In Re: Sheliga, M., Appeal of: Sheliga, M.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket420 WDA 2026
JudgeNeuman
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: MICHAEL SHELIGA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: MICHAEL SHELIGA :
:
:
:
:
: No. 420 WDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered February 25, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-65-MD-0001356-2025
BEFORE: KING, J., NEUMAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED: November 18, 2026
Appellant, Michael Sheliga, appeals pro se from the trial court’s February
25, 2026 order denying and dismissing his petition to review the
Westmoreland County District Attorney’s Office’s disapproval of his private
criminal complaint.1 Due to substantial defects in Appellant’s brief, we dismiss
his appeal.
We glean the following background from the record. On April 28, 2025,
Appellant submitted a private complaint to the Westmoreland County District
Attorney’s Office, alleging Jordan Grogan violated the penal laws of this
Commonwealth in Salem Township, Westmoreland County, on November 14,
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1 Appellant has proceeded pro se throughout this litigation.
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2024.2 Appellant alleged Mr. Grogan committed criminal mischief, disorderly
conduct, littering, and harassment, after he kicked a sign to pieces, left litter
on the road, screamed and yelled, called Appellant a “mother fucker,” and was
generally disorderly. On August 15, 2025, the District Attorney notified
Appellant his private complaint was disapproved because it lacked
prosecutorial merit.
On October 8, 2025, Appellant filed a petition for review with the trial
court. A hearing on the petition for review took place on February 9, 2026.
At the beginning of the hearing, Appellant summarized the alleged November
14, 2024 incident which led to his filing a private complaint as follows:
I[ was] on the side of a public street with a sign commenting on
the Pennsylvania State Police who had threatened to arrest me for
campaigning for Mr. Trump.[3] After the election, I ha[d] a sign
about this, critical [of] Pennsylvania State Police, and an individual
I never met before [(Mr. Grogan)], as much as it’s on video,
c[ame] and he kick[ed] the sign to pieces. This definitely had
prosecutorial merit. He le[ft] debris on the street, that’s littering,
that had prosecutorial merit.
In addition to that, on tape -- and we can load the tape here if
you would like -- face to face, he call[ed] me an m’er f’er, he
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2 As discussed further infra, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 506
provides a private complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the
Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it. Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A). If
the attorney for the Commonwealth disapproves the complaint, the attorney
shall state the reasons on the complaint form and return it to the petitioner,
who may then petition the court of common pleas for review of the decision.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(B)(2).
3 The record indicates this alleged incident involving the Pennsylvania State
Police’s threatening to arrest Appellant for campaigning occurred on
November 3, 2024. See Petition for Review, 10/8/25, at ¶¶ 10, 13-15; N.T.,
2/9/26, at 16.
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scream[ed] it to one of his friends. There[ was] lots of other
cussing and swearing because he didn’t like my sign. He’s free to
put up whatever sign he may choose, but I have a constitutional
right to go on a public street and put up a sign in relation to a
public agency.
N.T. at 4. Jennifer Dupilka, Esq. (an assistant district attorney) and Appellant
then testified. Attorney Dupilka — who had reviewed Appellant’s private
complaint — addressed why the complaint was disapproved, explaining:
The … allegations are from November 14, 2024. In [Appellant’s]
petition [for review], he indicates the state police were called
beforehand, before this incident, and informed him that he would
be arrested in furtherance of his allegations. And normally with a
private criminal complaint, the state police are our investigators,
also local police. Our office, as assistant [district attorneys], are
not investigators; we are attorneys, so we defer to the police.
When they do an investigation, we defer to their …
recommendation.
So if we see in a private criminal complaint that the police have
been involved in that criminal complaint, then we defer, certainly,
to the police agency that was involved. In this case, it was the
state police. They, with regard to the allegations, indicated that
they were not going to file … with regard to this individual, in fact,
[they] would arrest [Appellant].
Also, [Appellant] provided a DVD copy of the … actual incident. I
reviewed the DVD. I have it today. … What is viewed on this DVD
is [Appellant] did have political signs. Now, these political signs
were not printed, they were on cardboard that he put and wrote
on, it looks like [with] marker, and he put it on cardboard, and
they were laying [sic] beside the road. … I didn’t, when I viewed
this, see that it was on private property; it seemed to be on the
road. The other individual he’s alleged against[, i.e., Mr. Grogan,]
[came] by and [took] the signs and put[] them in the dumpster.
I not only reviewed this DVD, but I did review it with my
supervisor…, and we agreed that it lacked prosecutorial merit
because the police were already involved, and, also, it was de
minimis. It seemed like a de minimis infraction. And we were not
interested in pursuing this, and we were deferring to the state
police.
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Id. at 7-9 (italics added); see also id. at 28 (Attorney Dupilka’s testifying
she did not see Mr. Grogan “doing anything wrong” on the video and “[i]t
seemed like he was picking up litter[] alongside a public roadway”); id. at 31
(Attorney Dupilka’s stating Mr. Grogan did not come towards Appellant or put
his hands on Appellant in the video, and “it was just a couple words
exchanged, and [Mr. Grogan] was picking up these cardboard signs that
weren’t attached to anything and putting them in the dumpster”).
Appellant testified he had several signs, some of which were cardboard
and some of which were wood. Id. at 35. He stated he was planning to sit
with his signs for three hours, and leaned his signs against either his lawn
chair or against the telephone pole, making sure all signs remained propped
up. Id. at 35-36. Afterwards, he said he intended to take his signs with him.
Id. at 36. However, during about the second hour he was there, the incident
with Mr. Grogan occurred. Id. He claimed the video shows a “sign that
originally had the word situation, now ha[d] two letters missing, and this is
some of the rubbish that [Mr. Grogan] left on the street. Before he kicked it,
it was property which I wanted. It was my sign. Once he kick[ed] it to pieces,
it [became] rubbish.” Id. at 35-36 (italics in original).4
Following the hearing, the trial court issued an opinion and order on
February 25, 2026, denying and dismissing Appellant’s petition. It explained:
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4 Videos of the incident were played at the hearing. The trial court observed
it did not see anybody kicking or destroying a sign, and Appellant indicated he
did not have a chance to get his camera out at that time. N.T. at 38.
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Upon a thorough review of the record in this matter and following
relevant case law, the [c]ourt finds that the Assistant District
Attorney’s decision to disapprove the private criminal complaint
and thereby decline to bring charges against Mr. Grogan … did not
amount to bad faith, did not occur due to fraud, and was not
unconstitutional. The [c]ourt finds that [Appellant] has not
established[,] and the record is [de]void [of] any evidence[,] that
the Assistant District Attorney’s decision to disapprove the private
criminal complaint was made with a fraudulent, dishonest, or
corrupt purpose, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional.
To the contrary, the record in this matter reveals that the
Assistant District Attorney relied on several sound reasons in
declining to approve the private criminal complaint. Namely, the
Assistant District Attorney reviewed the private criminal complaint
and the video exhibit submitted by [Appellant] with the First
Assistant District Attorney[,] and they determined that it “lacked
prosecutorial merit” and any alleged conduct was de minimis,
especially in relation to the multitude of other serious crimes that
they prosecute; the Pennsylvania State Police investigated the
matter[,] determining that there was no merit[,] and the
Westmoreland County’s District Attorney’s Office largely defers to
the recommendation of the police; and there was no direct
evidence of Mr. Grogan[’s] destroying [Appellant’s] sign or ripping
the sign(s) from [Appellant’s] hand or putting his hands on
[Appellant], rather the signs were not secured to anything and the
video depicted Mr. Grogan[’s] picking up the signs on a public
roadway and walking away from [Appellant to] mov[e] them to
the trash.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 2/25/26, at 3.
Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. Thereafter, the
trial court ordered him to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b), and he timely did so. The trial court then issued a Rule 1925(a)
opinion.5
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5 In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, it claimed Appellant waived all
issues on appeal by failing to serve a copy of his concise statement on the trial
court. Problematically, however, the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order did not
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Upon review, we are compelled to dismiss Appellant’s appeal. Appellate
briefs must comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P.
2101. Moreover, “if the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the
appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or
dismissed.” Id. Rule 2111 addresses the contents of the appellant’s brief and
sets forth what the brief must include. Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a).
In this case, the defects in Appellant’s brief are substantial. In violation
of Rule 2111(a), his brief fails to include: a statement of jurisdiction, the order
in question, a statement of both the scope and standard of review, a statement
of the questions involved, a statement of the case, a summary of the
argument, a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought, a copy of
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, and the certificates of compliance
required by Pa.R.A.P. 127 and 2135(d).
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comply with Rule 1925(b)(3)(iii). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii) (requiring the
judge’s Rule 1925(b) order specify “both the place the appellant can serve the
Statement in person and the address to which the appellant can mail the
Statement. In addition, the judge may provide an email, facsimile, or other
alternative means for the appellant to serve the Statement on the judge.”);
Order, 3/30/26 (the trial court’s instructing only that “Appellant shall serve a
copy of this statement on this Judge pursuant to [Rule] 1925(b)(1)”); see
also Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88
A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (“In determining whether an
appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925, it is the trial court’s order that triggers an appellant’s
obligation[. T]herefore, we look first to the language of that order.”) (cleaned
up). Accordingly, waiver is inappropriate on this basis. To the extent the trial
court uses a standard Rule 1925(b) order, we respectfully encourage the trial
court to amend its order to strictly comply with the mandates of Rule
1925(b)(3).
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We recognize Appellant is pro se. Even though this Court is willing to
liberally construe materials filed by pro se appellants, pro se appellants are
not entitled to special treatment by virtue of the fact they lack legal training.
Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1017 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1993)
(citation omitted). Here, Appellant failed to comply with numerous briefing
requirements. Based on the foregoing substantial defects in his brief, we must
dismiss his appeal.
However, even if Appellant’s appeal was not subject to dismissal for
briefing deficiencies, he would not convince us relief is due. Based on our
review of his argument, it appears Appellant intends to raise four issues: (1)
our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Ajaj, 288 A.3d 95 (Pa. 2023), applies
too lenient of a standard of review for district attorneys’ decisions to
disapprove private criminal complaints and should not apply to acts that
violate constitutional freedoms, see Appellant’s Brief at 2-5, 15; (2) Attorney
Dupilka acted in bad faith because (i) there was no mention of any interaction
with or investigation by law enforcement in Appellant’s private criminal
complaint, (ii) Appellant’s petition for review (which mentioned a police
investigation) was not filed until two months after the district attorney’s
disapproval decision, and (iii) the petition for review does not indicate law
enforcement investigated the November 14, 2024 incident with Mr. Grogan,
but instead a November 3, 2024 incident relating to Appellant’s campaigning,
see id. at 5-12; (3) Attorney Dupilka made other false statements at the
hearing, such as saying Appellant was cussing at Mr. Grogan, Appellant’s signs
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constituted litter, and that Mr. Grogan never came toward Appellant, which
further proves dishonesty and bad faith, see id. at 12-15; and (4) the trial
court erred by not allowing Appellant to make a closing argument, see id. at
15-16.
Before addressing Appellant’s claims, we preliminarily recognize Rule
506 governs the approval of private complaints and provides:
(A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the
complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the
Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it without
unreasonable delay.
(B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:
(1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate this
decision on the complaint form and transmit it to the issuing
authority;
(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state the
reasons on the complaint form and return it to the affiant.
Thereafter, the affiant may petition the court of common pleas for
review of the decision.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 506.
Our Supreme Court has held:
[W]hen reviewing a prosecutor’s decision disapproving a private
criminal complaint under Rule 506, a court of common pleas may
only overturn that decision if the private complainant
demonstrates that the disapproval decision amounted to bad faith,
occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional. … In addition, for
purposes of determining whether the prosecutor’s disapproval
decision amounted to bad faith, we … hold that bad faith is
demonstrated when the prosecutor acted with a fraudulent,
dishonest, or corrupt purpose. We note that the adoption of the
foregoing standard of review ensures that a court of common
pleas will afford proper deference to the discretionary decision of
the prosecutor—a member of the executive branch of the
Commonwealth’s government.
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Ajaj, 288 A.3d at 109-10 (cleaned up).
With respect to appellate review, this Court has determined:
[T]he appellate standard of review for a trial court’s review of a
district attorney’s disapproval of a private, criminal complaint is
the same as any other sufficiency-of-the-evidence review: de
novo. In conducting such a review, this Court must examine all
of the evidence admitted at the hearing, together with any
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the party in whose favor the trial court ruled.
Critically, the trial court, as the fact finder, is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented in judging the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded the evidence
produced. Whether all the evidence and inferences drawn
therefrom in the favor of the party who prevailed below are
sufficient to prove bad faith, fraud, or unconstitutionality is a pure
question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.
In re Private Crim. Compl. Filed by Animal Outlook, 349 A.3d 229, 234
(Pa. Super. 2025) (cleaned up), appeal denied, --- A.3d ----, 2026 WL
2236772 (Pa. filed Aug. 4, 2026).
Further, this Court has observed:
Ultimately, it is not the function of our courts to direct the day-to-
day operations of the district attorney’s office. If the voters in a
specific county disagree with the executive decisions of their
district attorney, the proper recourse is at the ballot box, not in
our courts. Absent affirmative proof of bad faith, fraud, or
unconstitutionality, the district attorney is free to prosecute
whatever crimes he or she chooses.
Id. at 236.
We now turn to Appellant’s claims. First, Appellant emphasizes “the
importance of free political speech[,]” and argues Ajaj “should not apply to
acts that violate freedoms found in the US and Pennsylvania Constitutions.”
Appellant’s Brief at 2, 4. He says he “should not have to be shoved [by Mr.
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Grogan] for his [F]irst [A]mendment rights to be protected[,]” id. at 4, and
insists a different standard from Ajaj should apply to constitutionally
protected activities. See id. at 2; see also id. at 4-5 (“The very lenient
standard of Ajaj should not apply in this set of circumstances. Instead, the
pre[-]Ajaj standard of review of the asserted basis for the disapproval should
apply.”).
No relief would be due. Initially, there is no indication in the record that
Mr. Grogan was a state actor; thus, Appellant’s constitutional rights could not
have been violated by Mr. Grogan. See Maylie v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 601 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. Super. 1991) (“The provisions of the
Constitution do not reach the acts of purely private actors.”) (citations
omitted); Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Ct. General
Life Ins. Co., 485 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 1984) (“The right of free speech
secured by the federal Bill of Rights is held against the government and cannot
be unreasonably infringed. In the absence of ‘state action,’ however, the acts
of purely private actors … do not violate the federal constitution….”) (citations
omitted). Further, to the extent Appellant argues a standard other than the
one announced in Ajaj should apply, our Supreme Court has made clear “a
court of common pleas may only overturn [the] decision [of the district
attorney] if the private complainant demonstrates that the disapproval
decision amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was
unconstitutional.” Ajaj, 288 A.3d at 109 (emphasis added). As an
intermediate appellate court, we are bound to apply Supreme Court
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precedent. See Hillbrook Apartments, Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co., 352 A.2d
148, 152 (Pa. Super. 1975) (“[W]e are not free, as an intermediate appellate
court, to overrule the decisional law enunciated by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.”) (citations omitted). Thus, even if Appellant’s appeal was not
subject to dismissal, his first claim would fail.
In Appellant’s second claim, he contends Attorney Dupilka acted in bad
faith because (i) there was no mention of any investigation by law
enforcement in the private complaint; (ii) the petition for review — which
mentioned a police investigation — was not submitted until two months after
the private complaint was disapproved; and (iii) even setting aside this date
discrepancy, the petition for review said police investigated the November 3,
2024 incident relating to Appellant’s campaigning, not the November 14, 2024
incident involving Mr. Grogan. Appellant’s Brief at 7-11. As such, Appellant
says Attorney Dupilka’s assertion that she relied upon the police’s
investigation in disapproving the private complaint is dishonest and represents
bad faith. Id. at 12.
Upon review, Appellant is correct that there was no mention of any
police investigation in his private complaint and that the police investigation
mentioned in his subsequent petition for review involved only the November
3, 2024 campaigning incident (not the November 14, 2024 incident involving
Mr. Grogan). Nevertheless, Attorney Dupilka testified she disapproved the
private complaint, in part, because the police were already involved in the
matter and she deferred to their decision on whether charges were warranted.
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N.T. at 7-9. While this information about a police investigation was not
contained in the private complaint reviewed by Attorney Dupilka and the police
investigation mentioned did not pertain to the November 14, 2024 incident
with Mr. Grogan, the trial court still chose to credit Attorney Dupilka’s
testimony about disapproving the complaint due to the police’s involvement,
see TCO at 3, and “the trial court, as the fact finder, is free to believe all, part,
or none of the evidence presented in judging the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be afforded the evidence produced.” Animal Outlook, 349
A.3d at 234.
Even setting aside the police investigation, though, Attorney Dupilka
gave two additional reasons for why she disapproved the private complaint.
First, she spoke about how Mr. Grogan’s alleged conduct was de minimis. She
stated she “did not feel that it was worth the court’s time prosecuting this
case[,]” N.T. at 25, and explained “[w]e have much other [sic] serious crimes
to deal with such as homicide, rape, burglaries, and we felt that this was de
minimis….” Id. at 31 (italics added). Second, Attorney Dupilka indicated it
did not appear Mr. Grogan did anything wrong. In watching the video footage
from the incident, Attorney Dupilka explained, “It seemed like [Mr. Grogan]
was picking up litter[] alongside a public road, so I didn’t see that Mr. Grogan
was doing anything wrong.” Id. at 28.6 Viewing the evidence in the light
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6 See also N.T. at 21 (Attorney Dupilka’s testifying, “I hear language from
both of you. Again, those signs were propped up. They weren’t even attached
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the party in whose favor the trial
court ruled, the record supports the trial court’s determination that Attorney
Dupilka’s disapproval decision did not amount to bad faith, occur due to fraud,
or consist of unconstitutional action. See Animal Outlook, 349 A.3d at 234.
Thus, even if Appellant’s brief was not subject to dismissal, no relief would be
due on his second issue.
In Appellant’s third issue, he argues Attorney Dupilka made other false
statements at the hearing, such as saying Appellant was cussing at Mr.
Grogan, Appellant’s signs constituted litter, and that Mr. Grogan never came
toward Appellant, which Appellant argues further proves dishonesty and bad
faith. Appellant’s Brief at 12-15. Appellant asserts the video shows he did
not cuss at Mr. Grogan, he did not leave his political signs unattended (such
that they could have been considered litter), and that Mr. Grogan came toward
Appellant. Id.
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to anything. They were just laying [sic] on the side of the road. You saw it
in the video how easy it was for [Mr. Grogan] to just pick it up. He’s picking
up debris, and that’s how I viewed the video. [Appellant] littered, [Mr.
Grogan’s] actually picking it up.”); id. at 25 (Attorney Dupilka’s conveying,
“[S]omeone calling someone an mf’er isn’t a crime.”); id. at 29 (Attorney
Dupilka’s stating, “I see [Mr. Grogan] walking away from [Appellant]. I see
him, to me, diffusing the situation. [Appellant is] kind of coming after him,
talking to him, and he’s just picking up and walking away from [Appellant].”);
id. at 30-31 (Attorney Dupilka’s asserting, “[I]n no way did [Mr. Grogan] ever
come towards [Appellant]. [Mr. Grogan’s] holding the things in his arms. He
didn’t push [Appellant].”).
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The trial court heard Attorney Dupilka’s testimony and was able to
compare it against the video footage it viewed.7 To the extent Appellant
argues aspects of Attorney Dupilka’s testimony conflicted with the video
footage, we reiterate “the trial court, as the fact finder, is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence presented in judging the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be afforded the evidence produced.” Animal
Outlook, 349 A.3d at 234. The trial court also did not find that any
discrepancies between Attorney Dupilka’s testimony and the video footage
amounted to bad faith. See id. at 237 (noting, even if a party offers evidence
of bad faith by the district attorney, the trial court is free to reject that
evidence). Therefore, Appellant’s third issue would fail even if not subject to
dismissal.
Finally, in Appellant’s fourth issue, he advances the trial court erred by
not allowing him to make a closing argument. Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. We
would deem this claim waived due to Appellant’s failure to raise it below. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.”); see also Steiner v. Markel, 968
A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. 2009) (“Because issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, a 1925(b) statement
can therefore never be used to raise a claim in the first instance.”) (cleaned
up). Our review of the transcript shows the following, in relevant part:
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7 This Court has also viewed the video footage.
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[APPELLANT]: Your Honor, can I ask you a question? Do we get
to summarize ever? A closing argument?
THE COURT: This isn’t a trial. This is a hearing for me to
determine whether there was any abuse of discretion by the
District Attorney’s Office in refusing your private criminal
complaint. The record should reflect that you have made
sufficient argument as to your position. [The Commonwealth’s]
position has been made satisfactorily on the record for my needs
to make a decision on the petition.
[APPELLANT]: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate it.
N.T. at 43. Because Appellant did not object or raise an issue with the trial
court’s disallowing closing argument, we would find his fourth issue waived for
failure to preserve it below. In sum, even if Appellant’s appeal were not being
dismissed for briefing deficiencies, his four issues would not warrant relief.
Appeal dismissed.
DATE: 11/18/2026
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