Full Opinion

J-S26016-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.R.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.N., MOTHER : : : : : No. 145 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Decree Entered December 22, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2025-0098a IN RE: ADOPTION OF: R.J.T., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.N., MOTHER : : : : : No. 146 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Decree Entered December 23, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2025-0099a IN RE: ADOPTION OF E.M.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: S.N., MOTHER : : : : : No. 147 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Decree Entered January 5, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2025-0100a IN RE: ADOPTION OF: H.E.M.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA J-S26016-26 : : APPEAL OF: S.N., MOTHER : : : : : No. 148 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Decree Entered January 5, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2025-0115a BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and NEUMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2026 Appellant S.N. (Mother) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating her parental rights to C.R.T., R.J.T., E.M.S., and H.E.M.R. (collectively, Children),1,2 claiming on appeal that York County Offices of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) violated Mother’s due process rights by requiring her to work with private healthcare providers rather than more accommodating public providers. We affirm. Children’s dependency cases commenced in November of 2023, when CYF began to investigate Mother; T.T., the father of H.E.M.R. (Father T.T.); and K.R., the father of C.R.T. and R.J.T., based on, inter alia, “allegations of behavioral health concerns, conduct by a parent placing a child at risk, inadequate nurturing/affection, and substance abuse as to Mother.” Trial Ct. ____________________________________________ 1 As of February of 2026, E.M.S. was eleven years old, H.E.M.R. was eight years old, C.R.T. was four years old, and R.J.T. was three years old. See Trial Ct. Op., 2/20/26, at 2. 2 We sua sponte consolidated the separate appeals for each child on March 13, 2026. -2- J-S26016-26 Op., 2/20/26, at 2. On July 3, 2024, after a “traffic stop by law enforcement . . . involving Mother and Father T.T. during which “cocaine and marijuana were found in the car[] and Father T.T. was arrested . . . [CYF] sought emergency protective custody and removed [] Children” from Mother’s care. Id. at 2-3. After a hearing, the trial court entered a shelter care order on July 5, 2024, directing that Children would remain in foster care. See id. at 2. On August 6, 2024, the trial court adjudicated Children dependent, finding that “[t]here were safety concerns for [] Children and for Mother not meeting their needs and getting them to school,” as well as “concerns for Mother’s mental health, which was erratic,” and placed Children with kinship resource foster parents. See id. at 5. On October 15, 2025, well over a year after Children had been removed from her care and after they had been adjudicated dependent, CYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights and, in response, the trial court appointed legal counsel for Mother and Children for the termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions. See id. On October 29, 2025, after a permanency review hearing, the trial court changed Children’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. See Permanency Review Order, 10/29/25.3 The trial court heard the TPR petitions on December 17, 2025. At the hearing, the legal interests of E.M.S., C.RT., and R.J.T. were represented by ____________________________________________ 3 The course of Children’s dependency and adoption cases generally proceeded on identical timelines and, therefore, any singular order and/or filing we cite references the equivalent orders and/or filings in each child’s case, unless noted otherwise. -3- J-S26016-26 Sydney C. Benson, Esq., and the legal interests of H.E.M.R. were represented by Kanika D. Henderson, Esq. See N.T., 12/17/25, at 1. Gillian A. Woodward, Esq., represented Children’s best interests as guardian ad litem (GAL). Mother was represented by Matthew Thomsen, Esq. (Counsel). See id. at 2. The trial court granted CYF’s uncontested request to admit the complete dependency records for Children as evidence. See Trial Ct. Op., 2/20/26, at 2, n.3. In addition to Children’s dependency records, CYF presented the testimony of ten witnesses, including Children’s current caseworker, Mother’s probation officer, two visitation supervisors, two therapists who had worked individually with Mother, two therapists who had worked individually with E.M.S., a family therapist who had worked with Mother and Children, and the program director and custodian of records at one of the agencies that supervised Mother’s visits with Children and provided drug-screening services. See N.T., 12/17/25, at 3-4, 18, 81, 86, 91, 94-95, 99, 107, 112-13, 147-48, 161-62, 164; see also Trial Ct. Op., 2/20/26, at 5. Mother testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of an advocate employed by a visitation service provider, who had observed Mother’s therapeutic supervised visitations with Children. See N.T., 12/1/25, at 2, 201-02; Trial Ct. Op., 2/20/26, at 11. The trial court entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to C.R.T. on December 22, 2025, to E.M.S. and R.J.T. on December 23, 2025, and to H.E.M.R. on January 5, 2026. In explaining its decisions to terminate, the trial court stated that, -4- J-S26016-26 [while] Mother loves her children and has made some progress . . . Mother had not made enough progress. After around eighteen months of dependency for the Children, Mother has not demonstrated the necessary progress with her parenting skills, and her current therapeutic supervisor has indicated that she cannot say whether it might be two months or six months before she might recommend a change in the level of supervision [for visits with the Children]. Meanwhile, the Children’s need for permanency continues. Legal counsel for E.M.S., C.R.T., and R.J.T., Attorney [] Benson[,] told the court that C.R.T. and R.J.T. are too young to have an opinion [on whether to terminate Mother’s parental rights]. Attorney Benson indicated that E.M.S. does not want to hurt anyone’s feelings and [ ] wants to believe that Mother will protect her, but she knows that she is safe where she is. [H.E.M.R].’s legal counsel, Attorney [] Henderson, told the court that [H.E.M.R.] wants to be with Mother and does not want her parental rights terminated. Attorney Henderson[] indicated that she never observed Mother and [H.E.M.R.] but[,] based on . . . testimony [at the hearing], they do have a bond and seem to have a good relationship. Attorney [] Woodward[,] the [GAL] for all four Children[, stated] that it would be best for the Children to have permanency at this time. Attorney [Woodward] indicated that although Mother has made some progress[] it is not enough[] and[,] given the amount of time that has passed, it is time for the Children to have permanency. Regarding [H.E.M.R.], Attorney Woodward agreed that he wants to be with hi[s] mom and dad like most kids. However, she has concerns for how long it [would] take for him to receive permanency given how long he has been in a treatment facility. She wants to see him go to a home where he can remain on a permanent basis. Attorney Woodward explained that [H.E.M.R.’s] first question was whether he would continue being able to see his siblings, and she assured him that would be a priority. She expressed her support for [CYF’s] petition. Trial Ct. Op., 2/20/26, at 12-13 (footnotes omitted and some formatting altered). -5- J-S26016-26 Counsel filed timely notices of appeal to each decree, accompanied by Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statements of errors setting forth eight claims. See Mother’s Concise Stmt., 1/20/26. 4,5 The trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). On appeal, Mother raises the following claim: “Did the [trial] court inappropriately allow [CYF] to rely on private healthcare providers with unreasonably draconian rules, excessively long waiting lists, and demonstrated aversion to scrutiny, thereby violating [Mother’s] due process ____________________________________________ 4 On January 20, 2026, Mother filed notices of appeal at both Children’s dependency and adoption dockets. See Not. of Appeal, 1/20/26. Because the period to appeal the goal change orders of October 29, 2025 under Children’s dependency dockets had passed by the date of filing of the notices of appeal, this Court directed Mother to file amended notices stating that the appeal was taken from the adoption dockets only; Mother complied on March 12, 2026. See Pa.R.A.P. 903; see also Order, 3/3/26; Am. Not. of Appeal, 3/12/26. We therefore do not address the goal change orders of October 29, 2025. 5 After filing the notices of appeal and before the deadline to file Mother’s appellate brief, on March 30, 2026, Counsel filed a petition with this Court to withdraw, stating therein “that filing a brief [here] would constitute a violation” of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Responsibility and that he had “no other alternative than to seek to withdraw from representation.” Counsel’s Withdrawal Pet., 3/30/26. This Court ordered the trial court to address Counsel’s petition and, if the court granted the application to withdraw, to appoint new appellate counsel for Mother or to hold a Grazier hearing to address whether Mother could proceed pro se. See Order, 4/2/26; see also Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). On April 13, 2026, after a hearing, the trial court denied Counsel’s application to withdraw, stating in the denial order that “the court understands [Counsel’s] ethical dilemma[] but . . . believes that allowing [Counsel] to withdraw at this time would be prejudicial to [Mother].” Trial Ct. Order, 4/15/26. The order further stated that “it is not [Counsel’s] voluntary decision to go forward with continuing to represent [Mother].” Id. Counsel subsequently filed Mother’s appellate brief. -6- J-S26016-26 rights and resulting in manifest injustice with respect to [Mother]?” Mother’s Brief at 7. Before evaluating the merits of the claim raised in Mother’s appellate brief, we first address whether she has preserved it for appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). Here, Mother identified the following claims in her Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement: 1. The trial court disallowed any testimony by Mother or her proposed witnesses at several permanency review hearings. 2. The trial court on a number of occasions relied on testimony from [CYF] employees that was wholly speculative and lacked any first-hand basis in fact. 3. Though the trial court questioned E.M.S. and H.E.M.R. in chambers, the court did not allow counsel other than the guardian ad litem to pose their own questions for the children. 4. The trial court did not allow C.R.T. or R.J.T. to be questioned in any capacity regarding their preferences or state of being. 5. On more than one occasion, the trial court appeared to disregard or reverse its own prior findings on factual matters without the introduction of any subsequent evidence or explanation. 6. The trial court is believed to have engaged in prejudgment. [Hon.] Christopher Menges remarked in open court that no matter what steps a parent took, sometimes the kids are so “screwed up” that the parents would never get them back anyway. Also, on more than one occasion, the court appears to have issued a ruling prior to the start or completion of the related evidentiary hearing. 7. The trial court refused to hear testimony that [Mother] sought to bring regarding collusion between the York County Police -7- J-S26016-26 Department and [CYF] for the express purpose of removing [Mother]’s children. 8. As no Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion has been issued, the reasons for the trial court’s ruling are vague or not discernable from the record. On information and belief, the trial court’s rulings are not supported by law or fact. See Hess v. Fox Rothschild, L.L.P., 925 A.2d 798 (Pa. Super. [] 2007). Mother’s Concise Stmt., 1/20/26. Comparing the claims raised in Mother’s Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement with the claim raised in her appellate brief, we find no overlap between the two. Accordingly, Mother has failed to present to the trial court the claim she now argues to this Court on appeal and, also, failed to raise or argue in her appellate brief any of the claims presented in her concise statement. Therefore, we conclude that Mother has failed to preserve any claim for our review and affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Grate v. Mann, 955 EDA 2024, 2024 WL 4785012 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 14, 2024), at *3 n.5 (noting that issues raised in a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statement but not included in an appellate brief “are abandoned and therefore waived for purposes of appeal” (citing Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003)).6 Decrees affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. ____________________________________________ 6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that we may cite unpublished non- precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value). -8- J-S26016-26 Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/20/2026 -9-