Full Opinion

[J-10-2026] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ. GREGORY LUKASIK : No. 14 MAP 2025 : : Appeal from the Order of the v. : Superior Court at No. 885 MDA : 2023, entered on April 16, 2024, : reversing and remanding the SARAH A. SCOTCHLAS : Order of the Lackawanna County : Court of Common Pleas, Civil : Division, at No. 2021-40676, APPEAL OF: RYAN P. CAMPBELL, : entered on May 5, 2023 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF : ROTHENBERG & CAMPBELL : ARGUED: March 11, 2026 OPINION JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: July 21, 2026 The Superior Court held Appellant, Ryan P. Campbell, Esq. (“Campbell”), and his law firm, Rothenberg & Campbell, 1 jointly and severally liable for $19,072.40 in counsel fees awarded by the trial court against Campbell’s former client, Sarah Scotchlas (“Mother”). The counsel fees were awarded to Gregory Lukasik (“Father”), and Appellee Brenda M. Kobal, Esq., (“Kobal”), the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) previously assigned in Mother and Father’s custody case involving their mutual child (“Child”). We granted review to determine whether the Superior Court erred in applying County of Fulton v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 292 A.3d 974 (Pa. 2023), to hold that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold Campbell jointly and severally liable for the counsel fees 1 Appellant Campbell is before this Court representing both himself and his law firm, Rothenberg & Campbell. Unless otherwise provided, all references to Campbell are intended to include his law firm. awarded to Kobal. 2 After careful review, we reverse the Superior Court’s decision as to counsel fees awarded to Kobal to be paid by Campbell. We hold that County of Fulton does not support the Superior Court’s determination that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold Campbell jointly and severally liable for Kobal’s counsel fees. Background Several weeks after Child was born in May 2021, Mother filed a complaint in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas seeking to establish Father’s paternity. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/2023, at 1. After some initial resistance, Father eventually accepted paternity and then filed a petition for custody in August 2021. Id. Two months later, after the parties appeared for a conciliation conference before a custody master, the trial court appointed Kobal as GAL by agreement of the parties and granted limited visitation rights to Father on a temporary basis as the custody litigation proceeded. Id. Kobal quickly became concerned with Child’s safety, which prompted Father to file an emergency petition for special relief on November 5, 2021. Id. That same day, the trial court issued an emergency order granting Father temporary sole legal and physical custody of Child. Id. On November 22, 2021, the court entered an order granting Mother periods of professional supervised custody and directing the parties to submit to a comprehensive psychological evaluation. Id. at 1-2. That order prohibited distribution of the psychological evaluations to clients or third parties without prior court approval. Id. at 2 (quoting Order, 11/22/2021 (“Psychological Evaluation Order”)). A hearing on Father’s petition for special relief was repeatedly continued through the following year. Id. In the meantime, Father filed an amended custody complaint on March 29, 2023, and Mother 2 Campbell did not seek our review of the Superior Court’s decision insofar as it applied to the award of counsel fees to Father. See Clarification Letter, 5/23/2024, at 1 (“[P]lease allow this correspondence to serve as a confirmation of the oral representations made to your office that the appropriate and correct docket number from which petitioner seeks appellate review is 885—MDA—2023 and does not include 884—MDA—2023.”). [J-10-2026] - 2 filed two petitions for special relief on April 1, 2022, seeking to regain custody. Id. After a status conference on April 7, 2022, the court permitted Mother supervised physical custody for two hours, twice per week. Id. However, on May 4, 2022, upon Father’s motion, the court issued an order suspending Mother’s periods of supervised custody. Id. On May 11, 2022, through her third attorney in this matter, James T. Mulligan, Jr., Esq., Mother filed a petition to remove Kobal as GAL. Defendant’s Petition to Remove Guardian Ad Litem, 5/11/2022 (“First Removal Petition”). Mother alleged that Kobal was biased against her and engaged in various forms of misconduct. Id. at 4 (unnumbered paragraph). 3 Kobal testified at a hearing on the First Removal Petition and generally denied the accusation of bias, stating that she supported Father’s obtaining temporary sole legal and physical custody of Child until a full inquiry could be conducted regarding Child’s safety. N.T., 6/13/2022, at 20. Kobal indicated that she “could not ascertain the safety and well-being” of Child while in Mother’s care due to Mother’s lack of cooperation. Id. She stated that when an “individual is cooperating[,]” she was “better able to ascertain the safety and well-being of the child.” Id. at 51. Kobal maintained that contrary to being biased against Mother, she had bent over backwards to encourage her cooperation. Id. at 94-97 (describing various attempts to facilitate Mother’s cooperation). Kobal stated that it was her intention to have Mother see Child and that any frustrations Mother had with the court process or the appointment of a GAL should have been discussed with Mother’s therapist. Id. at 100. 3 Mother alleged that Kobal had rushed to judgment with her concerns regarding Child’s safety without first conferring with Child’s pediatrician and/or other medical professionals. First Removal Petition, ¶¶ 5(a)-(g). She also complained that Kobal had reported concerns about Mother’s mental health and potential drug use or that she had encouraged Father to do so based on minimal investigation. Id. ¶¶ 5(h)-(i). Mother asserted Kobal’s speculations demonstrated a bias against Mother that directly led to her loss of custody of Child despite an absence of evidence showing that Child’s safety or health were at risk. Id. ¶¶ 9-18. She also alleged that Kobal had exceeded her authority by suspending supervised visits that had been approved by the court. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. [J-10-2026] - 3 Mother also testified at the hearing on the First Removal Petition. She complained that she had never agreed to have a GAL appointed. Id. at 113. 4 She stated that Kobal had “threatened” to transfer custody of Child to Father if she did not come to be interviewed at a very specific time on November 3, 2021. Id. at 114. Mother also maintained that Kobal made several unsubstantiated accusations about Child’s safety and Mother’s mental health that led to her loss of custody. Id. at 115-17. Mother stated that she did not trust Kobal and doubted her ability to be fair and impartial. Id. at 122-23. Kobal moved to dismiss the First Removal Petition because Mother “failed to prove that there was any bias exhibited” by Kobal. Id. at 138. Mother argued that Kobal exhibited bias by rushing to judgment regarding whether Mother had endangered Child and had failed to conduct a sufficient investigation before recommending Child’s removal from Mother’s custody. Id. at 140-41. Kobal countered that her client had testified credibly and that no evidence was presented that Kobal “did anything differently in this case” that demonstrated a bias toward Mother. Id. at 142. Kobal maintained that Mother was seeking to remove her merely because Mother did not like the results of the court’s orders or the consequences of her failure to cooperate. Id. at 143. Ultimately, the trial court denied the First Removal Petition. Order, 6/15/2022, ¶ 1. A custody hearing began immediately after the hearing on the First Removal Petition but could not be completed and was continued until September 29, 2022. 5 Mother appeared pro se at the September 2022 hearing but refused to take the stand. Trial Court Opinion, 5/5/2023, at 4. Consequently, the court again temporarily granted Father full physical and legal custody and suspended Mother’s supervised visitation. Id. 4 Mother later admitted that her prior attorney had not only agreed to have a GAL appointed but had specifically requested Kobal’s appointment. N.T., 6/13/2022, at 128. 5As of the September 29, 2022 hearing, all of the parties’ custody petitions, including the emergency and amended custody petitions, had been consolidated for resolution. [J-10-2026] - 4 The trial court’s docket reflects that nothing further transpired until January 26, 2023, when Campbell entered his appearance as Mother’s fourth attorney in less than twenty months. Five days later, Campbell filed on Mother’s behalf a second petition to remove Kobal. Defendant’s Petition to Remove Guardian Ad Litem, 1/31/2023 (“Second Removal Petition”); see also Amended Second Removal Petition, 4/14/2023. The Second Removal Petition was voluminous, setting forth 262 individual paragraphs over 55 pages with 391 pages of attached exhibits. Mother provided a lengthy recitation of the prior history in the case, asserted claims of misconduct by Kobal in her capacity as GAL in other cases, and summarized governing standards of law. Second Removal Petition, ¶¶ 1-214. Mother first asserted that Kobal’s participation was unnecessary and that the trial court “never made the statutory determination of necessity prior to her appointment[.]” Id. ¶ 215. Second, Mother asserted that Kobal should be removed because of bias, prejudice, and unfairness. Id. ¶¶ 246-62. Third, Mother argued that Kobal should be removed for usurping the role of the judiciary, which Kobal ostensibly did by “unilaterally attempting to limit [Mother’s] court-ordered custody times” and by “misrepresenting facts and evidence to the [c]ourt.” Id. ¶ 256. In the Amended Second Removal Petition, Mother added eight additional paragraphs pertaining to Mother’s retention of Katie Maxwell, Esq., ostensibly “an expert in the field of custody litigation[.]” Amended Second Removal Petition, ¶ 264. Mother asked Attorney Maxwell to determine whether Kobal “breached the standard of care” and thereby caused Mother “to lose legal and physical custody of” Child. Id. Attorney Maxwell opined that Kobal “was negligent in her advisory and investigatory roles as GAL” and that such negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the loss of custody. Id. ¶ 266. The Amended Second Removal Petition also cited an expert report authored by Mother’s long-term treating psychiatrist, Matthew A. Berger, M.D. Dr. Berger opined that Mother [J-10-2026] - 5 did “not suffer from any psychiatric or cognitive impairment that would interfere with her ability to make informed decisions concerning healthcare for her and” Child. Id. ¶ 265. The amended petition noted that Attorney Maxwell and Dr. Berger’s expert reports were the foundation of a lawsuit 6 filed against Kobal. Id. ¶ 268. Based on those two reports and the pending lawsuit, Mother contended that there was “no question that there presently exists bias, prejudice, and unfairness” by Kobal “rendering her completely unable to act impartially … in her capacity as GAL[,]” and that she should be removed for those reasons. Id. ¶ 269. Finally, Mother argued that since the First Removal Petition, “new events, facts, information[,] and circumstances have arisen that constitute a change in circumstances related to said Motion, further amplifying” the court’s “duty to remove” Kobal. Id. ¶ 270. Kobal moved to dismiss or strike the Second Removal Petition on res judicata grounds. Kobal’s Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Second Removal Petition, 2/2/2023, ¶ 21; see also Kobal’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Second Removal Petition, 3/9/2023. Kobal later filed a separate petition for counsel fees. Kobal’s Petition for Counsel Fees, 3/8/2023. Kobal’s request for counsel fees focused on Mother; there was no request for counsel fees to be assessed against Campbell. See id. ¶¶ 17-23. Kobal also filed an answer to the Second Removal Petition. Kobal’s Answer to Second Removal Petition, 3/9/2023. On April 4, 2023, the trial court issued an order scheduling oral argument for April 18, 2023, to determine if the Second Removal Petition was precluded under res judicata and/or collateral estoppel principles. Order, 4/4/2023. 6 Mother filed a civil lawsuit against Kobal on the same day Mother filed the Amended Second Removal Petition. See 2023-CV-01573. Mother eventually moved to withdraw the complaint on March 25, 2025, approximately six weeks after we granted allocatur in this case. The trial court ordered the case closed on November 17, 2025. [J-10-2026] - 6 At the oral argument, the trial court 7 indicated its intent to deny the Second Removal Petition as amended insofar as it alleged that Kobal’s appointment was void ab initio because the court had not entered an order regarding the necessity to appoint a GAL. The court reasoned that the claim was “inaccurate in as much as both parties were represented in front of the master and both parties agreed to the appointment of the [GAL].” N.T., 4/18/2023, at 2-3. Next, the court determined that allegations of Kobal’s bias were not new and were “all previously litigated” before Judge Munley when the First Removal Petition was denied. Id. at 3. The court also determined that Kobal had not “usurped the role of the judiciary.” Id. at 3-4. However, because of Mother’s pending civil suit against Kobal, the court decided to remove Kobal as GAL to avoid “an appearance of impropriety” and because the court did not want Kobal “to suffer any further with this case[.]” Id. at 4. Nonetheless, the court described the timing of the lawsuit as being “very suspect.” Id. at 8. Despite the court’s intent to remove Kobal as GAL on alternative grounds, Campbell argued on behalf of Mother that he should be allowed to argue the merits of the three claims presented in the Second Removal Petition. Id. at 10-12. The court acknowledged that it had read Campbell’s “voluminous filings” and asked what he would add to it. Id. at 21. Campbell responded that he did not believe the First Removal Petition had been fully adjudicated. Id. at 22. Father and Kobal’s attorneys countered that Campbell was misrepresenting the record because the First Removal Petition had been fully adjudicated and ultimately denied. Id. at 24-26. The court agreed that the First Removal Petition had been fully litigated and that it was “bound by Judge Munley’s ruling.” 7 Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas Judge Julia K. Munley presided over most of the prior proceedings in this case. President Judge Trish Corbett was reassigned to this case on February 2, 2023 while the Second Removal Petition and the Amended Second Removal Petition were pending. [J-10-2026] - 7 Id. at 27. Over Campbell’s protestations, the court refused to hear further argument beyond what had already been submitted in the Second Removal Petition and related filings. Id. at 28. Subsequent to these rulings on the record and after the parties discussed the appointment of a new GAL, Kobal’s attorney brought to the court’s attention her outstanding fee petition against Mother. Id. at 42. The court was not prepared to rule on the matter and asked for further briefing. Id. at 42-43. The court provided the same response when Father mentioned his own petition for counsel fees. Id. at 43. Campbell never responded on Mother’s Behalf to the outstanding counsel fee petitions before, during, or immediately after the oral argument. At the same time, and consistent with the parties’ filings at that point, there was no discussion at the April 18 oral argument that counsel fees were being sought from Campbell. At no point during the April 18 proceeding did the court hear testimony on the counsel fee claims. Two days after the oral argument, Kobal filed a brief in support of her petition for counsel fees. Brief in Support of Petition for Counsel Fees, 4/20/2023. For the first time, Kobal argued that counsel fees should be assessed against both Mother and Campbell because their “conduct was arbitrary, vexatious, obdurate and in bad faith.” Id. at 3. Kobal alleged her claim for counsel fees was based on purportedly “undisputed facts” pertaining to Mother and Campbell’s “taking the completely false position that the June 13, 2022 Hearing was not a final adjudication” as a basis for arguing that the Second Removal Petition was not barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. Id. at 4-6, ¶¶ 10-11. Kobal also alleged that Campbell repeatedly exhibited evidence of a personal vendetta against Kobal well beyond the confines of this case. Id. at 7-8. By order dated May 5, 2023, the trial court denied the Second Removal Petition because it “failed to raise differing allegations of misconduct against [Kobal] from what [J-10-2026] - 8 was previously raised and litigated in” the First Removal Petition. Amended Order, 5/5/2023, ¶ 1. Nonetheless, and consistent with its statements at the April 2023 oral argument, the court removed Kobal as GAL because of Mother’s civil suit. Id. ¶ 2. The court also granted Father’s petition for counsel fees, ordering Mother to compensate Father in the amount of $8,950.00. Id. ¶ 3. Likewise, the court granted Kobal’s petition for counsel fees, ordering Mother to compensate Kobal in the amount of $10,482.40. Id. ¶ 4. The court also held Campbell in contempt and set conditions to purge the contempt order. Id. ¶ 5. 8 Order, 5/5/2023. Neither the order nor the accompanying memorandum addressed Kobal’s claim for Campbell to pay counsel fees. The court explained that Father and Kobal were entitled to counsel fees pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5339. 9 Memorandum, 5/5/2023, at 7. The court determined that the Second Removal Petition was filed without legal merit as the allegations in [the] 262 paragraph [Second Removal Petition] predominantly focused on Kobal’s conduct in previous cases and not the case at hand. The facts which were raised regarding the custody case were previously litigated through a full evident[iary] hearing and denied by the Honorable Judge Munley. [Mother]’s pursuit to remove the GAL without … legal merit has risen to the level of vexatious and repetitive. Therefore, this [c]ourt [holds that Father and Kobal] shall be entitled to legal fees to be paid for by [Mother]. Id. at 7-8. No additional rationale was given for the imposition of counsel fees beyond the vexatious and repetitive nature of the Second Removal Petition. 8 The contempt order was issued because Campbell had violated the Psychological Evaluation Order by releasing a sealed psychological evaluation to Attorney Maxwell. See Memorandum and Order, 5/5/2023, at 8. 9 23 Pa.C.S. § 5339 (“Under this chapter, a court may award reasonable interim or final counsel fees, costs and expenses to a party if the court finds that the conduct of another party was obdurate, vexatious, repetitive or in bad faith. This section may not apply if that party engaged the judicial process in good faith to protect the child from harm.”). [J-10-2026] - 9 On May 8, 2023, Kobal filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 5, 2023 order. Kobal’s Motion for Reconsideration, 5/8/2023. Therein, Kobal requested that the court reconsider its failure to hold Campbell liable for the counsel fee award of $10,482.40. Id. ¶ 17. Father also filed a motion for reconsideration along similar grounds, asking the court to reconsider its failure to hold Campbell liable for the counsel fee award of $8,950.00. Father’s Motion for Reconsideration, 5/8/2023, ¶ 38. The court denied both motions for reconsideration. Order, 5/8/2023 (Kobal); Order, 5/9/2023 (Father). Campbell filed an appeal on behalf of Mother, and Father and Kobal each filed cross-appeals. 10 All of the appeals were consolidated in the Superior Court by order dated October 31, 2023. Mother’s appeal was dismissed after Campbell failed to file a Brief on her behalf. 11 Father argued in his Rule 1925(b) Statement that the trial court had “abused its discretion and committed an error of law” by failing to impose counsel fees on Campbell for “relentless” pursuit of the Second Removal Petition despite being given notice by Father that the Second Removal Petition violated Pa.R.C.P. 1023.1(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3). Father’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, ¶¶ 8-9. Kobal’s Rule 1925 statement raised nearly identical issues. Kobal’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, ¶¶ 1-4. In her brief before the Superior Court, Kobal argued that the trial court “erred” by ordering Mother to pay Kobal’s counsel fees “instead of” Campbell and his law firm. Kobal’s Superior Court 10 In Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Campbell raised four issues challenging the trial court’s imposition of counsel fees on Mother. Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, 6/26/2023, ¶¶ 4-7. 11 See Order, 811 MDA 2023 / 884 MDA 2023 / 885 MDA 20233, 12/5/2023, at 1-2 (“This [c]ourt set forth a briefing schedule on October 31,2023, directing Counsel for [Mother] to file the first brief by December 4, 2023. The Order specifically stated that no extensions would be granted. Accordingly, the appeal at 811 MDA 2023 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”). In the same order, the Superior Court unconsolidated the appeals and removed the cross-appeal classifications of Father and Kobal’s appeals at 884 MDA 2023 and 885 MDA 2023, respectively. Id. at 2. [J-10-2026] - 10 Brief at 2. Kobal’s four-page argument focused almost exclusively on our decision in County of Fulton. Id. at 18-22. Superior Court Decision The Superior Court agreed with Father and Kobal that the trial court had abused its discretion by holding Mother solely responsible for Father and Kobal’s counsel fees. Lukasik v. Scotchlas, Nos. 884 MDA 2023 & 885 MDA 2023, 2024 WL 1636597, at *4 (Pa. Super. April 16, 2024) (non-precedential decision). The court found this matter to be analogous to our decision in County of Fulton, stating that County of Fulton stands for the proposition “that in situations where counsel has engaged in dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, and bad-faith conduct, it would be unjust for a client to fully bear the costs[.]” Id. Because we sanctioned the attorney in County of Fulton for his dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct, the Superior Court reasoned: Likewise, in the instant matter, we find that … Campbell engaged in dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, and bad-faith conduct by filing a 56-page, 262-paragraph second petition to remove Attorney Kobal as GAL on January 31, 2023, less than 9 months after the filing of Mother’s first removal petition and while the underlying custody case was already in progress. The record reveals that this second petition had no basis in law or fact and raised no additional new claims, and was filed by … Campbell with full knowledge that Mother’s first petition to remove the GAL was denied by the trial court following an extensive evidentiary hearing. Id. 12 On that basis, the Superior Court reversed “the trial court’s May 5, 2023 amended order, in part, to the extent it direct[ed] Mother to bear full responsibility to pay $8,950.00 in counsel fees to Father and $10,482.40 in counsel fees to Attorney Kobal.” Id. It also 12 Although the Superior Court stated that the trial court had “authored a comprehensive [memorandum] in support of its May 5, 2023 order[,]” it did not address the trial court’s failure to even mention Father and Kobal’s claims to hold Campbell liable for their counsel fees. Lukasik, 2024 WL 1636597, at *2. [J-10-2026] - 11 remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine “joint and several responsibility for these counsel fees during the period for which” Mother, Campbell, and the law firm “share responsibility for the misconduct.” Id. Issue Campbell filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal, and we granted review of one question, which we phrased as follows: Whether the Superior Court erred in applying County of Fulton … to sua sponte find … Campbell’s conduct was dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, and in bad faith and to remand for further proceedings to determine … Campbell[’s] joint and several liability for attorney’s fees the trial court imposed solely on their client. Lukasik v. Scotchlas, 333 A.3d 1044 (Pa. 2025) (per curiam). Parties’ Arguments Campbell acknowledges that counsel fees may be awarded against any participant in a civil action, but he maintains that a participant seeking counsel fees must meet a stringent requirement of establishing dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, or bad faith conduct, and that such an award is not simply the price of losing a legal dispute to the prevailing party. Campbell’s Brief at 24-26 (citing, inter alia, O’Connell v. O’Connell, 597 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa. Super. 1991) (reversing award of counsel fees where the “record d[id] not support the stringent requirement that [the non-prevailing party’s] behavior was dilatory, obdurate or vexatious … or that the action was arbitrary or in bad faith”). Campbell argues that to meet that stringent standard a hearing is typically required. Id. at 26-27. 13 13 Campell notes distinctions between counsel fee awards for dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct and sanctions for civil contempt. Campbell’s Brief at 27-32. He maintains that sanctions for contempt may serve a remedial purpose in addition to vindicating the authority of the court, and that a finding of contempt requires a hearing at which it must be demonstrated that a court order was violated, with “all inferences, ambiguities or omissions construed in favor of the alleged contemnor.” Id. at 31 (citing County of Fulton, 292 A.3d at 1054) (emphasis omitted). [J-10-2026] - 12 Campbell observes that, in County of Fulton, our decision to award counsel fees against Fulton County’s counsel, Attorney Carroll, followed an extensive evidentiary hearing conducted by a Special Master appointed by this Court. Based on her findings, the Special Master recommended holding Fulton County liable for counsel fees for contempt and provided alternative bases for the imposition of counsel fees under Section 2503 and Pa.R.A.P. 2744. 14 Campbell’s Brief at 33 (citing County of Fulton, 292 A.3d at 1013-15). We agreed with most of the Special Master’s findings and recommendations, but we held that the record also supported Attorney Carroll’s culpability for counsel fees. In Campbell’s view, we did so to “set an example” because Fulton County’s counsel had engaged in relentlessly dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, and bad-faith conduct in addition to contributing to Fulton County’s contempt. Id. (citing County of Fulton, 292 A.3d at 1018 (“In sum, we find that Attorney Carroll, both in tandem with and also independently of his clients, is guilty of relentlessly dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, and bad-faith conduct before this Court and the Special Master, especially, but not exclusively, during these sanction proceedings.”)). Campbell believes County of Fulton stands for the proposition that so long as the parties enjoyed a fair opportunity for the matter to have been fully heard on the merits—including the presentation of evidence and testimony—a court may hold an attorney representing a client whose actions were held to be in contempt of a court order, jointly and severally liable with his client for any counsel fees awarded as a sanction for directly contributing to his client’s conduct, sanctionable by Section 2503. Campbell’s Brief at 35. Campbell contrasts Attorney Carroll’s direct contribution to “sustained and deliberate” sanctionable conduct by Fulton County, established by an extensive 14 Rule 2744 permits imposition of counsel fees by an appellate court as a sanction “if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.” Pa.R.A.P. 2744. [J-10-2026] - 13 evidentiary record including “robust procedural safeguards,” with the Superior Court’s identification of only one sanctionable act in this case—the filing of the Second Removal Petition. Id. at 38-39. Campbell asserts that to sanction him under the authority of County of Fulton, the Superior Court had to make prerequisite findings that there were due process safeguards, that Mother engaged in sustained and deliberate sanctionable conduct, and that Campbell contributed to the sanctionable conduct. Id. at 39. Campbell emphasizes that this Court sat as the ultimate factfinder in County of Fulton, aided by the recommendations of the Special Master, in addressing the Secretary’s application for sanctions and fees before this Court. Id. at 39 n.38. In the instant matter, by contrast, the Superior Court was not addressing sanctions in the first instance. Id. at 39-40. As such, Campbell argues that the Superior Court could only review the trial court’s decision under a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 40. He contends that the Superior Court “failed to properly employ” that standard and essentially substituted its judgment for that of the trial court by ordering Campbell to pay counsel fees when the trial court had refused to do so. Id. Campbell also observes that “there was no evidentiary hearing on the parties’ respective Motions for Sanctions or to Hold Mother in Contempt” and that the April 18, 2023 proceeding, was an oral argument—erroneously called a hearing by the Superior Court—held solely for the purpose of addressing the motions to dismiss the Second Removal Petition. Id. He maintains that the order scheduling the oral argument “did not list any additional issues to be addressed during oral argument and no testimony was taken[.]” Id. at 41. Campbell argues that neither he nor Mother “were afforded … notice []or a fair opportunity to be heard during the eponymously named proceeding” and that Campbell “was refused any opportunity to provide substantive argument” about any of the topics discussed, including the sanctionable conduct. Id. [J-10-2026] - 14 Campbell contends that because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, the intermediate court had no evidence before it of “sustained and deliberate” sanctionable conduct “throughout the proceedings.” Id. at 46. He argues that the only admitted fact was that that the Second Removal Petition had been filed. Id. at 47. Campbell also argues that because he did not represent Mother during litigation of the First Removal Petition, his conduct cannot be interpreted as repetitive and that absent additional facts on the record, his filing of that petition could not have been deemed by the Superior Court to have been fraudulent, dishonest, lacking due diligence, or as having caused the delay of proceedings, as those allegations cannot be proven on the face of the petition. Id. at 47-48. Campbell states that the record is “devoid of any evidentiary facts” showing that he “directly contributed to dilatory, obdurate, vexatious or in bad faith” conduct engaged in by his client that had been sanctioned by the trial court. Id. at 48. 15 Kobal argues that Campbell had both notice and an opportunity to be heard in the trial court. Kobal’s Brief at 33. Regarding notice, she asserts that she sought compensation from both Mother and Campbell for counsel fees both before and after the trial court issued the counsel fee awards against Mother. Id. (citing Kobal’s Brief in Support of Petition for Counsel Fees, 4/20/2023; Kobal’s Motion for Reconsideration, 5/8/2023). She then raised the issue in her Rule 1925(b) concise statement and in her brief before the Superior Court. Id. at 34-35 (citing Kobal’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, ¶¶ 1-4; Kobal’s Superior Court Brief). Regarding an opportunity to be heard, Kobal essentially contends that Campbell failed to take advantage of opportunities to be heard after he was on notice of her request 15 For the sake of completeness, we note that Campbell argues that the trial court’s award of counsel fees against Mother was itself “an unconstitutional error[,]” Campbell’s Brief at 49 (emphasis omitted), and that her due process rights were violated, id. at 50. However, because Campbell abandoned Mother’s appeal, resulting in that appeal’s dismissal with prejudice, we do not consider those arguments. [J-10-2026] - 15 for counsel fees. First, she contends that Campbell never objected to the fee award in the trial court, and that he raised it for the first time in the Rule 1925(b) statement that he filed on Mother’s behalf. Id. at 35 (citing Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 6/26/2023, ¶¶ 6-7). Kobal notes that Campbell never spoke up at the April 18, 2023 oral argument when counsel fees were discussed. She further observes: In the ensuing 17 days (almost three weeks) between the April 18, 2023 proceeding and the trial court's May 5, 2023 Memorandum and Order, Campbell was silent; he did not file an Answer to the Petition for Counsel Fees or an opposing brief. In the ensuing 28 days between the trial court’s May 5, 2023 Memorandum and Order and [Mother]’s appeal, [he] did not seek reconsideration. [He] did not make or file an objection to Kobal's Motion for Reconsideration. Id. at 37. Kobal highlights that Campbell filed an appeal to contest the counsel fee award against Mother and that he abandoned all related claims when he failed to file a brief on Mother’s behalf. Id. at 40. And although both Father and Kobal specifically sought counsel fees against Campbell in their appeals from the May 5, 2023 order, Campbell never filed an Appellee’s brief in those appeals. Id. at 37. Because Campbell failed to avail himself of those opportunities to be heard both in the trial court and Superior Court, Kobal argues that “his failure to do so results in waiver” of the issue presented for our review. Id. at 38. Alternatively, Kobal contends that the Superior Court did not err in applying County of Fulton to hold Campbell jointly and severally liable for the counsel fee award against Mother. Id. at 41. First, Kobal asserts that the Superior Court did not award counsel fees sua sponte as suggested by the questioned accepted for review; to the contrary, she alleges that the fees were awarded based on analogous circumstances in County of Fulton. Id. at 46. She further argues that a hearing on counsel fees was unnecessary because [J-10-2026] - 16 the record contains undisputed facts as to Campbell’s conduct and the relative merits of [Mother]’s claims” that “clearly show Campbell’s conduct was dilatory, obdurate, vexatious, and in bad faith under § 2503 and “repetitive” under § 5339; that he unreasonably pursued Kobal’s removal as GAL; and that he unnecessarily delayed the underlying custody case. Id. at 47. Kobal maintains that Campbell was dilatory because, as a result of the meritless Second Removal Petition, Kobal was forced “to file answers, motions to strike and/or dismiss, motion for a protective order, petition for fees, supporting briefs, etc.” Id. at 48. She argues his conduct was obdurate “in that he was stubbornly persistent in wrongdoing” despite being served notice under Rule 1023.1 that his filing was unethical. Id. (quotation marks omitted). In particular, Kobal argues that Campbell was persistent in maintaining that the First Removal Petition had not been fully litigated even after responses to the Second Removal Petition demonstrated otherwise. Id. at 49. Kobal contends that Campbell was vexatious insofar as he continued to allege Kobal’s bias as GAL in the Second Removal Petition without a reasonable basis for doing so. Id. at 50. Such conduct was, in Kobal’s view, “harassing and annoying.” Id. at 52. Kobal believes this was particularly true considering Campbell’s crusade against Kobal that predated this case, asserting that Campbell had a “relentless goal to remove Kobal” that was “focused on his own interests[.]” Id. at 53. Kobal argues such evidence showed bad faith because Campbell was “dishonest” in that his goal was not to represent Mother’s interests so much as it was to remove Kobal, who Campbell treated as “his white whale.” Id. at 54. She claims that Campbell’s conduct was repetitive because Campbell filed the Second Removal Petition despite full litigation of the First Removal Petition, and because he continued to repeat allegations of Kobal’s bias in response to her petition to dismiss the Second Removal Petition and in Mother’s amended Second Removal Petition. Id. Kobal also faults Campbell for repeating those claims before this Court. Id. at 54-55. Kobal [J-10-2026] - 17 also directs our attention to the fact that Campbell did not seek allowance of appeal from the portion of the Superior Court’s order concerning Father’s counsel fees. Id. at 56. She asserts that this is even more evidence of Campbell’s personal vendetta against Kobal. Id. (“This whole case has been and is about nothing more than Campbell’s goal to remove Kobal as a GAL altogether—even this appeal to this Court.”). For these reasons, Kobal maintains that t