Full Opinion

[J-32-2026] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ. CONYNGHAM TOWNSHIP, : No. 34 MAP 2025 : Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the : Commonwealth Court at No. 113 : CD 2024, dated October 4, 2024, v. : Vacating and Remanding the : Decision of the Public Utility : Commission at No. C-2021- PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY : 3023624 dated January 18, 2024 COMMISSION, : : ARGUED: April 16, 2026 Appellant : OPINION JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: October 29, 2026 For more than 80 years, municipal authorities throughout the Commonwealth have operated largely without regulation by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission). Under the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-3316, the Commission exercises regulatory authority over public utilities and municipal entities providing utility service to customers beyond their corporate boundaries. Since 1945, the prevailing law has been that the Commission lacks regulatory authority over municipal authorities incorporated under the Municipality Authorities Act (MAA), 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5601-5623. The MAA is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing municipal authorities that places jurisdiction over disputes involving their rates and service exclusively with the courts of common pleas. With one exception, 1 municipal authorities established under the MAA historically have not been regulated by the Commission, even 1 The Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, discussed infra, is the sole exception. when they provide service outside the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities. However, in 2024, the Commonwealth Court concluded the Commission possessed jurisdiction to consider a challenge to a municipal authority’s failure to obtain Commission approval, in the form of a certificate of public convenience (certificate), before extending its utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of the incorporating municipality. We granted discretionary review to consider the propriety of that decision. We hold the Commission’s jurisdiction over municipal corporations, as defined in the Code, does not extend to municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA, because the MAA vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over municipal authorities’ rates and services. We further hold that municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA are not subject to Commission regulation when they operate beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities. Therefore, we reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1973, the Borough of Shickshinny (Borough), a municipality in Luzerne County, filed Articles of Incorporation with the Secretary of the Commonwealth establishing the Sanitary Sewer Authority of the Borough of Shickshinny (Authority) as a municipal authority for the purpose of constructing, improving, furnishing and equipping a sanitary sewage system and sewage treatment works. See Certified Record at 909a-912a. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary issued a Certificate of Incorporation “evidencing the incorporation of [the A]uthority under the provisions of [the Municipality Authorities Act of 1945 (1945 MAA)].” Id. at 917a. The Borough is the Authority’s sole member. The Authority treats domestic wastewater and discharges the treated wastewater into the Susquehanna River in accordance with a permit issued by the Pennsylvania [J-32-2026] - 2 Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The Authority operates a sewage processing plant on Authority-owned property in adjacent Conyngham Township (Township). The Authority provides sewage treatment services to the Borough, a portion of the Township, and a few other areas beyond the Borough limits. The Township’s sewer lines are owned and maintained by the Conyngham Township Sewer Authority (CTSA) and convey wastewater to the Authority’s processing plant via a single point of connection, where it is treated by the Authority. The Township is not within the Borough’s corporate limits and has no representation on the Authority’s governing board. In 1992, the Authority and the Township entered into a Sewage Treatment Agreement, wherein the Authority agreed to provide sewage treatment and disposal services to the CTSA as a single bulk customer. At that time, the Authority provided sewer services to approximately 220 residential customers and 8 commercial customers in the Township as well as the Township itself, which received service at its municipal building. For 28 years, the Authority directly billed the CTSA for its bulk sewage treatment services. The CTSA, in turn, directly billed residential and commercial customers in the Township a flat $134 quarterly rate for sewer services. In September 2020, the Authority notified the Township it was cancelling the Sewage Treatment Agreement due to the Township’s failure to address influx and infiltration issues for the prior three years. 2 Consequently, in January 2021, the Authority began directly billing individual Township customers $75 per quarter for its sewer services. Between January 2021 and September 2021, the Authority collected nearly $55,000 from Township customers. 2 In 2020, the Authority also filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County against the Township and the CTSA, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. That suit was still pending as of the date of the Commission’s decision in this case. See Certified Record at 1165a. [J-32-2026] - 3 A. Agency Proceedings In January 2021, the Township filed a Formal Complaint with the Commission, alleging the Authority was operating as a public utility in the Township and directly billing Township customers without a Commission-issued certificate. Under Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code, a certificate is required “[f]or any municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service beyond its corporate limits.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(5). In its Formal Complaint, the Township asked the Commission to “order [the Authority] to immediately stop billing residents of [the] Township and return all monies collected until after a valid [c]ertificate … is obtained.” Certified Record at 3a. In September 2021, the Commission’s Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement (Bureau) filed a Notice of Intervention in the matter, seeking a civil penalty against the Authority. The Bureau asserted that following its preliminary investigation, it determined “the Authority’s termination of the Sewage Treatment Agreement with the Township[] … and its subsequent provision of wastewater services to numerous Township residents for compensation renders it … a public utility subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction.” Certified Record at 142a. When the parties were unsuccessful in resolving their dispute through mediation, the matter proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Before the hearing, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts. The ALJ held an evidentiary hearing in October 2022 and closed the record in March 2023. The ALJ issued an Initial Decision sustaining the Township’s Formal Complaint. The ALJ concluded the Township met its burden of proving the Authority was improperly operating as a public utility in the Township without a Commission-issued certificate, specifically finding the Authority “provided sewer treatment service beyond its Borough [J-32-2026] - 4 limits for compensation in violation of Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code.” Certified Record at 1115a. The ALJ directed the Authority to file an application for a certificate with the Commission and to issue partial refunds to Township customers, but he denied the Bureau’s request for a civil penalty. Notably, in reaching his decision, the ALJ did not consider or address the applicability of the MAA, even though the Authority raised the issue in its brief filed with the ALJ. The Authority then filed exceptions to the ALJ’s Initial Decision, asserting the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the Authority under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, which provides, in pertinent part: Any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety and reasonableness of the authority’s services, including extensions thereof, may bring suit against the authority in the court of common pleas of the county where the project is located or, if the project is located in more than one county, in the court of common pleas of the county where the principal office of the project is located. The court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphases added). The Authority averred the threshold question before the Commission was whether its jurisdiction over municipal corporations, as defined in the Code, also extends to municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA. Relying on Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, the Authority asserted: (1) the MAA vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over municipal authorities’ rates and services, and (2) municipal authorities are not subject to Commission regulation, even when they operate beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities. The Commission granted in part and denied in part the Authority’s exceptions. Specifically, the Commission concluded it lacked jurisdiction over municipal authorities providing service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities under the MAA. The Commission explained that although it historically exercised jurisdiction over [J-32-2026] - 5 municipal corporations providing services outside their boundaries and issued certificates to those entities, the 1945 amendments to the MAA explicitly removed municipal authorities from the Commission’s jurisdiction. Section 5607(d)(9) of the present MAA vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over the rates and services of municipal authorities. The Commission noted that Pennsylvania’s intermediate appellate courts have similarly interpreted Section 5607(d)(9) and held the MAA gives the courts of common pleas, not the Commission, exclusive jurisdiction over a municipal authority’s rates and service, both within and beyond the boundaries of the incorporating municipality. The Commission also relied on the parties’ stipulation that the Authority is a municipal authority, noting that municipal authorities and municipal corporations are distinct entities under Pennsylvania law. Section 1301 of the Code establishes Commission jurisdiction over the rates charged by municipal corporations when those entities provide public utility service beyond their corporate limits. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1301. Section 1501 of the Code gives the Commission jurisdiction over the quality, reliability, and adequacy of services of municipal corporations under similar terms. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501. However, the Commission concluded its jurisdiction does not extend to municipal authorities because the 1945 amendments to the MAA expressly removed municipal authorities from its jurisdiction, and that provision remains codified in Section 5607(d)(9) of the present MAA. The Township appealed to the Commonwealth Court. B. Commonwealth Court’s Decision On October 4, 2024, the Commonwealth Court vacated the Commission’s order and remanded the matter to the Commission. See Conyngham Township v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 325 A.3d 885 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). The Commonwealth Court began by [J-32-2026] - 6 explaining that Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code allows, “[u]pon the application of any public utility and the approval of such application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its [Certificate] first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing laws, ... [f]or any municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service beyond its corporate limits.” Id. at 888 (citation omitted; emphasis and some alterations in original). Further, Section 102 of the Code expressly includes an “authority” within the definition of “municipal corporation.” Id. (citation omitted). The Commonwealth Court also relied on Section 1501 of the Code, which provides that “[a]ny public utility service being furnished or rendered by a municipal corporation beyond its corporate limits shall be subject to regulation and control by the [C]ommission as to service and extensions, with the same force and in like manner as if such service were rendered by a public utility.” Id. (citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original). The Commonwealth Court acknowledged, however, that Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA gives the courts of common pleas jurisdiction to determine “the reasonableness or uniformity of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of the authority’s services, including extensions thereof” and further provides that “[t]he court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service.” Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 888 (citation omitted; emphases in original). Based on this statutory language, the Commonwealth Court found “the MAA does not confer jurisdiction on the common pleas courts for all disputes involving municipal authorities but, rather, only those involving ‘rates or service.’” Id. at 888-889 (emphases in original). In rejecting the Commission’s claim that its jurisdiction extends only to municipal corporations and municipalities, the Commonwealth Court found the cases on which the [J-32-2026] - 7 Commission relied involved challenges to rates, which are expressly covered by the MAA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts. The Commonwealth Court observed those cases did not address the Commission’s “jurisdiction over municipal authorities concerning the Code’s mandate that municipal authorities obtain [c]ertificates when furnishing service beyond their corporate limits.” Conyngham Twp., 325 A.3d at 889; see Elizabeth Township v. Mun. Auth. of McKeesport, 447 A.2d 245 (Pa. 1982); Rankin v. Chester Mun. Auth., 68 A.2d 458 (Pa. Super. 1949). The Commonwealth Court reasoned that to conclude the common pleas courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a claim that a municipal authority failed to obtain a certificate before operating beyond its corporate limits, the Court would need to construe the certification requirement as relating to “the reasonableness or uniformity of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of the authority’s services” pursuant to Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA. Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 889-890 (citation omitted; emphases in original). However, the Commonwealth Court declined to do so, because it determined the certification requirement “does not ‘involv[e] rates or service.’” Id. at 890 (citation omitted; brackets in original). To reach that conclusion, the Commonwealth Court looked to the provisions of the Code governing the issuance of certificates. In particular, Section 1103(a) of the Code provides a certificate “shall be granted by order of the [C]ommission, only if the [C]ommission shall find or determine that the granting of such [C]ertificate is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public.” Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 890 (citation omitted; emphasis and alterations in original). According to the Commonwealth Court, the primary consideration for obtaining a certificate is whether it is “necessary or proper[,]” which it opined does not implicate rates or service. Id. (citation omitted). [J-32-2026] - 8 Lastly, the Commonwealth Court found the Commission’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction over this action was undermined by the fact that the Commission previously issued certificates to municipal authorities in two prior cases. Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 890-891 (citing E. Dunkard Water Auth. v. Sw. Pa. Water Auth., 2020 WL 6707503 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Nov. 16, 2020) (unreported); Middle Smithfield Twp. Mun. Auth. v. Maula, 2008 WL 9404647 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Oct. 24, 2008) (unreported)). Therefore, the Commonwealth Court concluded “the Commission had jurisdiction to consider the Township’s [Formal] Complaint challenging the Authority’s operation [in the Township] without a [c]ertificate.” Id. at 891. II. ISSUE The issue before this Court is whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding the Commission has jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the MAA when the authority provides utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of its incorporating municipality. See Conyngham Township v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 340 A.3d 272 (Pa. 2025). 3 3 The Dissent takes issue with our use of the term “jurisdiction” throughout this decision, opining that we improperly conflate subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute with regulatory authority over a municipal authority. Dissenting Opinion at 2. According to the Dissent, this appeal is not about the Commission’s regulatory authority over municipal authorities generally, but only whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to determine if Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA applies to the underlying dispute, consistent with the Commonwealth Court’s limited holding. While the Commission did raise that issue in its Petition for Allowance of Appeal (PAA), Allocatur Docket No. 657 MAL 2024, both parties also clearly raised the overarching question of whether the Commission has any authority to regulate a municipal authority’s rates and service following the MAA’s enactment. See, e.g., PAA, 12/23/2024, at 32 (asserting the Commonwealth Court’s decision “has broad practical implications for previously unregulated entities that will now be considered to fall under Commission jurisdiction”); Answer to PAA, 12/31/2024, at 1 (asserting this appeal “involves the fundamental question of whether a municipal authority can operate as a public utility outside its jurisdictional limits without obtaining the requisite (continued…) [J-32-2026] - 9 III. OVERVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY LAWS We granted discretionary review in this case to resolve an apparent conflict between two statutes governing public utility service in Pennsylvania — the Code and the MAA — specifically as they relate to municipal authorities. 4 Before we address the issue on appeal, we will provide a brief overview of both statutes. A. Public Utility Code The Code governs privately owned entities that provide water, electric, gas, sewer, and similar services to the public, as well as municipalities and municipal corporations that provide utility service to customers beyond their geographic boundaries. See 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101, 1102(a). 5 The present-day Code was enacted in 1978 and was a codification, without substantial change, of the former Public Utility Law, which was in effect from 1937 to 1978. The Code grants the Commission “general administrative [c]ertificate … and submitting itself to Commission oversight and regulation”). In fact, that broader issue comprised the bulk of the parties’ appellate briefs and was the focus of their oral arguments before this Court. This is not surprising, since the question we directed the parties to address was: “Did the Commonwealth Court err when it held the [Commission] has jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the [MAA]?” Conyngham Twp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 340 A.3d 272, 273 (Pa. 2025). Based on the parties’ arguments, it is clear they understood that our use of the word “jurisdiction” meant not only subject matter jurisdiction over the underling dispute, but, more broadly, regulatory authority and oversight over municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA. Hence, it is confounding that the Dissent opines that this broader legal issue is not actually before the Court. 4 The question before us, which involves the interplay between the Code and the MAA, is one of statutory interpretation. Thus, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. See Leight v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Physicians, 243 A.3d 126, 136 (Pa. 2020). 5 “The [Commission] regulates the rates and service of investor-owned water and wastewater companies, along with some municipal systems that serve customers outside their boundaries.” A History of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission at 2, available at https://www.puc.pa.gov/general/pdf/PUC_History.pdf (last accessed October 26, 2026). [J-32-2026] - 10 power and authority to supervise and regulate all public utilities doing business within this Commonwealth.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 501(b). Under the Code, a “public utility,” as defined in the statute, is required to obtain a certificate to legally operate and always is subject to the Commission’s regulation. Section 1501 of the Code provides: Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations, substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to such service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and the public. Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay. Such service and facilities shall be in conformity with the regulations and orders of the [C]ommission. Subject to the provisions of this part and the regulations or orders of the [C]ommission, every public utility may have reasonable rules and regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be required to render service…. 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). A public utility is required to obtain a certificate before it “begin[s] to offer, render, furnish or supply” utility service or “abandon[s] or surrender[s], in whole or in part, any service[.]” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1)-(2). The issuance of a certificate, in effect, subjects the public utility provider to the Commission’s regulation and oversight in the provision of utility service to ratepayers. The Commission will grant a certificate only if it “determine[s] that the granting of such certificate is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public” and “may impose such conditions as it may deem to be just and reasonable.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a). Through its regulation, the Commission ensures that public utility providers meet strict insurance, safety, and operational standards and provide safe, reliable, and reasonable service to the public at established rates. In addition, “[a c]ertificate … makes it lawful for [a] public utility to provide service within a defined territory, and imposes on the public utility an obligation to provide [J-32-2026] - 11 service in that territory.” Lukens Steel Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 499 A.2d 1134, 1136 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (en banc) (emphasis added); see Borough of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co., 170 A.2d 565, 567 (Pa. 1961) (recognizing the Commission has jurisdiction to determine a public utility’s authority under its certificate, as well as its “rights to serve [a] particular territory”). Section 1101 of the Code provides that a certificate issued by the Commission “shall include a description of the nature of the service and of the territory in which it may be offered, rendered, furnished or supplied.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1101. Unlike a privately owned utility, which always is subject to the Commission’s regulation, a municipal corporation that provides public utility service is subject to the Commission’s regulation only when it provides service to customers beyond its municipal boundaries. Section 1501 of the Code provides in relevant part: Any public utility service being furnished or rendered by a municipal corporation beyond its corporate limits shall be subject to regulation and control by the [C]ommission as to service and extensions, with the same force and in like manner as if such service were rendered by a public utility. 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). Thus, before a municipal corporation may furnish service beyond its corporate limits, it must obtain the Commission’s approval in the form of a certificate, as set forth in Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code: Upon the application of any public utility and the approval of such application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its certificate of public convenience first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing laws, it shall be lawful[] … [f]or any municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service beyond its corporate limits. 66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(5) (emphases added); see Borough of Phoenixville v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 280 A.2d 471, 474 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971) (en banc) (“As soon as a [municipality] holds itself out to render uncertificated extraterritorial service and renders such service, it [J-32-2026] - 12 is within the jurisdiction of the Commission to determine whether extension of such service should be granted[]” because “the Commission has jurisdiction to determine the extent of the extraterritorial utility service area for the municipality.”). The reason municipal corporations are exempt from Commission regulation when they provide utility service to customers within their borders is because those customers, as residents of the municipality, have the power to elect the local officials who set the utility’s rates and service standards. However, when a municipal corporation serves customers beyond its borders, those customers have no political representation, so the Commission steps in to provide state-level oversight and consumer protection. See County of Dauphin v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 634 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (“[T]he purpose of subjecting a municipally operated public utility which renders service beyond its corporate limits to the jurisdiction of the [Commission] is to protect users of the service who are not residents of the municipality.”); id. at 282 (agreeing that “the reason for regulating extraterritorial service is so that the municipality cannot discriminate against users who are outside of the corporate limits”). B. Municipality Authorities Act The MAA is a comprehensive scheme specifically governing municipal authorities. A municipal authority is a special-purpose entity created by one or more municipalities for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, financing, and operating public works projects. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(a). 6 A municipal authority is run by a board appointed by the 6 According to the Pennsylvania Department of State website, a municipal authority is “‘a body politic and corporate’ created to finance and/or operate specific public works projects without tapping the general taxing powers of the municipality. Authorities (sometimes known as special districts in other states) are alternate vehicle[s] for accomplishing public purposes rather than through [the] direct action of counties, municipalities and school districts.” Municipal and Other Authorities, https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/programs/business/types-of-filings-and- registrations/municipal-and-other-authorities (last accessed October 26, 2026). [J-32-2026] - 13 governing body of the municipality but functions independently of the local government that incorporated it. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5610. Before the current version of the MAA, there were two prior iterations: the Municipality Authorities Act of 1935 (1935 MAA), which was repealed and replaced 10 years later by the 1945 MAA. The 1945 MAA existed without significant change for almost 60 years. 7 In 2001, the General Assembly codified the present-day MAA, which includes the following statements, in relevant part, of the statute’s purpose and intent: (2) The purpose and intent of this chapter being to benefit the people of the Commonwealth by, among other things, increasing their commerce, health, safety and prosperity and not to unnecessarily burden or interfere with existing business by the establishment of competitive enterprises[.] … 7 The Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development has described the history of municipal authorities in Pennsylvania as follows: Municipal authorities in Pennsylvania, as in many other states, had their beginning in the 1930s Depression. As part of its fiscal recovery policy, the federal government granted money to states and municipalities for public works construction to stimulate employment and provide needed public facilities. These grants had to be matched by the recipient unit, but many states and localities were unable to pay their share, due both to reduced revenues and restrictive debt limits. A number of states, including Pennsylvania, then created state authorities to borrow outside constitutional debt limits by making use of revenue bonds. Pennsylvania was one of three states that passed general enabling legislation to allow their municipalities to create authorities. This was the [1935 MAA]. The 1935 [MAA] was repealed and replaced in 1945 by the present [MAA], which gave greater flexibility in operation and financing. The [MAA] was officially codified in the P[ennsylvania] Consolidated Statutes in 2001. Municipal Authorities in Pennsylvania (Eleventh Edition, April 2020) at 1, available at https://dced.pa.gov/download/municipal-authorities-in- pennsylvania/?wpdmdl=57758&refresh=6a5f743862d8b1784640568 (last accessed October 26, 2026). [J-32-2026] - 14 (3) It is the intent of this chapter in specifying and defining the authorized purposes and projects of an authority to permit the authority to benefit the people of this Commonwealth by, among other things, increasing their commerce, health, safety and prosperity while not unnecessarily burdening or interfering with any municipality which has not incorporated or joined that authority. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(2)-(3). The MAA explicitly allows incorporated municipal authorities to establish their own rates and services. Section 5607(d)(9) provides, in pertinent part: Every authority may exercise all powers necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the purposes set forth in this section, including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following rights and powers: ... (9) To fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges in the area served by its facilities at reasonable and uniform rates to be determined exclusively by it for the purpose of providing for the payment of the expenses of the authority, the construction, improvement, repair, maintenance and operation of its facilities and properties … and to determine by itself exclusively the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served. If the service area includes more than one municipality, the revenues from any project shall not be expended directly or indirectly on any other project unless such expenditures are made for the benefit of the entire service area. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphases added). Thus, unlike public utilities governed by the Code, municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA have the power to “exclusively” determine their rates and “the services and improvements” necessary to provide utility service to their customers. Id. The MAA also does not place geographic limits on where a municipal authority may provide utility service. Our case law holds that, whether incorporated under the present MAA, the 1945 MAA, or the 1935 MAA, “municipal authorities are not the creatures, agents or representatives of the municipalities which organize them, but rather are ‘independent agencies of the Commonwealth and part of its sovereignty.’” [J-32-2026] - 15 Commonwealth v. Erie Metro. Transit Auth., 281 A.2d 882, 884 (Pa. 1971) (citation omitted; emphasis added); see Marshall v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 568 A.2d 931, 939 (Pa. 1990) (“[Municipal] authorities must be state created, and they must be separate and distinct entities from the municipalities which compose them.”) (Papadakos, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Municipal authorities, as independent agencies of the Commonwealth, “ha[ve] no boundaries within which [they] must limit [their] services.” White Rock Sewage Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 578 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (en banc); see In re Application of Mun. Auth. of Upper St. Clair, 184 A.2d 695, 698 (Pa. 1962) (recognizing “the fundamental nature of an [a]uthority as a corporate agency of the state, and not the child of a municipality”). 8 A municipal authority’s right to define its service area is embodied in Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, which authorizes an incorporated authority “to determine by itself exclusively the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9). This “exclusive” power addresses the authority’s independence from its organizing municipality, but, as discussed more fully below, does not affect the court of common pleas’ jurisdiction to review the legality of the authority’s actions under the MAA. See Yezioro v. N. Fayette Cnty. Mun. Auth., 164 A.2d 129, 137 (Pa. Super. 1960) (“The [MAA] provision to the effect that the services provided by the authority are to be determined ‘by itself exclusively’ must certainly have been intended to make it clear that the authority itself, not the creating municipality or some other instrumentality, controlled the initial determination of the service.”). 8 While a municipal authority is an independent agency of the Commonwealth, the MAA provides that “[a]n authority may not pledge the credit or taxing power of the Commonwealth” and the authority’s obligations “are not obligations of the Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(e)(1)-(2). [J-32-2026] - 16 IV. REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES With this background in mind, we now turn to the present dispute, which involves the conflict between the Code and the MAA regarding the regulation of municipal authorities that provide public utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities. To resolve this conflict, we will review the statutory language, engage in a statutory construction analysis, and examine prior case law interpreting both statutes and their predecessor laws. Generally, under the Code, the Commission regulates the rates and services of public utilities and municipal corporations that provide utility service beyond their boundaries, whereas municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA establish their own rates and services, without Commission approval. The conflict in this case arises, specifically, from the definition of “municipal corporation” in the Code. The Code defines “municipal corporation” as “[a]ll cities, boroughs, towns, townships, or counties of this Commonwealth, and also any public corporation, authority, or body whatsoever created or organized under any law of this Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering any service similar to that of a public utility.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 102 (emphases added). In other words, the Code defines “municipal corporation” as including both municipalities — cities, boroughs, towns, and townships — and “authorit[ies] … created or organized under any law of this Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering any service similar to that of a public utility.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 102. “Authority” is not defined separately in the Code. Under the plain language of Section 1501 of the Code, then, authorities are regulated in the same manner as public utilities when they provide extraterritorial service, meaning they are subject to Commission regulation and must obtain a certificate before operating beyond their corporate limits. See 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102(a)(5), 1501. [J-32-2026] - 17 Given the Code’s inclusion of “authority” in its definition of “municipal corporation,” the question then becomes whether municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA are subject to Commission regulation. The Township asserts that a municipal authority created under the MAA is clearly encompassed within the Code’s definition of “municipal corporation,” since it is “created or organized under [a] law of this Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering [a] service similar to that of a public utility.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 102. The Township posits that since authorities are municipal corporations under the Code, and the Commission has jurisdiction over municipal corporations operating beyond their boundaries, a municipal authority operating beyond the boundaries of its incorporating municipality — such as the Authority here — is subject to Commission regulation in the same manner as a public utility. Were this Court to look only to the provisions of the Code, we might agree. However, because the Authority in this case specifically was establishe