In Re: A.M.J., a Minor
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket1030 MDA 2026
JudgeMurray
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-S41017-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.M.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: N.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1030 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2025-00088
IN RE: E.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: N.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1031 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2025-00089
IN RE: L.R.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: N.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1032 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered May 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2025-00090
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.
J-S41017-26
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2026
N.H. (Mother) appeals from the orders granting the petitions filed by the
Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (the Agency), and
terminating her parental rights to her biological daughters, A.J. and L.J. (born
in August 2021 and February 2024, respectively), and her biological son E.J.
(born in June 2022) (collectively, Children).1, 2 After careful review, we affirm.
In its opinion, the orphans’ court described the Agency’s initial
involvement with the family, and the ensuing procedural history:
The family had an open and ongoing case for services with the
[Agency] since August 29, 2023. Additionally, the Agency had
prior involvement with the family dating back to 2021. A referral
was made on October 22, 2024, regarding substance abuse by
[Mother and Father (Parents)]. [See N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 6
(Service, Access, and Management (SAM) caseworker Kristie
Valera (Ms. Valera) testifying that the referral alleged Mother was
abusing methamphetamine, and Father was housing illicit drug
users in the basement of the family residence).] In response to
the referral, caseworkers were able to enter the home on October
23, 2024. Mother was present and tested positive for
methamphetamine. Father was at work. The Agency also had
concerns about the conditions of the home. An Emergency
Protective Order was granted on the same day[,] and a Shelter
Care hearing was held on October 24, 2024. [C]hildren were
adjudicated dependent on November 12, 2024[, and Children
were placed with Father’s mother (paternal grandmother)]. ….
….
____________________________________________
1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of Children’s biological
father, J.J. (Father). Father’s consolidated appeals are listed before this panel
at 971-973 MDA 2026.
2 On August 19, 2026, we sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals.
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Three separate Family Service Plans (hereinafter “FSP”)
were created in this case[, dated November 19, 2024; and May
12 and November 12, 2025]. All three plans had nearly identical
goals and objectives for Mother and Father to complete. … [T]he
goals and objectives for Mother were to (1) maintain a sober
lifestyle, which include[d] the requirement that Mother submit to
drugs screens twice [] a week and attend drug and alcohol
counseling; (2) maintain safe and stable housing[,] which
include[d] a requirement to maintain employment; (3) maintain
safe and healthy relationships with [C]hildren, which include[d] a
requirement to complete [the] Safe Care[ Program3]; (4)
understand how her actions affect the family; (5) address …
mental health[ concerns]; and (6) maintain a clean and safe
home.
The goals and objectives for Father include[d] all six of the
above goals[,] but also include[d] an additional goal requiring
successful completion of the Domestic Violence Intervention
Program.
… The initial [permanency review hearing (PR)] was held on
January 16, 2025. No ratings were offered[,] as the first FSP was
adopted at that hearing. The next PR was scheduled for July 10,
2025[,] but was continued at Mother’s request because she was
in [a drug] rehab[ilitation program]. The [PR] was ultimately held
on August 26, 2025. At that hearing, both Mother and Father
received a compliance rating of moderate and a progress rating of
none. The next PR took place on March 11, 2026. Mother received
a compliance and progress rating of none and none. Father
received a compliance and progress rating of minimal and
minimal.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 1-3 (record citations omitted; footnote
moved to body).
____________________________________________
3 The orphans’ court explained that the “Safe Care [Program] is an evidence[-
]based, parent-training curriculum[,] specifically designed to assist parents
with [] baseline parenting skills and to enhance the well[-]being of children
[from newborn] to five[ years old].” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 11
n.5.
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On November 25, 2025, the Agency filed separate, substantially
identical termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions, each requesting
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b). The matter proceeded to a hearing, which occurred on
April 27-28 and May 5, 2026. Mother appeared and was represented by
counsel. Children, who did not appear, were collectively represented by their
guardian ad litem, George Mehalchick, Esquire (GAL).4 The Agency presented
the testimony of several witnesses, and Mother testified on her own behalf.
Gene Hockenbury (Mr. Hockenbury), an employee of drug-testing
agency Northern Tier Research, testified as an expert toxicology witness.
N.T., 4/27/26, at 16-17. Mr. Hockenbury testified that Mother submitted to
six drug tests on the following dates: November 1, 2024; March 11 and April
____________________________________________
4 While the certified record does not contain an order defining the scope of the
GAL’s appointment (or any appointment order), our review of the notes of
testimony discloses that the GAL represented both the best and legal interests
of Children. See In re P.G.F., 247 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. 2021) (“[T]he Adoption
Act requires that all children receive counsel in contested involuntary parental
termination proceedings.” (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a))). At the TPR
hearing, the orphans’ court inquired of Parents’ counsel and Children’s GAL
whether they believed a conflict of interest exists between Children’s best and
legal interests. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 49; see also In re Adoption of
K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1224 (Pa. 2020) (“Given the essential nature of the
GAL/[legal c]ounsel’s ability to represent a child without conflict and this
Court’s mandate that the orphans’ court make that determination prior to
appointment, we conclude that appellate courts should verify that the orphans’
court indicated that the attorney could represent the child’s best interests and
legal interests without conflict.”). Children’s GAL represented that no conflict
exists. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 49-50. The orphans’ court thereafter
accepted the GAL’s representation. See id. at 50 (the orphans’ court
entertaining the parties’ arguments).
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17 and 22, 2025; and February 24, 2026 (two tests administered). Id. at 21,
24-25, 48. According to Mr. Hockenbury, Mother tested positive on each of
those dates for various substances, including methamphetamine,
amphetamine, cocaine, alcohol, and THC. Id.
Kristy Vassell (Ms. Vassell) testified concerning her involvement with the
family in her capacity as the supervised visitation lead at Outreach Center for
Community Resources Family Reunification Program (Outreach). N.T. (Vol.
I), 4/28/26, at 12. Ms. Vassell testified that Parents had supervised visits with
Children at the Outreach facility every other week, between November 2024
and November 2025, for a total of 28 visits. Id. at 18, 32; see also id. at 22
(Ms. Vassell testifying that “a police officer was present each time [M]other
and [F]ather had visits with [C]hildren,” due to Father’s aggressive behavior
toward Outreach staff and Mother), 34-35 (Ms. Vassell confirming that
Outreach would not have deemed the presence of law enforcement necessary
if Father was not at a supervised visit).
Ms. Vassell testified that supervised visits “started as one hour, and then
[Mother] was granted the hour before, but that only took place for two visits,
and then [Parents] joined together for the remainder [of] the two hours.” Id.
at 32. According to Ms. Vassell, Parents’ last supervised visit with Children
was in November 2025. Id. at 33. Ms. Vassell stated that “after several
attempts of scheduling [additional visits between Parents and Children,
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Parents advised Outreach] that they didn’t want the visitation because they
were seeing” Children independent of Outreach’s supervised visitation. Id.
Ms. Vassell testified that during visits with Children, Mother “did []
display some times of falling asleep, being very tired, picking at her skin
during the visit,” but that “[f]or the most part,” Mother’s interaction with
Children during visits was appropriate. Id. at 38; see also id. at 40 (Ms.
Vassell agreeing that Mother’s visits with Children were largely appropriate,
but “[t]here were a few [instances] where we had some issues [regarding
Mother’s] falling asleep, dropping items.”). According to Ms. Vassell, Children
“were always happy to see [Mother. Mother] interacted with [Children], for
the most part, appropriately.” Id. at 61; see also id. (Ms. Vassell agreeing
that Children and Mother appeared to share a bond).
Outreach supervised visitation specialist Olivia Fryer (Ms. Fryer) testified
that Parents’ “nodding off and falling asleep” was a “recurring issue” during
their supervised visits with Children. Id. at 65. Ms. Fryer opined that Parents’
[c]onsistent dozing off …, laying on the floor and falling asleep[
during visits], [] is consistent with my concerns [regarding
Parents’] sobriety during visitations. I know [Parents’ youngest
child, L.J.,] at one point had crawled on [Father,] trying to pat him
awake, and [Father] said that he was sleeping. [S]o those were
my main concerns with the lack of engagement in the visits[,] due
to the consistent nodding off.
Id. at 68; see also id. at 74 (Ms. Fryer describing an occasion where L.J.
“was laying on [Mother], trying to wake [Mother] up, and then [Mother] said
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‘[L.J.], wake mommy up.’ So it was recurring and I never took it as a form of
play.”).
Kathryn Schnurr (Ms. Schnurr) testified that during her time working
with Parents, she facilitated the Safe Care Program. Id. at 81. Ms. Schnurr
explained that both Mother and Father successfully completed the Safe Care
Program. Id. at 83. The orphans’ court summarized Ms. Schnurr’s pertinent
testimony as follows:
Ms. Schnurr [] talk[ed] to Parents about available [parenting,
mental health, and drug and alcohol] resources, as well as made
referrals[ for various programs]. [N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26,] at 91.
Ms. Schnurr reviewed the FSP with [] Parents. Id. at 93. [Ms.
Schnurr] testified she would remind [Parents] to [submit to drug]
screen[s,] because [they] were required under the FSP. Id. Ms.
Schnurr referred Mother to Healthy Moms at the Wright Center.
Id. at 95. [Ms. Schnurr] also referred [Parents] to Parents as
Teachers, a parenting program at Outreach. Id. at 96. [] Parents
did not follow through. Id.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 11 (capitalization modified).
Ms. Valera testified that she has acted as the family’s primary Agency
caseworker, through SAM, since Children were adjudicated dependent in
November 2024. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 3. Concerning Mother’s FSP goals,
Ms. Valera testified consistently with the orphans’ court’s above factual
recitation. See id. at 24-25. Ms. Valera testified that, following their
dependency adjudications, Children were placed into kinship care with Father’s
mother (paternal grandmother). Id. at 5; see also id. (Ms. Valera stating
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A.J. and E.J. were placed with paternal grandmother on July 22, 2025, and
that L.J. was placed with paternal grandmother on November 13, 2025).5
The orphans’ court summarized Ms. Valera’s testimony concerning
substance abuse service referrals made for Mother, and Mother’s engagement
with those services:
Mother was referred to Just Care on October 24, 2024, December
13, 2024, and January 25, 2025. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 7. 6
On April 17, 2025, [] Just Care [staff drug-]screened Mother. N.T.
(Vol. I), 5/5/26, at 79. Based upon [Mother’s positive drug test
results for methamphetamine, Just Care staff] declined to admit
Mother into the program because, in their opinion, [Mother]
needed a higher level of care. Id. … [Just Care staff]
recommend[ed that] Mother go to inpatient [substance abuse]
treatment. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 8. Ms. Valera testified [that]
Just Care would have addressed Mother’s mental health and drug
and alcohol needs[,] as well as provide[d] parenting support. Id.
at 31.
Mother was admitted to participate at Lakeside on October
27, 2025, for outpatient drug and alcohol treatment. Id. at 8.
[Following a drug screen at Lakeside, Mother] tested positive for
cocaine, methamphetamine, alcohol, and naloxone …. Id. at 9.
Ms. Valera testified Mother’s attendance at Lakeside in November
and December 2025 was spotty. Id. Mother had too many no
calls/no shows[ and, as a result,] Lakeside discharged Mother via
a letter dated December 12, 2025. Id. Mother then rescinded
her release [of confidential information] at Lakeside[, which
prevented the Agency from obtaining additional information]. Id.
____________________________________________
5 At the time of the TPR hearing, Children and paternal grandmother were
residing in Middletown, New York. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 5. It is unclear
from the record whether paternal grandmother is a pre-adoptive resource for
Children.
6 The orphans’ court explained that Just Care is a program facilitated by
Friendship House that “brings support to parents and families experiencing a
range of challenges[,]” including substance abuse and mental health issues.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 12 n.6.
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Mother re-engaged with Lakeside on December 29, 2025. Id.
However, [Mother] was discharged unsuccessfully on January 18,
2026[, as Mother failed to appear at her intake appointment]. Id.
[Ms.] Valera testified she referred both [Parents] to Drug
and Alcohol Treatment Services (hereinafter “DATS”). Id. at 8.
Ms. Valera testified Mother had attended on June 17, 2025. Id.
at 10. Mother then no call[ed]/no showed on October 9, 2025[,]
and October 19, 2025. Id. Mother re-enrolled in DATS on January
26, 2026. Id. On that date, [Mother] had her intake
appointment. … [Mother] kept some appointments and missed
some appointments. Id. Mother rescinded her DATS release on
March 31, 2026. Id. Mother was asked by DATS to [submit to a
drug] screen on that date[,] and she refused. Id.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 12-13 (record citations and capitalization
modified; headings and original footnote omitted; footnote added); see also
N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at 11 (Ms. Valera testifying that Mother had 150
“presumed positive” drug screens based upon her failure to appear for
testing).
Concerning housing, Ms. Valera testified that the family home was
condemned sometime after September 25, 2025. N.T. (Vol. II), 4/28/26, at
12-13; see also id. at 14 (Ms. Valera stating that Scranton Police observed
that the family residence “was full of trash, roaches, garbage, maggots, old
food,” and housed dogs that “were starved and full of bedbugs”). Ms. Valera
testified that the Agency referred Mother to housing case management, but
Mother failed to supply the required pay stubs. Id. at 12.
Ms. Valera testified that Mother obtained a new residence (Wayne
Avenue residence) in October 2025. Id. at 14. According to Ms. Valera,
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Mother was getting her rent paid every month up until February
[2026] from the Women’s Resource Center[ (WRC)]. [WRC] did
have to stop payments due to [M]other’s noncompliance [with the
lease terms,] and the fact that [WRC] was made aware that
[Father] was living in [Mother’s residence], which is not allowed
due to … [Mother] receiving the funding because of the ongoing
domestic violence.
Id. at 21.
Regarding Mother’s mental health FSP goal, Ms. Valera testified that the
Agency referred Mother to Omni Health Services (Omni), a mental health
services provider. Id. at 30. Ms. Valera testified that Omni discharged Mother
due to her failure to attend sessions. Id. Ms. Valera explained that Mother
re-engaged with Omni, but was again discharged, with her last session
occurring in August 2025. Id.
Ms. Valera testified that Children share a bond with Parents, but opined
that Children could not be safely returned to Parents “due to the ongoing
concerns throughout the dependency … case.” Id. at 57; see also id. at 59-
60 (Ms. Valera opining that termination of Parents’ parental rights would not
harm Children). Ms. Valera highlighted that Children each have special needs
to which paternal grandmother attends:
[E.J.] has cerebral palsy with hypoxia. [E.J.] is receiving services
in Middletown, New York[, where Children reside with paternal
grandmother]. [Paternal grandmother] has been getting [E.J.] all
the appropriate services that are needed. [E.J.] does outpatient
therapy, [physical therapy], and speech[ therapy]. [A.J.] was
diagnosed with autism. [A.J.] gets occupational therapy and
speech [therapy] in the day care. And [L.J.] is [going to] have
a[n] early intervention appointment to see if she is up to speed
on her milestones.
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Id. at 57 (paragraph breaks omitted); see also id. at 58 (Ms. Valera testifying
that paternal grandmother “is a director of a school, so she is up to speed on
all the services and needs of [C]hildren”). According to Ms. Valera, she
observed paternal grandmother interact with Children, and opined that
Children are “extremely bonded to” paternal grandmother. Id. at 59.
Finally, Mother testified on her own behalf. Mother explained that she
resides, alone, at the Wayne Avenue residence. N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 5.
Mother denied that Father resides with her at the Wayne Avenue residence,
and testified that she and Father have been separated, at the latest, since
August 2025. Id. at 5-6.
Mother testified that the Agency “never invited [her] to participate” in
formulating an FSP, but that she was aware of her obligation to submit to drug
screens twice a week. Id. at 8. According to Mother, she did not attend most
of her required drug screens because she did not have transportation, and the
Agency only provided her with one bus pass. Id. at 9-10. But see id. at 27
(regarding her failure to attend drug screens, Mother testifying, “I understand
where I went wrong. I should have found a way.”). Mother additionally
challenged the accuracy of several of the drug screens to which she did
submit. Id. at 29-30.
Mother testified that, despite the Agency’s purported lack of support in
facilitating visits between Mother and Children, she and Children share a
strong bond. Id. at 16. Mother testified that she “talk[s] to [Children] every
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night,” and visits Children at paternal grandmother’s residence every
weekend. Id.
Mother testified that she is enrolled in mental health treatment through
Friendship House, where she is engaged in counseling. Id. at 17. Mother
admitted that she did not sign a release for the Agency to obtain
documentation from Friendship House, and asserted her belief that “anything
that [Ms. Valera] was trying to get would [be used to] try to hurt me …” Id.
at 18; see also id. at 19 (Mother testifying, “I want to be able to go to
treatment and not have to worry about it backfiring on me or [] somebody
being [] biased towards me or pre-judged or whatever.”).
Mother acknowledged that she did not complete her FSP goals, but felt
“like [she] made significant progress really quickly.” Id. Mother stated, “I’m
not blaming the [A]gency at all. I take responsibility for what I’ve done and
what I didn’t do. I just feel like there could have been a little bit more
support.” Id. at 20. But see id. at 20-21 (Mother testifying, “I feel like there
was [] a lot of manufactured failures, [and] obstacles put in the way.”).7
____________________________________________
7 Following Mother’s testimony, Children’s GAL advised the orphans’ court that
he “feel[s] the best place for [C]hildren is to be with paternal grandmother.
And in that regard, I would support the [A]gency’s petitions.” N.T. (Vol. II),
5/5/26, at 50.
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At the conclusion of the TPR hearing, the orphans’ court terminated
Mother’s parental rights to Children.8 Mother timely filed notices of appeal
and contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statements. On June
26, 2026, the orphans’ court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Mother raises the following issues:
A. Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred as a matter of law
and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency
presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for
termination of Mother’s parental rights under Sections
2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5) and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act?
B. Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred as a matter of law
and/or abused its discretion in failing to consider and/or
improperly weighing evidence regarding Mother’s ongoing efforts
to remedy the conditions that led to [] Children’s placement?
C. Even if this Court determines the Agency presented
sufficient evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of
Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5)
and/or 2511(a)(8) of the Adoption Act, whether the [orphans’
c]ourt nevertheless erred as a matter of law and/or manifestly
abused its discretion in determining termination of Mother’s
parental rights is in the best interest of … Children?
D. Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred as a matter of law
and/or abused its discretion in failing to give adequate weight to
the bond between Children and Mother, and the potential harm
termination may cause?
____________________________________________
8 On May 6, 2026, the orphans’ court issued orders (docketed May 13, 2026)
formally terminating Mother’s parental rights. While the orders do not
reference any subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, it is apparent from the
orphans’ court’s on-the-record remarks, at the conclusion of the TPR hearing,
and its subsequent Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, that the orphans’ court
terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8), and (b). See N.T. (Vol. II), 5/5/26, at 55-61; Orphans’ Court Opinion,
6/25/26, at 20-25.
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E. Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred as a matter of law
and/or abused its discretion in failing to consider and/or
improperly admitting hearsay evidence in making its findings?
Mother’s Brief at 12-13 (issues reordered).9
We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an
abuse of discretion. In re M.L.R., 351 A.3d 731, 736 (Pa. 2026).
[A]ppellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
____________________________________________
9 Despite acknowledging that the orphans’ court terminated her parental rights
pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), see Mother’s Brief at
21, Mother offers no argument concerning subsection 2511(a)(1) in her brief,
nor does she cite subsection 2511(a)(1) in her statement of questions
involved. We could deem Mother’s challenge under Section 2511(a) waived
on this basis. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(deeming waived a parent’s challenges to subsections of Section 2511(a) not
included in her statement of questions involved); In re L.J.W., 264 A.3d 345
(Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 9-10) (wherein the orphans’
court determined termination was warranted pursuant to subsections
2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), this Court concluding that the parent’s “failure to
contest subsection (a)(8) concedes that subsection and [] compels us to
conclude that the [orphans’] court properly terminated her parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a).” (citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004), wherein we reiterated that “we need only agree with [the
orphans’ court’s] decision as to any one subsection [of Section 2511(a)] in
order to affirm the termination of parental rights.”)); see also Pa.R.A.P.
126(b) (unpublished non-precedential memorandum decisions of this Court
filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).
Nevertheless, as explained herein, we address Mother’s Section 2511(a)
challenge pursuant to subsection (a)(8).
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facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the
orphans’ court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or
her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Interest of N.A.S., 338 A.3d 191, 196–97 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation
omitted); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021)
(instructing that in reviewing an order terminating parental rights, “the
appellate court should not search the record for contrary conclusions or
substitute its judgment for that of the [orphans’] court.”). “[Our Supreme]
Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases involving close calls,
deference to the [orphans’] court’s determination is particularly crucial.” In
re Adoption of G.W., 342 A.3d 68, 84 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc) (citation
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis: “Courts must begin by first
considering whether a parent’s conduct warrants termination under [S]ection
2511(a)[,] prior to shifting its focus to whether termination best serves the
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child’s needs and welfare.” Interest of M.K.L., 354 A.3d 42, 60 (Pa. Super.
2026) (citation omitted). If the court finds grounds exist to warrant
termination under Section 2511(a), it must then assess the evidence relative
to the child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), “giv[ing] primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
Notably, as explained above, this Court need only agree with the
orphans’ court as to “any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to
[Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In
re M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).
Instantly, because the orphans’ court addressed only Section
2511(a)(8) in its opinion,10 we confine our analysis to that subsection, which
provides as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
____________________________________________
10 In its opinion, the orphans’ court stated its intention to “focus its analysis
on” Section 2511(a)(8), because a petitioner “need only prove by clear and
convincing evidence all of the elements of any one of the [] subsections it has
chosen to proceed under.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/25/26, at 23. Although
the orphans’ court accurately described a petitioner’s burden, an orphans’
court should address each subsection of Section 2511(a) upon which
the court bases its termination decision. Here, had we disagreed with
the orphans’ court’s Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, our ability to review the
sufficiency of the evidence as to the remaining subsections would have been
materially impeded by the absence of the court’s alternative reasoning.
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).
To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that
(1) the child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least
12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or
placement still exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8)
does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent’s willingness or
ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the
child. Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue
conditions have been remedied such that reunification of parent
and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.
In re E.J.C., 335 A.3d 1222, 1230-31 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations and
quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
In considering Section 2511(a)(8), we have observed that “a parent’s
progress toward remedying the conditions [necessitating her child’s
placement] is insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant a finding in favor of
the parent under the second prong of [Section 2511](a)(8).” In re Adoption
of G.W., 342 A.3d at 87 (citing In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 512 (Pa. Super.
2006), wherein we emphasized that termination under Section 2511(a)(8)
“does not require an evaluation of [the parent’s] willingness or ability to
remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children.” (emphasis in
original; citation omitted)). Moreover, Section 2511(a)(8) does not “require
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an evaluation of the availability or efficacy of [a county agency’s] services.”
Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
Here, in her first issue, Mother “address[es] the evidence of record as it
applies to all subsections of [2511(a)] relied upon by the Agency.” Mother’s
Brief at 21. Mother does not dispute that Children were removed from her
care more than twelve months prior to the Agency’s filing of its TPR petitions.
Instead, Mother focuses her argument on the second element of Section
2511(a)(8), i.e., that the conditions necessitating Children’s removal from her
care continued to exist at the time of the TPR hearing.
In support of her argument, Mother points to evidence that she attended
multiple drug and alcohol treatment programs, including “Lakeside, DATS …,
and later, Just Care[.]” Id. at 22. Mother further cites Ms. Schnurr’s
testimony that Mother “‘attended Endless Mountain … for a couple of days,’
which is a rehab facility.” Id. at 24 (quoting N.T. (Vol. I), 4/28/26, at 91-92).
According to Mother, “[t]his is evidence that Mother did attempt, on multiple
occasions, to seek help and assistance for her drug and alcohol issues and
mental health [issues] in compliance with her FSP.” Id. at 23.
Mother emphasizes that she completed the Safe Care Program; secured
stable housing, for which she was current on rent and utility payments; and
“maintained two separate jobs during [Children’s] dependency, allowing
[Mother] to afford stable and safe housing while meeting all the needs of []
Children.” Id. at 23, 25, 27. Mother opines that the orphans’ court “decided
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to terminate [her] parental rights while ignoring Mother’s positive course of
action, good faith attempts [at] compliance with her FSP[s,] and remarkable
progress ….” Id. at 27-28.
Mother additionally faults the Agency for failing to (1) inspect her
residence to assess its suitability for Children’s return; (2) “go to her place of
employment, to pick[ ]up her paystubs as proof of her income”; and (3) “give
Mother appropriate transportation or adequate resources to be successful
during [Children’s] dependency.” Id. at 25, 27.
In response, the Agency argues that under Section 2511(a)(8), the
orphans’ court
properly focused on the length of [Children’s] placement[,]
Mother’s failure to remedy conditions, and the needs and welfare
of [] Children. Mother’s attempts to blame the Agency for her
struggles and lack of progress[] demonstrate an inability or
unwillingness to accept any responsibility[,] and highlight the lack
of [Mother’s] affirmative steps to reunite with [C]hildren.
Subsection [2511(a)](8) does not measure the efforts, but the
progress; progress that simply was not achieved ….
Agency Brief at 19.
The Agency further argues that Mother’s account of her efforts to
address her substance abuse issues
conveniently leaves out the fact that [Mother] was unsuccessfully
discharged from Lakeside; left [] an inpatient rehabilitation
[facility, i.e., Endless Mountain,] after only six days, [] against
medical advice; was unsuccessfully discharged from DATS; and
was discharged from [the] Just Care program on multiple
occasions.
Id. at 17-18 (punctuation modified).
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Instantly, the orphans’ court set forth its rationale for terminating
Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8) as follows:
[C]hildren have been in placement since October 23, 2024. At the
time of the [TPR] hearing …, [C]hildren had been in foster care for
18 months.11 … Th[e orphans’] court is satisfied the Agency has
established by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions
that led to [C]hildren’s placement continue to exist today. ….
….
[Pursuant to the FSPs, P]arents were required to address
their drug and alcohol issues, their mental health issues, and
maintain safe and stable housing. … Throughout the history of
the case, neither parent received a compliance rating higher than
moderate. In addition, neither parent received a progress rating
higher than none or minimal. At the last PR held on March 11,
2026, Mother received a compliance and progress rating of none
and none. … The testimony [at the TPR hearing] established that
at the time of the hearing …, [P]arents were still only allowed to
have supervised visits with [C]hildren. Currently, [] paternal
grandmother supervises visits between [P]arents and [C]hildren
at her home in Middletown, New York. [P]arents were offered
additional visits at Outreach[,] but they declined.
The testimony established that neither [Mother nor Father]
has adequately addressed their drug and alcohol issues. Mother
only [drug-]screened six times in 18 months[, missing 150
required drug screens]. … [O]n February 24, 2026, [Mother]
tested positive for methamphetamine. [At t]he most recent
[drug] screen[,] on March 11, 2026[, Mother] tested positive for
cocaine, THC, and alcoh