In the Int. of: J.T.M.

J-A15023-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.T.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: J.M., MOTHER : : : : : No. 283 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Decree Entered February 9, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at No(s): 138-ad-2025 IN THE INTEREST OF: J.A.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: J.M., MOTHER : : : : : No. 284 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Decree Entered February 9, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at No(s): 139-ad-2025 BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2026 J.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees which terminated her parental rights to her two children: J.T.M. (born in 2013); and J.A.M. (born in 2015) (collectively “the Children”). Additionally, Mother’s court-appointed counsel, Michael Farabella, Esquire (“Counsel”) has filed a brief styled pursuant to ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A15023-26 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), as well as an application to withdraw as counsel. After careful review, we defer a ruling on Counsel’s application, and remand to the orphans’ court with instructions. The orphans’ court summarized the factual and procedural history of this matter as follows: . . . Mother has a history with the [Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (hereinafter “the Agency”)] dating back to 2019. At that time, Mother left the Children for a month, but because she left the Children with an appropriate caretaker, the Agency referral was screened out. In 2021, the Agency received a referral regarding the subject Children’s sister, who was allegedly being sexually abused by Mother’s former paramour, who is the father of the Children. Father was subsequently charged with rape of a minor and various other charges. On October 19, 2023, the Agency received a referral with concerns for Mother and the Children. Specifically, there were concerns that Mother had been driving while intoxicated and that Mother was unable to meet the mental health needs of the Children’s sibling who had been raped by Mother’s former paramour. On November 3, 2023, the Agency filed a dependency petition against Mother due to concerns of unsanitary and unsafe housing conditions, and lack of parental ability as the Children were experiencing . . . developmental delays. On November 6, 2023, following a shelter care hearing which was attended by Mother, the Children were placed in the temporary care and custody of the Agency. On November 13, 2023, Mother had a supervised visit with the Children scheduled, but she missed the visit due to failing to attend a drug screening. On November 15, 2023, the court held an adjudication and disposition (“A&D”) hearing. Mother appeared at the hearing but not until the hearing was concluding. Following the A&D hearing, the Children were adjudicated dependent and placed in the care and custody of the Agency in a -2- J-A15023-26 kinship foster home. On that same date, Mother tested positive for alcohol, benzodiazepines, marijuana, and cocaine. From November 16, 2023[,] to January 22, 2024, Mother failed to show for multiple drug screens, missed multiple scheduled visits with the Children, and missed multiple scheduled appointments with an Agency caseworker. On January 22, 2024, Mother completed a drug and alcohol evaluation through Dauphin County Drug and Alcohol Services. On January 23, 2024, Mother met with the Agency caseworker to discuss court objectives, a family service plan, and child permanency plans for the Children. On February 12, 2024, Mother again failed to appear for a drug screen, and her scheduled visit with the Children was cancelled. Between March 1, 2024[,] and July 10, 2024, there was no contact between Mother and the Agency. On October 29, 2024, Mother was arrested and charged with driving under the influence, possession of marijuana, careless driving, driving while privileges suspended, required financial responsibility, and possession of a controlled substance by person not registered. On December 11, 2024, the Agency caseworker made a referral for a psychological evaluation for Mother with Hugh Smith [&] Associates. On January 24, 2025, Mother called the Agency caseworker. Mother sounded intoxicated and was slurring her speech such that the caseworker had a difficult time understanding what she was saying. The caseworker reviewed Mother’s service objectives and asked that Mother come to the Agency for a drug screen. On January 28, 2025, the Agency caseworker requested Mother come into the office to discuss her family service plan, but Mother only wanted to talk via telephone. After reviewing Mother’s service objectives, Mother became distressed and hung up the phone. Mother and the caseworker spoke again and scheduled an in-person appointment for January 31, 2025. Mother failed to appear at the Agency for that appointment. Mother also failed to appear for a scheduled psychological evaluation on February 25, 2025. -3- J-A15023-26 On February 28, 2025[,] and March 4, 2025, the Agency caseworker left two voicemails for Mother, asking her to return her call. Mother failed to return either call. On March 7, 2025, the Agency caseworker met with the Family Alternative Provider (“FAP”). The FAP reported that Mother had been inconsistent with her appointments and that she had admitted to continuing to drink alcohol. On March 12, 2025, the Agency caseworker telephoned Mother, who reported that she was working with FAP and Pennsylvania Counseling for mental health and drug and alcohol treatment, as well as working with Justice Works once per week. The Agency caseworker told Mother that if Mother could give a negative urine drug screen[,] visitation could be reinstated. The Agency caseworker also reviewed Mother’s objectives from the family service plan. From March 27, 2025[,] to May 30, 2025, Mother tested positive for alcohol on two occasions, and from March 31, 2025[,] to June 26, 2025, Mother tested positive for cocaine on four occasions. From March 21, 2025[,] to June 4, 2025, the Agency caseworker left three voicemails with Mother, all which were unanswered. On July 7, 2025, Mother contacted the Agency to inquire about what she needed to do for reunification. The caseworker advised Mother that she would review the case and contact Mother. On July 21, 2025, Mother was arrested based on a bench warrant stemming from failure to pay child support. On August 7, 2025, Mother came to the Agency to advise that she had just been released from jail, and she submitted a urine sample which was negative for all substances. On August 20, 2025, the Agency caseworker telephoned Mother, and they discussed Mother’s recent release from Dauphin County Prison. Mother reported that she was finishing a psychological evaluation the following day, that she had completed a parenting class, and that she was completing a drug and alcohol evaluation through TrueNorth. On September 5, 2025, the Agency caseworker called Mother because she had missed an appointment at the Agency scheduled for August 29, 2025. Mother reported that she still needed to finish her drug and alcohol and mental health evaluation and submit them to True North. Mother also requested a bus pass from the Agency to assist with urine drug screens. The -4- J-A15023-26 caseworker and Mother scheduled to meet on September 11, 2025. On September 11, 2025, Mother failed to show at the parking lot of Eddie’s Furniture on Cameron Street, which was the meeting location requested by Mother. The caseworker attempted to contact Mother twice by telephone and then texted Mother, requesting that she call the caseworker back. Mother called back and said that she would be at Eddie’s Furniture in approximately fifteen (15) minutes, but the caseworker requested that Mother come to the Agency instead. Mother never came to the Agency. Throughout the life of this case, six (6) permanency review hearings were held on February 24, 2024; July 16, 2024; November 19, 2024; March 27, 2025; June 26, 2025; and October 30, 2025, respectively. Mother only attended three (3) of the hearings. At each permanency review hearing, the Children were found to be dependent and continued to be placed in Agency care and custody. On December 19, 2025, the Agency filed petitions for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children. [The Agency also filed petitions to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of the Children’s biological father.] ***** On February 9, 2026, th[e] court conducted a hearing (hereinafter “the TPR hearing”) on the Agency’s petitions for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights. [The attorney who represented the Children during the dependency proceedings, as their guardian ad litem, Quintana Laudermilch, Esquire (“Attorney Laudermilch”) appeared at the TPR hearing and requested to also represent the Children’s legal interests. The orphans’ court questioned Attorney Laudermilch as to whether she discerned any conflict between the Children’s best and legal interests, and she indicated that there was no conflict. See N.T., 2/9/26, at 5. Accordingly, the orphans’ court ruled that Attorney Laudermilch could represent the Children’s best and legal interests at the TPR hearing. Mother did not appear at the hearing and did not present any testimony or evidence in opposition to the petitions.] ***** -5- J-A15023-26 At the TPR hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of Amber Torres [(“Torres”)], the Agency caseworker assigned to the instant matter. Torres recounted that the Children in this case were placed into Agency care due to concerns of unsanitary and unsafe housing conditions, lack of parental ability, and concerns of substance abuse by Mother. N.T., 2/9/26, at] 11. . . . Torres recalled that throughout the life of this case, Mother was scheduled for 195 drug screens, but she only appeared for nine of them. [Id.] at 13-14. In five of those nine screens, Mother tested positive for either alcohol, cocaine or both. [Id.] at 15. Throughout the life of the case, spanning more than two years, Mother only saw the Children at select court hearings, and she never had a single formal visit with the Children since they came into Agency care because she never provided three consecutive negative drug screens as required for visitation. [Id.] at 16. Torres also testified that on October 30, 2025, the court granted the Agency a finding of aggravated circumstances due to Mother’s failure to maintain substantial and continuing contact with the Children for a period of longer than six months. [Id.] at 19. Torres was asked about the various service objectives Mother was ordered to complete following the [A&D] hearing on November 15, 2023. Mother’s first service objective was to cooperate and comply with the Agency, to yield positive results. Torres testified that Mother failed to maintain communication with the Agency and that the Agency received returned mail from Mother throughout the life of this case. [Id.] at 20. Mother’s second service objective was to participate in a parenting program and address her parenting needs to ensure the consistency of the Children. Torres recounted that Mother completed the curriculum of a parenting program but failed to attend the program’s final session to do her post-curriculum assessments, so she never received a certificate of completion for the court. [Id.] at 20-21. Mother’s third service objective was to address any drug and alcohol issues to ensure the safety of the Children. Mother failed to appear for most of her scheduled drug screenings, and, therefore, she was unable to attend any visits with the Children throughout the life of this case. [Id.] at 21. According to Torres, the Agency received information indicating that Mother was at -6- J-A15023-26 White Deer Run, a drug and alcohol treatment center in Lebanon, but she was only there for about five days before being unsuccessfully discharged. [Id.] at 21. Mother’s fourth service objective was to maintain stable housing and employment to provide for her and the Children. Torres, who only became involved in this case in the summer of 2025, testified that she had never been to Mother’s home and was therefore unable to testify as to the appropriateness of Mother’s home. [Id.] at 22. However, Torres did note that Mother was presently incarcerated at Dauphin County Prison as of the time of the TPR hearing. [Id.] at 22. Mother’s fifth and final service objective was to address any mental health needs to ensure her stability. Torres recounted that the Agency had referred Mother for a psychological evaluation through Hugh Smith & Associates, but she missed several appointments and never completed the evaluation. [Id.] at 22. Moreover, while Mother represented to Torres that she intended to go to TrueNorth for mental health services, Mother never provided any documentation from TrueNorth to confirm that she was receiving such services. [Id.] at 22-23. ***** The Agency also presented testimony from Tiffany Burston [(“Burston”)], a casework supervisor with the Agency. Burston testified that the Agency was never able to do a home assessment and that she had never been to Mother’s home because Mother would always ask the Agency’s workers to meet her at some location other than her home. [Id.] at 37. Burston stated that she believed Mother owned a successful cobbler business, but Mother always refused to provide any documentation to verify the existence of the business and to verify the income that she earned from the business. [Id.] at 37-38. As with Torres, Burston testified that Mother was never able to provide three consecutive clean drug screens throughout the life of this case. [Id.] at 39. Burston furthermore recalled that Mother attended some court hearings under the influence of alcohol or cocaine. [Id.] at 39. On February 9, 2026, following the TPR hearing, th[e] court concluded that the Agency had satisfied its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights to [the Children] and -7- J-A15023-26 issued . . . decree[s] terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. [The court also issued decrees terminating the parental rights of the Children’s father.] On February 19, 2026, Mother, through counsel, filed notices of appeal to the Superior Court at each of the above-captioned dockets, and amended notices of appeal followed on March 9, 2026. Mother, however, did not file a statement of errors complained of on appeal at either docket. Instead, Mother’s counsel filed a statement of intent to file an Anders . . . brief in lieu of filing a concise statement of matters on appeal. On March 3, 2026, th[e] court filed a statement in lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925[(a)] opinion. Therein, th[e] court expressed that it would refrain from issuing a [Rule] 1925[(a)] opinion because Mother’s counsel had not filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal and instead filed a statement of intent to file an Anders . . . brief. However, on July 22, 2026, the Superior Court issued an order directing the trial court to file a [Rule] 1925[(a)] opinion, addressing the statutory grounds upon which th[e] court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to each child. The [orphans’ court then filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Thereafter, Counsel filed an updated Anders brief.] Orphans’ Court Opinion, 8/20/26, at 2-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, some capitalization added). When faced with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of any underlying issues without first examining counsel’s request to withdraw. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014). As this Court has explained, in order to withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: 1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy of the court's attention. -8- J-A15023-26 With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the following requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009): (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. X.J., 105 A.3d at 3-4 (citation omitted). “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Id. at 4 (citations omitted). Our independent review is not limited to the issue(s) discussed by Anders counsel, but extends to “additional, non- frivolous issues” that may have been overlooked by counsel. J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 908 (citation omitted). An appeal is frivolous when it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 356 (citation omitted). -9- J-A15023-26 In this matter, Counsel filed an application to withdraw indicating his conscientious review of the cases and his determination that Mother’s appeals are frivolous. Counsel also filed an Anders brief which included a summary of the factual and procedural of the case with citations to the record, discussion of the issues that could arguably support Mother’s appeals, and Counsel’s explanation for his belief that Mother’s appellate claims are frivolous, with citations to relevant legal authority. Finally, Counsel attached to his petition the letter that he sent to Mother which advised her of her rights to: (1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeals; (2) proceed pro se on the appeals; and (3) raise any additional points that Mother deems worthy of this Court’s attention. As Counsel has met the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, we will proceed to consider the issues that Counsel has identified. In the Anders brief, Counsel identifies the following issues for our review: I. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion in terminating [the] parental rights of Mother where the agency failed to meet its burden of proof? II. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion by failing to give primary consideration to the developmental, physical, emotional needs, and welfare of the child? Anders Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is well established: - 10 - J-A15023-26 In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill- will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up). The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act,1 which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct set forth in section 2511(a) that may warrant termination. Id. at 830; see also 23 ____________________________________________ 1 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101 et seq. - 11 - J-A15023-26 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for termination under one of the section 2511(a) subsections by “clear and convincing evidence,” the court then assesses the petition pursuant to section 2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with the orphans’ court’s determination as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b), in order to affirm termination. See M.E., 283 A.3d at 830 (citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)). In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Given our latitude in the review of an orphans’ court’s findings under section 2511(a), we elect to review the underlying decrees pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows: (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. **** (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights - 12 - J-A15023-26 of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). In the first issue identified in the Anders brief, Counsel addresses the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under section 2511(a). Counsel notes that Torres testified that she became involved with Mother’s case at the beginning of July 2025, although the Agency had been involved with Mother since 2019 due to parenting concerns. Counsel asserts that Mother’s substance abuse had been an ongoing concern, and the Agency put a safety plan in place where Mother could work toward getting off drugs. However, throughout the life of the case, Mother was in prison or non- responsive to the Agency. Counsel relates that Mother has not addressed her substance abuse concerns, and she was unsuccessfully discharged from both White Deer Run and Gaudenzia’s Family Alternatives Program. The Agency scheduled Mother for urine screens and made it a condition that she test negative three consecutive times to have visitation with the Children reinstated. Counsel indicates that the Agency requested a total of one hundred and ninety-five urine screens, but Mother complied with only nine. Furthermore, when Mother would comply with drug screening, she tested positive on five occasions for - 13 - J-A15023-26 drugs such as cocaine, buprenorphine, benzodiazepine, and amphetamine. Counsel highlights that there was a point in time where Mother did not show for testing for two years, despite the Agency offering to meet her at home or work. Counsel explains that Mother did not complete her mental health requirements. Although she received a referral for Hugh Smith & Associates, she missed the appointment and never rescheduled an evaluation. While Mother claimed that she voluntarily signed up for TrueNorth’s counseling services, she never provided any documentation to the Agency. The Agency also referred Mother to Justice Works’ Nurturing Parenting Program, but she failed to attend the final class to graduate from the program. Counsel explains that Mother failed to maintain a relationship with the Children throughout the case. Counsel points to Torres’ testimony that Mother had never taken the Children to medical appointments, and she did not attend any school meetings for the Children. Torres further testified that the only time Mother would see Children would be at court, and there was a point in time that Mother did not have contact with the Children for two years. In fact, the court found aggravated circumstances existed because Mother did not attempt to maintain a relationship with her Children for a period exceeding six months. Counsel further notes that Mother failed to obtain consistent income or safe and stable housing. Torres testified that Mother never provided the - 14 - J-A15023-26 Agency with pay stubs, and Mother never allowed the Agency to do a walk- through of her residence, despite repeated attempts to do so. Mother was also in Dauphin County Prison for two months for DUI and drug offenses. In sum, Counsel submits that Mother was unable to address the concerns which led to the Agency’s involvement, and the issues that existed at the time of the Children’s referral to the Agency still existed at the time of the TPR hearing. The orphans’ court explained the reasons underlying its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), as follows: [Section] 2511(a)(1) allows for the termination of parental rights when “[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” [The court] believe[s] that the testimony presented at the TPR hearing in this matter demonstrated that Mother had evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the Children for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the Agency’s filing of the TPR petition[s]. Mother has exhibited almost no compliance with the service objectives established in th[ese] case[s]. She almost never communicated with the Agency, and she has missed all except for nine of the 195 drug screenings scheduled throughout the life of this case. And out of the nine screenings she appeared for, she tested positive for alcohol or cocaine on five of those occasions. She has had zero visits with the Children outside of court proceedings due to her consistent failure to appear for drug screenings as required for her to have visits with the Children. Mother has also failed to complete a mental health evaluation through Hugh Smith & Associates despite an Agency referral, and she failed to provide any documentation that she completed an evaluation through any other outlet. As for Mother’s objective to maintain stable employment, there was testimony suggesting that Mother owned a cobbler business, but she neglected to provide the Agency with - 15 - J-A15023-26 documentation regarding her finances and income such that the Agency was unable to determine whether her income would be sufficient to provide for the Children. Finally, as to Mother’s objective to maintain stable housing, the Agency caseworker, . . . Torres, testified that the Agency was unable to evaluate the suitability of Mother’s home because Mother repeatedly denied the caseworkers access to her home and insisted on having meetings at locations other than her home. In sum, Mother’s continued drug use; her consistent failure to appear for drug screenings and visits with the Children; her failure to complete a psychological evaluation; her failure to verify her employment, income, and housing status; and her otherwise complete lack of cooperation and communication with the Agency clearly evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, as well as an unwillingness to take the steps necessary for her to effectively perform her parental duties. Therefore, the termination of her parental rights was appropriate under [section] 2511(a)(1). Orphans’ Court Opinion, 8/20/26, at 12-13 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, some capitalization added). Based on our review, we conclude that the orphans’ court’s determination that the Agency established the requirements of section 2511(a)(1) by clear and convincing evidence is supported by the record. As explained above, pursuant to subsection (a)(1), the Agency was required to establish that Mother “by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1). In making this assessment, the orphans’ court was not permitted to consider any efforts - 16 - J-A15023-26 made by Mother to remedy the conditions after the filing of the TPR petitions. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Here, the Agency filed the TPR petitions on December 19, 2025. The evidence of record reflects that, in the six months preceding the filing of those petitions, Mother either refused or failed to perform parental duties. While Mother was provided with a list of service objectives, she failed to comply with or complete those objectives. Specifically, Torres recounted that Mother’s service objectives were to: (a) cooperate and comply with the Agency to yield positive results; (b) participate in a parenting program and address her parenting needs to ensure the consistency of the Children; (c) to address any drug and alcohol issues to ensure the safety of the Children; (d) maintain stable housing and employment to provide for her and the Children; and (e) address any mental health needs to ensure her stability. In the six months prior to the filing of the TPR petitions, Mother did not cooperate or comply with the Agency’s directives. Mother failed to maintain communication with the Agency, and the Agency received returned mail from Mother throughout the life of this case. Mother failed to return phone calls from Agency caseworkers, and failed to appear for numerous meetings scheduled with caseworkers. Although Mother participated in a parenting program, she failed to attend the program’s final session to do her post-curriculum assessments, and - 17 - J-A15023-26 therefore never completed the program, and never received a certificate of completion to provide to the Agency and the court. Mother did not address her ongoing drug and alcohol issues to ensure the safety of the Children. Mother failed to appear for 186 of her 195 scheduled drug screenings. Although the Agency received information indicating that Mother was at the White Deer Run drug and alcohol treatment center, she was only there for approximately five days before being unsuccessfully discharged. Indeed, although Mother attended only a few court hearings, she appeared at some of those hearings under the influence of alcohol or cocaine. While the Agency referred Mother for a psychological evaluation through Hugh Smith & Associates, she missed several appointments and never completed the evaluation. Moreover, while Mother claimed that she intended to go to TrueNorth for mental health services, she never provided the Agency with any documentation from TrueNorth to confirm either her participation in — or completion of — any services. Mother did not demonstrate that she maintained stable housing or employment to provide for her and the Children. Mother consistently refused to provide any information regarding her employment or her income. Thus, the Agency was unable to determine whether Mother had the financial means to provide for the Children’s needs and welfare. Mother also refused to permit - 18 - J-A15023-26 caseworkers to come to her residence to assess it for the safety of the Children. Most troubling, however, is the fact that, since November 6, 2023, when the Children were first placed in the care and custody of the Agency, Mother has not been able to attend any visits with the Children due to her inability to provide three consecutive negative drug screens throughout the life of this case. Thus, as of the date of the TPR hearing on December 19, 2025, Mother had not had a visit with the Children for more than two years. In that same period of time, Mother did not attend any medical appointments for the Children, nor any school meetings for them. Consequently, as the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding of grounds for termination under section 2511(a)(1), we affirm this ruling at both dockets. In the second issue identified in the Anders brief, Counsel challenges the trial court’s ruling with respect to section 2511(b). Having agreed with the orphans’ court as to one of the enumerated subsections of section 2511(a), we would ordinarily turn our attention to the court’s analysis of section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (holding that if the orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for termination under one of the section 2511(a) subsections by clear and convincing evidence, the court then assesses the petition pursuant to section 2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare); see also M.E., 283 A.3d at 830 (explaining that this Court need only agree - 19 - J-A15023-26 with the orphans’ court’s determination as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), in addition to section 2511(b), in order to affirm termination). However, the record before us, including the Orphans’ court opinion prepared following remand, is devoid of