Caleb Barnett v. Kwame Raoul

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ Nos. 24-3060, 24-3061, 24-3062 & 24-3063 CALEB BARNETT, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. KWAME RAOUL, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, et al., Defendants-Appellants. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Nos. 3:23-cv-209, 3:23-cv-141, 3:23-cv-192 & 3:23-cv-215 — Stephen P. McGlynn, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2026 ____________________ Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. In 2023, six months after a mass shooting at a Chicago suburb’s Independence Day parade left seven dead and dozens more wounded, Illinois enacted the Protect Illinois Communities Act. Among other things, the 2 Nos. 24-3060 et al. Act criminalizes the manufacture, sale, delivery, purchase, and possession of assault weapons and large-capacity maga- zines. A grandfather clause permits preexisting lawful own- ers of the regulated items to continue possessing them. Plaintiffs across Illinois swiftly challenged the Act, suing state and local officials for declaratory and injunctive relief protecting their right to keep and bear arms. One federal court granted a preliminary injunction, two did not, and all three losing parties appealed. We consolidated their appeals and held in Bevis v. City of Naperville, 85 F.4th 1175 (7th Cir. 2023), that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenges. One of the consolidated cases in Bevis was Barnett v. Raoul, which itself was the lead case for a set of four similar chal- lenges pending in the Southern District of Illinois. After build- ing out the record following Bevis, the Barnett parties pro- ceeded to a bench trial. In the end, the district court held that much of the Act violated the Second Amendment and that the offending provisions were not severable. The court therefore enjoined enforcement of the Act in its entirety. The defend- ants appealed. For reasons that follow, we focus on the Act’s application to AR-15s and thirty-round rifle magazines. The Act’s re- strictions on these items, we hold, are consistent with the prin- ciples that underpin our Nation’s tradition of firearm regula- tion. Whether to adopt them is thus a decision reposed in our elected representatives, and we reverse. Nos. 24-3060 et al. 3 I. Background A. The Protect Illinois Communities Act The Protect Illinois Communities Act, see Pub. Act 102- 1116 (2023), 2022 Ill. Laws 8833, covers a broad array of mat- ters, both substantive and administrative, but its restrictions on weapons, parts, accessories, and the like are the subject of the disputes before us. Beginning with the restrictions on firearms, the Act makes it unlawful to knowingly carry, possess, manufacture, sell, de- liver, import, or purchase any assault weapon. 720 ILCS 5/24- 1.9(b)–(c); see 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(15)–(16), (b). Given the range of conduct proscribed, the Act effectively amounts to a ban. That ban, however, does not apply to qualified law enforce- ment officers, members of the military performing official du- ties, and other similar groups. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(e). The Act defines four types of weapons as assault weapons. First are semiautomatic rifles that can accept a detachable magazine and have at least one of the following features: a pistol grip or thumbhole stock; a protruding grip that can be held by the non-trigger hand; a folding, telescoping, thumbhole, or detachable stock; a flash suppressor; a grenade launcher; or a barrel shroud. Id. 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(A). Second and third, the Act bans semiautomatic pistols and shotguns that can accept detachable magazines and have at least one feature from enumerated lists, the details of which are not relevant here. Id. 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(C), (F). Finally, the Act bans certain fire- arms based on the type of ammunition feeding device they utilize—for example, semiautomatic weapons that can accept a belt ammunition feeding device. Id. 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(B), (D)– (E), (G). As with the expired federal assault weapon ban from 4 Nos. 24-3060 et al. which Illinois borrowed, the Act defines assault weapons not only by reference to these features but also through a list of prohibited models, including the AR-15. Id. 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(J)– (L). The Act also bans “assault weapon attachments”—that is, “any device capable of being attached to a firearm that is spe- cifically designed for making or converting a firearm into” an assault weapon. Id. 5/24-1.9(a)(3), (b)–(c). The Act next criminalizes the knowing manufacture, de- livery, sale, purchase, or possession of “large capacity ammu- nition feeding devices.” Id. 5/24-1.10(b)–(c), (g). That term is defined to include “a magazine, belt, drum, feed strip, or sim- ilar device that has a capacity of” more than ten rounds for rifles and shotguns, and more than fifteen rounds for hand- guns. Id. 5/24-1.10(a)(1). We will focus, as the parties have, on magazines, the most common type of ammunition feeding de- vice. And we will refer to the restricted ones as “large-capac- ity magazines.” Finally, the Act bans certain .50 caliber rifles and their car- tridges, as well as any device or accessory—like a bump stock—“that is designed to and functions to increase the rate of fire of a semiautomatic firearm above the standard rate of fire for semiautomatic firearms.” Id. 5/24-1.9(a)(6), 5/24- 1(a)(14). The Act’s grandfather clauses provide significant excep- tions to these restrictions. As to assault weapons, assault weapon attachments, .50 caliber rifles, or .50 caliber car- tridges, preexisting lawful owners could continue possessing them if they provided the Illinois State Police an “endorse- ment affidavit” containing certain information by January 1, 2024. Id. 5/24-1.9(d). The required information consisted of the owner’s firearm license number, an affirmation that he pos- Nos. 24-3060 et al. 5 sessed the item before the Act went into effect, and the make, model, caliber, and serial number of the item. Id. 5/24- 1.9(d)(1)–(3). This registration process, which was free, “cre- ate[d] a rebuttable presumption that the person [was] entitled to possess and transport the” restricted item. Id. 5/24-1.9(d)(3). As to large capacity ammunition feeding devices, preexisting lawful owners could continue possessing them (subject to lo- cational restrictions) with no registration required. Id. 5/24- 1.10(d). Those who move to Illinois today and wish to possess the restricted items may avail themselves of the grandfather clauses by applying for an Illinois firearm license and (for eve- rything but the ammunition feeding devices) completing an endorsement affidavit within sixty days of moving. Id. 5/24- 1.9(d), 5/24-1.10(d). B. Procedural History Four related cases, which the district court consolidated, are now before us. See Langley v. Kelly, No. 3:23-cv-192 (S.D. Ill.); Harrel v. Raoul, No. 3:23-cv-141 (S.D. Ill.); Barnett v. Raoul, 3:23-cv-209 (S.D. Ill.); Federal Firearms Licensees of Ill. v. Pritzker, No. 3:23-cv-215 (S.D. Ill.). The plaintiffs consist of individuals, participants in the commercial firearm market, and organiza- tions that advocate for Second Amendment rights. The de- fendants are a wide range of state and local officials charged with enforcing the Act in one way or another. Each of the plaintiffs, relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, chal- lenged the Act’s ban on assault weapons, large-capacity mag- azines, and assault weapon attachments under the Second Amendment. The Langley and Federal Firearms Licensees plain- tiffs further challenged the Act’s ban on .50 caliber rifles and 6 Nos. 24-3060 et al. cartridges. Only the Langley plaintiffs attacked the Act’s reg- istration requirement. 1 After each set of plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc- tion, the district court consolidated the four actions, designat- ing Barnett as the lead case. It then granted the plaintiffs pre- liminary relief. See generally Barnett v. Raoul, 671 F. Supp. 3d 928 (S.D. Ill. 2023). But in functionally identical Second Amendment challenges, two district judges in the Northern District of Illinois came out the other way. See generally Bevis v. City of Naperville, 657 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2023); Her- rera v. Raoul, 670 F. Supp. 3d 665 (N.D. Ill. 2023). So when all three losing parties appealed, we consolidated the three cases to unify the Act’s status across Illinois and to guide the district courts and parties in litigating the cases to final judgment. See generally Bevis, 85 F.4th 1175. When we decided Bevis, no circuit court had applied the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), to assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. In Bruen, the Supreme Court estab- lished a new test governing Second Amendment claims: “When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individ- ual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at 24. Bevis sought to flesh out the Bruen inquiry, particularly its first step. Based on an analysis of District of Columbia v. Heller, 1 The Langley plaintiffs also asserted a due process challenge below, but the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on that claim. The Langley plaintiffs did not cross-appeal that decision. Nos. 24-3060 et al. 7 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Bevis concluded that Bruen’s first step re- quired “the plaintiffs in each of the cases before us [to show] that the weapons addressed in the pertinent legislation are Arms that ordinary people would keep at home for purposes of self-defense, not weapons that are exclusively or predomi- nantly useful in military service, or weapons that are not pos- sessed for lawful purposes.” Bevis, 85 F.4th at 1194. If a regu- lated weapon meets this definition, it is an “Arm” covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text, satisfying Bruen’s first step; if not, the regulation is constitutional without need to evaluate our historical tradition of firearm regulation. Applying this test, Bevis concluded the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their Second Amendment challenges because AR-15s (which the court used as repre- sentative of the banned weapons) and large-capacity maga- zines “are much more like machineguns and military-grade weaponry than they are like the many different types of fire- arms that are used for individual self-defense (or so the legis- lature was entitled to conclude).” Id. at 1195. AR-15s, Bevis concluded, are not “materially different” from M16s—which Heller confirmed may be banned. Id. at 1195–97; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. To be sure, Bevis recognized that AR-15s are lim- ited to semiautomatic fire, whereas M16s are capable of both semiautomatic and automatic fire. See Bevis, 85 F.4th at 1195– 96. And Bevis recognized this difference in firing modes trans- lates to a difference in firing rates. Id. at 1196. But Bevis ulti- mately concluded that the distinctions between AR-15s and M16s paled in comparison to their similarities, placing AR-15s beyond the Second Amendment’s protections. After assuming that the regulated items were “Arms” un- der the Second Amendment, Bevis went on to hold that the 8 Nos. 24-3060 et al. Act also passed muster under Bruen’s second step. Our Na- tion’s history of firearm regulation, Bevis concluded, revealed a tradition of reserving especially dangerous weapons for mil- itary use while leaving many other weapons available for ci- vilians. See id. at 1197–1202. And the Act “respects and relies on” that tradition. Id. at 1202. We therefore vacated the pre- liminary injunctions that the district court had entered in Bar- nett, Harrel, Langley, and Federal Firearms Licensees. See id. at 1203. 2 Following Bevis’s direction, the plaintiffs and defendants in Barnett and the consolidated cases developed the record. The parties stipulated to presenting much of the evidence on the papers, but the court also held a four-day bench trial. At the conclusion, the district court held in a thorough opinion that the Act’s ban on assault weapons, assault weapon attach- ments, and large-capacity magazines violated the Second Amendment, as did the registration requirement. Tackling Bevis’s “Arms” inquiry, the district court first con- cluded that ordinary citizens choose assault weapons, large- capacity magazines, and assault weapon attachments for self- defense. With respect to the firearms themselves, the court re- lied on both statistical evidence of these items’ wide circula- tion and testimony from self-defense experts, firearm instruc- tors, and a gun store owner. As for the large-capacity maga- zines, the court noted that “every round matters in a self-de- fense scenario.” And the attachments, the district court rea- soned, are “well-suited for self-defense,” especially for “an in- dividual who is infirm, small-statured, or has limited firearms 2 The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied. See Harrel v. Raoul, 144 S. Ct. 2491 (2024). Nos. 24-3060 et al. 9 training.” The district court concluded, by contrast, that law- abiding citizens would not choose .50 caliber rifles, their am- munition, .50 caliber pistols, belt-fed weapons, and grenade launchers for self-defense, so these items failed to qualify for presumptive constitutional protection under Bevis. Moving to whether the regulated items are exclusively or predominantly useful in military service, the district court concluded that AR-15s are materially distinct from the M16 rifles that the U.S. military issues. The court first stressed that no military has ever issued AR-15s to its troops, largely be- cause of their different firing modes: AR-15s can fire only sem- iautomatically, whereas M16s are capable of semiautomatic, automatic, and burst fire. 3 The court stressed, too, that AR-15s are not “subject to exact standards of military specificity and rigorous quality-insurance [sic] inspections.” The court fur- ther held that large-capacity magazines and assault weapon attachments are not predominantly useful in military service because the military does not issue them for use in combat. And finally, the court concluded that people do not possess AR-15–style semiautomatic rifles, large-capacity magazines holding up to thirty rounds, and assault weapon attachments (other than grenade launchers) for unlawful purposes be- cause most of the weapons are not used in illegal activity. 3 Though Bevis had identified the difference in firing rates between AR-15s and M16s as important, the district court did not expressly make a finding on this matter. It came close, however, in a footnote—located in the court’s summary of circuit caselaw—where it cited a U.S. Army man- ual stating that an M16 in automatic mode has a maximum effective firing rate of 150–200 rounds per minute, whereas in semiautomatic mode it has a maximum effective firing rate of 45–65 rounds per minute. 10 Nos. 24-3060 et al. Having concluded that the items the Act regulates qualify as “Arms” for Second Amendment purposes under Bevis, the court proceeded to Bruen’s second step, where it held that the defendants failed to establish that the Act is consistent with our Nation’s history of firearm regulation. At this stage, the court did not make or rely on factual findings undercutting the applicability of Bevis’s historical assessment. Instead, looking at essentially the same record as existed at the prelim- inary injunction stage, the district court found Bevis’s dissent- ing opinion more persuasive than its majority, holding that the historical analogues on which Bevis relied were insuffi- cient to sustain the Act. Because the district court concluded that the offending provisions of the Act were not severable, it enjoined the Act in its entirety. The court’s permanent injunctions (one for each of the four cases), entered under Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 65, enjoined “the State of Illinois” from enforcing the Act against anyone. 4 The defendants appealed, and we granted their request to stay the district court’s injunctions pending appeal. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review We begin with our standard of review. We review the dis- trict court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 4 Enjoining enforcement of the Act against anyone—i.e., entering a uni- versal injunction—became problematic after the Supreme Court’s deci- sion in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 837 (2025), but our conclusion in these appeals renders that flaw moot. Nos. 24-3060 et al. 11 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Republic Techs. (NA), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, LLP, 135 F.4th 572, 587 (7th Cir. 2025). On the merits, however, our standard of review is somewhat murkier. Though it is clear (and undisputed) that we review “the un- derlying question of constitutional law de novo,” Schoenthal v. Raoul, 150 F.4th 889, 901 (7th Cir. 2025), it is less clear (and is disputed) how much deference, if any, we owe the district court’s findings of fact. As a general matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) prescribes that on appellate review of a bench trial, “[f]indings of fact … must not be set aside unless clearly erro- neous.” That standard is satisfied only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit- ted.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). But the Supreme Court has recognized that appellate review may be more searching as to legislative facts than adjudicative facts. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986) (“We are far from persuaded … that the ‘clearly erroneous’ stand- ard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of ‘legislative’ facts at is- sue here.”); see also Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., 705 F.3d 694, 697 n.4 (7th Cir. 2013). Though the line between the two can be blurry, roughly speaking, “[l]egislative facts are those general considerations that move a lawmaking or rulemaking body to adopt a rule, as distinct from the facts which deter- mine whether the rule was correctly applied.” Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 795 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The concept of a legislative fact comes into its own when there is no reason to believe that certain facts per- tinent to a case vary from locality to locality, or from person to person; a typical definition of legislative facts is broad, gen- eral facts that are not unique to a particular case and provide 12 Nos. 24-3060 et al. therefore an appropriate basis for legislation of general appli- cation.”). And even for adjudicative facts, an exception to Rule 52(a) for so-called constitutional facts—ultimate facts in constitutional cases—might create yet another obstacle to clear-error review. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–14 (1984) (making an independent de- termination of “actual malice” for First Amendment pur- poses); A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that de novo re- view of constitutional facts “prevent[s] the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from having far-reaching legal effects”). We need not wade into these murky waters, however. In- stead, “[b]ecause we do not ultimately base our decision to- day on the invalidity of the lower court[’s] factual findings, we need not decide the standard of review issue.” McCree, 476 U.S. at 168 n.3 (citation modified). We therefore assume that the district court’s factual findings are shielded by clear-error review. 5 B. The Plaintiffs’ Facial Challenges Each of the plaintiffs presses a facial challenge against the Act’s operative provisions in 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b)–(c) and 5/24-1.10(b)–(c). The former provisions make it unlawful to 5 The defendants separately contend that the district court did not make any factual findings under Rule 52(a)(1)—which requires “the court” to “find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law sepa- rately”—because its opinion contained only introduction, background, and analysis sections. But substance, not form, determines compliance with Rule 52(a)(1). See Bartsh v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1297, 1304 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Valsamis v. Gonzalez-Romero, 748 F.3d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 2014). The district court made factual findings, even if it did not specifi- cally delineate them. Nos. 24-3060 et al. 13 “knowingly manufacture, deliver, sell, import, or purchase … an assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber ri- fle, or .50 caliber cartridge,” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b), or “to know- ingly possess” these items, id. 5/24-1.9(c). The latter provisions make it unlawful “to knowingly manufacture, deliver, sell, [or] purchase … a large capacity ammunition feeding de- vice,” id. 5/24-1.10(b), or “to knowingly possess” one, id. 5/24- 1.10(c). 6 The plaintiffs’ decisions to pursue facial claims “come[] at a cost,” as the Supreme Court has “made facial challenges hard to win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024); see Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008) (explaining that facial challenges are “dis- favored” because they “often rest on speculation,” “short cir- cuit the democratic process,” and “run contrary to the funda- mental principle of judicial restraint”). To prevail on a claim of facial invalidity, the challenger must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged provi- sions] would be valid.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). In the context of these appeals, that standard requires us to side with the defendants as to 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(b) and (c) if the Act’s restriction of any “assault weapon, assault weapon attachment, .50 caliber rifle, or .50 caliber cartridge” is constitutional. The same goes with respect to 720 ILCS 5/24- 1.10(b) and (c) if the Act’s restriction on any “large capacity ammunition feeding device” is valid. See, e.g., Bianchi v. 6 The Federal Firearms Licensees plaintiffs also challenge the endorse- ment affidavit requirement (part of the Act’s grandfather clause), which we address below. 14 Nos. 24-3060 et al. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 452–54 (4th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (exem- plifying this approach); Capen v. Campbell, 134 F.4th 660, 668– 69 (1st Cir. 2025) (same). The plaintiffs cannot satisfy this demanding standard. In- deed, they do not even advance arguments as to some of the items that 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9 and 5/24-1.10 regulate, all of which must be constitutionally protected for their facial claims to be viable. The Act, for example, restricts semiauto- matic rifles that have grenade launchers attached, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.9(a)(1)(A)(v), yet the district court unsurprisingly held that the Act may ban these weapons because they are not in common use for lawful purposes, and no plaintiff argues oth- erwise on appeal. Likewise, the plaintiffs focus on magazines holding up to thirty rounds, but 720 ILCS 5/24-1.10’s re- striction of “large capacity ammunition feeding device[s]” also includes, among other things, belts and ammunition feeding devices holding more than thirty rounds. Notwith- standing their failure to substantiate their attack on every item that the challenged provisions regulate, the plaintiffs ask that we enjoin the Act in its entirety. But because the plaintiffs have not made the showing that Supreme Court precedent re- quires, “the broad relief their facial challenge seeks is not ours to grant.” Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 453; see also, e.g., United States v. Charles, 159 F.4th 545, 547 (8th Cir. 2025) (rejecting facial chal- lenge to federal machine gun ban because some machine guns, such as the M230 machine gun mounted on military hel- icopters, are not bearable and thus lie beyond the Second Amendment’s scope). Following the Fourth Circuit’s model under similar cir- cumstances, we nonetheless proceed to evaluate the Act’s re- strictions on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines Nos. 24-3060 et al. 15 based on the circumstances on which the parties have princi- pally focused: an AR-15 (as representative of the banned ri- fles) and a thirty-round rifle magazine. 7 See Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 452–54. As in Bianchi, “the parties thoroughly briefed the issue of whether the Second Amendment protects a citizen’s ability to purchase and possess” these items, and moreover, the parties developed a record focused primarily on them. Id. at 453–54. “Not to address [them] would be to bypass the very heart of the dispute in this proceeding.” Id. at 454. It would also leave the two other cases Bevis consolidated, which re- main pending in the Northern District of Illinois, in limbo. C. The Second Amendment The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Mi- litia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The Supreme Court recognized in Heller that these words secure an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, see 554 U.S. at 576–600—a right that Justice Story called “the pal- ladium of the liberties of a republic,” 2 Joseph Story, Commen- taries on the Constitution of the United States 620 (4th ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1873). Two years after Heller, the Court confirmed that the states must respect that right by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). All Americans, therefore, may enjoy 7 Thus, we do not resolve the constitutionality of the Act’s application to the pistols and shotguns that the Act defines as assault weapons. Nor do we address pistol or shotgun magazines that qualify as large-capacity magazines under the Act. These restrictions, and any others not addressed in this opinion, are better left for another day and remain open to chal- lenge on an as-applied basis. 16 Nos. 24-3060 et al. the “means of self-defense” that “the right secures.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 690. Fundamental as it is, “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. In this respect, the right to keep and bear arms is just like other con- stitutional rights. The Free Speech Clause does not enshrine an absolute right to express oneself however one sees fit. The Free Exercise Clause does not protect believers from any and all burdens on their religious practice. And the Second Amendment does not secure “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for what- ever purpose.” Id.; see Wolford v. Lopez, 609 U.S. ----, No. 24- 1046, 2026 WL 1825723, at *5 (June 25, 2026) (“[W]hile the founding generation cherished the Second Amendment right, they did not think it was absolute.”). What does distinguish the Second Amendment is the na- ture of the standard governing challenges brought under it. Rejecting means-end scrutiny in favor of history and tradi- tion, the Court in Bruen set out a two-step framework for ad- judicating challenges to firearm regulations. Courts first ask whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an indi- vidual’s conduct”; if it does, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” 597 U.S. at 17. At that point, the burden shifts to the government to “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. Only if the government carries that burden “may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls out- side the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’” Id. (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.10 (1961)). Nos. 24-3060 et al. 17 In assessing whether a state’s proffered historical ana- logues satisfy its step-two burden, courts should consider “the number of jurisdictions in which they were adopted,” “the extent to which they were well-accepted,” and whether they are “‘relevantly similar’ to the modern law.” Wolford, 2026 WL 1825723, at *6. Ascertaining whether historical ana- logues are “relevantly similar” to a modern law in turn “re- quires consideration of ‘how’ the analogue restricted the keeping or bearing of arms” and “‘why’ the analogue re- stricted the keeping or bearing of arms.” Id. Especially because “states were not bound by the Second Amendment until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868,” we may rely on nineteenth-century statutes to shed light on the prevailing understanding of the right to keep and bear arms. Schoenthal, 150 F.4th at 913; see United States v. He- mani, 608 U.S. ----, No. 24-1234, 2026 WL 1751710, at *6 n.3 (June 18, 2026) (reserving the question “‘whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati- fied in 1868’ or when the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791” (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 37–38)); Wolford, 2026 WL 1825723, at *13 (indicating that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend- ment may be a relevant time period for purposes of ascertain- ing the Second Amendment’s meaning); see also Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rts. v. Lamont, 153 F.4th 213, 235 (2d Cir. 2025); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108, 1121 (11th Cir. 2025). D. AR-15s and Large-Capacity Magazines We turn now to whether the Act’s restrictions on AR-15s and thirty-round rifle magazines pass muster. We will assume for purposes of today’s ruling that the regulated items are “Arms” under Bevis, such that their possession is presump- 18 Nos. 24-3060 et al. tively entitled to constitutional protection, and move to Bruen’s second step. We hold that the Act is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition. In short, legislatures have long imposed restrictions on particularly dangerous weapons, and the Act is but another chapter in that story. As an initial matter, little has changed since we held in Bevis that the Act satisfies Bruen’s historical inquiry. See 85 F.4th at 1197–1202. To be sure, the parties developed the rec- ord in the years since Bevis. But that development—and the district court’s factual findings—went almost exclusively to step one. By contrast, the historical laws in the record, and the parties’ arguments about them, remain essentially the same as they stood at the preliminary injunction stage. Indeed, no- table intervening developments favor the defendants. First, the Court decided Rahimi, which “clarified that the Bruen standard should not be misunderstood to mean that modern firearm regulations require close founding-era comparators.” United States v. Reyna, 165 F.4th 1056, 1062 (7th Cir. 2026). And second, every circuit to have confronted the issue has agreed with our conclusion that legislatures may ban AR-15s and large-capacity magazines. 8 Though we do not rest on this point, we note that creating a conflict under these circum- 8 See Capen, 134 F.4th at 668–77 (assault weapons and large-capacity magazines); Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island, 95 F.4th 38, 43–52 (1st Cir. 2024) (large-capacity magazines); Lamont, 153 F.4th at 235–47 (assault weapons and large-capacity magazines); Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 446–72 (as- sault weapons); Duncan v. Bonta, 133 F.4th 852, 865–84 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (large-capacity magazines); Hanson v. District of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223, 234–43 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (large-capacity magazines). Nos. 24-3060 et al. 19 stances would be imprudent. See United States v. Tuggle, 4 F.4th 505, 522 (7th Cir. 2021). In any event, we remain persuaded by the unanimous cir- cuit consensus. Using one or another label—“dangerous and unusual,” “unusually dangerous,” “especially dangerous,” “particularly capable of unprecedented lethality”—these courts have coalesced around a largely overlapping set of his- torical regulations imposing targeted restrictions on weapons whose danger and lethality stand out. These courts have fur- ther concluded that those regulations justify restrictions on AR-15s and large-capacity magazines equivalent to those the Act imposes. See Ocean State Tactical, 95 F.4th at 44–52; Capen, 134 F.4th at 669–73; Lamont, 153 F.4th at 240–47; Bianchi, 111 F.4th at 464–72; Duncan, 133 F.4th at 874–84; Hanson, 120 F.4th at 234–40. Given the ground already covered, we think it un- necessary to reiterate the courts’ analyses of each of the stat- utes comprising this tradition, which spans from the pre- Founding going-armed laws through today’s machine gun ban. 9 Although we adopt the courts’ well-reasoned analyses of these statutes, we focus here instead on a leading example of this tradition: regulations of the Bowie knife 10—or, as one Reconstruction-era court called it, the “instrument of almost certain death.” Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859). 9 To be clear, we recognize that twentieth century machine gun bans are “insufficient to support a tradition of regulating [arms] in and of them- selves.” Hanson, 120 F.4th at 239. They “fit nicely,” however, “into the tra- dition of regulating weapons particularly capable of unprecedented le- thality.” Id. 10 The Second Amendment’s plain text is not limited to firearms. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 411–12 (2016) (per curiam). 20 Nos. 24-3060 et al. Popularized in the 1830s, Bowie knives came in a variety of forms, but “in its purest form” it was “a large knife with a clipped point” making the tip more piercing. Harold L. Peter- son, American Knives: The First History and Collectors’ Guide 26 (1958). These features, combined with the technological short- comings plaguing the era’s prominent firearms—which re- quired the user to carefully reload after every shot, such that one missed shot could leave the user defenseless—made Bowie knives a popular choice for fights and duels. Contrary to the dissenting opinion’s efforts (often without citation) to conclusively link Bowie knives to criminality, however, Bowie knives were both widespread and used for lawful purposes. One expert in the history of arms in Amer- ica, for example, explained that in the nineteenth century, “European visitors who ventured beyond the Appalachians found [the Bowie knife] such an integral part of the American way of life that they felt compelled to comment on it at length in accounts of their adventures…. In many communities, no man, whether hunter, gambler, tradesman or political leader felt himself fully clothed without one.” Peterson, supra, at 25. Similarly, the historian who (literally) wrote the book on Bowie knives noted they were “widely carried by Americans of all stripes”; “served everyone equally, upstanding citizens and villains” alike; were “wide[ly] popular[], in the North and South” during the Civil War; and were “common[]”—“a weapon carried by men of all walks of life.” Norm Flayder- man, The Bowie Knife: Unsheathing an American Legend 20, 125, 130 (2004). Other scholars agree. See David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 167, 184 (2013) (“During the nineteenth century, Bowie knives were commonly present in many areas of the United States. Contemporary sources Nos. 24-3060 et al. 21 leave no question that Bowie knives, Arkansas Toothpicks, and similar knives were a common part of American life until well after the Civil War….”). Bowie knives were also “particularly suitable for self-de- fense” and “typically possessed for self-defense.” Id. at 180, 185; see Peterson, supra, at 26 (“[T]he original knife made for James Bowie was a large heavy knife suitable for both self- defense and general utility in the woods.”); Cockrum, 24 Tex. at 402 (noting that “[t]he gun or pistol may miss its aim, and when discharged, its dangerous character is lost, or dimin- ished at least,” whereas the Bowie knife is “difficult to defend against”). Hunting served as another lawful purpose for which people owned Bowie knives. See Joseph E. Worcester, Dictionary of the English Language 165 (1860) (defining the term as “[a] large knife or dagger, used as a weapon, and car- ried by hunters in the South-western part of the United States”); see also Wolford, 2026 WL 1825723, at *4 n.4 (“[M]ost Americans in the late 18th century also ‘undoubtedly thought’ that the codified Second Amendment was ‘im- portant for hunting,’ which, particularly for those moving west, was an important source of sustenance.” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599)). But their “large blades … wreaked particu- larly bloody and gruesome injuries,” Lamont, 153 F.4th at 243 (citation modified), and no doubt criminals misused them. Legislatures responded accordingly, enacting criminal prohibitions that often authorized imprisonment. Some juris- dictions banned the carry of Bowie knives, with narrow ex- ceptions or none at all—a broad proscription. See 1871 Tex. Laws 1st Sess. 25; 1881 Ark. Acts 191; 1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws 30. Others prohibited their concealed carry. See, e.g., 1820 Ind. Acts 39; 1838 Va. Acts 76; 1838 Tenn. Pub. Acts 200; 1839 Ala. 22 Nos. 24-3060 et al. Acts 67; 1878 Miss. Laws 175; 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws 231; 1880 S.C. Acts 448. While these restrictions targeted what one did in public, others burdened one’s ability to own Bowie knives for use in private too, such as for defense of the home, by ban- ning the sale of Bowie knives or imposing burdensome, and sometimes prohibitive, taxes. See 1838 Tenn. Pub. Acts 200 (banning sale); 1881 Ark. Acts 192 (same); 1837 Ala. Laws 7 ($100 tax per sale, which is equivalent to several thousand dollars today); 1838 Fla. Terr. Laws 36 ($200 per year tax on Bowie-knife sellers and $10 per year on Bowie-knife carriers). The dissenting opinion seeks to undermine our reliance on the Texas, Arkansas, and Arizona carry bans, but it misappre- hends these statutes. The dissenting opinion first claims that the Texas and Arizona statutes permitted carry for self-de- fense, but their exceptions were significantly narrower. The Arizona statute, for example, excepted only “one who has rea- sonable ground for fearing an unlawful attack upon his per- son, and the danger is so imminent and threatening as not to admit of the arrest of the party about to make such attack upon legal