Bloise, C. v. Bassler, H.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket813 WDA 2026
JudgeDubow
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
CARMINE BLOISE JR. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
HANNAH BASSLER : No. 813 WDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered April 1, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Civil Division at
No(s): AA-2026-00560
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 16, 2026
Appellant, Carmine Bloise, Jr., appeals from the April 1, 2026 order of
the Washington County Court of Common Pleas in which the trial court sua
sponte modified its prior order, which had granted Appellant’s petition filed
pursuant to the Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.
After review, we conclude that the April 1, 2026 order is a legal nullity because
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify its prior order. Accordingly, we
vacate the April 1, 2026 order.
The following is a brief factual and procedural history, as the underlying
facts are not relevant to our disposition. Appellant (“Father”) and Appellee
Hannah Bassler (“Mother”) are the parents of a ten-year-old child, J.B.
(“Child”). Mother and Father had been engaged in custody litigation in
Allegheny County.
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On January 27, 2026, Father obtained a temporary PFA order on behalf
of Child in Washington County, alleging that Mother had abused Child.
On February 4, 2026, following a hearing at which Child testified, the
Washington County trial court (“PFA court”) issued a final PFA order against
Mother, limiting Mother’s custody to supervised visitation. It further provided
that the “future custody/visitation provision of this order shall be superseded
by any order entered in the custody litigation between the parties.” Order,
2/4/26, at ¶ 5.
On March 26, 2026, Allegheny County Judge Cathleen Bubash granted
Mother sole physical and legal custody at Docket Number FD-17-003032-008.
Judge Bubash ordered law enforcement to assist in returning Child to Mother
and issued an arrest warrant for Father.
On April 1, 2026, more than thirty days after entry of the February 4th
final PFA order and in the absence of any petition for modification from the
parties, the PFA court sua sponte issued an “amended final PFA order.” The
order substantially reproduced the February 4th final PFA order but also
provided as follows:
No hearing was held in this matter, as the prior Order dated
February 4, 2026, permitted the custody order to supersede this
Order. Upon consideration of the filed custody Order at docket
FD-17-003032-008 in Allegheny County, this Order shall be
amended as follows: Without regard as to how the order was
entered, this is a final order of court subject to full enforcement
pursuant to the Protection From Abuse Act.
Order, 4/1/26, at 2 (unpaginated). The court then granted primary physical
custody to Mother and inserted the operative language of the Allegheny
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County custody order. The order indicates that the amended PFA order was
“entered to prevent any confusion to law enforcement.” Id. at ¶ 2. The court
clarified that “any future custody order granted by Judge Bubash shall
supersede this court’s order.” Id. (some capitalization omitted).
On June 12, 2026, Appellant filed pro se a notice of appeal. On June
30, 2026, the court filed an order recommending that we quash the appeal
based upon Appellant’s facially untimely notice of appeal.1
Without addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s notice of appeal or the
merits of his issues, we are constrained to vacate the April 1, 2026 order as
we conclude that the PFA court did not have jurisdiction to modify the February
4th final PFA order.2 Rather, in the absence of a motion for reconsideration, a
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1 Appellant argues that the notice of appeal was timely because he did not
receive proper notice of the April 1, 2026 order. We need not address these
factual issues as we conclude that the April 1, 2026 order is void, as set forth
infra. See Stanton v. Lackawanna Energy, Ltd., 915 A.2d 668, 673 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (holding that a party aggrieved by a void order has “no
obligation to file a notice of appeal from [that] order”).
2 Appellant raised the following issues:
(Q1) Did the trial court err as a matter of law by modifying a final
Protection From Abuse order sua sponte, without a petition, service,
notice, or hearing, contrary to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6108(d), 6117(a), and
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1901.8?
(Q2) Did the trial court violate Father and J.B.’s procedural due-process
rights by entering adverse factual findings, custody directives, and law-
enforcement retrieval provisions against Father and J.B. without notice
or an opportunity to be heard?
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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petition for modification, or a patent error, the PFA court lost jurisdiction on
March 6, 2026, thirty days after entering the February 4th final PFA order.3
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 65 (Pa.
2007); see also Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1218 n.3 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (concluding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside PFA
order more than 30 days after entry of the order); Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1901.8(c)
cmt (“After a final protection order is entered, and no motion to reconsider or
appeal is filed, the court no longer retains jurisdiction to vacate that order.”).
Accordingly, as the PFA court lacked jurisdiction, we vacate the April 1, 2026
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Q3) Did the trial court exceed the permissible scope of relief under the
Protection From Abuse Act by using Father and J.B.’s PFA action to
impose sanctions, filing restrictions, adverse custody findings, and law-
enforcement directives against Father and J.B. rather than relief
directed toward cessation of abuse by Biological Mother?
(Q4) Did the trial court err by sua sponte amending a final PFA order to
award sole legal and physical custody of a protected child to the
adjudicated abuser, Biological Mother, where the PFA Act authorizes
temporary custody relief only within the statutory framework for
protection from abuse and upon the required procedure?
(Q5) Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion by imposing a
prospective filing restriction requiring future PFA, emergency PFA, TPFA,
or ICC requests in any jurisdiction to be presented to a specific judge in
another county, where no petition, notice, hearing, bad-faith finding, or
statutory authority supported such relief?
Appellant’s Br. at 16-18.
3 The PFA Act allows parties to seek modification “at any time during the
pendency of an order” and permits a court to grant modification “after the
filing of a petition for modification, service of the petition and a hearing on the
petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6117(a). In the instant case, the court modified the
final PFA order without any of the prerequisites described in Section 6117(a).
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order. See Gardner v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 A.3d 280, 283 (Pa. Super.
2014) (vacating order “entered after the trial court was divested of jurisdiction
to act”).
In vacating the April 1, 2026 order, we clarify that our decision has no
effect on the March 26, 2026 Allegheny County custody order, which the PFA
court incorporated into the April 1, 2026 order. Moreover, we emphasize that
there was no need for the PFA court to incorporate the new custody order into
the PFA order, given that the Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that any new
custody order supersedes a PFA order’s temporary custody provision. See
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1901.7(d) (“Any valid custody order entered after the final [PFA]
order supersedes the custody provisions in paragraph 5 of the [PFA] order.”).
Thus, regardless of the void April 1, 2026 order, the March 26, 2026 custody
order entered in Allegheny County, and any subsequent custody order,
superseded the temporary custody provisions included in the February 4th
final PFA order.
As stated, we vacate the PFA court’s April 1, 2026 order because the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it.
Order vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.
DATE: 11/16/2026
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