Full Opinion

J-A22016-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 JOHN M. SURMA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JULIE S. SURMA : No. 339 WDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered March 5, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No(s): FD19-009106-005 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: November 12, 2026 Appellant, John M. Surma, (“Father”) appeals from the March 5, 2026 amended final custody order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that granted Father and Julie S. Surma (“Mother”) shared physical custody and shared legal custody, but with Mother having sole legal custody regarding extracurricular activities, of the parties’ biological children C.S, a female child born January 2017, and R.S., a female child born June 2019 (collectively, “the Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm. ____________________________________________ 1 The amended final custody order was dated February 17, 2026, but notice of the entry of the order was not provided to the parties until March 5, 2026. As such, for purpose of appeal, the amended final custody order was entered on March 5, 2026. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 236; see also Carr v. Michuck, 234 A.3d 797, 805 (Pa. Super. 2020) (explaining that, an order is not entered on the docket until a it is noted on the docket that appropriate notice has been given pursuant to Rule 236). We have amended the caption accordingly. J-A22016-26 The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows: This case originated on October 29, 2019, with Father’s filing of a complaint in divorce and a custody complaint. On November 15, 2019, Father filed a praecipe to withdraw/discontinue the divorce action. On April 29, 2020, Father filed a new custody complaint. On May 1, 2020, [the trial court] denied Father’s emergency petition for interim custody relief. Thereafter, on May 11, 2020, [the trial court] entered an interim order setting a shared custody schedule. Contemporaneously, the parties were ordered to enroll [in] and use the Our Family Wizard application for their non-emergency communications. On May 28, [2020,] Father filed a new complaint in divorce. On December 22, 2020, a divorce decree was granted. On July 6, 2021, the parties were ordered to enroll C.S. in therapy[] and to participate as recommended by the [therapist]. On August 11, 2021, Mother filed a counterclaim for custody. On April 14, 2022, [the trial court] entered extensive findings and a final custody order imposing shared legal and physical custody. On December 8, 2022, Father filed a petition for modification of custody. Mother filed a counterclaim and response. On August 23, 2023, [the trial court] issued an interim custody order, keeping the prior final order in full force and effect absent a few minor changes [set forth] in that interim order. These changes were principally that the parties were to reengage their efforts with Dr. [Deborah] Gilman [(“Dr. Gilman”)] in coparent counseling and [] submit to full [psychological] evaluations. On April 4, 2024, after the parents completed their psychological evaluations on February 29, 2024, and failed to file a praecipe for a judicial conciliation, the custody complaints were dismissed. On May 30, 2024, Father filed a petition for modification of custody. [Some time prior to November 14, 2024, Father filed a petition that requested Mother undergo a mental health examination pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.8 and sought interim custody relief. At that same time, Father also filed a petition seeking special relief regarding -2- J-A22016-26 therapy.2] On November 14, 2024, Mother filed a response to Father’s petition for a mental health examination [] and [] interim custody relief[. That same day, Mother] also filed a [response to Father’s] petition for special relief regarding therapy. On November 19, 2024, [the trial court] ordered [Father’s] petitions be deferred until the upcoming judicial conciliation. A judicial conciliation was scheduled for January 21, 2025.[3] On May 22, 2025, [the trial court] set the case for a two-day custody trial on September 18, 2025, and September 19, 2025. Pretrial statements were filed by the parties. After testimony [was taken] on September 18 [and] 19, [2025,] and a brief proceeding [was held] on October [9, 2025,4] the parties submitted written closing statements/arguments. Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/26, at 2-4 (record citations and extraneous capitalization omitted).5 ____________________________________________ 2 Father’s petitions for a mental health evaluation and special relief regarding therapy were not docketed with the trial court and, therefore, are not part of the certified record presently before us. As such, the exact filing dates of these petitions are unknown. Father withdrew his petition for a mental health evaluation at the start of the custody hearing on September 18, 2025. N.T., 9/18/25, at 6. 3 A review of the trial court docket does not indicate that the trial court disposed of Father’s petitions for a mental health evaluation or special relief regarding therapy at the January 2025 judicial conciliation. 4 The October 9, 2025 proceeding was held for the purpose of taking the testimony of Officer Devon Siegfried (“Officer Siegfried”) of the Northern Regional Police Department, who failed to appear at the September 2025 custody hearing after being subpoenaed to appear. N.T., 10/9/25, at 2. Officer Siegfried failed to appear for a second time on October 9, 2025. Id. As a result, the parties stipulated to, and the trial court accepted, the admission of Exhibit 15, which was comprised of the Northern Regional Police Department records from 2019, to 2024, involving the parties. Id. at 3. 5 On page 1 of the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion appears the date “April 6, 2025.” This appears to be a typographical error. The trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion was filed on May 12, 2026. -3- J-A22016-26 After the conclusion of the custody hearing, the trial court made the following findings of fact: 1. Which party is more likely to ensure the safety of the child One of the [Children] suffered an eye injury, and on another occasion, a broken arm while in [Father’s] care. Father did not seek [] medical care for the eye injury. No other significant evidence was presented regarding the physical safety of the [Children]. This factor skews only very slightly [in favor of] Mother. 2. The present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s household, which may include past or present protection from abuse or sexual violence protection orders where there has been a finding of abuse This factor is not applicable. 2.1 The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective services). This factor is not applicable. 2.2 Violent or assaultive behavior committed by a party[.] This factor is not applicable. 2.3 The level of cooperation and conflict between the parties, including: i. which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and the other party or parties if contact is consistent with the safety needs of the child; and ii. the attempts by a party to turn the child against the other party, except in cases of abuse where reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the safety of the child. A party’s good faith and reasonable effort to protect the safety -4- J-A22016-26 of a child or self shall not be considered evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with the other party. A party’s reasonable concerns for the safety of the child and a party’s reasonable efforts to protect the child shall not be considered attempts to turn the child against the other party. A child’s deficient or negative relationship with a party shall not be presumed to be caused by the other party. This factor is the most salient in this inquiry. (The discussion here is also relevant to factor 3.)[] The parties both admitted that they are unable to co-parent effectively. [The trial court] agrees. Father insists that the reason for their inability to get along lies with Mother. [The trial court] disagrees. Father produced no significant evidence that Mother interferes with his custodial time or is consistently unreasonable. Father produced a video [recording] which was intended to demonstrate Mother[] being unreasonable and irrational. Instead, the [video] footage from the surveillance camera outside of his home[] demonstrated Father’s failure to communicate and his dysregulated behavior. Other evidence of Father’s unreasonable behavior came through police reports from [the] Northern Regional Police Department. Father spent from May to September [] 2024[,] interacting numerous times with the police in an effort to have Mother arrested for allegedly coming into his home around the time of a custody exchange to retrieve an item that one of the [Children] wanted to take with her. (Also of note in those reports was Father’s assertion that his “security” cameras are only set to record between 8:10[ a.m.] and 8:25[ a.m.] to capture video of the custody exchanges). The police reports document that Father wanted Mother to be prosecuted for harassment, as well[ as] for calling at the appointed time for video calls. When the police declined to pursue the charges, [Father] requested that the incident be documented “in case he needs it in the future.” And herein lies the crux of the problem – Father’s focus [is] on custody litigation rather than the well-being of [the Children]. -5- J-A22016-26 His exhibits and narrative expose a desire to “win at custody” rather than to parent healthy, happy, well-adjusted [Children.] He has been so pre-occupied with what is “his time” that he deprived [R.S.] of the comfort of her mother after the child had broken her arm, gone to two hospitals, and had her arm put in a cast. Instead, he took the child to his house and left her with a nanny while he went back to work - to deprive Mother of custodial time. During that series of hospital visits, Father alerted the security at the hospital to their custody dispute because Mother was getting too close to the child. Father has threatened to pull the Children from events if Mother will be present, even going so far as to say that he would not take the [Children] to their first day of school if Mother [was] present[] to take a photo[graph]. Mother is not permitted to watch [the Children’s] tennis matches that occur at Father’s country club. Mother testified that she provides the [Children] with various options for extracurricular activities[,] and they check off the ones in which they would like to participate. Mother also described activities that the [Children] tried and did not want to pursue. Father employs software to document and analyze the length of the [tele]phone calls between the [Children] and [Mother,] and the [Children] and himself. He asks to eliminate these [tele]phone calls because the [Children] spend more time talking to [Mother], and that is somehow not fair to him. Father’s blanket statements that Mother is an incredible challenge were unsubstantiated by any actual evidence. Father does not appear to be willing to encourage and permit frequent continuing contact with Mother. He appears bent on depriving Mother of [as much] time [with the Children] that he possibly can. Mother presented as a calm and rational person who is tired of all [] the litigation. Mother had a good memory of events and was able to convey facts in a clear, coherent narrative. She appeared to be focused on finding activities and opportunities for [the Children] that were fun[,] enriching[,] and provid[ed] them with a sense of community. Unfortunately, Father does not take them to the arranged activities when it is “his day[.”] -6- J-A22016-26 Mother is not without fault in allowing the [Children] to witness their parents’ dysfunction. Both parents have made negative comments about the other in front of the [Children]. This factor weighs heavily in favor of Mother. 3. A willingness and ability of a party to prioritize the needs of the child by providing appropriate care, stability[,] and continuity for the child, considering the parental duties performed by the party on behalf of the child in the past and whether the party is willing and able to perform the duties in the future, and attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational[,] and special needs of the child. The [Children] are highly intelligent and well-adjusted. They do well in school and have many friends. They do not currently suffer any mental health diagnoses or have any special needs. The [Children] are not in need of any therapy or treatment[. H]owever, if the parties do not cease anxiety inducing behavior, that may not be the case for long. [The trial court] is not at all convinced that Father is able to put the needs of the [Children] above his compulsion to maintain a contentious and hostile relationship with [Mother]. The parties are both able to attend to the [Children’s] educational and physical needs. This factor favors Mother slightly, as the [trial court] finds that a great deal of the dysfunction that may ultimately affect the [Children’s] emotional well-being arises from Father’s behavior. 4. The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, family life[,] and community life. Both parents appear to recognize the importance of stability and continuity in [the Children’s] lives. They live in the same school district and within close proximity to the other. This factor is neutral. 5. The child’s sibling and other familial relationships. -7- J-A22016-26 The [Children] are close in age and should be together during their custodial time periods. 6. The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s maturity and judgment. The [Children] are too young to have a well-reasoned preference. 7. The proximity of the residences of the parties. The distance between the parties is not substantial and does not impact the custody decision. 8. Each party’s employment schedule and availability to care for the child or ability to make appropriate childcare arrangements. Mother works from home and seems to have a more flexible schedule and is able to prioritize time with the [Children]. Both parents are able to make child-care arrangements. This factor is neutral. 9. The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of a party’s household. No significant evidence was presented regarding this factor. 10. The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a party’s household. No significant evidence was presented regarding this factor. 11. Any other relevant factor. The parties have the means to purchase their own sets of equipment or uniforms for [the Children’s] various activities so that there is a set at each household. -8- J-A22016-26 Trial Court Findings, Conclusions, and Order, 1/28/26, at 2-6 (extraneous capitalization omitted).6 In its January 28, 2026 final custody order, the trial court awarded Mother and Father shared physical custody and shared legal custody except that Mother was awarded sole legal custody regarding the Children’s extracurricular activities. Father filed a motion for reconsideration of the final custody order on February 11, 2026. On February 17, 2026, the trial court expressly granted, in part, and denied, in part, Father’s motion for reconsideration.7 On March 5, 2026, the trial court entered an amended final ____________________________________________ 6 The trial court’s findings, conclusions, and final custody order was dated January 19, 2026, but the trial court docket indicates that notice of the entry of the filing was not provided to the parties pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 236 until January 28, 2026. Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b) (stating, “[t]he prothonotary shall note in the docket the giving of the notice” of entry of the order) As such, the trial court’s findings, conclusions, and final custody order are deemed entered on the trial court docket on January 28, 2026. Carr, 234 A.3d at 805. 7 The order expressly granting, in part, and denying, in part, Father’s motion for reconsideration was dated February 17, 2026, but was not entered on the trial court docket until March 5, 2026, the date notice of the entry of the order was provided to the parties. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 236; see also Carr, 234 A.3d at 805. While the order was not entered until March 5, 2026, February 17, 2026 is the date on which the trial court expressly granted, in part, the motion for reconsideration of the January 28, 2026 final custody order. See PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, 929 A.2d 219, 227 (Pa. Super. 2007) (recognizing that, the trial court expressly granted the motion for reconsideration on the date appearing on the order, not as of the date the order was docketed by the prothonotary). As such, the trial court retained its power, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505, to act upon Father’s motion for reconsideration because it did so within the 30-day period following the January 28, 2026 final custody order. See id. at 226-227; see also 42 -9- J-A22016-26 custody order that awarded Mother and Father shared physical custody and shared legal custody of the Children except that Mother was awarded sole legal custody regarding the Children’s extracurricular activities. This appeal followed.8 Father raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in failing to narrowly tailor the scope of the custody trial to the specific requests sought in Father’s underlying petition for modification of custody, and where Mother did not file a crossclaim for custody[?] 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in issuing a custody determination that relied upon pleadings which were not part of the trial court record and were specifically withdrawn at the custody trial[?] 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed errors of law in its application of the custody factors at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328[?] a. Whether the trial court misapplied facts and failed to consider credible testimony and evidence in its discussion and findings under custody factor[s 1, 2.3, and 3?] ____________________________________________ Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (stating, “a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed”). The trial court granted Father’s request to modify the provision regarding vacation time and denied all other requested relief. 8 Both Father and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. - 10 - J-A22016-26 b. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed errors of law in finding that custody factor[s 1, 2.3, and 3] weigh in favor of Mother[?] c. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed errors of law in failing to acknowledge that Father also works from home, has a flexible schedule[,] and prioritizes time with the [Children,] under custody factor 8[?] 4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in awarding Mother [sole] legal custody regarding extracurricular activities[?] 5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in reducing Father’s overnights with the [Children] and effectively awarding Mother primary physical custody, despite directing the parties to share physical custody, and without any evidence or testimony to support such a reduction in Father’s time[?] 6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in failing to appoint a parenting coordinator[?] 7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in failing to consider and rely upon credible facts, testimony[,] and recommendations offered by the parties’ coparent counselor, Dr. [] Gilman[?] 8. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in ordering daily [tele]phone/video calls with the [Children?] Father’s Brief at 3-5 (extraneous capitalization omitted). Father’s issues collectively challenge the March 5, 2026 amended final custody order for which our standard and scope of review are well-settled. The appellate court’s scope of review in custody cases is of the broadest type. This broad power is limited to the extent that an appellate court may not nullify the fact[-]finding function of the [trial court]. We are empowered to form our own independent deductions and inferences from the facts found by the [trial court], but may only interfere with the decisions of the [trial] court where there has been a gross abuse of discretion. We must determine - 11 - J-A22016-26 whether the trial court’s factual findings support the trial court’s factual conclusions, but we may not disturb these conclusions unless they are unreasonable in light of the [trial] court’s factual findings. Our appellate function is to make an independent judgment, based on the testimony and evidence before us, that is in the best interest of the child. We must make an independent examination of the record and make an order on the merits of the case which is right, just[,] and will serve the best interest of the child. After we take full account of the [trial court’s] reasoning, still, we must be easy in our own conscience that the [trial court’s] award will serve the best interest of the child, or children, in question. Although we are given a broad power of review, we are constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating the [trial] court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if the [trial] court’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused. An abuse of discretion is also made out where it appears from a review of the record that there is no evidence to support the [trial] court’s findings or that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence. M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 18-19 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). In his first issue, Father asserts that the trial court erred in modifying certain parameters of the custody order beyond the scope of specific requests contained in his petition for modification. Father’s Brief at 22. Father contends that Mother did not file a counterclaim requesting a modification of custody but the trial court, nonetheless, modified certain aspects of custody, namely expanding the Children’s custodial time with Mother and granting Mother sole legal custody of the Children regarding extracurricular activities. Id. Father maintains that, because Mother did not file a counterclaim requesting that these aspects of custody be modified, he was not provided the - 12 - J-A22016-26 necessary notice as required for due process. Id. As a result, Father was unable to present “substantial evidence and testimony [] that would have rendered many of Mother’s claims as patently false.” Id. at 24. Section 5425 of the Child Custody Act states that, Before a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standards of [S]ection 5408 (relating to notice to persons outside [the] Commonwealth) must be given to all persons entitled to notice under the laws of this Commonwealth as in child custody proceedings between residents of this Commonwealth, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated[,] and any person having physical custody of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5425(a). Formal notice and an opportunity to be heard are fundamental components of due process when a person may be deprived in a legal proceeding of a liberty interest, such as physical freedom, or a parent’s custody of her [or his] child. Both notice and an opportunity to be heard must be afforded at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. As previous panels of this Court have explained: Notice, in our adversarial process, ensures that each party is provided adequate opportunity to prepare and thereafter properly advocate its position, ultimately exposing all relevant factors from which the finder of fact may make an informed judgment. Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also C.A.J. v. D.S.M., 136 A.3d 504, 508 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating, “[w]ithout notice to the parties that custody was at issue, the trial court could not assume that the parties had either sufficiently exposed the relevant facts or properly argued their significance” (citation and emphasis omitted)). If the parties have notice that custody will be at issue in - 13 - J-A22016-26 the hearing, the trial court is permitted to modify custody without a pending petition for modification. C.A.J., 136 A.3d at 509. As this Court recently held, “after a party files a petition requesting modifications to custody, proper notice of the matter was provided, and the trial court considered the statutory custody factors, it is well[-]settled that the trial court may then modify custody to effectuate the child’s best interests.” Brown, 363 A.3d 849, 856 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2026); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338 (stating that, “[u]pon petition, a [trial] court may modify a custody order to serve the best interest of the child”). “[O]nce a trial court is tasked with examining whether modifications to a custody order are necessary to serve the best interests of a child, that court is not constrained to consider only the modifications sought by the petitioning party.” Brown, 363 A.3d at 856 n.8 (citation omitted). In the case sub judice, Father filed a petition for modification of the custody provisions “regarding telephone/video calls, the custody schedule (i.e., the format of the shared 50/50 [physical] custody schedule), extracurricular activities[,] and similar[.]” Father’s Petition for Modification of an Existing Custody Order, 5/30/24, at ¶ 5. Father specifically indicated that he was “not seeking a change as to shared legal custody or shared physical custody (i.e., he is not seeking primary physical or sole legal custody).” Id. - 14 - J-A22016-26 (emphasis in original). At the start of the custody hearing, the following discussion occurred:9 [Trial Court: Attorney] Begg, this is [Father’s] petition. You may call your first witness. [Attorney Begg:] Thank you, Your Honor. Prior to doing so, we did have an off-the-record discussion about the petition that was filed for today. I understand you made a ruling, but I do want to put on the record that we believe that the petition that was filed in this case to initiate the action on May 30[,] 2024[,] was a specific pleading. [T]he issues today should be limited to what is outlined within that petition, and [] the hearing should be focused on those issues, Your Honor. I understand, for the record, there was no response filed. No counter petition seeking primary custody or legal custody. And, Your Honor, I understand you made your ruling, but I just wanted to put that on the record. [Trial Court:] Oh, absolutely. And you have cited a case. Did you want to put that on the record as well? ____________________________________________ 9 At the custody hearing, Father was represented by Todd Begg, Esquire (“Attorney Begg”). Mother was represented by Jay Blechman, Esquire (“Attorney Blechman”). - 15 - J-A22016-26 [Attorney Begg:] We did. [Trial Court:] I believe it was [C.J.A., supra.] [Attorney Begg:] That’s correct, Your Honor. [Attorney Blechman:] If I may, Your Honor, I have a response. [Trial Court:] Yes, sir. [Attorney Blechman:] That is that statutorily, no response was required to the petition that was filed. The petition that was filed was for a petition for modification of an existing custody order. That being the case, both statutorily and under the rules, we are permitted to proceed forward with modification as to all issues relative to that order. It is not limited [by] the limited prayer of their petition. The modification is available as to all issues relative to that [c]ourt [o]rder. And the citation that was made by opposing [c]ounsel in support of that particular position that they forwarded, actually supports our position, which is, that there was sufficient notice and understanding that the modification meant that the entire order is at issue and that [the trial court] has the statutory authority to issue an order in the best interest of the [Children] pursuant to the factors set forth in this statute. [Trial Court:] All right. I agree with your position. - 16 - J-A22016-26 N.T., 9/18/25, at 3-5.10 As indicated by the discussion supra, Father was aware prior to the start of the custody hearing that the purpose of the custody hearing was to discuss not only the modifications raised in his petition but also modification of the custody parameters in the best interest of the Children. As such, Father had proper notice of the scope of the custody hearing and was able to bring forth facts and present argument in support of his position and in opposition to any testimony and evidence offered by Mother regarding potential modifications in the over-all custody arrangements as they related to the best interest of the Children. Therefore, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s scope of custody modifications addressed in the March 5, 2026 amended final custody order. In his second issue, Father asserts that the trial court erred when it considered his petition requesting that Mother submit to a mental health evaluation and have supervised visitation since that petition was withdrawn at the start of the custody trial. Father’s Brief at 24-26; see also N.T., 9/18/25, at 5-6. We find Father’s claim is belied by the record and a mischaracterization of the trial court’s reference to the petition. In support of his claim, Father directs this Court to the trial court’s statement in its Rule ____________________________________________ 10 We note that the first day of the custody hearing was misidentified as occurring on September 19, 2025. We reference the first day of the custody hearing by its correct date, September 18, 2025. - 17 - J-A22016-26 1925(a) opinion wherein, the trial court, in response to Father’s claim that it failed to appoint a parenting coordinator, stated [Mother and Father] also attempted coparent counseling for three years. It was ultimately unsuccessful, as [the trial court] gleaned from Dr. Gilman’s testimony and Mother’s testimony that Mother was quite reasonably unwilling to participate after Father filed a petition for Mother to have a mental health evaluation and supervised visitation. Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/26, at 38. As the trial court’s statement demonstrates, it relied on the testimony of Dr. Gilman and Mother wherein they explained the reasons coparenting counseling was not successful. The trial court did not, as Father contends, consider the contents of his withdrawn petition but, rather, Mother’s explanation of why she felt coparenting was nonproductive.11 See id. at 27 (stating that, the trial court “did not consider the content of [Father’s withdrawn] pleadings in reaching its decision”). In his third issue, Father contends that the trial court erred in its assessment of custody factors 1, 2.3, 3, and 8 because it failed to consider the credible testimony offered by Father in reaching its determinations. Father’s Brief at 27-41. Regarding custody factor 1 – which party is more likely to ensure the safety of the child – Father claims that the trial court’s ____________________________________________ 11 We note that, on cross-examination, Father’s counsel asked a question of Mother that required her to reference Father’s petition seeking to have her mental health evaluated. N.T., 9/19/25, at 385. As such, Father, despite withdrawing the petition at the start of the custody trial, inserted the petition into the custody trial. We further note that when the petition was first mentioned by Mother in her direct examination (see id. at 304-305), Father did not lodge an objection. Id. - 18 - J-A22016-26 statement that the broken arm injury, which occurred while R.S. was in Father’s care, was never explained as to cause of manner “completely disregards the credible testimony offered by Father specifically discussing the injuries, their cause, and manner for handling them[.]” Id. at 28. Father directs this Court’s attention to his testimony in which Father explained the cause of the broken arm as “[R.S.] was running around at home and fell and had what’s called a greenstick fracture, a relatively minor fracture.” N.T., 9/19/25, at 174. The trial court found that the broken arm injury “has never been the subject of any explanation as to its cause or manner.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/26, at 28. Mother testified that R.S. was in the care of Father’s nanny at the time of the fall and that Mother was never provided the nanny’s name or contact information by Father and was instructed that she was not permitted to contact the nanny. Id. at 412. Mother indicated that she was never able to learn the cause of the injury. Id. Although Father offered the explanation that R.S. was running and fell, Father did not provide any particular detail about what caused the child to fall, what her arm struck that caused it to break, why she was running, or if she was being supervised by an adult when the accident occurred. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s assessment that custody factor 1 “only very slightly [favored] Mother.” Concerning custody factor 2.3 – the level o