Full Opinion

J-S34018-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: E.B.H., FATHER : : : : : : No. 463 WDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered March 10, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-02-DP-0000668-2025 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: E.B.H., FATHER : : : : : : No. 464 WDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered March 10, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-02-DP-0000667-2025 BEFORE: KING, J., NEUMAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 2, 2026 E.B.H. (“Father”) appeals from the orders dated February 18, 2026, and entered on March 10, 2026, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Juvenile Division, directing E.H. (born November 2023) and M.H. (born February 2025) (collectively “Children”) to remain in their current foster J-S34018-26 placement following their dependency adjudications.1, 2 Father challenges the trial court’s dispositional decision to keep Children in their current placement, its decision during the adjudicatory hearing to admit certain evidence, and the effectiveness of court-appointed counsel’s representation. After careful review, we affirm the adjudicatory and dispositional decisions but remand these cases to allow the trial court to correct its dispositional orders consistent with this memorandum. The trial court summarized the relevant factual background of this matter as follows: The Allegheny County Office of Children Youth and Families (“CYF”) became involved with Children on November 17, 2025[,] following a disclosure from their 10[-]year[-]old half-sister, Y.H.,[3] that Father physically disciplined her and had touched her inappropriately. Following a forensic interview of Y.H., CYF obtained a verbal Emergency Custody Authorization to remove all three children from [the] parents’ care. All three children were placed in the foster home of S.K. and M.K. At the time of removal, E.H. was one year old and M.H. was eight months old. In early December 2025, [E.H.] and [M.H.] were placed in a new foster ____________________________________________ 1 These appeals are properly before us, as “it is the dispositional order following a dependency adjudication that is a final appealable order.” Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 651 (Pa. Super. 2019). 2 By per curiam order dated April 16, 2026, this Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals at docket nos. 463 and 464 WDA 2026, as the appeals involve related parties and issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 513. 3 Y.H. is not a subject of the instant appeals. See Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 6/11/26, at 1 n.1. The three children share the same mother; however, the biological father of Y.H. is S.B. Dispositional Order, 3/10/26, at 2. -2- J-S34018-26 home of A.C. and C.V. [(collectively “Foster Parents”)], due in part to some challenging behavioral issues with E.H. Following Children’s removal, both [M.H.C. (“Mother”)] and Father [(collectively “Parents”)] were charged with criminal offenses related to Y.H.’s disclosures. Mother was charged with one felony count of endangering the welfare of children. Father was charged with numerous felonies including rape, aggravated indecent assault, unlawful contact with a minor, indecent assault, corruption of minors, and indecent exposure. On January 27, 2026, the [c]ourt conducted an adjudicatory hearing in these matters during which Mother and Father were represented by separate counsel. At the time, Father was incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail and participated by video. Father had been denied bail related to his criminal charges, and an anticipated release date was unknown. Mother was detained in an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention center in West Virginia and participated by telephone. Mother’s eligibility for release was unknown and remained subject to the control of the United States immigration authorities. During the hearing, the [c]ourt heard brief testimony from Dr. Margaret Russell, an attending physician at Children’s Hospital Child Advocacy Clinic, and Detective Julie Turney. Dr. Russell confirmed CYF’s offer of proof that had she been called to testify, she would have testified that her physical examinations of E.H. and M.H. did not independently raise concerns for maltreatment. The [c]ourt admitted the following exhibits with no objections from counsel: • CYF Exhibit 1: E.H.’s follow[-]up consult note from January 12, 2026; • CYF Exhibit 2: Y.H.’s follow-up consult note from December 19, 2025; • CYF Exhibit 3: Y.H.’s initial consult note from November 18, 2025; and • CYF Exhibit 4: Interview summary of Y.H.’s forensic interview conducted on November 17, 2025[,] at the Child Advocacy Center at UPMC Children’s Hospital.13 -3- J-S34018-26 13 In the Dispositional Order dated February 18, 2026, [and entered on March 10, 2026,] the [c]ourt summarized CYF Exhibit 4 as follows: CYF Exhibit 4 is the written summary of the forensic interview of [Y.H.] conducted at the Children’s Advocacy Center at Children’s Hospital. The interview was conducted on 11/17/25. In it, [Y.H.] made credible disclosures of sexual abuse by [Father], including credible disclosures of penetration. [Y.H.] further provided a credible description of her observation of [Father’s] ejaculating. [Y.H.] also made credible disclosures of threats of physical violence made by [Father] against Mother and against [Y.H]. [Dispositional Order, 3/10/26, at 3 ¶ 16.] No additional testimony or exhibits were offered or admitted, and the [c]ourt adjudicated Children dependent under subsection 1 of the definition of dependent child.[4, 5] The [c]ourt then found that placement of … Children remained clearly necessary as neither parent was available to care for them. On February 10, 2026, the parties appeared for the dispositional hearing to address, among other things, Parents’ requests that Children be placed with a paternal aunt, Ye.H., with childcare and other assistance to be provided by another paternal aunt, K.B., who resided in the same household as Parents and Children prior to their removal. During the hearing, all parties agreed that, while the law requires both CYF and the [c]ourt to give preference to kinship caregivers including blood relatives, the [c]ourt must make a dispositional decision reflecting the child’s best interests based on the evidence presented. The [c]ourt heard testimony from the following witnesses: Anjelica Salih[,] CYF Casework ____________________________________________ 4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining ‘dependent child’ as “[a] child who: (1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals”). 5 The orders of adjudication are dated January 27, 2026, and were entered on the docket on February 9, 2026. TCO at 1 n.1. The court also adjudicated Y.H. dependent that same day. Id. -4- J-S34018-26 Supervisor; Mother; K.B., paternal aunt; Ye.H., paternal aunt; S.K., foster parent to Y.H.; and A.C., foster parent to Children. Both the casework supervisor and Children’s foster parent reported … Children are doing well in their current placement[;] … regarding E.H. specifically, they have seen improvement with his behavioral concerns. Children’s foster parent also spoke of the efforts he and his wife have made to get Children involved with Alliance for Infants and Toddlers, and their current and future plans for childcare with the help of extended family. Further, [the] foster parents for both Children and Y.H. have been working together to facilitate sibling visitation, which all three children enjoy. CYF recommended … Children stay in their current foster placement[,] as the agency had “serious concerns” regarding [the] paternal aunts’ understanding of why Father is incarcerated.18 During their respective testimony, both paternal aunts expressed confusion about Father’s incarceration. Ye.H. testified … she did not believe there could be charges against Father. Similarly, K.B. testified … she believed Y.H. lied and … the allegations of abuse were false. Further, K.B. spoke negatively about Y.H. and referred to her as a “rebel[.”] Despite their confusion, both paternal aunts expressed their intention to comply with any court orders should Children be placed in their care. 18 CYF also noted … the agency was unable to complete full assessments and criminal background checks on various family members. However, this played no role in the [c]ourt’s ultimate decision to keep Children in their current foster placement. Following the testimony, the [c]ourt needed an opportunity to review the exhibits entered on the first day of the hearing before announcing a decision regarding disposition. The parties next appeared before the [c]ourt on February 18, 2026, at which time the [c]ourt ordered … Children were to remain in their current foster placement. When announcing the disposition, the [c]ourt gave a description of the facts and reasoning supporting its decision to keep Children in their foster placement rather than place them in the care of their paternal aunt. First, the [c]ourt observed that, although the criminal court proceeding regarding Father has yet to conclude, the evidence it was entitled to rely upon during the dispositional phase of these proceedings established … Y.H. experienced abuse in the -5- J-S34018-26 household, and further, … Father’s family had yet to understand or confront the current situation. The [c]ourt found … it was not in … Children’s best interests to be placed with family “who have not yet begun to understand what happened.” Second, the [c]ourt noted … the three siblings deserve to have a continuing relationship with one another. Given the views expressed by paternal aunts, specifically those of K.B. regarding Y.H., the [c]ourt did not believe the family could effectively facilitate the ongoing relationship between Children and their sister who would remain in her current foster placement. Last[ly], the [c]ourt noted the uncertainty and disruption that comes with multiple placement changes for dependent children and that E.H. and M.H. had already experienced one change in placement after removal from Parents’ care. While Ye.H. is willing to care for Children, she has not been a caregiver for them in the past. Children have been in their current placement for a few months, and they are doing well. In arriving at its decision to maintain Children’s placement, the [c]ourt considered the importance of both their English and Spanish language development in order to maintain a relationship with Mother, who speaks primarily Spanish, and other extended family. Accordingly, the [c]ourt ordered ongoing visits between Children and Parents, Children and Y.H., as well as with paternal relatives, many of whom reside in the area. TCO at 2-8 (some footnotes omitted; some formatting altered). On March 31, 2026, Father filed timely notices of appeal, and after being directed to do so, he filed concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court later filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Herein, Father presents the following issues for our review: 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it admitted the double hearsay summary report of the complainant’s forensic interview at the adjudication hearing in violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and the [t]ender [y]ears exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1? -6- J-S34018-26 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found credible and assigned weight to the allegations in the double hearsay summary report at the disposition hearing over the sworn, in- court testimony of the paternal relatives even though the summary report was never admitted into evidence, and there were no facts of record to support the findings? 3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it placed the children in foster care with non-Spanish-speaking strangers rather than with ready and available relatives based on its finding that the allegations presented in the double hearsay summary report were more credible and reliable than the sworn, in-person testimony of the paternal aunts? 4. Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance when she made no objection to the admission of the double hearsay summary report at the adjudication hearing or the disposition hearing without ever having seen the forensic interview recording, without having reviewed the forensic interview with her client, and without investigating or testing the accuracy and reliability of the allegations presented in the summary report in any way? Father’s Brief at 7-8.6 Preliminarily, we note: [T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Interest of X.P., 248 A.3d 1274, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “We accord great weight to the trial court’s fact-finding function because the trial court is ____________________________________________ 6 We have reordered Father’s issues for ease of disposition. -7- J-S34018-26 in the best position to observe and rule on the credibility of the parties and witnesses.” In Interest of C.K., 165 A.3d 935, 941 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned up). Additionally, we recognize, “A dependency hearing is a two-stage process governed by the Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6387].” Interest of S.D., 334 A.3d 919, 925 (Pa. Super. 2025). The first stage requires the court to hear evidence on the dependency petition and to determine whether the child is dependent. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a). Section 6302[] defines a ‘dependent child,’ in part, as one who: is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law[,] or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental or emotional health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent … that places the health, safety[,] or welfare of the child at risk[.] 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 6302(1). This Court has held a child will be declared dependent when he is presently without proper parental care or control, and when such care and control are not immediately available. See In re G.T., 845 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2004). Proper parental care has been defined as “that care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the child.” In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care and control encompasses two discrete questions: whether the child presently is without proper parental care and control, and if so, whether such care and control are immediately available.” In re M.W., 842 A.2d 425, 428 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). In answering the first question, the paramount concern is the “welfare of the child at the time of the hearing.” In the Interest of Black, … 417 A.2d 1178, 1183 ([Pa. Super.] 1980). In answering … the second question, “it may be necessary for the hearing court to look to the future.” Id. at 1182. -8- J-S34018-26 A finding that a child is dependent requires proof by “clear and convincing evidence,” i.e., testimony that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts at issue.” Matter of C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. Super. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the court finds a child dependent, it proceeds to the second stage of the dependency process, which requires an appropriate disposition based on the best interest of the child pursuant to section 6351(a) and (b). See 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 6341(a), (c); see also In re B.S., 923 A.2d 517, 521 (Pa. Super. 2007).[7] Id. at 925-26. During a dispositional hearing following the finding of dependency, “all evidence helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, may be received by the court and relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not otherwise competent in the hearing on the petition.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(d)(1)(i); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(d)(2) (“The parties or their counsel shall be afforded opportunity to examine and controvert written reports so received and to cross-examine individuals making the reports.”). We address Father’s first two issues together, as they both relate to CYF Exhibit 4. Specifically, Father challenges the trial court’s admission of CYF Exhibit 4 into evidence at the adjudicatory hearing, as well as the weight it prescribed to the allegations contained within said exhibit at the dispositional ____________________________________________ 7 “The ‘disposition’ of a dependent child refers to where the child will live, under what conditions, and who will assume physical and/or legal custody.” Interest of V.B., No. 438 EDA 2023, unpublished memorandum at 6 n.3 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 29, 2023); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value). -9- J-S34018-26 hearing, on the grounds that the exhibit constitutes inadmissible hearsay. We review the merits of these claims mindful of the following: “It is well settled that questions concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence in dependency proceedings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only where a clear abuse of that discretion exists.” In re J.J., 69 A.3d 724, 730 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “The Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure provide that in adjudications, each party shall have an opportunity to present evidence subject to the rules of evidence. Pa.R.J.C.P. 1406(C), cmt.” Interest of I.R.- R., 208 A.3d 514, 519 (Pa. Super. 2019)…; see also In Interest of Gonzalez, … 386 A.2d 586, 589 ([Pa. Super.] 1978) (stating, “The Juvenile Act states … all proceedings shall be conducted in an informal but orderly manner. This of course does not mean … all rules of evidence are abandoned”; but noting … the Juvenile Act “does provide the judge wide latitude in assuring … the truth is brought out and the philosophy and purpose of the Juvenile Act is realized.” (footnotes omitted)). “To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Interest of K.D.-Z., 330 A.3d 831, 837 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted). “A party suffers prejudice when the trial court’s error could have affected the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 257 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Interest of A.J., 345 A.3d 374, 387 (Pa. Super. 2025) (cleaned up). “Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Heddings v. Steele, 526 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 1987); see also Pa.R.E. 801(c) (defining ‘hearsay’). As a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible, because such evidence lacks guarantees of trustworthiness fundamental to our system of jurisprudence. The rule against admitting hearsay evidence stems from its presumed unreliability, because the declarant cannot be challenged regarding the accuracy of the statement. Notably, it is elemental that an out[-]of[-]court statement which is not offered for its truth, but to explain the witness’ course of conduct[,] is not hearsay. - 10 - J-S34018-26 Interest of A.J., 345 A.3d at 387 (citation omitted). Hearsay may be admissible if it falls within one of the exceptions delineated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence or within an exception prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or by statute. See In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1167 (Pa. 2018) (citing Pa.R.E. 802); Interest of A.J., 345 A.3d at 388; see also Interest of V.B., No. 438 EDA 2023, unpublished memorandum at 4 (“Hearsay within hearsay — or ‘double hearsay’ as it is sometimes referred — is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”) (citing Pa.R.E. 805). Here, Father claims the trial court erred in admitting CYF Exhibit 4 — a written summary report of Y.H.’s forensic interview — during the adjudication hearing, because the report constitutes double hearsay and does not fall within the tender years exception8 or any other hearsay exception. Father’s Brief at 18, 23; see also id. at 18 (“The report constitutes double hearsay[,] as neither the child nor the interviewer testified, and the underlying video recording was never presented or reviewed.”). Father notes the trial court’s dispositional orders list the criminal allegations made by Y.H. against Father ____________________________________________ 8 The tender years exception is codified at Section 5985.1 of the Tender Years Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5981-5988, and “allows for the admission of a child’s out- of-court statement due to the fragile nature of young victims of sexual abuse.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 286 A.3d 1288, 1295 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Pursuant to Section 5985.1(a), an out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness may be introduced into evidence if: “(i) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, … the evidence is relevant and … the time, content[,] and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and (ii) the child either: (A) testifies at the proceeding; or (B) is unavailable as a witness.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1(a)(1) (formatting altered). - 11 - J-S34018-26 and referenced in CYF Exhibit 4 among the facts it considered in concluding Children were dependent. Id. at 27. As such, he contends the trial court relied on inadmissible evidence in adjudicating Children dependent and therefore requests this Court vacate both the adjudicatory and dispositional orders and remand for a new adjudication hearing and disposition hearing. Id. at 23, 25; see also id. at 25 (“The adjudication order should be vacated. Once the adjudication order is vacated, the disposition order must be vacated as well, as the former must precede the latter. Pa.R.J.C[iv.]P. 1409.”). In response, the trial court acknowledged it admitted CYF Exhibit 4 during the adjudicatory portion of the hearing on January 27, 2026. See TCO at 12. However, it clarified “the [c]ourt did not take the time to review and consider it before adjudicating Children dependent.” Id.; but see Dispositional Order, 3/10/26, at 3 ¶ 16 (referencing CYF Exhibit 4 as evidence supporting the dependency adjudication). In fact, the trial court conveyed it “did not review CYF Exhibit 4 until after the conclusion of testimony during the dispositional portion of the hearing.” TCO at 12 (emphasis added). Hence, the trial court opined its reference to CYF Exhibit 4 in its dispositional order merely constitutes a harmless error, which “can easily be corrected by entering amended findings that do not include Paragraph 16 in the section supporting the adjudication of dependency.” Id. A review of the hearing transcripts confirms the trial court’s accounting. For instance, immediately following the admission of CYF Exhibit 4 during the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court confirmed with the parties’ counsel that - 12 - J-S34018-26 there was nothing further they wished to present related to adjudication and then announced, “I am adjudicating all three children dependent.” See N.T., 1/27/26, at 27-28. Subsequently, towards the end of the dispositional hearing, the trial judge stated, “[T]here are some exhibits from last time that I have not looked [sic] and wish to before I make a decision.” N.T., 2/10/26, at 65; see also Interest of V.B., No. 438 EDA 2023, unpublished memorandum at 8 (recognizing “our trial judges are perfectly capable of entertaining a thought for one purpose, without accepting it for another”). Moreover, the trial court expressly stated it adjudicated Children dependent because neither parent was available to care for them. See N.T., 1/27/26, at 28; TCO at 4-5. The trial court’s dependency adjudication is supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. See N.T., 1/27/26, at 21 (Mother’s counsel stipulating that as of the date of the adjudication hearing, Mother is “in ICE detention and … her status remains subject to the control of the U.S. Immigration authorities”); id. at 23 (Father’s counsel stipulating that Father is currently incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail, Father has been denied bail, and his anticipated release date is currently unknown); see also In re G.T., 845 A.2d at 872 (stating a child will be declared dependent when he is presently without proper parental care or control and when such care and control are not immediately available). Based on the foregoing, it is evident the trial court’s admission of CYF Exhibit 4 had no effect on its adjudicating Children dependent; thus, we discern no reversible error in the trial court’s admission of said evidence. See - 13 - J-S34018-26 Interest of K.D.-Z., 330 A.3d at 837 (“To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.”). Additionally, we conclude the reference to the exhibit in the portion of its dispositional order supporting the adjudication of dependency constitutes a harmless error. As such, we remand to allow the trial court to amend its March 10, 2026 dispositional orders, omitting any reference to CYF Exhibit 4 as evidence supporting the dependency adjudication. Father further claims he “was never afforded the opportunity to examine and controvert the written summary report at the disposition hearing because it was never introduced into evidence.” Father’s Brief at 29 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(d)(2)). Nevertheless, even if this Court determines CYF Exhibit 4 was properly admitted into evidence, Father contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding the double hearsay summary report credible and assigning more weight to it than to the paternal aunts’ sworn testimony for the purpose of determining disposition. See id. at 29-32. Father argues the trial court could not properly assess the credibility of the allegations contained within the written summary report of Y.H.’s forensic interview, “because the witness did not testify, nor was her recorded interview admitted into evidence.” Id. at 31. He adds, “The allegations were not corroborated by any other evidence, such as physical or medical evidence. The allegations were contradicted by the in-court, sworn testimony of the paternal aunts.” Id.; see also id. at 35 (arguing even though the evidentiary rules are relaxed at - 14 - J-S34018-26 the disposition hearing, “the evidence relied on by the trial court must be reliable (accurate) and credible (believable)”); id. at 36 (suggesting even if the tender years exception is not technically applicable at the disposition hearing, it provides guidance as to “how a trial court should determine the weight afforded hearsay statements attributed to a child”). Hence, he concludes the trial court’s credibility determinations are not entitled to any deference. Id. at 32, 38. Father’s arguments are unavailing. Contrary to Father’s assertion that CYF Exhibit 4 was never admitted into evidence, the record indicates the written summary of Y.H.’s forensic interview was admitted into evidence at the January 27, 2026 hearing, “with no objections from counsel[.]” TCO at 4; see also N.T., 1/27/26, at 27. To the extent Father appears to suggest the exhibit cannot be considered for the purpose of determining disposition because it was admitted into evidence during the adjudicatory portion of the hearing rather than the dispositional portion, we deem this argument waived because Father fails to cite to any legal authority in support of his position or to engage in any meaningful discussion of the law. See Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”); see also Banfield v. Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 168 n.1 (stating this Court will not develop an argument on behalf of the appellant). - 15 - J-S34018-26 Alternatively, Father essentially asks us to re-weigh the evidence and re-assess the trial court’s credibility determinations, which we cannot and will not do. It is well-established, “[T]his Court defers to the trial court as fact- finder on issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, and it is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence on appeal.” A.C. v. J.B., No. 1751 EDA 2022, unpublished memorandum at 14 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 8, 2023) (citing Klos v. Klos, 934 A.2d 724, 728 (Pa. Super. 2007)); see also Interest of X.P., 248 A.3d at 1276 (“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”). Moreover, we recognize that during a dispositional hearing following a dependency finding, Section 6341(d) of the Juvenile Act explicitly permits the trial court to rely on “all evidence helpful in determining the questions presented, including oral and written reports, … to the extent of its probative value even though not otherwise competent in the hearing on the petition.” 42 Pa.C.S. 6341(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added); see also Matter of J.P., 573 A.2d 1057, 1065 (Pa. Super. 1990) (noting “all evidence including some hearsay may be received in disposition,” pursuant to Section 6341(d)); TCO at 13 (explaining Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act grants trial courts broad discretion to enter a disposition that serves the child’s bests interests and the relaxed standard set forth in Section 6341(d) applies to this stage of the proceeding). Here, the trial court found “[CYF] Exhibit 4 carried significant probative value sufficient to conclude, for purposes of disposition, that Y.H. - 16 - J-S34018-26 experienced some form of sexual abuse by Father.” TCO at 15. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion to weigh the evidence presented, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s consideration of the written summary of Y.H.’s forensic interview for the limited purpose of determining Children’s disposition following their dependency adjudication. Next, Father claims “[t]he trial court abused its discretion when it placed [Children] in foster care with strangers rather than with their paternal aunts.” Father’s Brief at 54; see also id. at 58 (contesting “the trial court’s decision to credit the double hearsay summary report over the sworn testimony of the paternal aunts”); id. (“Rather than place [Children] with their paternal aunts, who they knew and [with whom they] shared a common language and culture, the trial court chose to place them with [non-Spanish-speaking] strangers.”). In support, Father baldly avers, “The trial court’s chauvinistic disregard for the family’s language and culture demonstrates … it did not consider the best interests of … [C]hildren when it placed them in foster care with strangers.” Id. at 58-59. No relief is due on this claim. Again, Father asks this Court to re-weigh evidence and re-assess the trial court’s credibility findings, which we cannot do. See Interest of X.P., supra; Interest of C.K., supra; A.C., supra. Additionally, Father’s claim the trial court failed to consider Children’s best interests and disregarded the family’s language and culture is belied by the record. Based on our review of the record, it is clear the trial court “considered and weighed multiple factors - 17 - J-S34018-26 affecting … Children’s interests” in determining Children should remain in their current foster placement. TCO at 13-14; see also id. at 14 (concluding “the considerations supporting maintaining … Children in their current placement outweighed those that would support moving … Children to a new placement”). In doing so, it acknowledged the statutory preference for placing children with kin when a child’s parents are not available to provide care for the child. Id. at 13-14; see also id. at 14 n.40 (citing 67 Pa.C.S. § 7507(c) (“If a child has been removed from the child’s home under a voluntary placement agreement or is in the legal custody of the county agency, the county agency shall give first consideration to placement with relatives or kin.”)). However, it explained: The [c]ourt may place children with a foster family, although there might be willing relatives, where foster care is in the best interest of the children or aggravated circumstances exist. … The goal of preserving the family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when considering the best interests of children, but must be weighed in conjunction with other factors. Id. at 14 n.42 (quoting In re Adoption of G.R.L., 26 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations omitted)).9 Specifically, the trial court considered the following factors in reaching its dispositional decision: 1) the criminal charges against Father; 2) Children’s interest in maintaining their relationship with their older sibling, Y.H.; 3) Children’s need for stability; and 4) Children’s interest in maintaining their ____________________________________________ 9 The trial court recognized, “In re Adoption of G.R.L. addressed a prior version of the kinship care program which had substantially similar provisions to the version currently enacted.” TCO at 14 n.42 (citation omitted). - 18 - J-S34018-26 connections with Spanish-speaking family. See TCO at 14-20; see also id. at 20 (opining the trial court fashioned a disposition that recognized the important interests of maintaining Children’s connections with their family and culture, while according greater weight to the factors that supported maintaining Children’s current placement). First, the trial court explained the criminal charges against Father and the evidence related to his conduct demanded its serious attention. Id. at 14; see also id. at 14-15 (stating Father is charged with rape and associated other sexual offenses against Y.H., who resided in the household with Children); id. at 15 (noting the charges alone raise obvious safety concerns, but CYF’s Exhibit 4 supplemented and added weight to the charges). It stressed the importance for any proposed caregiver for children who resided in a home where child abuse is alleged to have occurred to treat those allegations seriously and to demonstrate some understanding of them, especially when the proposed caregiver is a close family member of the alleged perpetrator of the abuse. Id. at 16-17; see also id. at 17 (finding Children’s paternal aunts demonstrated no understanding of the seriousness of the allegations against Father and no acceptance of even the possibility that the abuse described by Y.H. occurred); id. (conveying the paternal aunts’ testimony raised serious concerns about their protective capacity and judgment). Second, the trial court considered Children’s interest in maintaining their relationship with their half-sister, Y.H. Id. at 17. It found Foster Parents have already demonstrated their ability to support Children’s relationship with Y.H., - 19 - J-S34018-26 noting some sibling visits have already taken place and future visits hav