Full Opinion

J-S37029-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 STEPHANIE RIVERA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANDREW MOY : : Appellant : No. 467 EDA 2026 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No: 007819-CV-2025 BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KUNSELMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2026 Appellant, Andrew Moy, seeks review of the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court), after he was found in indirect criminal contempt of a temporary Protection From Abuse (PFA) order. He now argues that the evidence of the conviction was legally insufficient because it was not shown that his conduct was prohibited by the PFA order; that the PFA order was clear and definite; and that he acted with wrongful intent. We affirm. The present case commenced on December 1, 2025, when the plaintiff, Stephanie Rivera, filed a petition for a PFA order against Appellant. That same date, the trial court held an ex parte hearing on the petition and entered a temporary PFA order, which was immediately served on Appellant, giving him notice of its terms. J-S37029-26 The PFA order named Rivera as a protected person, and evicted Appellant from the residence he shared with her. It provided in relevant part that Appellant was barred from “having ANY CONTACT with [Rivera] . . . either directly or indirectly, at any location”; it further prohibited contact with her “by . . . any other means, including through third persons.” Temporary PFA Order, 12/1/2025 (all-caps in original). The sole exception to these prohibitions was that Appellant could contact Rivera when “necessary to effectuate custody of the parties’ minor child(ren).” Id. The temporary PFA order was made immediately effective as of the date it was entered and set to remain in effect until December 8, 2025. See id. Two days after the PFA order’s entry, on December 3, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a petition for contempt based on an alleged violation of the temporary PFA order. The trial court held a hearing on the petition a few days later, on December 8, 2025, and both Appellant and Rivera testified. 1 The testimony presented at the hearing was summarized by the trial court as follows: [Rivera] and [Appellant] lived together, had been in a relationship for 7+ years, and had two children together, a boy age 7 and a girl age 3. The parties lived in Saylorsburg, PA. [Rivera] filed for and received a temporary PFA [order] on December 1, 2025. Mother had her father (“Grandfather”) pick up the daughter from daycare that day, and her father also had the parties’ son with him that day since [Rivera] had gone to the Monroe County Courthouse to file for the [temporary PFA order]. There was no testimony as to why the son was not in school that day. ____________________________________________ 1 One of Rivera’s co-workers, Liam Johnson, also testified to corroborate parts of Rivera’s account. -2- J-S37029-26 [Appellant] was served with a copy of the [temporary PFA order] shortly after it was entered in the afternoon of December 1, 2025. [Appellant] then immediately went to see his daughter at daycare. He usually picks her up from daycare. [Appellant] learned at daycare that the Grandfather had already picked up the parties’ daughter from daycare. Grandfather and his wife live in Easton, PA, about 25 minutes from [Rivera] and [Appellant’s] home in Saylorsburg. [Appellant] then went to the grandparents’ home in Easton, per his testimony, to see his children. He claims he did this because he knew the Grandfather had picked up the son that morning and the daughter from daycare; he assumed the children were at the grandparents’ home; he knew he was evicted from the residence in Saylorsburg; and he wanted to see the kids. By [Appellant’s] testimony, when he arrived at the grandparents’ home, no one was there. He stated he went to a local Target and Chik-fil-A for a while, and then returned to the grandparents’ home at about 5:00 p.m., hoping to see the children. [Rivera] testified credibly that she went back to work after obtaining the PFA [order], and then proceeded later in the day to the grandparents’ home to get the kids. At the exit ramp from the highway to the William Penn Highway, [Rivera] observed a vehicle pass by her that appeared to [belong to Appellant]. She checked the license plate number with a friend and determined it was [Appellant’s vehicle]. [Rivera] testified she was terrified, having just obtained a PFA [order] and seeing [Appellant] apparently headed to her parents’ house, so she called 911. [Rivera] followed behind [Appellant] to her parents’ house, and she passed by him to pull into their driveway where she waited for police to arrive. [Appellant] stopped across the street and remained there in his car until police arrived. [Rivera] did not think [Appellant] knew the kids were at her parents’ house at the time, and saw no reason for him to be there. Trial Court Opinion and Order, 2/6/2026, at 2-3. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court credited Rivera’s testimony that Appellant had deliberately driven to a place where he knew -3- J-S37029-26 Rivera would soon arrive, in violation of the PFA order. The trial court found, conversely, that Appellant was not credible in stating his reasons for appearing at the home of Rivera’s parents. More specifically, the trial court determined that Appellant had gone to the home and remained parked across the street – thereby making contact with Rivera – for reasons other than taking custody of their children; [Appellant] stated he knew the children were there, and [Rivera] did not know he knew they were there. [Appellant] had just been served with a no-contact PFA [order] as to [Rivera], which included an eviction from [their shared] home, and by his own admission he knew the children were at [Rivera’s] parents’ house. Yet, he decided to go to [Rivera’s] parents’ house knowing he was to have no contact with [Rivera], and not knowing if she would be there or not. He knew, or should have known, it was likely [Rivera] would be at her parents at some point since the children were there. [Appellant] claims he did not know the [Rivera] was there until she passed him on the street where her parents live and she pulled into the driveway. We find it hard to believe that he did not recognize [Rivera’s] car as he passed by her on the exit ramp of the highway, or that she was behind him as he went to [Rivera’s] parents’ house. Moreover, once he admittedly saw [Rivera] in her car pull into her parents’ driveway, [Appellant] did not pull away or continue on, and instead pulled over and waited across the street. [Appellant] claims he was waiting for the police to arrive, whom he claimed to have called, but that testimony was not credible either. Id., at 4.2 Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Appellant had willfully violated the conditions of the temporary PFA order, as his conduct had amounted to “direct ____________________________________________ 2 Appellant testified that he called the police while he was parked in his vehicle across the street from the grandparents’ home. See N.T. Hearing, 12/8/2025, at 47. -4- J-S37029-26 or indirect contact with [Rivera] at any location.” Id. Appellant was found to be in violation of the temporary PFA order and convicted of indirect criminal contempt. A fine and costs were imposed, and the trial court denied reconsideration on February 6, 2026. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and in his brief, he now raises three related claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed the subject offense: Whether there was insufficient evidence at the hearing to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: A. That the [temporary PFA] Order was sufficiently clear and definite; B. That Appellant's conduct was prohibited by the [PFA] Order; and C. That the Appellant acted with wrongful intent. Appellant’s Brief, at 4 (numbering omitted, sub-claims reordered). 3 When reviewing such sufficiency challenges, we must consider whether, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the fact finder could conclude that all elements of an offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Felder, 176 A.3d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2017). The role of the trier of fact is to pass “upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight ____________________________________________ 3 The trial court determined in a 1925(a) statement that the reasons given for the order on the review were fully addressed in its opinion and order, dated February 6, 2026. See 1925(a) Statement, 3/5/2026, at 1. -5- J-S37029-26 of the evidence produced[.]” Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 109-10 (Pa. Super. 2007). We will not reweigh “the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder[,]” who in its discretion “is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Felder, 176 A.3d at 333 (citation omitted). A contempt conviction must be affirmed, rather, as long as the “facts support the court’s decision,” and a trial court’s determination may be reversed “only when there has been a plain abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 802 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa. Super. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The chief purpose of the Protection From Abuse Act (PFA Act), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6117, is to “prevent imminent harm to abused person(s).” Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 982 (Pa. Super. 1993). To that end, the PFA Act authorizes courts to grant “any protection order or approve any consent agreement to bring about the cessation of abuse[.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a). A PFA order may include a prohibition on “the defendant from having any contact with the plaintiff or minor children[.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a)(6). The PFA Act contemplates that an order prohibiting “contact” may be achieved by limiting the defendant “from entering the place of employment or business or school of the plaintiff or minor children and from harassing the plaintiff or plaintiff’s relatives or minor children.” Id. -6- J-S37029-26 The offense of indirect criminal contempt of a court order (including a PFA order) has four elements, which the Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the order was sufficiently clear to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act must have been one prohibited by the order; and 4) the intent of the contemnor in committing the act must have been wrongful. Commonwealth v. Baker, 722 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1196 (Pa. Super. 1998)); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114 (“Contempt for violation of order or agreement). In the present case, Appellant’s first insufficiency sub-claim is that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the temporary PFA order was adequately clear and definite to apprise him of its terms. See Appellant’s Brief, at 30-33. The record indicates, however, that the language of the temporary PFA order could have left “no doubt” as to the conduct that was prohibited. See id. The subject order barred Appellant from “having ANY CONTACT with [Rivera] . . . either directly or indirectly, at any location,” and from having “contact with her by . . . any other means[.]” Temporary PFA Order, 12/1/2025 (all-caps in original). The only stated exception was that contact between Appellant and Rivera would be permitted to the extent necessary to “effectuate custody” of their children. See id. Thus, we find no merit in Appellant’s claim, as the PFA order was sufficiently clear that he could not have “any” form of contact with Rivera, at any location – precluding either -7- J-S37029-26 verbal or physical contact – unless the sole stated exception applied. See Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 111 (finding defendant to be in violation of PFA order prohibiting “any contact” with plaintiff where he was intentionally in the plaintiff’s physical presence). Appellant’s second insufficiency sub-claim is that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the temporary PFA order prohibited the conduct which was the basis of the violation. He argues that he went to the home of Rivera’s grandparents only to see his children, and not to have direct or indirect contact with Rivera. As discussed above, the record evidence shows, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that Appellant was notified of a prohibition on “any” form of contact with Rivera. This included “direct or indirect” contact, as well as verbal or physical contact. See Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 111. The record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant violated this condition by driving to the home of Rivera’s parents, where it was likely Rivera would be. In fact, the trial court credited the plaintiff’s testimony that Appellant “followed” Rivera to her parents’ house. See Trial Court Opinion and Order, 2/6/2026, at 4. The trial court declined to credit Appellant’s testimony that he did not recognize Rivera when he passed her on the highway while driving to the home. See id. Regardless, Appellant admitted to observing Rivera arrive there. Then, rather than leave, he remained parked across the street until police responded. This was clearly a violation of the temporary PFA’s order -8- J-S37029-26 prohibition on having “any” contact with Rivera. See Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 111. The evidence was therefore sufficient to establish that Appellant’s conduct was prohibited by the order. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 689 A.2d 238, 240-41 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding that defendant came into “contact” with plaintiff, in violation of a PFA order, by physically appearing at the plaintiff’s location, even without directly approaching her); Commonwealth v. Mieckowski, No. 263 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super. filed September 27, 2024) (unpublished memorandum) (same). 4 Appellant’s third and final insufficiency sub-claim is that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with wrongful intent. Again, however, we find that the record supports the trial court’s determination as to this element of the subject offense. Appellant’s act was indisputably volitional, and his wrongful intent “can be imputed” from the “substantial certainty” that parking at the home of Rivera’s parents would place him “in contact” with her. See Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 111 (“[A]ppellant's act was clearly volitional . . . and wrongful intent can be imputed by . . . the substantial certainty that by choosing to accept the victim's invitation to travel with her in the same vehicle to a party, he would be in contact with her in violation of the PFA Order.”). The trial court credited record evidence that Appellant followed Rivera to her parents’ house and then stayed parked across the street after he saw ____________________________________________ 4 Under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), non-precedential decisions of this Court decided after May 1, 2019, may be cited as persuasive authority. -9- J-S37029-26 her arrive and go inside. See Trial Court Opinion and Order, 2/6/2026, at 5- 6. His physical presence in that area put him in contact with the plaintiff, but did not “effectuate custody of the children,” removing Appellant’s conduct from the purview of that exception in the temporary PFA order. See id. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the evidence of Appellant’s guilt to be legally sufficient, and the judgment of sentence must be upheld. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judge Kunselman joins the memorandum. Judge Olson concurs in the result. Date: 10/30/2026 - 10 -