that “come into his possession” relating to any action “requisite to voting in [a federal] election” for a period of twenty-two months “from the date of” that election: Every officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of twenty-two months from the date of any general, special, or primary election of which candidates for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, or Resident Commissioner from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are voted for, all records and papers which come into his possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election, except that, when required by law, such records and papers may be delivered to another officer of election and except that, if a State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico designates a custodian to retain and preserve these records and papers at a specified place, then such records and papers may be deposited with such custodian, and the duty to retain and preserve any record or paper so deposited shall devolve upon such custodian. 52 U.S.C. § 20701. According to the panel, “[a]n ordinary English speaker would not say that [Michigan’s Secretary of State] has come into possession of something that she created, established, and maintained.” Benson, 179 F.4th at 479. I might agree—at least in the abstract if the phrase has not developed a specialized legal meaning (as Judge Griffin suggests).  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 5 From there, though, the panel makes an unexplained logical leap: it treats all “Michigan officials” as a single “officer of election” and exempts records that any state actor creates even when the actor transfers the records to other officers. Id. at 478–79. Yet, as Judge Nalbandian explained, the language imposes a specific duty on an individual (each officer of election), not a general duty on the entire State of Michigan. See id. at 486–87 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting). That is, if a particular officer of election “come[s] into . . . possession” of a qualifying record, this specific person must “retain and preserve” it unless state law allows the person to transfer the record “to another officer of election” or the State has designated a “custodian” to keep all these records. 52 U.S.C. § 20701. And an “ordinary English speaker” would say that the Secretary of State “has come into possession” of records that (for example) a local official creates when that local official places the records in the Secretary’s custody. Benson, 179 F.4th at 479. At the least, the Secretary of State “came into possession” of the voter-registration list when she assumed office in 2019. Cf. Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 1962). Keep in mind, too, that the panel’s reading of “come into . . . possession” extends beyond this case’s factual context: a request for voting records for list-maintenance purposes. 52 U.S.C. § 20701. That reading would also apply when the United States requests voting records to investigate allegations of voter discrimination. In both contexts, the DOJ now may lack the power to obtain “internally generated” records from the States. Benson, 179 F.4th at 479. II Despite my concerns with the panel’s reasoning, several other factors convince me that this legal issue does not warrant en banc review at this time. A First, the difference between the panel opinion and Judge Nalbandian’s dissent may turn out to be more semantic than real. As I read these opinions, their disagreement rests primarily on the meaning of the three letters that the DOJ sent—not on the United States’ right to review Michigan’s voter records. On the one hand, the panel nowhere disputes the dissent’s main claim: that the United States is entitled to the “underlying individual records” that Michigan used to create its statewide voter-registration list. Benson, 179 F.4th at 485 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting)  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 6 (emphasis added). The problem for the United States, according to the panel, is that none of its letters requested the “compilation of individual voter records used to create the voter list.” Id. at 482 (majority opinion). Noticeably absent from the majority’s response to the dissent? Any claim that the United States could not seek these individual voter records. So the procedural defect that the panel identified with the dissent’s reading of the letters has a simpler fix than en banc review: the DOJ may send a new letter unambiguously requesting these individual records. On the other hand, the dissent does not seem to dispute the majority’s main claim: that “the aggregate” list does not qualify as a record that the Secretary must preserve under § 20701. Id. at 485 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting). Indeed, all panel members reconcile Title III with the NVRA and HAVA in similar ways. Title III punishes officers of election who “willfully” violate its command to “retain and preserve” qualifying records, and it punishes “[a]ny person” who “willfully” “alters” those records. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20701–02. These provisions ostensibly create a problem if the entire statewide list qualifies as a record that election officers must preserve: the NVRA and HAVA require those officials to “constantly change” the list whenever a voter moves into the State, leaves it, changes an address, dies, or the like. Benson, 179 F.4th at 479. The dissent viewed these changes as acceptable because the “current-eligibility snapshot” (the full list as it exists at any moment) does not qualify as a record that officers must preserve under § 20701—only the “underlying individual records” do. Id. at 485 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting). In short, neither the majority nor the dissent treated the item that the DOJ requested—the “current snapshot of eligible voters” as of July 21, 2025—as subject to preservation under § 20701. Id. Rather, Judge Nalbandian disagreed with the majority over the meaning of the letters. He read the United States’ formal request for “the aggregate file” to encompass a request for the “individual records” that make up that file. Id. But again, this debate about the meaning of letters has a simpler solution: the DOJ may send a new letter. B Second, while I also have my doubts about the majority’s second reason for affirming the district court, that issue appears even less worthy of en banc review. Title III allows the Attorney General to “demand” covered records from an officer of election, but it then says that the written “demand shall contain a statement of the basis and the purpose therefor.” 52 U.S.C.  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 7 § 20703. The panel read this text in a technical way as requiring a single letter to contain the required statement of the “basis” and “purpose” for the request. Benson, 179 F.4th at 483. It also read the word “basis” as requiring the letter to contain both a legal basis (Title III) and a factual basis (perhaps a suspicion of violating the law?) for the demand. Id. As Judge Nalbandian explained, however, the third letter likely included enough information. Id. at 488 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting). It made clear that the DOJ’s demand was based on “Title III”; it referred to its earlier requests showing the factual concerns with Michigan’s voter-registration lists; and it identified its purpose to “assess” the State’s “compliance” with the NVRA’s and HAVA’s list-maintenance requirements. Ltr., R.39-4, PageID 500–01; cf. Lynd, 306 F.2d at 229 n.6. At the same time, I would not overread the panel opinion. It nowhere disputed that the three letters collectively contained enough information to identify the DOJ’s “basis” and “purpose” for its records request. 52 U.S.C. § 20703. My colleagues also did not hold that the DOJ lacks the authority to investigate NVRA and HAVA violations using Title III. They thus did not follow those courts that have suggested that an investigation into voter discrimination represents the only proper “purpose” for a Title III investigation. See United States v. Weber, 816 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1182–83 (C.D. Cal. 2026). Although § 20703 requires the DOJ to identify the “purpose” for its demand, I see nothing in the statute’s text that limits the purposes for which the DOJ may request the records. So the district court’s reading in this case (that the DOJ may investigate NVRA and HAVA violations using Title III) remains viable in this circuit. See United States v. Benson, 819 F. Supp. 3d 753, 767–68 (W.D. Mich. 2026). Here too, then, the panel’s holding does not prevent the DOJ from sending a new letter with all the information contained across the three letters. C Third, the belated way in which Title III entered the picture in this controversy suggests that further percolation in the courts (and additional clarification by the DOJ) could serve a useful function. Because the DOJ was investigating Michigan’s general efforts to comply with the NVRA’s and HAVA’s list-maintenance requirements, it initially identified the NVRA as the source of authority to request the “current electronic copy” of Michigan’s voter-registration list  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 8 as of July 21, 2025. Ltr., R.39-2, PageID 492 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)); see Ltr., R.39-3, PageID 497 (same). On appeal, however, it did not renew its arguments that the NVRA or HAVA required this disclosure. And the DOJ did not identify Title III as a source of authority for the request until it sent its third letter to the Secretary of State. Ltr., R.39-4, PageID 501. Yet that letter did not change the scope of the DOJ’s demand: the voter-registration list as it existed at that time. This fact creates a potential mismatch. The NVRA and HAVA address the States’ general list-maintenance duties. Title III, by contrast, appears to have an election-specific focus. Section 20701 seems to create a (recurring) retention duty covering only the “records and papers” for a specific election on a specific date. 52 U.S.C. § 20701. The retention duty starts “from the date of” that election. Id. And it runs “for a period of twenty-two months” after that date. Id. The duty covers only those “records and papers . . . relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election[.]” Id. (emphasis added). I read the phrase “in such election” as likely modifying all the words that proceed it—meaning that the statute covers only records about a specific election. Id.; see Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 352, 355 (2016); id. at 362–68 (Kagan, J., dissenting); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339–40 (1971). In legalese, the series-qualifier canon (not the last-antecedent rule) applies. See Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147–53 (2012). Title III’s apparent election-specific nature leads me to conclude that this case does not present the ideal vehicle for en banc review. Did the DOJ’s letters request records tied to any election? If so, which one? It did not say. Even if an entire voter list could qualify as a “record” in the abstract, it is not obvious that Michigan’s list as it existed on July 21, 2025, would relate to any election under § 20701. And the Attorney General may request only a “record” “required by section 20701 . . . to be retained and preserved,” not all voting records. 52 U.S.C. § 20703. Perhaps the voter-registration list as it existed on July 21, 2025, relates to the future November 2026 election? The Fifth Circuit once held that § 20701’s retention duty covered records about “subsequent” “elections” and that a contrary view would read “the statute too narrowly.” Kennedy v. Lewis, 325 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam). That reading  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 9 serves Title III’s purpose by barring States from destroying records (say, rejected applications to register) before an election—as some state laws once permitted. See Rep. of the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, at 95 (1959). But how can the text support this result? The Fifth Circuit did not explain. See Lewis, 325 F.2d at 212. And the retention duty seems to have a clear start date: it runs “for a period of twenty-two months from the date of” an election. 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (emphasis added). The duty thus does not seem to apply before an election. If Congress had instead written that election officials must retain records “[until] twenty-two months [after] the date of” a federal election, then the statute might imply that the duty begins on the date the officials first possess the records. Id. So if the date of possession came before the election (under this hypothetical text), the official would have to preserve the records up until the election and then for the following twenty-two months. But may we rewrite § 20701’s text in this way to fulfill its purpose (even though Title III’s criminal sanctions might trigger the rule of lenity)? See id. §§ 20701–02. Or perhaps the voter-registration list as it existed on July 21, 2025, relates to a past election (say, the one from November 2024)? Between those two dates, however, officials likely would have updated this list countless times in preparation for the next election. Voters who moved out of state or who died since November 2024 would have been removed. And voters who moved in or registered for the first time would have been added. So if the entire statewide list qualifies as one “record,” the list from July 2025 may well not “relat[e] to” the prior election. Id. § 20701. All that said, this interpretive conundrum also may represent only a case-specific concern. Ostensibly, the concern would fall away as applied to a demand for a voter list used for a specific election (say, the Michigan primary from last week). The prior version of the statewide list that election officials used to distinguish eligible from ineligible voters for a specific election might qualify as a record “in such election” because it “relat[es] to” the “registration[s]” used then. Id. And this reading might reconcile Title III with the NVRA and HAVA in a different way. Title III would make clear that officials must “retain and preserve” for “twenty-two months from the date of” an election the official list that they used to determine voter eligibility during that election. Id. They cannot “alter[]” this past record for those twenty-  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 10 two months. Id. § 20702. But Title III would not prevent them from doing what the NVRA and HAVA require: develop an updated list for the next election by adding newly eligible voters and deleting newly ineligible ones. Granted, the parties have not identified these interpretive issues. But they have raised the general question whether §§ 20701 and 20703 allow the DOJ to seek a statewide voter list as it existed in July 2025. So the issues could complicate our review at the en banc stage because they touch on that general question. Parties also typically cannot force courts to adopt a mistaken view of the law through their stipulations or waivers. See Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 19 n.6 (2024); Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 304 n.9 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). And even if we found the legal argument forfeited on appeal, cf. Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy, 601 U.S. 366, 371 (2024), it still could complicate matters down the road. This appeal arises at the motion-to-dismiss stage. So Michigan may well be able to raise the issues at later stages. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. First Agency, Inc., 756 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 2014). This fact too leads me to conclude that denying en banc review at this time represents the better course. D Fourth, timing concerns do not justify immediate en banc review. At this point, I do not see how the United States could get the relief that it seeks in time for that relief to matter for the upcoming election in November 2026. One should keep in mind this case’s procedural posture. The United States has appealed the grant of a motion to dismiss the case, not the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction. Although the United States alleges that Title III suits trigger summary proceedings, it did not seek preliminary relief in the district court that would immediately compel Michigan to turn over the requested records. Nor has it moved for any type of emergency relief in this court or the Supreme Court. So even if we expedited an en banc rehearing, ultimately agreed with the United States on these issues, and quickly rendered an opinion to that effect, our decision would not entitle the United States to any records. It would instead simply overturn the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss and return this case to that court for further proceedings. The United States would then have to file a motion requesting  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 11 the production of the records. Yet Michigan’s Secretary of State and various intervenors have stated that they would raise other arguments about why the Secretary should not have to comply. See Appellee’s Br. 58–66; Intervenor’s Br. 51–53. Those proceedings might take even more time. Nor would the mere disclosure of the records immediately matter to the pending election. Rather, once the DOJ got the records, it would still need to review them. If the DOJ found that Michigan’s list-maintenance practices violated the NVRA or HAVA and Michigan’s Secretary of State refused to cooperate (as she has to date), the United States would then have to bring a separate enforcement action under those laws. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20510(a), 21111. Even here, the parties have debated how much these laws would allow Michigan to engage in any sort of systematic list-maintenance practices this close to the election. Compare 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(2)(A), with Bell v. Marinko, 367 F.3d 588, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2004). And besides, the Supreme Court’s cases have “repeatedly cautioned” against granting federal relief that changes a state’s election framework close to an election. Allen v. Milligan, 146 S. Ct. 1377, 1381 (2026) (per curiam); see Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5. In sum, given the panel’s narrow ruling, it is far from obvious that rehearing this case en banc would promote any efficiency goals more than staying our hand at this time. * * * The parties have suggested that there are dozens of other cases pending throughout the country that raise similar issues under Title III. So these issues are not going away. And further percolation will enhance our court’s—and ultimately the Supreme Court’s—ability to decide the issues correctly. For these reasons, I have concurred in the denial of en banc rehearing.  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 12 _________________ DISSENT _________________ GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc. This is an exceptionally important case, Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(2)(D), impacting the integrity of federal elections in the State of Michigan. In refusing to disclose Michigan’s Qualified Voter File, defendant Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson asserts two meritless, technical defenses. First, Benson argues that she never came into possession of the Qualified Voter File. Second, she asserts that the federal government’s repeated requests for the voting record were deficient because the basis and need for the requests were contained in two separate letters, not one. For the reasons stated below and in the dissenting statement by Judge Thapar, I would grant the United States’ petition for rehearing en banc and therefore respectfully dissent. The unredacted records that the federal government seeks contain voters’ unique identifying numbers, which are “necessary to identify duplicate registration records, registrants who have moved, and registrants who have died or otherwise are no longer eligible to vote in federal elections.” United States v. Benson, 819 F. Supp. 3d 753, 768 (W.D. Mich. 2026) (citation modified). In other words, without the unredacted records, the federal government cannot effectively verify Michigan’s compliance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et seq., and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. The NVRA generally directs States to implement programs that “[(1)] increas[e] voter registration and [(2)] remov[e] ineligible persons from the States’ voter registration rolls.” Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756, 761 (2018) (citing 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)). HAVA, for its part, expands the NVRA’s framework and requires States to establish a “single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” that contains “the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State.” 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A). It also requires designated election officials to regularly maintain the list, which includes removing ineligible voters. Id. § 21083(a)(2).  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 13 Against that backdrop, when construing a statute, our task is to identify the “single, best meaning” of its text. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024). In so doing, courts must give the text the meaning it bore at the time of its enactment. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113 (2019). As explained, the single, best reading of Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 52 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq., is that it covers all qualifying records in an election official’s possession—including those self-created by an election official. At the very least, it captures some government-created records, including the Qualified Voter File here. In this regard, historical usage suggests “comes into possession” signals commencement of a duty and had nothing to do with a record’s source of origin or who created it. To begin, the panel majority’s interpretation assigns the phrase “come into his possession” more legal significance than contemporaneous readers seemingly understood it to bear. By 1960, “come into” possession or custody was a familiar legal expression. Courts and legislatures regularly used it to describe when a person lawfully assumed possession of property through an office, employment, or other legal authority. See, e.g., United States v. Northway, 120 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1887); Rife v. Ruble, 107 F.2d 84, 85–86 (6th Cir. 1939). The phrase marked the commencement of lawful possession and the legal duties or liabilities that followed. See Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268, 270–72 (1895). But it did not distinguish property according to its source. And because no such distinction existed, here, records that come into an official’s possession could include self-created records. Early decisions construing Title III reinforce that understanding. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1962); State of Ala. ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848, 855 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff’d sub nom. Dinkens v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1961). Although they did not directly interpret the phrase “come into his possession,” they are significant because of how they naturally described the statute. Both Lynd and Gallion quoted or referenced § 20701’s requirement that election officers retain records that “come into” their possession. Yet, when describing the statute’s operation, both courts stated that the election official’s duty to preserve and retain records applied to records “in” an election official’s possession or “in” the official’s custody. Lynd, 306 F.2d at 227 (“Since the statute specifies ‘all records and papers’ in the officer’s custody ‘relating to any application [. . .] or other act requisite  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 14 to voting [. . . ],’ in such elections held within twenty-two months, the custodians’ duty to retain and preserve and the Attorney General’s right of inspection and copying extend as far back as the earliest date of any such record or paper which bears on the eligibility of any currently listed voter to vote in such election.” (emphasis added)); Gallion, 187 F. Supp. at 855 (“There is nothing uncertain about that part of the Act requiring the preservation and production of all records and papers which are in the possession of an election official . . . if those records and papers relate to the acts requisite to voting.” (emphasis added)). That is, they moved among those formulations without suggesting that “come into” and “in” possession of described a different category of records. That pattern is revealing. Had contemporaneous courts understood “come into his possession” to impose the source-of-origin limitation the majority identifies, one would expect them to preserve that distinction when describing the statute’s reach. Instead, they described the statute as applying to records in an election official’s possession or custody without suggesting that the phrase “come into” carried an additional limitation based on where a record originated. The more natural inference is that they understood “come into possession” as a familiar legal formulation identifying when the statutory duty attached, not as creating a separate substantive limitation on the records covered. Later judicial usage reflects the same understanding. In United States Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, for example, the Supreme Court explained that agency records include records “created or obtained” by an agency and then described agency control as requiring that the materials “have come into the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties.” 492 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1989). To be sure, the Court was not interpreting § 20701, and Tax Analysts does not resolve the question presented here. But its formulation is nonetheless instructive. The Court used the phrase “come into the agency’s possession” while discussing a category of records that expressly included agency-created documents, suggesting that the phrase naturally describes the assumption of official custody regardless of whether the records were created within or received from outside the agency. At bottom, the relevant distinction in Tax Analysts was between official agency records and an employee’s personal papers—not between internally created and externally received documents.  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 15 This understanding also answers the majority’s surplusage argument. The majority reasons that if “come into possession” merely identifies possession, Congress could have referred to records “in” an election official’s possession. But that reasoning assumes the phrase was newly coined rather than an established legal formulation. We have recognized, however, that the canon against surplusage does not require every component of a stock legal language to perform independent substantive work. See Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 882 (6th Cir. 2012). In any event, the phrase still performs meaningful work by identifying the commencement of official possession—that is, the point at which the statutory duty to retain and preserve attaches. And the statutes that the district court cited to show that Congress often employs “come into possession” when contemplating materials received from an external source do not change the calculus. Benson, 819 F. Supp. 3d at 768. Some of those statutes expressly limit their reach to materials received from outside the government. See, e.g., 44 U.S.C. § 3572 (covering confidential information that comes into an employee’s possession after being submitted to the agency). Yet § 20701’s text contains no comparable limitation. The remaining statutes fare no better because their subject matter inherently involves materials originating outside the official’s office, such as letters entrusted to the Postal Service, abandoned property, entrusted property, and the effects of a deceased seaman. See 18 U.S.C. § 1703(a); 50 U.S.C. § 217; 18 U.S.C. § 654; 46 U.S.C. § 10705. So in those statutes, any external-source limitation flows from the nature of what is being regulated—not from the phrase “come into possession.” By contrast, § 20701 applies broadly to “all records and papers which come into [an election official’s] possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting.” 52 U.S.C. § 20701 (emphasis added). Nothing in that language inherently limits the statute to records created by someone other than the election official. In sum, the majority asks the phrase to do more work than contemporaneous legal usage supports. It reads “come into his possession” as though Congress had written “come into his possession from another” or “received from outside the office.” But Congress imposed no such limitation. The proper reading is the one contemporaneous readers would have assigned the phrase: “come into his possession” identifies the commencement of an election official’s lawful  No. 26-1225 United States et al. v. Benson et al. Page 16 official possession of a covered record and, with it, the beginning of the statutory duty to preserve. It does not exclude records based on where they originated. Even assuming the majority correctly interprets the phrase “come into possession” to require that an election official acquired, obtained, or received the relevant record from another person rather than having personally created it, the majority still erred in concluding that the Qualified Voter File falls outside § 20701. United States v. Benson, 179 F.4th 470, 478 (6th Cir. 2026). True enough, under that understanding, an election officer who personally creates a document does not ordinarily acquire, obtain, or receive it. To use the majority’s analogy, one would not say that a baker acquired a cake she baked when she removed it from the oven, even if she first acquired the ingredients. Id. at 479. But the majority extends that premise one step too far. It transforms a limitation on who creates the record into a limitation on where the record originates. The majority reasons that Benson never “acquire[d], obtain