Full Opinion

J-S36031-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 IN RE: J.J.V.-F. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: J.J.V. : : : : : : No. 940 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered May 6, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 89394 BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 27, 2026 J.J.V. (Father) appeals from the order denying his petition to rescind his acknowledgment of paternity for J.J.V.-F. (Child) (born June 2012). Father challenges the court’s denial of Father’s: (1) motion to deem admitted his requests for admission of documents and things, directed to Child’s mother (Mother); (2) request to admit documentary and DNA test evidence; and (3) petition to rescind his acknowledgment of paternity. We affirm. The orphans’ court set forth the following factual history of this case: At the time of [Child’s] birth, he was given a hyphenated last name of both [Mother’s and Father’s last names]. When the parents’ relationship soured, they entered into custody and child support litigation. Since [Mother and Father] were not married at the start of the support litigation, [Father] signed an acknowledgement of paternity. [Mother and Father] then ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S36031-26 proceeded for years raising [] Child in a joint custodial relationship, with [Father] paying child support. The most recent child custody order was entered in November of 2022, by agreement of [Mother and Father]. The agreed[-]upon child custody order from November of 2022 identifies [Father] as “Father” and [Mother] as “Mother.” It also provides that [Mother and Father] shall share legal custody, [Mother] shall have primary physical custody, and [Father] shall have partial physical custody. After years of raising [C]hild as his own, in December of 2025[, Father] filed a petition to rescind acknowledgement of paternity alleging fraud and that DNA tests showed that he was not the actual father of [Child]. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/24/26, at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The court denied Father’s petition to rescind his acknowledgment of paternity on May 6, 2026.1 Father filed a timely notice of appeal but failed to file a concomitant concise statement pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i).2 Nevertheless, Father filed a concise statement two days later, upon court order to do so. ____________________________________________ 1 The order was dated May 4, 2026, but was not entered on the docket with notice to the parties until May 6, 2026. See Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(8) (providing appeal may be taken as of right from order of orphans’ court under rules set forth in Chapter 3); see also Pa.R.A.P. 301(a) (providing that no order of court is appealable until entered on docket); Pa.O.C.R. 4.6(b) (providing for clerk to issue docket notice in orphans’ court cases); Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (providing that date of entry of order is “day on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b)”); Pa.O.C.R. 4.6(b), note (explaining that “Rule 4.6 [. . .] is derived from Pa.R.C[iv].P. [] 236.”). 2 We decline to find waiver on the basis of Father’s omission. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (declining to dismiss appeal for appellant’s failure to file Rule 1925 statement concomitantly with children’s fast track appeal because such failure results in defective notice of appeal and is violation of procedural rule and not order of court). -2- J-S36031-26 In this appeal, Father presents the following four issues for our review: 1. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny [Father]’s motion to deem admitted requests for admission of documents and things propounded by [Father] to [Mother] (filed on April 10, 2026). 2. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to admit into evidence [Father’s] Exhibit 2 during the May 5, 2026 hearing. 3. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to admit into evidence during the May 5, 2026 hearing [Father’s] Exhibit 3 (the DNA paternity report issued by ArcPoint Labs [(ArcPoint)] upon analyzing DNA samples provided by [Mother, Father, and Child] pursuant to the order dated January 13, 2026[]. 4. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to deny [Father’s] petition to rescind [his] acknowledgement of [his] paternity (filed on December 1, 2025). Father’s Brief at 3-4 (suggested answers and unnecessary capitalization omitted). We review appeals from orders relating to paternity matters for an abuse of discretion. See S.N.M. v. M.F., 175 A.3d 333, 337 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2017). An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has rendered a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. A finding by an appellate court that it would have reached a different result than the trial court does not constitute a finding of an abuse of discretion. Where the record adequately supports the trial court’s reasons and factual basis, the court did not abuse its discretion. Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (Pa. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 462 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “resolution of factual issues is -3- J-S36031-26 for the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s findings if they are supported by competent evidence. It is not enough for reversal that we, if sitting as a trial court, may have made a different finding.” (brackets omitted)). In his first issue, Father argues that pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4014(b), requests for admissions are automatically deemed admitted if the opposing party fails to serve a verified answer within thirty days of service. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. Father emphasizes that he served Mother with two sets of requests—on December 23, 2025, and February 21, 2026—making the respective responsive deadlines January 22 and March 23, 2026. See id. at 16. Father notes that Mother’s only verified answer was dated March 2, 2026, and was not served until March 7, 2026; thus, Father concludes that both Mother’s answers were untimely under the circumstances. See id. Father acknowledges that the court has discretion to extend Mother’s deadline to respond to Father’s requests but argues the court has no discretion to excuse the legal consequence of Mother’s late answers— automatic admission—and that denying Father’s motion to deem all matters admitted was an abuse of discretion. See id. Also, Father contends it was an abuse of discretion for the orphans’ court to require Father to seek court permission prior to serving requests for admission, as that determination is allegedly inconsistent with its own conduct where the court admitted Mother’s verified answer, which implicitly validated Father’s use of that discovery device. See id. at 16-17. After our review, we find no relief is due. -4- J-S36031-26 We conclude Father’s first issue is waived because, aside from citing to Rule 4014—which is only arguably applicable3—Father failed to cite relevant authority to support his claims, which has materially inhibited our review. 4 See In re Estate of Fellman, 362 A.3d 1173, at *21 (Pa. Super. 2026) (1587 EDA 2025) (noting that undeveloped claims without pertinent citation to legal authority, thereby preventing meaningful review, are waived); Piston v. Campbell, 62 A.3d 440, 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding claim waived where appellants failed to direct Court’s attention to record or case law supporting their assertion); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring citation to relevant authority in connection with each issue in argument portion of brief). Accordingly, no relief is due on Father’s first issue. We address both of Father’s second and third claims on appeal together. In his second claim, Father asserts that the court wrongly denied admission ____________________________________________ 3 See In re Hyman, 811 A.2d 605, 608 (Pa. Super. 2002) (noting appellant’s reliance on Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery rules in orphans’ court is misplaced). 4 For instance, we observe that Father does not cite Berks County Orphans’ Court Rule 7.1A, which is plainly applicable to this case. See B.C.O.C.R. 7.1A (see https://www.berkspa.gov/getmedia/d563f82c-4761-4dda-a0c6- 2e86f97f3a36/OC-Rules-Berks-final.pdf (accessed 10/14/26)); see also Hyman, 811 A.2d at 608 (interpreting old rule Pa.O.C.R. 3.6, applicable to discovery in orphans’ court proceedings, and concluding rule requires interpretation and application of parallel local county rule); see also Pa.O.C.R. 7.1 note (stating that current Rule 7.1 is derived from old Rule 3.6). In any event, “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). -5- J-S36031-26 of his Exhibit 2 on the basis that the exhibit incorporated too many other unauthenticated documents containing hearsay. See Appellant’s Brief at 17. Father maintains that the documents were physically attached to, and incorporated into, the requests for admissions that he served on Mother, making the requests and exhibits a single, unified document. See id. On that basis, Father concludes that the court’s exclusion of Exhibit 2 was an abuse of discretion, especially where twenty-one of the requests in his requests for admission expressly referenced the documents contained in Exhibit 2. See id. Further, Father argues that excluding the exhibit undermines the purpose of Rule 4014, which is designed to streamline the authentication and admission of documents by allowing a party to request admission of a document’s genuineness, authenticity, execution, delivery, and related matters. See id. at 17-18. In his third issue, Father alleges that the orphans’ court erred in failing to admit his Exhibit 3, a DNA report, for lack of relevance and authentication. See id. at 18. Specifically, Father contends that the DNA report was properly admitted because an adequate foundation was established through multiple sources where: (1) Mother testified that she and Child provided samples to ArcPoint and identified the report as the one she received; (2) Father testified that he provided a test sample and received the report; and (3) the report itself contained a notarized statement from the ArcPoint laboratory director confirming the accuracy of the results as of February 10, 2026. See id. Further, Father emphasizes that the report is relevant because it excludes -6- J-S36031-26 Father as Child’s biological father, which directly contradicts Mother’s representation that Father was the only man who could have fathered Child. See id. Father concludes that the excluded DNA report is material evidence of Mother’s fraud and should have been admitted. See id. No relief is due on either issue. We have previously applied an abuse of discretion standard of review for challenges to determinations regarding admissibility of evidence in orphans’ court proceedings as follows: The admission or exclusion of evidence[ . . .] is within the sound discretion of the [orphans’] court. We may only reverse upon a showing that the [orphans’] court clearly abused its discretion or committed an error of law. To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. In re Est. of Byerley, 284 A.3d 1225, 1239-40 (Pa. Super. 2022) (original brackets and ellipsis omitted). Instantly, the orphans’ court declined to admit Father’s Exhibit 2 and, in support of its determination, cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157 (Pa. 2018). In particular, the court noted its concerns that Father’s exhibit was a compilation of many differing documents and further identified issues related to hearsay, double hearsay, and authentication. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/24/26, at 8-13. Specifically, the court emphasized that Exhibit 2 is a packet consisting of twenty-one separate documents, including a birth certificate, assorted text -7- J-S36031-26 messages between various people (some with the year missing), a custody order, and lab reports. See id. at 10. Similarly, the court did not admit Father’s Exhibit 3 because it found the DNA report was not relevant and was further not authenticated. See id. at 11-16. In particular, as to relevance, the court cited this Court’s decision in McConnell v. Berkheimer, 781 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. 2001), for the proposition that “[t]he putative father is precluded from challenging paternity even if subsequently performed blood tests exclude him as the child’s biological father.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/24/26, at 14 (citing McConnell, 781 A.2d at 211). Also, as to authenticity, the court emphasized points of unreliability and untrustworthiness with the conclusions in the report because no representative from the testing laboratory testified about its authenticity, the parties could only authenticate the document as something they received in the mail, and the court had chain-of-custody concerns regarding the test samples. See id. at 15-16. In A.J.R.-H., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a single exhibit compiling many independent documents from different sources was erroneously admitted because it contained inadmissible hearsay. See A.J.R.- H., 188 A.3d at 1167; see also Pa.R.E. 801(c) (defining hearsay); Pa.R.E. 802 (providing that hearsay evidence is inadmissible). In reaching its conclusion, the Court recognized that an exception to the general rule against -8- J-S36031-26 hearsay exists for business records.5 See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1167; see also Pa.R.E. 803(6); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b) (stating that “A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.”). Nevertheless, the Court observed that no custodian or other qualified witness testified as to when and how the documents were created or if they were created in the regular practice of the various agencies ____________________________________________ 5 The business record exception to the rule against hearsay provides that the evidence is admissible if: (A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from information transmitted by--someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a “business”, which term includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and (E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. Pa.R.E. 803(6). -9- J-S36031-26 from which they were sourced. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1167-68; see also Pa.R.E. 803(6)(A), (C), (D); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b). In that case, the only applicable evidence was testimony that the documents were “collected in the ordinary course of business with regard to this case,” which the Court deemed insufficient as to the source of each underlying document within the compilation. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1167-68. Also, the A.J.R.-H Court found the compilation exhibit violated the rule against double hearsay, which is “where a hearsay document contains additional hearsay within it[], [such that] each level of hearsay must satisfy an exception to the rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence.” A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1169; see also Pa.R.E. 805 (providing that “Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”). Specifically, the Court observed that there was no testimony establishing a foundation to admit each level of hearsay contained within the individual underlying documents. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1169; see also Pa.R.E. 805. In addition to the issues with the hearsay rules, the Supreme Court determined that authentication of the compilation exhibit was insufficient. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1169-70; see also Pa.R.E. 901(a) (providing that “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”). The Court observed that, even absent hearsay barriers, no witnesses’ testimony authenticated most of - 10 - J-S36031-26 the underlying documents. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1169-70; see also Pa.R.E 901(a). After our review of the instant case, initially, we observe that Father fails to cite pertinent authority or explain how he preserved his claims for both of his second and third issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Further, we note that Father has neither raised the issue of whether the evidence meets other hearsay exceptions aside from the business records exception nor raised the issue of whether the evidence is self-authenticating, so any argument on those grounds is deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). In any event, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Father’s Exhibit 2 on hearsay and authenticity grounds because the excluded evidence was a compilation of documents and Father failed to provide: (1) supporting testimony of a custodian or someone with knowledge of how the underlying documents were made; or (2) evidence regarding how the individual documents originated in the ordinary course of business or were otherwise subject to an exception to the rule against hearsay. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1167-70; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b); Pa.R.E. 803(6); see also U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Pautenis, 118 A.3d 386 401 (Pa. Super. 2015) (affirming exclusion of evidence based on lack of foundation and authenticity grounds for business record exception). - 11 - J-S36031-26 As to Exhibit 3, we agree with Father that the report is relevant to establish Mother’s alleged fraud6 but we conclude that the court’s exclusion of that evidence was not an abuse of discretion on authenticity grounds and over concerns regarding its trustworthiness. See Pa.R.E. 401 (providing that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the action); Pa.R.E. 402 (providing that all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by law). We find the concerns of the orphans’ court regarding authenticity and chain-of-custody are supported where the parties only testified that they delivered samples to the laboratory and received the DNA reports in the mail, but Father could not establish chain of custody of any of the test samples which formed the basis of the report and he could not testify regarding the creation of the report. See A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 1169-70; see also Commonwealth Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 15 A.3d 492, 499 (Pa. Super. 2011) (affirming exclusion of evidence because of chain-of-evidence and authenticity concerns). Accordingly, no relief is due on either of Father’s evidentiary issues. ____________________________________________ 6 Evidence of fraud or misrepresentation is relevant to issues of paternity. See Vargo, 940 A.2d at 464; see also Manze v. Manze, 523 A.2d 821, 825 n.7 (Pa. Super. 1987). Theoretically, the test results, if accurate, could help prove Father’s claims that Mother intentionally wrongly informed him he was the only person who could be Child’s biological father. Nevertheless, as discussed below, we conclude that Father failed to establish the timing of any alleged fraudulent statements as well as failed to prove Mother’s intent to deceive, requiring that we affirm. - 12 - J-S36031-26 In his fourth issue, Father asserts that Mother committed actionable fraud by representing to Father that he was the only man who could have fathered Child, when Mother knowingly had a sexual relationship with at least one other man around the time of conception. See Appellant’s Brief at 19- 21. Father relies on the fact that three separate DNA tests have excluded him as the biological father, yet Mother continues to maintain her claim regarding Father’s paternity. See id. at 21. Father acknowledges the suggestion of the orphans’ court that Mother may have convinced herself of the paternity and argues that Mother’s subjective belief is beside the point because she knew about her other sexual relationship which could have led to Child’s paternity and deliberately concealed that fact from Father. See id. at 20-21. Father maintains that Mother’s fraud caused harm because it caused him to move into her home, attend appointments, share in newborn care, sign the acknowledgment of paternity, and pay child support for over a decade at $521 per month, which are obligations he continues to carry. See id. at 21. Father argues these facts satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard for fraud. See id. at 19. Father concludes that the court committed reversible error by denying the petition to rescind his acknowledgment of paternity as to Child based on the allegedly proven fraud. We find no relief is due. The law governing a request to rescind an acknowledgment of paternity is as follows: A signed, witnessed, voluntary acknowledgment of paternity shall be considered a legal finding of paternity if it is not rescinded by the signatories within sixty days of its signing. [See] 23 Pa.C.S. - 13 - J-S36031-26 § 5103(g)(1). After sixty days, the acknowledgment may only be challenged in court on the basis of fraud, duress[,] or material mistake of fact, if established by the challenger through clear and convincing evidence. [See] 23 Pa.C.S. § 5103(g)(2). S.N.M., 175 A.3d at 337-38 (original brackets omitted). “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.E.D.H., 338 A.3d 1010, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Fraud in this context is established by proving the following elements by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) a misrepresentation[;] (2) a fraudulent utterance thereof[;] (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced to act[;] (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation[;] and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result.” R.W.E. v. A.B.K., 961 A.2d 161, 167 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Instantly, the orphans’ court denied Father’s request to rescind his acknowledgment of paternity for the following reasons: After completion of the presentation of the evidence, the [c]ourt was not satisfied that [Father] met the burden of persuasion to prove fraud. In short, the weight and credibility of the evidence presented did not convince th[e orphans’ c]ourt that [Father] met the fraud requirement to rescind an acknowledgement of paternity after sixty [] days. Initially, the [c]ourt was not convinced that any representations made by [Mother], at the time that they were made, were made with knowledge of their falsity or recklessness as to whether they were true or false. At best, it appears that [Mother] may have been wrong when she asserted that [Father] was [C]hild’s father. - 14 - J-S36031-26 Being wrong and knowing that you are wrong, however, are two [] very different things. * * * On the basis of the sole fact that [Mother] had engaged in sexual relations with another man and had said that [Father] was the only man who could be [Child’s] father, [Father] asserts that there is fraud. [Father] did not effectively develop the evidence to the [c]ourt’s satisfaction as to why [Mother] believed [Father] was the only person who could have been [Child’s] father. [Father] [neither] explore[d] how recently the sexual relations were engaged in vis-a-vis [Mother’s] pregnancy[ with Child, n]or did [Father] explore whether the sex was unprotected sex, or even whether [Mother] had reason to believe her other sex partner may not have been fertile. On the basis of the evidence presented, a finding that representations were made with knowledge of, or recklessness as to, their falsity would be mere conjecture and speculation. Quite to the contrary of [Father’s] argument, it is entirely possible to believe something and be completely wrong in your belief. In addition, in order to prove fraud, a party must establish that a representation was made with the intent of misleading another into relying on it. The evidence was wholly unconvincing on this element. In consideration of the foregoing, the Appellant did not meet his burden of proof, and most specifically, the related burden of persuasion. Consequently, the appeal has no merit[,] and this issue should be found to be dispositive of the appeal. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/24/26, at 7-8. After our review of Father’s brief7 and the record in this case, we agree with the orphans’ court that there was not clear and convincing evidence of fraud perpetrated by Mother because Father failed to establish the existence ____________________________________________ 7 Mother did not file a brief in this Court. - 15 - J-S36031-26 of a misrepresentation on her part, an essential element of his claim. See R.W.E., 961 A.2d at 167. Insofar as Father relies on the DNA tests for support of his claim of fraud, we may not consider that evidence where its exclusion by the court did not amount to an abuse of discretion. See Matthew 2535 Props., LLC v. Denithorne, 313 A.3d 223, 234 (Pa. Super. 2024) (en banc) (noting that Pennsylvania courts may not consider evidence not admitted into evidence). In any event, we agree with the court’s analysis that Father failed to prove essential aspects of his fraud claim including the timing of any alleged misrepresentations, whether any alleged relevant sex was unprotected, or whether Mother had reason to believe her alleged sex partners were fertile. Absent clear and convincing evidence of fraud, Father was not entitled to relief. See S.N.M., 175 A.3d at 337-38; see also Warfield v. Warfield, 815 A.2d 1073, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2003) (rejecting appellant’s claim that acknowledgement of paternity invalid because appellant failed to establish alleged fraud); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 795 A.2d 403, 407 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding that court properly denied request to rescind acknowledgment of paternity where appellant failed to prove fraud). Accordingly, Father is due no relief on this final issue. Order affirmed. - 16 - J-S36031-26 Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/27/2026 - 17 -