Full Opinion

[J-70-2025] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, : No. 59 EAP 2024 : Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the : Commonwealth Court entered : January 8, 2024, at No. 39 CD 2023, v. : affirming the Order of the Court of : Common Pleas of Philadelphia : County, Civil Division, entered on FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE : December 13, 2022, at No. 2544 NO. 5, : : ARGUED: September 11, 2025 Appellee : OPINION JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: October 29, 2026 Appellant the City of Philadelphia (“City”), asks the Court to overturn Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt), 656 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1995), or, alternatively, to overturn Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n (Smith), 741 A.2d 1248 (Pa. 1999). Betancourt held that appeals of grievance arbitration awards rendered pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act1 are subject to the narrow certiorari scope of review.2 Betancourt, 656 A.2d at 89. Smith, decided four years after Betancourt, declined to add a limited public policy 1 Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.12 (“Act 111”). 2 “The narrow certiorari scope of review limits a reviewing court to questions regarding: (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights.” Betancourt, 656 A.2d at 85. exception to the narrow certiorari scope of review. Smith, 741 A.2d at 1252-53. In reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis, we uphold our decisions in Betancourt and Smith and affirm the judgment of the Commonwealth Court. I. Background Marc Hayes is a lieutenant in the City’s Police Department responsible for supervising officers in the City’s 24th Police District. On August 13, 2018, Hayes sent multiple inappropriate and sexual text messages to two female officers (“Officer One” and “Officer Two”) under his supervision. In the texts, Hayes made numerous sexual innuendos, boasted about his sexual prowess, discussed Officer One’s use of the restroom, and sent a video showing a dog performing oral sex on a woman. On October 30, 2018, an anonymous letter was found at District Headquarters which claimed that Hayes sent the sexually explicit bestiality video to two subordinate officers during work hours. The Police Department forwarded the letter to its Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), which investigated the allegation through its Investigative Support Services (“ISS”) and Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) teams. Representatives of the ISS and EEO interviewed Officers One and Two and reviewed the text messages between Hayes and the officers, including the bestiality video. The City claims that on October 31, 2018, the day after receipt of the anonymous letter, Hayes attempted to influence the statement of Officer One by telling her that she could tell the investigators that she could not recall anything. City’s Brief at 12. The City also claims that Hayes approached Officer Two in the hallway later that day and, after asking her whether she still had the video on her phone, mentioned that he submitted her name for a promotion. Id. After its investigation, the City charged Hayes with violations of four different sections of the collectively bargained Disciplinary Code: [J-70-2025] - 2 Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§024-10: Any act, conduct, or course of conduct which objectively constitutes sexual harassment. Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§021-10: Any incident, conduct, or course of conduct which indicates that an employee has little or no regard for his/her responsibility as a member of the Police Department. Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§025-10: On duty or job-related inappropriate sexually based communication(s) conveyed in any manner. Article VIII: Failure to Supervise, Section 8-§003-10: Failure to properly supervise subordinates. Philadelphia Police Department Disciplinary Code, July 2014, at 10, 12, 37. On July 9, 2020, the City’s Police Commissioner determined that Hayes committed each offense and that he should be dismissed from the Department. The Commissioner ordered that Hayes be suspended for thirty days with the intent to dismiss. Hayes, by and through the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 (“FOP”), challenged his termination by filing a grievance, demanding arbitration as provided by the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).3 The parties stipulated that the issues to be decided at arbitration were whether the City had just cause to discharge Hayes, and if not, what the remedy should be. The arbitration consisted of hearings on June 17, and June 22, 2022, where the arbitrator heard testimony from Lieutenant Brent Conway and Detective Jeanette Smith, each of whom investigated the matter. Officer One and Hayes also testified at the arbitration.4 In rendering his decision, the arbitrator first noted that the City had to prove by a preponderance of credible evidence that Hayes committed the charged offenses. 3 The parties agreed to select David J. Reily, Esq. to preside over the arbitration. Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 9. 4 Office Two did not testify at the arbitration. Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 6 n.8. The transcript of the arbitration proceedings, if it exists, is not a part of the record. [J-70-2025] - 3 Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 14. Concerning the sexual harassment charge, the arbitrator relied on the City’s Department Directive 8.7, which provides, that “[i]t is sexual harassment if one employee attempts to impose their sexual desires, will or wish, fantasy or preference on another employee through an offensive act, deed, gesture or comment and such conduct interferes with the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.” Department Directive 8.7-2, 10/21/2011. The arbitrator also relied on the City’s Sexual Harassment Policy which states “[s]exual [h]arassment is defined legally as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, or other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when … the conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.” City’s Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy, 7/19/2018, at 3. After considering the testimony and all the text messages, the arbitrator concluded that there was not a sufficient basis to find that the texts “were unwelcome or rose to the level of creating a sexually hostile work environment.” Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 16. To the arbitrator, “the texts reflect[ed] some questionable banter in which Hayes, Officer One and Officer Two all appeared willing to engage.” Id. The arbitrator relied on Officer One’s testimony and prior statements that she did not consider the texts to be sexually harassing, but instead an attempt at humor by Hayes. Id. at 16-17. The arbitrator highlighted that Officer Two did not testify at arbitration and explained, “[w]ithout the context that her testimony would have provided, I cannot draw any conclusions from her entries in the … text exchange relative to whether she considered Hayes’ texts to be sexually offensive or harassing. Her statements during the … investigation represent hearsay.” Id. at 17 n.12. [J-70-2025] - 4 As for the video, the arbitrator acknowledged that it was “very disturbing” and had “the potential to offend and create a hostile work environment based upon sex.” Id. at 17. However, the arbitrator again analyzed whether the video subjectively constituted sexual harassment, explaining I cannot simply look to the content of the video itself and the fact that Hayes, a male supervisor, sent it to two female subordinates, Officer One and Officer Two. Instead, I must find that Officer One and/or Officer Two were, in fact, offended by the video, and it had the effect of rendering their work environment sexually hostile. Id. The arbitrator noted that Officer One never watched the video and explained that her knowledge of its contents “is limited to the still image that appears at the start of the video before it is played.” Id. at 17-18. While Officer One testified that she found the video to be “gross,” the arbitrator highlighted that she did not consider it to be an attempt by Hayes to sexually harass her. Id. at 18. The arbitrator further explained that Officer One did not claim that receiving the video adversely affected her work environment. Id. The arbitrator acknowledged that Officer Two texted “please don’t send me things like that” after receiving the video. Id. at 18 n.13. However, the arbitrator explained this text was inconclusive to determine whether transmission of the video constituted sexual harassment as to Officer Two. Id. The arbitrator found that Hayes’ sending of the video was highly inappropriate, but it did not rise to the level of sexual harassment in violation of Directive 8.7. Id. at 18. On the remaining three charges, the arbitrator found that Hayes violated each respective section of the Disciplinary Code. Id. at 18-21. The arbitrator imposed a fifty- day suspension for the three violations. Finding that the City did not have just cause to [J-70-2025] - 5 discharge Hayes, the arbitrator ordered the City to reinstate Hayes to his former position with the Department and awarded him backpay. Id. at 25. The City filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing first that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by rewriting the terms of the Disciplinary Code, Directive 8.7, and the City’s Sexual Harassment Policy by applying a different standard for sexual harassment than the standard collectively bargained for by the parties. City’s Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award, 8/22/2022, at 11. Alternatively, the City argued that the trial court should modify the narrow certiorari scope of review for grievance arbitration awards rendered pursuant to Act 111. Id. at 13. The trial court denied the City’s petition. The trial court explained that it was bound by the narrow certiorari scope of review when reviewing the arbitration award and therefore could only consider questions regarding “(1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrator; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) a deprivation of constitutional rights.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2023, at 2 (quoting City of Washington v. Police Dep’t of Washington, 259 A.2d 437, 440-41 (Pa. 1969)). The trial court concluded that the arbitrator acted within his authority in altering the discipline imposed on Hayes. Id. at 4. Further, the trial court noted that it did not have the authority to modify the narrow certiorari scope of review. Id. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, reiterating the trial court’s pronouncement that in Act 111 cases, judicial review is confined to narrow certiorari.5 City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5, 307 A.3d 1263, 1267 (Pa. Commw. 2024) (citing Borough of State Coll. v. Borough of State Coll. Police Ass’n, 303 A.3d 248, 255-56 (Pa. Commw. 2023)). The City argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because he fully 5 President Judge Cohn Jubelirer dissented without opinion. [J-70-2025] - 6 reformed the parties’ CBA by replacing its objective standard for sexual harassment with a subjective standard based on the specific perspectives of the officers who received the messages. The Commonwealth Court rejected the City’s argument, relying on this Court’s discussion in City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 224 A.3d 702 (Pa. 2020): Certainly, an Act 111 grievance arbitrator should not undertake to equitably reform a collective bargaining agreement. Absent an indisputably overt instance of reformation, however, we find the task of distinguishing between such an innovation and errors of law in the interpretation to be unmanageable. Cf. Smith, 741 A.2d at 1252-53 (refusing to incorporate review for violations of public policy into narrow certiorari, since such a focus “-- however that nebulous concept may be defined by a particular appellate court -- would greatly expand the scope of review ... undercut[ting] the legislature’s intent of preventing protracted litigation in this arena.”). Id. at 1268 (emphasis removed) (quoting City of Pittsburgh, 224 A.3d at 714). Here, the Commonwealth Court explained that, “[a]t most, the arbitrator erred as a matter of law[.]” Id. However, it stressed that “[a] mere error of law is insufficient to support a court’s decision to reverse an Act 111 arbitrator’s award.” Id. (quoting Borough of State Coll., 303 A.3d at 255). The City also argued that the arbitrator acted outside of his authority by ruling on a matter of managerial prerogative. The Commonwealth Court explained that the propriety of Hayes’ discharge was submitted to the arbitrator as all matters of discipline are grievable pursuant to the CBA. Id. Thus, the Commonwealth Court determined that the arbitrator addressed an issue that was properly before him. Id. Lastly, the Commonwealth Court explained that it was not permitted to modify the narrow certiorari scope of review because it was constrained by this Court’s holding in Betancourt. Id. at 1268-69. [J-70-2025] - 7 The City filed a petition for allowance of appeal which we granted, limited to the following question: Where a police lieutenant sent a series of [ ] sexualized texts to two subordinate officers … and then encouraged one of the officers to cover it up, but where the grievance arbitrator reinstated the employee, should this Court modify the narrow certiorari scope of review set forth in Pa. State Police v. Pa. State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt), 656 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1995), and instead apply the essence test or judgment n.o.v. test, or at least incorporate a limited public policy exception into the narrow certiorari test? City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5, 326 A.3d 87 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam).6 II. Judicial Review under Act 111 Before addressing the arguments of the parties, it is necessary to recount the history of the narrow certiorari scope of review in the context of Act 111 cases and our decisions in Betancourt and Smith. In our recent decision of Northern Berks Regional Police Commission v. Berks County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 71, 230 A.3d 1022 (Pa. 2020), we explained: Act 111 was enacted in the wake of Erie Firefighters Local No. 293 v. Gardner, 178 A.2d 691 (Pa. 1962) (per curiam), which held that its predecessor was not binding on municipalities on constitutional non-delegation grounds. Id. at 695 (citing PA. CONST. art. [III], § 20 (repealed)). That former law “prohibited strikes and attempted to provide for the adjustment of grievances through negotiations” but did not allow for collective bargaining. Moon Twp. v. Police Officers of Moon Twp., 498 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. 1985). “This double denial of rights to police and fire personnel fueled the growing tension 6 We denied allowance of appeal of the City’s second issue concerning whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the narrow certiorari scope of review. See Petition for Allowance of Appeal, 2/6/2024, at 6; City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5, 326 A.3d 87 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam). Therefore, we do not analyze the Commonwealth Court’s determination that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in rendering the award. [J-70-2025] - 8 between labor and management, tension which culminated in ‘illegal strikes and a general breakdown in communication between public employers and their employees.’” [Smith], 741 A.2d [at] 1251 … (quoting Betancourt, 656 A.2d at 89). Following Erie Firefighters, the electorate authorized an amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. [III], § 31,[7] which allowed “the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public employers.” That amendment cleared the way for new legislation. Act 111 was passed two years later. It continued to withhold the right to strike from police and firefighters but conferred “the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment[.]” 43 P.S. § 217.1.[8] This process, deemed interest arbitration, 7 Article III, Section 31 provides: The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever. Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision of the Constitution, the General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of panels or commissions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public employers shall be binding upon all parties and shall constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer of the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employer, with respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative action, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivision or of the Commonwealth, with respect to matters which require legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry out such findings. PA. CONST. art. III, § 31. 8 Section 1 of Act 111 provides: Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of the Commonwealth or by the Commonwealth shall, through (continued…) [J-70-2025] - 9 is “in essence, the process by which the parties, through a neutral arbitrator or panel, create a collective bargaining agreement.” Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5, of F[raternal Ord. of Police] v. City of Phila[.], 129 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa. 2015). Interest arbitration is distinct from grievance arbitration, which involves the disputes over how the governing bargaining agreement should be interpreted and/or applied. … Grievance arbitration is not specifically mentioned in Act 111 as its language speaks only to the resolution of disputes arising from “the collective bargaining process,” i.e. interest arbitration, which must be settled before a board of arbitration composed of three persons. 43 P.S. § 217.4(b). However, Section 1 of Act 111 states that police and firefighters “shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act,” 43 P.S. § 217.1, and in Chirico v. B[oar]d. of Sup[ervisor]s for Newton T[ownship], 470 A.2d 470, 474-75 (Pa. 1983), we held that the General Assembly intended for Act 111 and the concomitant body of case law regarding the appellate scope of review to apply to grievance disputes. Therefore, an arbitrator’s decision in an Act 111 case, whether grievance or interest, “shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer ... No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” 43 P.S. § 217.7(a).[9] labor organizations or other representatives designated by fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act. 43 P.S. § 217.1. 9 Section 7(a) of Act 111 provides: (a) The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer and the policemen or firemen involved. Such determination shall be in writing and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to both parties to the dispute. No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to (continued…) [J-70-2025] - 10 N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1032-33. Although Act 111 does not allow for appeals of arbitration awards, this Court in City of Washington “adopted the narrow certiorari mechanism for a combination of pragmatic, historical, and constitutional reasons.” N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1033. There, after the City of Washington could not reach an agreement with its police officers, the parties went to arbitration where a three-member panel issued an interest arbitration award. The City of Washington subsequently filed an appeal in the court of common pleas, challenging a portion of the award which ordered it to provide “at its sole expense, hospitalization coverage for the members of the family of each member of the Police Department of the City of Washington, equal to the coverage now provided … for the member himself.” City of Washington, 259 A.2d at 439 (quoting arbitration award). The City of Washington claimed that it was illegal to make such payments to family members of police officers. After the trial court concluded that the City of Washington had no right to appeal under Act 111, the City petitioned for allowance to appeal to this Court. The City of Washington Court first rejected the City’s claim that it had a constitutional right to appeal an interest arbitration award to the court of common pleas. Id. The Court observed that Act 111 “clearly provides that ‘the determination of the majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer and the policemen or firemen any court. Such determination shall constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer of the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employer, with respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative action, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivision or of the Commonwealth with respect to matters which require legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry out the determination of the board of arbitration. 43 P.S. § 217.7(a) (emphasis added). [J-70-2025] - 11 involved. … No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” Id. (quoting 43 P.S. § 217.7(a)). Given that an arbitration panel “is neither a court nor an administrative agency[,]” the Court determined that Act 111’s prohibition on appeals of arbitration awards did not conflict with Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which only provides a right of appeal from cases arising from a court or administrative agency.10 Nonetheless, the City of Washington Court examined the appeal pursuant to then- existing Supreme Court Rule 68 ½, explaining that If an appeal is prohibited by an Act, or the decision of the Agency is stated to be final or conclusive, the law is well settled that an appeal will lie to the Courts in the nature of a narrow certiorari and this Court will review only (1) the question of jurisdiction; (2) the regularity of the proceedings before the Agency; (3) questions of excess in exercise of powers; and (4) constitutional questions: Cf. Devito v. Civil Service Commission, 172 A.2d 161 [(Pa. 1961)] (and cases cited therein); Dauphin Deposit Trust Company v. Myers, 164 A.2d 86 [(Pa. 1960)]. City of Washington, 259 A.2d at 441 (quoting Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm’n, 173 A.2d 97, 99 (Pa. 1961)). Given that “[n]o adjudicatory body has unlimited discretion” and that “each and every adjudicator is bound by the Constitution[,]” the City of Washington Court reasoned that applying the narrow certiorari scope of review would ensure “the protection of constitutional rights.” Id. at 440-41. 10 Article V, Section 9 provides: There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law. PA. CONST. art. V, § 9. It is questionable whether the City of Washington Court’s finding that a decision of an Act 111 arbitration panel is not a decision of an administrative agency remains true in light of subsequently enacted statutes. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(b); 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(b). [J-70-2025] - 12 Analyzing the third prong of the narrow certiorari scope of review, the Court concluded that the arbitration panel exceeded the scope of its authority in ordering the city to carry out an illegal act, noting that the city was forbidden by statute from paying hospitalization premiums for non-city employees. Id. at 443. Notably, the City of Washington Court did not draw a distinction between interest arbitrations and grievance arbitrations in finding that the narrow certiorari scope of review applied to review of arbitration awards rendered pursuant to Act 111.11 In Chirico v. Board of Supervisors for Newton Township, 470 A.2d 470 (Pa. 1983), the Court addressed, inter alia, whether a court of common pleas had jurisdiction to resolve a grievance between Newton Township and its police officers, stemming from the interpretation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. After an impasse in collective bargaining negotiations, a board of arbitrators entered an award setting forth 11 In 1970—two years following the passage of Act 111—the General Assembly enacted the Public Employe Relations Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (“PERA”). PERA outlines more detailed procedures and requirements for the representation of public employees, the scope of collective bargaining between representatives of public employees and public employers, and provides that “[a]rbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory.” 43 P.S. § 1101.903. Section 903 of PERA further provides that “[t]he procedure [for arbitration] to be adopted is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator or a tri-partite board of arbitrators as the parties may agree.” Id. In 1977, this Court held that the proper scope of review of grievance arbitration awards rendered pursuant to PERA is the essence test, which provides that “[t]he arbitrator’s award must be ‘respected by the judiciary if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention[.]’” Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 939 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty. v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., Soc. of the Fac., 375 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. 1977)). However, PERA is clear that it does not apply to employees covered by Act 111. See 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2) (“‘Public employe’ or ‘employe’ … shall not include … those employees covered under the act of June 24, 1968 (Act No. 111)[.]”). This Court has explained that PERA “has no application to proceedings initiated under Act 111.” Geriot v. Council of Darby, 417 A.2d 1144, 1147 (Pa. 1980). [J-70-2025] - 13 the terms and conditions of employment for police officers for the 1975 calendar year. Chirico, 470 A.2d at 471. When the Township refused to implement certain aspects of the award, the Police Department filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of common pleas. Id. at 472. During the pendency of that mandamus action, another board of arbitrators entered an award for the 1976 calendar year. Neither the Township nor the Police Department filed an appeal from either award. Relevant here, the 1975 award provided that police officers were entitled to one to five weeks of vacation, but the award did not define the term “week.” As a result, the parties disputed whether a “vacation week” was five or six days. In deciding the Police Department’s mandamus action, the trial court interpreted the phrase “vacation week” but refused to enforce other ambiguous provisions of the awards to the extent the directives were illegal. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to interpret the phrase in the award as this was exclusively for the arbitration panel. On appeal, this Court affirmed, explaining that “[a] dispute over the interpretation of a provision in an existing award falls within the ambit of grievance arbitration.” Id. at 474 (citing Geriot, 417 A.2d at 1144 (holding that a police department could seek mandamus against its municipality to enforce a wage provision in the CBA)). The Chirico Court continued: Grievance disputes are properly handled within the framework of [S]ection 1 of Act 111, which provides that “[Employees] shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.” [43 P.S. § 217.1]. Act 111 does not set forth the specific mechanism by which grievance, as compared with interest, disputes are to be arbitrated. We acknowledge it is clearly inadequate to recognize a right “to a settlement of grievances or disputes[,]” while failing to provide any method for the implementation of those rights. This obvious vacuum must not be countenanced. Yet resort to the courts to meet this need would contravene the strong affirmance of the use of non-adversarial methods for the resolution of disputes [J-70-2025] - 14 between governmental employers and police and firemen embodied in [S]ection two of the Act. First, Act 111 specifically avoids the use of the courts for dispute resolution. This policy is so strong that [S]ection seven of the Act, 43 P.S. [§] 217.7, provides for binding arbitration and contains the unique provision that “[n]o appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” Thus the only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration. This objective would be completely frustrated if we were to superimpose, by judicial fiat, a layer of court intervention. Id. at 474–75. The Court also highlighted that labor arbitrators, given their particular expertise in labor law, are best suited to resolve disputes as to the meaning of an award. Id. at 475. Two years later, in Moon Township v. Police Officers of Moon Township, 498 A.2d 1305 (Pa. 1985), the Court addressed whether an Act 111 interest arbitration panel may include in its award a procedure for binding grievance arbitration and, subsumed within that question, it addressed whether Act 111 requires that grievance arbitration procedures conform with the arbitration procedures set forth in Section 4 of Act 111.12 After Moon 12 Section 4 provides: (a) If in any case of a dispute between a public employer and its policemen or firemen employes the collective bargaining process reaches an impasse and stalemate, or if the appropriate lawmaking body does not approve the agreement reached by collective bargaining, with the result that said employers and employes are unable to effect a settlement, then either party to the dispute, after written notice to the other party containing specifications of the issue or issues in dispute, may request the appointment of a board of arbitration. For purposes of this [S]ection, an impasse or stalemate shall be deemed to occur in the collective bargaining process if the parties do not reach a settlement of the issue or issues in dispute by way of a written agreement within thirty days after collective bargaining proceedings have been initiated. (continued…) [J-70-2025] - 15 Township and its police officers reached an impasse in their collective bargaining negotiations, the parties proceeded to arbitration pursuant to Act 111. Relevant here, the In the case of disputes involving political subdivisions of the Commonwealth, the agreement shall be deemed not approved within the meaning of this [S]ection if it is not approved by the appropriate lawmaking body within one month after the agreement is reached by way of collective bargaining. In the case of disputes involving the Commonwealth, the agreement shall be deemed not approved within the meaning of this [S]ection if it is not approved by the Legislature within six months after the agreement is reached by way of collective bargaining. (b) The board of arbitration shall be composed of three persons, one appointed by the public employer, one appointed by the body of policemen or firemen involved, and a third member to be agreed upon by the public employer and such policemen or firemen. The members of the board representing the public employer and the policemen or firemen shall be named within five days from the date of the request for the appointment of such board. If, after a period of ten days from the date of the appointment of the two arbitrators appointed by the public employer and by the policemen or firemen, the third arbitrator has not been selected by them, then either arbitrator may request the American Arbitration Association, or its successor in function, to furnish a list of three members of said association who are residents of Pennsylvania from which the third arbitrator shall be selected. The arbitrator appointed by the public employer shall eliminate one name from the list within five days after publication of the list, following which the arbitrator appointed by the policemen or firemen shall eliminate one name from the list within five days thereafter. The individual whose name remains on the list shall be the third arbitrator and shall act as chairman of the board of arbitration. The board of arbitration thus established shall commence the arbitration proceedings within ten days after the third arbitrator is selected and shall make its determination within thirty days after the appointment of the third arbitrator. 43 P.S. § 217.4. [J-70-2025] - 16 interest arbitration panel issued an award which included a contractual grievance procedure that required binding arbitration of grievances between Moon Township and its police officers. Moon Twp., 498 A.2d at 1306 n.2. Notably, the grievance procedure set forth in the award differed from the procedure set forth in Section 4 of Act 111. Id. The award provided, in pertinent part, that “the issue may be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the rules and regulations, then prevailing, of the American Arbitration Association except as may be limited or expanded by the Uniform Arbitration Ac