Marcus, J. v. Hassan, S.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket583 WDA 2026
JudgeBowes
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
J.T. MARCUS F/K/A JUSTIN WAYNE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
TURNBAUGH : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 583 WDA 2026
SHERRIE ELIZABETH HASSAN :
Appeal from the Order Entered March 27, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Civil Division
at No(s): 2020-01539
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: November 16, 2026
J.T. Marcus f/k/a Justin Wayne Turnbaugh (“Father”), appeals pro se
from the March 27, 2026 order that denied his petition to modify the existing
custody order with respect to his twelve-year-old son, S.T. We affirm.
The certified record reveals an underlying protracted custody matter
initiated by Father in 2020 in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas with
respect to S.T., then age six, and his older daughter, S.N.H., both of whom
he shares with Sherrie Elizabeth Hassan (“Mother”).1 Throughout the history
of this case, Mother has been awarded primary physical custody of S.T. and
Father exercised periods of partial physical custody.
____________________________________________
1 This appeal does not involve S.N.H. because she is no longer a minor.
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In 2023, Father filed a notice of proposed relocation to Haslet, Texas, to
reside with his paramour, Adina Enlow, in the home of her father, Paul Enlow.
As of the date of the proposed relocation, Father exercised custody of S.T. on
alternating weekends and every Wednesday after school until 8:00 p.m.;
however, Father further sought to modify his periods of partial physical
custody to include, inter alia, one weekend per month in Pennsylvania, and
thirty consecutive days every summer in Texas. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court granted Father partial relief. Specifically, it granted
Father leave to relocate but awarded him only one weekend of physical
custody per month in Mercer County and seven consecutive days in Texas
during the summer.
Approximately two years later, on March 24, 2025, Father filed pro se
the at-issue petition for modification as well as a separate petition for
emergency relief seeking primary physical custody of S.T. in Texas. Father
alleged that Mother had engaged in parental alienation, psychological and
physical abuse of S.T., and medical neglect and malnutrition as demonstrated
by S.T.’s elevated body mass index. Petition for Emergency Relief, 3/24/25,
at 2. After interviewing S.T. in chambers and “receiv[ing] testimony from
[his] counselor of approximately [one] year,” the trial court granted, in part,
the emergency petition by increasing Father’s custody award to thirty
consecutive days in Texas during the summer, but maintained all other
provisions of the existing court order. See Order, 3/24/25 at 1.
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On April 21, 2025, Father filed pro se an amended custody modification
petition, this time alleging that S.T. (1) “has expressed desire to live with”
him; (2) fears Mother; and (3) has suffered “extreme emotional distress” in
Mother’s care. Amended Petition, 4/21/25, at ¶ 4. Once more, Father alleged
that Mother engaged in parental alienation and child neglect, including
“malnutrition, physical and psychological abuse and an unsafe environment.”
Id.
During the ensuing evidentiary hearings, the court conducted a second
in camera interview with S.T. Father appeared pro se and testified on his own
behalf. In addition, he presented the testimony of S.T.’s middle school
principal, Jonathan Fry, and school guidance counselor, Frank Galati. Father
also called witnesses from Texas, including his paramour, Ms. Enlow, her
father, Mr. Enlow, and her two daughters, Breylynn Chambers, a young adult
who lived at college, and Silver Pryor, age fifteen. Finally, Father presented
the testimony of S.T.’s paternal grandmother, Darlene Turnbaugh.
Represented by counsel, Mother testified on her own behalf and called S.N.H.
and the maternal grandmother, Christie Hassan, as witnesses.
On March 27, 2026, the trial court denied Father’s request for primary
physical custody but further increased his partial physical custody award to
cover the majority of S.T.’s summer break from school. In sum the court
concluded,
Considering all factors in total, there is not sufficient
evidence to completely remove [S.T.] from his entire family, other
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than Father, his school, supports, hobbies, and church, and move
him to Texas. [S.T.]’s entire exposure to Texas is essentially the
nature of a vacation, two weeks at one time, and thirty days in
the summer. [S.T.] clearly deeply loves both parents, and they
love him. It is clear both grandmothers and his sister have deep
love and a bond with [S.T.], and that feeling is mutual. The court
was very impressed with the testimony of the entire Enlow family
and their clear strong bond and love for [S.T.], but this
relationship does not support a change in custody.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/26, at 69 (cleaned up).
Specifically, the order provided that Father’s custody in Texas “shall
commence 15 days following the last day of the school year. The child shall
be returned to Mother’s custody 10 days prior to the start of the next school
year.” Order, 3/27/26 (cleaned up). The trial court accompanied the order
with a comprehensive opinion that included findings of fact, analysis, and
conclusions of law. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/26, at 1-70.
This timely pro se appeal followed, along with Father’s concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), wherein he raised forty-two separate claims of alleged
error. Thereafter, the trial court filed a thorough seventy-five-page Rule
1925(a) opinion addressing each of Father’s claims.
In this Court, Father presents the following issues for our review, which
we have re-ordered for ease of disposition:
1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused
its discretion by failing to properly apply 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)’s
safety-weighting requirements, including § 5328(a)(2.2), where
the record contained safety-relevant evidence concerning
Mother’s admitted physical conduct, the water-bottled incident,
the January 2026 slapping/reckless-driving incident, and the
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court’s finding that it was unable to determine whether a key
safety incident occurred.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by making
internally inconsistent and selectively applied findings, including
finding that the assaultive-behavior factor strongly favored Mother
while also finding that both parties could provide adequate
safeguards and supervision, and by minimizing Mother-related
safety evidence while applying Father-related history more
strictly.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its custody
and relocation analysis by characterizing the child’s Texas
exposure as essentially vacation-like and by discounting evidence
concerning Father’s Texas household, Silver Lining Sanctuary, the
child’s sibling-like bonds with the Enlow children, the availability
of extended family support, and Father’s proposed custody
structure preserving Mother’s relationship with the child.
4. Whether the trial court by discounting the twelve-year-old
child’s stated preference to live with Father, where the child
testified that his reasons were his own, identified peace and
freedom in Texas, rejected the suggestion that the farm alone
controlled his preference, and stated that the primary reason was,
“I just want to be with him.”
Father’s brief at 1-3 (pagination supplied).2
Our standard and scope of review are as follows:
We review custody orders for an abuse of discretion. We will not
find such an abuse merely because we would have reached a
different conclusion. Rather, an abuse of discretion occurs only if
the trial court overrode or misapplied the law in reaching its
conclusion, or the record shows the trial court’s judgment was
manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill will.
Moreover, our scope of review is broad. Because this Court does
not make independent factual determinations, however, we must
____________________________________________
2 For the purpose of this memorandum, we count the statement of questions
involved as the first page of Father’s brief.
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accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent
evidence of record. Importantly, we defer to the trial court on
matters of credibility and weight of the evidence, as the trial court
viewed and assessed witnesses firsthand. We are not, however,
bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences. Ultimately,
the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable
as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the
conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law,
or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial
court. As this Court has held, it is not this Court’s function to
determine whether the trial court reached the right decision;
rather, we must consider whether, based on the evidence
presented, given due deference to the trial court’s weight and
credibility determinations, the trial court erred or abused its
discretion.
When a trial court orders a form of custody, the best interest of
the child is paramount. The best-interests standard, decided on
a case-by-case basis, considers all factors which legitimately have
an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual
well-being. To that end, the Child Custody Act sets forth [several]
factors that a court must consider before making any custody
determination. It is within the trial court’s purview as the finder
of fact to determine which factors are most salient and critical in
each particular case.
Taylor v. Smith, 302 A.3d 203, 206-07 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up).
Collectively, Father’s arguments assail the trial court’s consideration of
the best interest factors that are enumerated in the Child Custody Act :
(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
factors, giving substantial weighted consideration to the factors
specified under paragraphs (1), (2), (2.1) and (2.2) which affect
the safety of the child, including the following:
(1) Which party is more likely to ensure the safety of the child.
(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
member of the party’s household, which may include past or
current protection from abuse or sexual violence protection
orders where there has been a finding of abuse.
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(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating
to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
protective services).
(2.2) Violent or assaultive behavior committed by a party.
(2.3) The level of cooperation and conflict between the parties,
including:
(i) which party is more likely to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and
the other party or parties if contact is consistent with
the safety needs of the child; and
(ii) the attempts by a party to turn the child against
the other party, except in cases of abuse where
reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect
the safety of the child. A party’s good faith and
reasonable effort to protect the safety of a child or self
shall not be considered evidence of unwillingness or
inability to cooperate with the other party. A party’s
reasonable concerns for the safety of the child and the
party’s reasonable efforts to protect the child shall not
be considered attempts to turn the child against the
other party. A child’s deficient or negative
relationship with a party shall not be presumed to be
caused by the other party.
(3) A willingness and ability of a party to prioritize the needs
of the child by providing appropriate care, stability and
continuity for the child, considering the parental duties
performed by the party on behalf of the child in the past and
whether the party is willing and able to perform the duties in
the future, and attend to the daily physical, emotional,
developmental, educational and special needs of the child.
(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
education, family life and community life, except if changes
are necessary to protect the safety of the child or a party.
(6) The child’s sibling and other familial relationships.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
child’s developmental stage, maturity and judgment.
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(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
(12) Each party’s employment schedule and availability to care
for the child or ability to make appropriate child-care
arrangements.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member
of a party’s household.
(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member
of a party’s household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).
Furthermore, to the extent that Father’s proposed exercise of primary
custody in Texas implicates relocation, the Child Custody Act directs a trial
court to consider the following considerations:
(h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a
proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors,
giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the
safety of the child:
(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of
the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and
with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant
persons in the child’s life.
(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the
likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical,
educational and emotional development, taking into
consideration any special needs of the child.
(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody
arrangements, considering the logistics and financial
circumstances of the parties.
(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age
and maturity of the child.
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5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of either
party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the
other party.
(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of
life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not
limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational
opportunity.
(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of
life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or
emotional benefit or educational opportunity.
(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or
opposing the relocation.
(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
member of the party’s household and whether there is a
continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.
(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h)
As we previously explained, even where, as here, a custody
determination “does not per se trigger [§] 5337 of the Child Custody Act,”
trial courts should still consider the relevant factors of [§] 5337(h)
in their [§] 5328(a) best interests analysis. Several of the factors
of [§] 5337(h) are encompassed, either directly or implicitly, by
the custody factors of [§] 5328(a). Trial courts should also
consider those relevant factors of [§] 5337(h) that are not
otherwise encompassed directly or implicitly by the [§] 5328(a)
factors pursuant to the catchall provision of [§] 5328(a)(16).
D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 476–77 (Pa.Super. 2014).
Instantly, the trial court assessed all the statutory best interest factors
pursuant to both § 5328 and § 5377 in its opinion that accompanied the
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relevant custody order. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/26, at 56-67.3 The court
found that § 5328(a)(2), (2.1), (2.2), (3), (4), and (16) strongly favored
Mother, and that (a)(6) and (14) weighed in her favor to some extent. With
respect to Father, the court determined that § 5328(a)(7) favored him slightly.
It deemed the remaining best interest factors neutral or inapplicable.
As it relates to the relevant relocation factors, the trial court weighed
the first three considerations in Mother’s favor. For the remaining
considerations relating to S.T.’s preference to live with Father in Texas and
the risk of child abuse, respectively, the court incorporated its findings from
its assessment of the corresponding best interest factors outlined in
§ 5328(a)(2), (2.1), (2.2) and (a)(7).
Father’s first three issues challenge the weight that the trial court
applied to certain factors. In this vein, he first assails the trial court’s
determination that the safety-related factors highlighted in § 5328(a)(2),
(2.1) and (2.2) weighed in Mother’s favor. He asserts that the trial court
minimized the evidence regarding Mother’s prior conduct that allegedly posed
a safety risk to S.T. See Father’s brief at 13-14, 17-22. In addition, he argues
that the trial court’s findings as to these factors were “internally inconsistent”
____________________________________________
3 The trial court addressed each of the mandatory best interest factors in its
April 2, 2026 opinion, albeit in different order and, at times, with different
paragraph numbers than that set forth in the statute. In this disposition, we
reference the best interest factors as set forth in § 5328(a) of the Child
Custody Act.
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with the neutral weight it assigned to (a)(1), concerning which party is likely
to ensure the child’s safety. Finally, he contends that the trial court abused
its discretion “by minimizing objective evidence of the Texas household” and
characterizing S.T.’s experience in Texas as “vacation-like.” Father’s brief at
26-35.
We start by outlining the court’s rationale as to the factors implicated
by Father’s argument, beginning with the following safety-related
considerations:
1. Which party is more likely to ensure the safety of the
child.
This factor is neutral. Although there is no credible evidence
either parent intentionally injured [S.T.], there is the incident,
although several years ago, in which Mother carelessly in anger
threw a plastic bottle causing an injury to [S.T.]. However,
Father, within the last five years, assaulted [S.N.H.] resulting in a
[Protection from Abuse “(PFA”) order], has a conviction for simple
assault, disorderly conduct/fighting, and three [convictions of
charges of driving under the influence].
[2.1] Consideration of child abuse and involvement of
protective services pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5329.1(a).
This factor strongly favors Mother. As set forth above, Father is
the defendant in a three-year PFA [order] in which the plaintiff is
his now-adult daughter. The adult daughter credibly testified
Father used some form of cord to strike her in the leg and back
causing . . . pain and bruising which lasted several days.
[2.2] Assaultive behavior committed by a party.
This factor strongly favors Mother. In addition to the above,
Mother testified Father assaulted her by placing his hands on her
throat and impeded her breathing. . . . Father did not deny, rebut,
or challenge this testimony.
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....
[2] The past or present abuse committed by a party or
member of the party’s household. . . .
This factor favors Mother. The court incorporates the discussions
above regarding child abuse of [S.N.H.], now an adult child, as
well as assaultive behavior of Mother. The court also notes
Father’s simple assault and disorderly conduct/fighting
convictions. However, the court does believe each party can
adequately provide safeguards and supervision. There was no
evidence of [S.T.] being the subject of abuse or neglect.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/26, at 56-58 (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).
Likewise, the trial court weighed the evidence concerning the Texas
household thusly,
Father’s entire case is based primarily on the premise [that S.T.]
wishes to move to Texas with Father and that is the end of the
matter. . . . Beyond the child’s preference, Father’s entire case
was focused on the environment in Texas, the access to animals,
and the amount of love and affection Father and the Enlow family
have for [S.T.].
These factors do not overcome [S.T.]’s lifelong residence in
Sharpsville, Pennsylvania, lifelong attendance at Sharpsville
School District, in which he appears to be doing well, and [S.T.]’s
entire extended family, on both parents’ sides, being present in
Mercer County other than Father.
....
Father’s living circumstances and stability are wholly dependent
on [his] relationship with [Ms. Enlow, his paramour]. [Ms. Enlow]
had only lived in Texas, in this instance, for just short of four
years, [Ms. Enlow]’s mother lives in Mercer County, Pennsylvania,
and the evidence is clear [Ms. Enlow] has moved back and forth
between Texas and Mercer County on at least two occasions.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/26, at 67-69 (cleaned up).
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Father’s contentions that the trial court “undervalued” certain evidence
and failed to “meaningfully weigh” other facts simply requests that we
reconsider the evidence adduced during the hearings to reach a more
favorable conclusion, which we will not do. See Father’s brief at 17, 29, 32,
34, 39. As we explained in M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.Super.
2013), “it is within the trial court's purview as the finder of fact to determine
which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.” This Court
will not revisit the trial court’s determinations that are based on the certified
record. J.R.M. v J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“[W]ith regard
to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the
presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand[.]”).
Instantly, the certified record supports each of the challenged trial court
findings. As it relates to Father being subject to a PFA order, S.N.H. testified
that, in November of 2021, the trial court issued a PFA order on her behalf
against Father for a three-year term, when she was approximately fifteen
years old, because Father repeatedly struck her with a cord while she was in
his custody, which caused pain and bruising. N.T., 3/12/26, at 82-89. The
record also reveals that, on June 8, 2022, Father pled guilty to two criminal
counts of “recklessly endangering another person” that arose from the same
incident. Petition for Civil Contempt, 8/31/22, at Exhibit C. Father was
sentenced to two years of probation. See id.
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Similarly, Mother testified that Father physically assaulted her during
their relationship, including in approximately 2019, when he “put his hands
around my throat and choked me.” N.T., 3/12/26, at 179. In addition, Mother
described a different incident where Father “thought I shut the door on him,
[h]e punched me in the stomach where I lost my breath. . . .” Id. at 180.
With respect to Father’s allegations that Mother was the perpetrator of
abuse against S.T., Mother testified regarding a “water bottle” incident that
occurred when S.T. was between three to five years old and seated in a car
seat in the back of her car. Id. at 170. She explained that, while driving her
car and arguing over the cellular phone with Father, “I remember grabbing
the [water] bottle and throwing it down into the back seat, and it must have
ricocheted, and [S.T.] had something in his hand” which hit him. Id. Mother
emphasized that the water bottle did not hit S.T., but its recoil caused “the
thing he had in his hand” to hit him in the face and cause “a small cut” which
did not require medical attention. Id. at 172. The trial court characterized
this incident as “a careless act” by Mother that occurred “eight to nine years
ago.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 5/20/26, at 20 (unpaginated). Notwithstanding
Father’s protestations to the contrary, the foregoing evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that the water bottle incident was “insufficient to establish
a continuing safety risk” to S.T. Id. at 19.
The record similarly sustains the trial court’s appraisal of Father’s
assertion that Mother placed S.T. at risk by striking him in the face with an
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open hand while driving a car at a high rate of speed. After interviewing S.T.
about the allegations and questioning Mother about the alleged episode, which
she described as a playful interaction that went awry, the trial court stated
that it was “unclear . . . whether the incident in fact occurred.” Trial Court
Opinion, 4/2/26, at 7. Even if it did occur, the trial court made credibility
findings in favor of Mother and once again determined that the incident was
“insufficient to establish a continuing safety risk” to S.T. Rule 1925(a)
Opinion, 5/20/26, at 19.
Finally, the record supports the court’s determination regarding the
child’s proposed move to Texas considering the stability that S.T. enjoys in
Mercer County. The court considered Paul Enlow’s description of the Texas
residence, adjoining property, and his animals, including “three horses; one
Texas Longhorn miniature; a dozen goats; approximately ten chickens and
ten dogs.” N.T., 3/11/26, at 152. It also noted the love and affection that
Ms. Enlow and her daughters have for S.T. See Id. at 178-248. However,
the court necessarily viewed this favorable testimony through the reality that
Ms. Enlow’s Texas roots are relatively shallow considering her testimony
noting the various times that she has moved between Texas and Mercer
County, and the fact that Father lacks ties to Texas beyond his relationship
with Ms. Enlow. See id. at 222-24.
In contrast Mother presented evidence concerning her residence, which
she purchased when S.T. was an infant, and S.T.’s academic achievements in
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the Sharpsville School District, including progress reports that indicate he
maintains an “A” average. See N.T., 3/12/26, at 147, 155-56, 190. Mother
also highlighted S.T.’s engagement in community programs, hobbies, and
extracurricular activities in Mercer County. S.T. is active in his local church,
where he takes piano lessons. Id. at 162-63. The church also provides S.T.
both a physical workspace and a computer to operate his online business
selling handmade crafts. Id. at 163, 166.
Father’s evidence further supported the court’s finding that S.T. was
thriving in his current school. See e.g., N.T., 3/11/26, at 103-04 (Principal
Fry testifying about S.T.’s grades, social interactions, and involvement in
school activities such as yearbook club). Likewise, contrary to Father’s
allegations that S.T. suffered extreme emotional distress under Mother’s care,
the child’s middle school guidance counselor, Mr. Galati, testified, “I don’t
believe that there is a major concern for [S.T.] emotionally[.]” Id. at 113.
He further noted that he does not have any concerns about S.T.’s stability in
Mother’s care. Id. at 129.
Based upon our review of the totality of the record evidence, we discern
no abuse of discretion by the court with respect to the weight it accorded to
the relevant factors. It is beyond cavil that a party cannot dictate the weight
that the trial court attributed to the evidence. See Taylor, 302 A.3d at 207
(reiterating that this court defers to the trial court on matters of credibility
and weight of the evidence). Further, we reject Father’s assertion that the
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trial court’s findings are “internally inconsistent” insofar as the court
determined, despite Father’s criminal history and evidence of present and past
abuse, he was no less likely than Mother to ensure S.T.’s safety. Thus,
Father’s first three contentions fail.
In his final issue, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion
“by discounting” then-twelve-year-old S.T.’s preference to live with him and
not placing determinative weight upon § 5328(a)(7) and § 5337(h)(4), both
of which relating to the child’s well-reasoned preferences. Father’s brief at
22-25. This issue concerns the fact that, in indicating the primary reason for
his preference to reside with Father, S.T. simply stated, “I just want to be with
him.” Id. at 75-76. Father suggests that the trial court should have accepted
S.T.’s statement at face value. See Father’s brief at 25. Again, we discern
no abuse of discretion by the trial court insofar as it weighed the totality of
S.T.’s testimony and considered it in light of the other statutory factors in
determining his best interests.
In concluding that S.T.’s stated preference to live with Father favored
Father marginally, the trial court reasoned as follows:
This factor is neutral or slightly favors Father. [S.T.] is an
intelligent, well-spoken twelve-year-old boy. The child has
expressed his desire to live in Texas with Father. However, when
the court inquired how much time [S.T.] would wish to spend with
Mother, he indicated three weeks every other month. This is
impossible and impractical. It is one week short of a fifty-fifty
(50/50) custody arrangement.
Further, [S.T.’s] stated basis is he wishes to undertake online
schooling and wishes more freedom. When the court inquired to
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[S.T.] regarding online schooling at Mother’s residence, he stated
he believed Mother would want him to take what classes she
wanted where Father would only make him take the classes the
child wished to take. [S.T.] also indicated his life would be better
in Texas. The court also has concerns regarding the extent Father
has attempted to sway [S.T.]’s opinion given the above as well as
. . . Father’s repeated attempts to call [S.T.] the night before his
testimony. The court notes the majority of the child’s reasoning,
in addition to above, was things such as animals, the farm, and
the like. [S.T.]’s only direct comment regarding Father himself
was “a son needs his father,” [which] again . . . suggests coaching
from Father.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/26, at 60-61 (cleaned up).
Once more, the record supports the court’s rationale. With respect to
the possibility that Father influenced his son’s preference, we reference S.T.’s
testimony on this issue:
Q. Does your dad talk to you about . . . things will be better in
Texas or you’ll be safer [t]here?
A. Sometimes.
Q. Tell me the kind of stuff he says.
A. . . . [S]ometimes he says when I’m [in Texas], I’d be able to
be home schooled and have my own freedom and stuff.
N.T., 3/11/26, at 56.
Moreover, S.T. indicated that he likes spending time with both Mother
and Father and that he has “fun” with both of them. Id. at 58. In fact, he
stated that, if he resided primarily in Texas, he would want to see Mother for
three weeks every other month and one full month every summer. See id.
at 60-61. In addition, S.T. testified that, if he relocated to Texas, he would
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miss his older sister and both of his grandmothers who live in close proximity
to Mother’s home in Mercer County. See id. at 61.
Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by minimizing
S.T.’s preference. However, upon review of the trial court’s rationale, which
the record amply supports, we discern no abuse of discretion. It is well
ensconced in our jurisprudence that “the weight to be accorded a child's
preference varies with the age, maturity and intelligence of that child, together
with the reasons given for the preference.” See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451,
468 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court weighed the child’s preference with the totality of
S.T.’s testimony and considered it in light of the other statutory factors in
determining his best interests. Notwithstanding any possible coaching on
Father’s part, S.T.’s preference may not have been entirely well reasoned. As
the court established in highlighting the unworkable custody arrangement that
S.T. envisioned as part of his move to Texas, it is obvious from the record that
S.T. did not fully appreciate the gravity of his decision. Hence, the trial court
assessed the child’s preference appropriately in light of the facts presented.
Accordingly, after thoroughly reviewing the certified record and
concluding that it supports the trial court’s custody determination, we affirm.4
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4 Father’s brief includes a final issue asserting that the cumulative effect of
the trial court’s alleged errors warrants vacating the custody order and
remanding for further proceedings. Appellant’s brief at 37. However, to the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order affirmed.
DATE: 11/16/2026
____________________________________________
extent that this contention necessarily presupposes that he established at
least one claim of trial court error, it must fail considering our conclusion to
the contrary.
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