Est. of: P.H., Appeal of: P.H.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket2272 EDA 2025
JudgeOlson
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
ESTATE OF: P.H., AN ALLEGED : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
INCAPACITATED PERSON : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: P.H. :
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: No. 2272 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 25, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 1173AI of 2024
BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
Appellant, P.H., appeals from the July 25, 2025 order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that appointed Edythe Shapiro
(“Ms. Shapiro”) as plenary guardian of the person and estate of Appellant after
a jury, on May 13, 2025, adjudicated Appellant a totally incapacitated person.
This case returns to us after this Court remanded the case for the trial court
to determine whether, or not, in rem jurisdiction was obtained in Pennsylvania
pursuant to Section 5913 of the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (“UAGPPJA”), 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5901 – 5992. See
Est. of P.H., ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 2184959, at *5. We affirm.
We previously summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital (“the hospital”) began
providing medical care and services to Appellant on May 9,
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2024, when the hospital admitted him due to his complaints
of abdominal pain, distention, and urinary retention. As of
May 13, 2025, Appellant remained admitted to, and under
the care of, the hospital. Appellant had been deemed by
the hospital to be medically stable for discharge to a
long-term care facility a few months after his admission, but
Appellant declined to engage in discharge planning to a
facility that would have accepted him. Appellant insisted on
discharge to an osteopathic hospital to perform surgery on
his hips, rather than to an assisted living facility where he
felt it was unlikely that he would ever be able to obtain the
hip surgery he needs to regain mobility. Appellant has a
diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder with psychotic features
and a history of delusional disorder among other medical
conditions.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/25, at 2 (record citation omitted;
formatting modified).
On September 30, 2024, the hospital filed a petition for the
adjudication of incapacity and for the appointment of a plenary
guardian of Appellant’s person and estate. In the petition, the
hospital alleged that Appellant was incapacitated, and “due to the
functional limitations associated with his mental and physical
conditions, was unable to receive and evaluate information
effectively and unable to make and communicate decisions
concerning his physical health, safety, and living arrangements.”
Petition for Adjudication of Incapacity, 9/30/24, at ¶ 6. The
hospital further alleged that Appellant was “unable to manage his
financial affairs” and was “in need of a guardian of his person to
handle his personal, medical affairs, including making end-of-life
decisions, as well as to make decisions regarding where he shall
reside and how his care shall be provided.” Id. at ¶ 7.
Appellant retained private counsel and, on December 12, 2024,
filed an answer to the petition, as well as new matter that
requested an independent medical examination and a jury trial to
determine Appellant’s capacity status. On January 7, 2025, the
trial court granted Appellant’s request to be evaluated by an
independent medical examiner. Based on Appellant’s request for
a jury trial, the trial court bifurcated the issue of capacity from the
issue as to whether, or not, the appointment of a plenary guardian
was necessary.
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On May 13, 2025, a jury found that Appellant’s ability to receive
and evaluate information effectively and communicate decisions
was impaired to such a significant extent that he was “totally
unable to manage his finances” and “totally unable to meet
essential requirements for physical health and safety.” N.T.,
5/13/25, at 95-96. In other words, the jury found Appellant to be
a totally incapacitated person. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501 (defining
“incapacitated person” as “an adult whose ability to receive and
evaluate information effectively and communicate decisions in any
way is impaired to such a significant extent that he or she is
partially or totally unable to manage his or her financial resources
or to meet essential requirements for his or her physical health
and safety”). On June 7, 2025, the trial court conducted a
guardianship hearing, and subsequently made the following
findings of fact:
1. Appellant is 71 years old and is a domiciliary of the City
and County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
2. Appellant has been diagnosed with schizoaffective
disorder with psychotic features and a history of delusional
disorder and other medical conditions, which impair his
ability to receive and evaluate information effectively or
manage his finances.
3. A jury found that Appellant was totally impaired as to his
capacity to manage his person or estate.
4. The record shows that Appellant needs guardianship
services.
5. There are no less restrictive alternatives to guardianship,
having ruled out a power of attorney, an advance health
care directive, or supported decision-making because there
are no individuals who are willing or able to serve in those
capacities.
6. Appellant has declined to provide his informed consent to
any less restrictive alternatives to guardianship.
Trial Court Final Decree, 7/25/25, at 5-6. Thereupon, the trial
court appointed Ms. Shapiro as plenary guardian of Appellant’s
person and estate. Id. at 6.
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P.H., ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 2184959, at *1-*2 (brackets and footnote
omitted). Appellant appealed the trial court’s order appointing Ms. Shapiro as
plenary guardian and raised the following issues for our review:
1. [Whether the trial] court should have declined jurisdiction
over [Appellant] under the [UAGPPJA] since Pennsylvania
was not [Appellant’s] home state[?]
2. [Whether] the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find
that [Appellant] was a totally incapacitated person[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4.1
Appellant’s first issue challenges the trial court’s decree that appointed
a plenary guardian of his person and estate after a jury adjudicated him a
totally incapacitated person on the ground that the trial court lacked in rem
jurisdiction under the UAGPPJA. Id. at 9-12; see also In re Avery, ___ A.3d
___, 2026 WL 1732098, at *24 (Pa. Super. filed Jun. 16, 2026) (slip opinion)
(stating, “a proceeding involving the capacity status of a person is an in rem
action, binding against the whole world, provided that the [trial] court
issuing the judgment had in rem jurisdiction over the res [(namely a person’s
capacity status)]” (emphasis in original)).
A challenge to a trial court’s in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate an
individual incapacitated and appoint a guardian raises a pure question of law
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1 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925.
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for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Hanrahan v. Ketch, 243 A.3d 219, 222 (Pa. Super. 2020).
In 2012, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the UAGPPJA with
the intent that the UAGPPJA would provide “the exclusive jurisdictional basis
for a court of this Commonwealth to appoint a guardian or issue a protective
order for an adult.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5912; see also Avery, ___ A.3d ___,
2026 WL 1732098, at *18-*19. According to the UAGPPJA, a trial court has
in rem jurisdiction
to appoint a guardian or issue a protective order for a respondent
if one of the following paragraphs applies:
(1) This Commonwealth is the respondent’s home state.
(2) On the date the petition is filed, all of the following
subparagraphs apply:
(i) This Commonwealth is a significant-connection state.
(ii) One of the following clauses applies:
(A) The respondent does not have a home state, or a
court of the respondent’s home state has declined to
exercise jurisdiction because this Commonwealth is a
more appropriate forum or has declined to exercise
jurisdiction in a manner not inconsistent with a
determination that this Commonwealth is a more
appropriate forum.
(B) The respondent has a home state; a petition for
an appointment or order is not pending in a court of
that state or another significant-connection state;
and, before the court makes the appointment or
issues the order:
(I) a petition for an appointment or order is not
filed in the respondent’s home state;
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(II) an objection to the court’s jurisdiction is not
filed by a person required to be notified of the
proceeding; and
(III) the court in this Commonwealth concludes
that it is an appropriate forum under the factors
set forth in section 5916 (relating to appropriate
forum).
(3) All of the following subparagraphs apply:
(i) This Commonwealth does not have jurisdiction under
either paragraph (1) or (2).
(ii) The respondent’s home state and all
significant-connection states have declined to exercise
jurisdiction because this Commonwealth is the more
appropriate forum or has declined to exercise jurisdiction in
a manner not inconsistent with a determination that this
Commonwealth is a more appropriate forum.
(iii) Jurisdiction in this Commonwealth is consistent with the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
Pennsylvania.
(4) The requirements for special jurisdiction under section 5914
(relating to special jurisdiction) are met.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5913. This Court recently explained that
The UAGPPJA takes a “cascade approach” to determining which
state has in rem jurisdiction over a person’s capacity status and
estate. States that adopted [a version of the UAGPPJA] have
created cooperative, jurisdictional tiers among themselves.[2]
The res is no longer stuck in one state, and multiple states do not
have to compete for jurisdiction over it. Instead, the res flows
down the UAGPPJA tiers from higher-priority states into
lower-priority states. The jurisdictional priorities, from highest to
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2 The Avery Court noted that, as of June 16, 2026, all the states that comprise
the United States, with the exception of Florida, Michigan, and Texas, have
adopted a version of the UAGPPJA. Avery, ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 1732098,
at *18.
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lowest, are: 1) the court in the respondent’s home state; 2) the
court of a state with which the respondent has a significant
connection; or 3) a third state that is neither the home state nor
a significant-connection state.
Avery, ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 1732098, at *25 (citations, original footnote,
and some quotation marks omitted). Thus,
[t]he state with the highest jurisdictional priority is the “home
state” of the person whose capacity status is at issue. “Home
state” is an idiomatic translation of the Latin word, domicilium. A
person’s domicile retains primary jurisdiction over that person’s
capacity status and estate.
Id. at *26 (footnote omitted). The UAGPPJA defines a “home state” as
One of the following:
(1) The state in which the respondent was physically present,
including any period of temporary absence, for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the filing of a petition for
a protective order or the appointment of a guardian.
(2) If the requirement of paragraph (1) is not met, the state in
which the respondent was physically present, including any period
of temporary absence, for at least six consecutive months ending
within the six months prior to the filing of the petition.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5911.
The hospital filed its petition for the adjudication of incapacity and the
appointment of a plenary guardian on September 30, 2024. The six-month
period leading up to the filing of the hospital’s petition began on March 30,
2024, inclusive of March 30.3 As such, if Appellant was physically present in
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3 See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1910 (stating, “[w]henever in any statute the lapse of a
number of months after or before a certain day is required, such number of
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Pennsylvania on March 30, 2024, and continued to be physically present in
Pennsylvania, including any period of temporary absence, until the date the
petition was filed, September 30, 2024, then Pennsylvania was Appellant’s
“home state” and the trial court possessed in rem jurisdiction over the res,
i.e., Appellant’s capacity status. Id., see also Avery, ___ A.3d ___, 2026
WL 1732098, at *24.
In his answer, Appellant admitted that he became a patient of the
hospital on May 9, 2024. Appellant’s Answer and New Matter, 12/12/24, at
¶ 1; see also Petition for Adjudication of Incapacity, 9/30/24, at ¶ 1. The
hospital is located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Appellant remained at the
hospital beyond September 30, 2024, the date on which the hospital filed its
petition. Appellant further admitted that, prior to his admission to the
hospital, he resided with a friend at a residence located in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Appellant’s Answer and New Matter, 12/12/24, at ¶ 3; see
also Petition for Adjudication of Incapacity, 9/30/24, at ¶ 3. The record was
unclear, however, as to the length of time that Appellant resided at his friend’s
residence in Pennsylvania, and the trial court made no factual finding as the
length of such residency.
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months shall be computed by counting the months from such day, excluding
the calendar month in which such day occurs, and shall include the day of the
month in the last month so counted having the same numerical order as the
day of the month from which the computation is made, unless there be not so
many days in the last month so counted, in which case the period computed
shall expire with the last day of such month”).
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In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that
Appellant was “a domiciliary of the City and County of Philadelphia[,
Pennsylvania.]” Final Decree, 7/25/25, at § III, ¶ 1. The trial court, however,
did not expand upon the basis for reaching its finding. In its Rule 1925(a)
opinion, the trial court stated the following:
We have operated under the premise that [Appellant’s] “home
state” is Pennsylvania for purpose of the [UAGPPJA]. The petition
in this matter was filed by [the hospital] on September 30, 2024,
almost [five] months after [Appellant] had been admitted [to the
hospital]. Before his admission, [Appellant] resided with a friend
[at his residence located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania], which
[Appellant] admitted in his answer to the petition. [Appellant’s
friend] has served as [Appellant’s] power of attorney since 2013.
Based upon the record[,] it can be reasonably inferred and it is
understood that [Appellant], a self-described “seasonal” resident
of Pennsylvania, had been physically present in Pennsylvania as a
resident and then a patient for at least six consecutive months
before the petition for adjudication was filed.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/25, at 9 (extraneous capitalization omitted;
emphasis added).
Based upon the record that was previously before us, we concluded that
we were unable to find support for the trial court’s inference that Appellant
“had been physically present in Pennsylvania as a resident and then a patient
for at least six consecutive months before the petition for adjudication was
filed.” P.H., ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 2184959, at *5. As we noted, based
upon the September 30, 2024 filing of the hospital’s petition for the
adjudication of incapacity and the appointment of a plenary guardian, “[i]If
Appellant began his residency in Pennsylvania on or before March 30, 2024,
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then Pennsylvania would qualify as Appellant’s ‘home state’ and the trial court
would have had in rem jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Section
5913(1).” Id. *4-*5 (finding that, the six-month period began on March 30,
2024, inclusive of March 30). We, therefore, remanded the case to the trial
court for the purpose of determining the length of time Appellant resided at
his friend’s residence in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. *5. On remand, the
trial court held an evidentiary hearing where Rebecca Horowitz, the complex
care manager at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital testified. Based upon
this testimony, the trial court determined that “Appellant resided in
Pennsylvania since at least January 23, 2024, and that Pennsylvania[,] thus[,]
qualifies as his ‘home state’ under the UAGPPJA.” 4 Trial Court Letter, 9/2/26,
at 3 (unpaginated).
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4 To the extent that Appellant objected to the trial court conducting an
evidentiary hearing and taking new evidence without subject matter
jurisdiction, we find this assertion to be of no avail. As our Supreme Court
noted in Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, L.P. v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control
Bd., 162 A.3d 353 (Pa. 2017) “when an appellate court remands for ‘further
proceedings’ there is no ‘one size fits all’ talismanic definition for those terms
which is applicable to all cases and situations.” Sugarhouse, 162 A.3d at
371. Rather, “every remand order directing that further proceedings be
conducted must necessarily be examined in conjunction with the opinion of
the appellate tribunal and the particular facts, circumstances, and procedural
history of the case in order to determine what the lower court or tribunal is
required to do upon return of the case to it.” Id. (noting that, Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 2591 requires a trial court, on remand, “‘to
proceed in accordance with the judgment or other order of the appellate
court,’ it does not require the [trial court] to utilize any specific mode of
compliance with a general remand order”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2591(a)
(stating, “[o]n remand of the record the [trial court] below shall proceed in
accordance with the judgment or other order of the appellate court and,
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At the hearing, Mr. Horowitz stated she was able to determine that
beginning with Appellant’s admission on January 17, 2024, to Jefferson
Torresdale Hospital, located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Appellant’s
electronic health records identified his home address as that of his friend’s
residence in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. N.T., 8/30/26, at 20-21. Ms.
Horowitz explained that once a patient provides his or her home address to a
medical facility and that address is recorded as part of the patient’s electronic
health record, that address “follows” the patient at subsequent medical
facilities unless the patient requests an update to the address. Id. at 28. Ms.
Horowitz confirmed that when Appellant sought medical treatment at a facility
on March 17, 2024, and again on April 18, 2024, both electronic health records
from those treatment visits identified Appellant’s home address as that of his
friend’s residence in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 28-30. As such, we
concur with, and the record now supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Pennsylvania qualified as Appellant’s “home state” under Section 5913(1) of
the UAGPPJA on March 30, 2024, the start of the six-month period prior to the
hospital filing its petition for the adjudication of incapacity and the
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except as otherwise provided in such order, [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure] 1701(a) (effect of appeals generally) shall no longer be applicable
to the matter”). In other words, provided that the trial court complies with,
and considers only the issues contained in the remand order, the trial court is
permitted to conduct an evidentiary hearing and take new evidence in order
to resolve the purpose of the remand order. As such, we discern no error of
law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision in the case sub judice to
conduct an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining whether, or
not, Appellant resided at his friend’s residence on or before March 30, 2024.
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appointment of a plenary guardian. Thus, the trial court had in rem
jurisdiction to adjudicate Appellant incapacitated and to appoint a plenary
guardian. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5913; see also Avery, ___ A.3d ___, 2026
WL 1732098, at *25.
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the jury’s finding of incapacity. Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. Section
777(b) of the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code states that “[a]ny person
against whom proceedings have been instituted to establish his [or her]
incapacity shall be entitled to a trial of such issue by a jury.” 20 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 777(b). Section 777(b) further states that “[t]he verdict of the jury shall
have the same effect as the verdict of a jury in a case at law.” Id. Thus, the
jury’s finding regarding capacity is binding and not merely advisory. As such,
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s finding of
incapacity, we must determine whether viewing all the evidence presented at
trial in the light most favorable to the petitioner as the party who prevailed in
the capacity hearing, there is sufficient evidence to enable the jury, as
fact-finder, to find an individual is incapacitated by clear and convincing
evidence. See In re Hyman, 811 A.2d 605, 609 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating
that, the burden is on the petitioner to prove the individual’s incapacity by
clear and convincing evidence). Our task is to ensure that the jury’s finding
is supported by competent and adequate evidence and is not predicated on
capricious disbelief of competent and credible evidence. In re Est. of
Schultheis, 747 A.2d 918, 922 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted), appeal
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denied, 761 A.2d 551 (Pa. 2000). Any doubts regarding the individual’s
capacity may be resolved by the jury, as the fact-finder, unless the evidence
is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
sustain the petitioner’s burden of proof. The jury, as the fact-finder, while
passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
Section 5501 of the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code defines an
incapacitated person as “an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate
information effectively and communicate decisions in any way is impaired to
such a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his
financial resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health
and safety.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501. “[A] person is presumed to be mentally
competent, and the burden is on the petitioner to prove incapacity by clear
and convincing evidence.” Hyman, 811 A.2d at 608.
To establish incapacity, the petitioner must present testimony, in
person or by deposition[,] from individuals qualified by training
and experience in evaluating individuals with incapacities of the
type alleged by the petitioner, which establishes the nature and
extent of the alleged incapacities and disabilities and the person’s
mental, emotional[,] and physical condition, adaptive behavior[,]
and social skills. The petition must also present evidence
regarding the services being utilized to meet essential
requirements for the alleged incapacitated person’s physical
health and safety, to manage the person’s financial resources or
to develop or regain the person’s abilities; evidence regarding the
types of assistance required by the person and as to why no less
restrictive alternatives would be appropriate; and evidence
regarding the probability that the extent of the person’s
incapacities may significantly lessen or change.
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20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5518.
At the May 13, 2025 jury trial, Dr. Paulina Khodak (“Dr. Khodak”) was
admitted as an expert in evaluating individuals for capacity. N.T., 5/13/25,
at 29. Dr. Khodak opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
Appellant was totally incapacitated as to his person and with regard to his
ability to manage his finances. Id. at 39. Dr. Khodak stated that she
attempted to evaluate Appellant’s cognitive abilities using the Applebaum
criteria for capacity and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment test, but Appellant
declined to participate in these evaluations with Dr. Khodak. 5 Id. at 31. Dr.
Khodak described Appellant as being “physically unable to walk given [his]
bilateral hip fractures that have not been rehabilitated and have healed
improperly because [Appellant] declined medical treatment.” Id. at 31-32.
Dr. Khodak explained that Appellant’s decline of medical treatment was the
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5 Dr. Paul Applebaum outlined “four criteria that patients must meet to be
deemed to have capacity. These four criteria are 1) communicating a choice,
2) understanding the relevant information, 3) appreciating the situation and
its consequences, and 4) reasoning about treatment options.” See
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10922513/ (last visited 10/20/26);
see also N.T., 5/13/25, at 40 (describing the Applebaum capacity criteria as
including “things like ability to make a consistent choice[ and] ability to
manipulate information rationally”).
“The Montreal Cognitive Assessment [(“MoCA”)] is a popular and
simple-to-administer screening instrument to detect cognitive impairment.
The MoCA generates a total score and six domain-specific index scores: (1)
Memory, (2) Executive Functioning, (3) Attention, (4) Language, (5)
Visuospatial, and (6) Orientation.” See
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7554137/ (last visited 10/20/26).
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result of the delusional process affecting Appellant’s cognitive abilities. Id. at
32. Dr. Khodak diagnosed Appellant “with schizoaffective disorder,” as well
as a “major neuro-cognitive disorder, which is a dementia” and “a history of
[a] traumatic brain injury.” Id. at 34. Dr. Khodak described schizoaffective
disorder as “a type of schizophrenia where there are periods of hallucinations
and disorganization of thinking[,] as well as periods [of] mood symptoms that
could be depression or mania.” Id. at 41. She stated that the schizoaffective
disorder manifests itself in Appellant through “auditory hallucinations and
significant paranoid and grandiose delusions.” Id. at 34. Dr. Khodak
explained that the disorder could be treated with antipsychotic medications
but Appellant declined treatment. Id. She also explained that his
neuro-cognitive disorder may possibly be the result of the schizoaffective
disorder or “exacerbated by the traumatic brain injury or a medical condition.”
Id. at 34-35. Dr. Khodak believed that Appellant was totally impaired and
“that his delusions affect his ability to intake [] information and manipulate it
appropriately.” Id. at 35. In other words, Appellant was “unable to
understand the consequences of the decisions he[ has] been making.” Id. at
36. Dr. Khodak expressed that, in her opinion, Appellant was totally impaired
with regard to “communicating decisions” and his short-term memory. Id. at
36. She described Appellant as needing “assistance for all hygiene needs” and
indicated that he was totally impaired with his ability to manage his financial
resources. Given that Appellant has declined medical treatment, Dr. Khodak
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believed that Appellant’s condition would likely decline further over time. Id.
at 37.
Dr. Kenneth Rosenstein (“Dr. Rosenstein”), who was retained by
Appellant to perform an independent evaluation to determine Appellant's
capacity, was admitted as an expert in geriatric psychiatry. Id. at 47-48. Dr.
Rosenstein agreed that Appellant suffered from schizoaffective disorder that
manifests itself with “significant paranoid and grandiose delusions” and
“auditory hallucinations” where Appellant “talk[s] to unseen people,
mumbl[es] to himself, respond[s] to internal stimuli, and appear[s] to be
lacking contact with reality.” Id. at 48-49. Dr. Rosenstein stated that he
administered the St. Louis University Mental Status Examination and that
Appellant’s results showed “a mild degree of cognitive impairment[.]” 6 Id. at
49. Dr. Rosenstein opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
Appellant was totally impaired as to his ability to receive and evaluate
information, communicate decisions, give informed consent, perform activities
of daily living, manage his finances; manage his healthcare and be compliant
with taking medication; and providing for physical health and safety. Id. at
50. Dr. Rosenstein explained that Appellant was able to express an opinion
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6 “The Saint Louis University Mental Status [(“SLUMS”)] Exam[ination] is a
commonly used tool for screening cognitive function, particularly for detecting
mild cognitive impairment [] and early dementia. It was developed to
overcome limitations in existing cognitive assessments by evaluating a broad
range of domains, including language comprehension, executive function,
memory, and attention.” See
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12319681/ (last visited 10/20/26).
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but that he believed Appellant’s opinion was not based on facts but rather on
his delusional thinking. Id. at 57. Dr. Rosenstein stated that his total
impairment was due primarily to his schizoaffective disorder “based on his
delusional thought process.” Id. at 51. Dr. Rosenstein stated that Appellant’s
medical records indicated he refused antipsychotic medications and that
“[w]ithout treatment, [Appellant’s impairment] most likely [will] remain the
same or worsen over time.” Id. Dr. Rosenstein believed that Appellant was
totally impaired regarding both his person and finances. Id. at 54.
Appellant testified that he was a graduate of Tufts University in Medford,
Massachusetts where he obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in
history and English. Id. at 72. He indicated that the “most significant thing”
he achieved during his lifetime, thus far, was being a “formulator of dietary
supplements[.]” Id. Appellant understood that he needed hip surgery and it
was his objective “to go to the facility that has [the] latest generation of
robotic surgery.” Id. According to Appellant, he wanted to be transferred to
Massachusetts General Hospital and if he could not be transferred to that
facility, he wanted to go to the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York where
he was a patient of Dr. Steven Hass, the chief of surgery. Id. at 74. When
asked if he was aware that the hospitals he wanted to be transferred to
declined to accept him as a patient because they could not provide additional
care, Appellant responded that he believed this was the result of “paperwork
issues” and that if the paperwork “had been done appropriately, [he] would
have gotten an affirmative response[.]” Id. at 76. Appellant believes “it
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comes to an issue of money” and indicated that the petition to adjudicate him
incapacitated and to appoint a plenary guardian was “coming mainly [from] a
financial dispute between [his health] insurer and [the hospital]” and that the
hospital was “trying to get something they don’t deserve[.]” Id. at 73, 76.
Appellant explained that because of his previous career as a dietary
supplement formulator, the hospital was trying to get more money from him
than they were legally contracted to accept from his insurance company. Id.
at 77.
Based upon the testimony provided at trial, we find there was sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding that, by clear and convincing evidence,
Appellant is totally incapacitated as to his person and finances. Both medical
experts reached the conclusion that Appellant suffers from schizoaffective
disorder that manifests itself in hallucinations, paranoid and grandiose beliefs,
and delusional thinking. This disorder, according to the medical experts,
resulted in Appellant becoming totally incapacitated and unable to handle both
his person well-being and his finances. 7 As such, we discern no error of law
or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order appointing a plenary guardian.
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7 Appellant concedes that the hospital “presented testimony sufficient to
establish incapacity” but asserts that “the jury also heard from [Appellant]
who testified clearly and forthrightly that he was not in need of a guardian”
and that “he was not impaired and was capable of making decisions on his
own.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. To the extent Appellant asks this Court to do
nothing more than alter the result reached by the jury, as fact-finder, by
reassessing witness credibility and reweighing the evidence presented at trial,
we decline Appellant’s invitation. It is the providence of the jury, as
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J-S15010-26
Order affirmed.
Date: 11/18/2026
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fact-finder, while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the
evidence, to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
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