In Re: N.J.B., Appeal of: M.S.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket508 WDA 2026
JudgeStabile
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: N.J.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.S., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 508 WDA 2026
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Orphans' Court at No: 3012 of 2023
BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: November 19, 2026
M.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the March 13, 2026 decree that
involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her daughter, N.J.B. (“Child”),
born in October 2023.1 Upon review, we affirm.
We glean the following factual and procedural history from the certified
record. This family first became known to Beaver County Children and Youth
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1 By separate decree, also entered on March 13, 2026, the orphans’ court
involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s biological father, B.B.
(“Father”) (collectively with Mother, “Parents”). We address Father’s appeal
in a separate memorandum.
We further note that by decrees entered on June 23, 2025, the Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental
rights to her two other children, M.B., born in January 2020, and K.D.B., born
in June 2021, whom she shares with Father. See Int. of M.B., 354 A.3d 524,
at *7 (Pa. Super. 2026) (unpublished memorandum) (affirming the
involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to M.B. and K.D.B.).
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Services (“CYS”) upon receipt of a report in October 2023, alleging that Child
and Mother had both tested positive for fentanyl and marijuana at the time of
Child’s birth.2 See N.T., 10/14/25, at 19. Following Child’s discharge into
Parents’ custody, CYS implemented a safety plan requesting that Mother
participate in a parenting course and begin attending a drug and alcohol
treatment program, including drug screens. See id. at 19-20. From October
2023 until June 2024, Mother did not test positive for any illicit substances at
monthly screens. See id. at 20. During this time period, Mother also
successfully completed a parenting course. See N.T., 9/23/25, at 60.
On June 7, 2024, Parents contacted emergency services because Child,
who was then eight months old, nearly drowned while they were bathing her.
See N.T., 10/14/25, at 17. Child was “life-flighted” to Children’s Hospital of
Pittsburgh (“CHOP”) where she also tested positive for fentanyl and xylazine.
Id. at 17. This incident was categorized as a near-fatality. See id.
Three days later, on June 10, 2024, CYS sought, and the juvenile court
granted, emergency protective custody of Child. Following a shelter care
hearing on June 13, 2024, the court maintained legal and physical custody of
Child with CYS. The court placed Child with her paternal grandparents, C.M.
and P.M. (“Paternal Grandparents”), who are a pre-adoptive resource.
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2 There is no indication in the certified record that Mother possessed a medical
marijuana card.
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On September 30, 2024, the court adjudicated Child dependent and also
determined that Child was a victim of child abuse as defined by 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6303. By separate order entered on October 2, 2024, the court found that
aggravated circumstances existed as to Parents and stated that “[n]o efforts
are to be made to preserve the family and reunify Child with [Parents].”
Aggravated Circumstances Order, 10/2/24; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
6341(c.1), 6302. In late October 2024, however, the juvenile court
established Child’s permanency goal as reunification with a concurrent goal of
adoption and directed CYS to resume providing reunification services to
Parents. See Order, 10/29/24.
In furtherance of reunification, the juvenile court ordered Mother to,
inter alia: submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all the resulting
recommendations, complete a parenting education course, and consistently
attend supervised visitation with Child. Overall, the certified record reflects
that Mother did not fully comply with these directives or make meaningful
progress toward reunification with Child. See N.T, 10/14/25, at 19-21.
At the time of these events, Mother was on parole in Allegheny County
due to a prior conviction for endangering the welfare of children (“EWOC”) as
to Father’s son from a former paramour. See N.T., 9/23/25, at 28; N.T.,
10/14/25, at 46. Stemming from Child’s near-fatality, Mother was arrested
and charged in Beaver County with a separate count of EWOC. See N.T.,
10/14/25, at 21; N.T., 9/23/25, at 27. Although Mother was initially released
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from incarceration, she was re-arrested in November 2024 in Allegheny
County in connection with a parole violation arising from the Beaver County
EWOC charge. See N.T., 10/14/25, at 21, 46; N.T., 9/23/25, at 29-30.
During the course of these proceedings, Mother has remained incarcerated at
correctional facilities located in both Allegheny County and Beaver County.3
Ultimately, Mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the Beaver
County EWOC charge in July 2025. See N.T., 9/23/25, at 27. In connection
therewith, the criminal court sentenced Mother to one year less one day to
two years less one day of incarceration, followed by four years of probation.
See id. at 27-28. Mother’s earliest release date from incarceration in
connection with the Beaver County EWOC charge is March of 2026. See N.T.,
10/14/25, at 23-24. As best we can discern, however, Mother’s parole
violation in Allegheny County was still pending at the time of the termination
hearing. See id. at 46; see also N.T., 9/23/25, at 29. It is unclear from the
certified record what the consequences of the Allegheny County parole
violation may be in the future.
Despite her struggles with incarceration and the criminal consequences
of Child’s near fatality, the certified record indicates that Mother has
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3 The certified record indicates that Mother remained in Allegheny County Jail
from November 2024, until June 2025, when she was transferred to Beaver
County Jail. See N.T., 10/14/25, at 60; see also N.T., 12/12/25, at 137.
Mother was transferred back to Allegheny County Jail in October 2025, where
she remained at the time of the subject hearing. See id.
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consistently failed to acknowledge any responsibility for the subject incident.
See N.T., 9/23/25, at 48; see also N.T., 10/14/25, at 41; N.T., 12/12/25, at
141-42. Further, Parents have provided conflicting accounts about how Child
nearly drowned, and they have never explained how Child, who was just eight
months old, ingested fentanyl and xylazine. See N.T., 12/12/25, at 141-42;
N.T., 10/14/25, at 18, 34-35; N.T., 9/23/25, at 72-73.
Along similar lines, Mother has continued to grapple with her own
addiction to narcotics. Although Mother has reported attending various drug
and alcohol programs, she has relapsed on multiple occasions. See N.T.,
9/23/25, at 31-32, 52. Mother has also tested positive for, inter alia, fentanyl
on multiple occasions. See id. at 29-30, 36-37. She has refused, however,
to accept the results of these positive drug screens and revoked CYS’s
authorization to view the records from her screening provider. See id. at 29-
30, 37. Overall, Mother continually diminishes the extent of her substance
abuse problems and has not made appreciable progress with respect to
maintaining sobriety outside of jail.
Due to Mother’s incarceration, her ability to participate in supervised
visitation with Child has been limited. The type of interactions permitted
between Mother and Child have differed depending upon her location. Mother
was permitted in-person visits during her incarceration at Beaver County Jail
from approximately June 2025 to October 2025, which consisted of one hour
every other week. See N.T., 12/12/25, at 142. While incarcerated at the
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Allegheny County Jail, Mother’s visits transitioned to virtual visits every other
week. See id. Mother’s supervised in-person visits with Child have gone well,
but she has struggled to keep Child’s attention during virtual visits. See N.T.,
10/14/25, at 27-28, 55-56; N.T., 12/12/25, at 7-8.
On June 16, 2025, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), and (b). In compliance with Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act, the
orphans’ court appointed legal interest counsel for Child.4 The orphans’ court
also appointed a separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent Child’s best
interests. Contemporaneously, in July 2025, the juvenile court entered an
order that changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother did not
appeal.
The orphans’ court held evidentiary hearings on September 23, October
14, and December 12, 2025, at which time Child was two years old. CYS
presented the testimony of CYS caseworker Kaitlyn Barnhart and Parents.
Mother, who was represented by counsel, also separately testified on her own
behalf. CYS and Mother each introduced documentary exhibits, as well.5
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4 On October 21, 2025, Child’s legal interest counsel requested to withdraw
his representation of Child, which the orphans’ court granted. The court
subsequently appointed new legal counsel for Child . See Order, 10/27/25.
5 We note with displeasure that these exhibits were not included in the certified
record. While this omission does not meaningfully hamper our review, we
pointedly remind counsel that appellants bear “the responsibility to make sure
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Prior to the commencement of the hearing in September 2025, Father’s
counsel filed a motion requesting a bonding evaluation, which the court
denied. See N.T., 9/23/25, at 20. Thereafter, Mother’s counsel filed a similar
motion requesting a bonding evaluation. The court heard brief argument on
Mother’s request at the October 14, 2025 hearing, but, ultimately, denied
Mother’s motion, as well. See N.T., 10/14/25, at 14.
On March 13, 2026, the orphans’ court entered a decree that granted
CYS’s petition and involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (b). On April 13, 2026, Mother timely
filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans’ court filed
a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 1, 2026.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:
I. Did the orphans’ court err as a matter of law and fact and/or
abuse its discretion by finding that clear and convincing
evidence was presented to establish a legal basis for
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?
II. Did the orphans’ court err as a matter of law and fact and/or
abuse its discretion by finding that clear and convincing
evidence was presented to establish a legal basis for
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that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents
necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised
on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wint, 730 A.2d 965, 967 (Pa. Super. 1999)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1921
Note (“Ultimate responsibility for a complete record rests with the party raising
an issue that requires appellate court access to record materials.”) (citation
omitted).
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terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to §
2511(a)(5)?
III. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion when it denied
Parents’ motion to order a bonding assessment?
Mother’s Brief at 6 (cleaned up).6
We review decrees involuntarily terminating parental rights for an abuse
of discretion. See Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829 (Pa. Super. 2022).
This Court has explained our inquiry, as follows:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
support. Termination of parental rights has significant and
permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
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6 In lieu of a brief, the GAL filed a letter on behalf of Child indicating her
support for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights. Child’s
legal interest counsel did not file a brief in this appeal.
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the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Id. at 829-30 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section
2511 of the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses
upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant
termination. Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the
orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for
termination under one of these subsections by “clear and convincing
evidence,” the court then assesses the petition pursuant to Section 2511(b),
which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs
and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013); see also 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with the orphans’ court’s
determination as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to
Section 2511(b), in order to affirm termination. See M.E., 283 A.3d at 830
(citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)).
Our analysis in this case will focus upon 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and
(b),7 which provide, as follows:
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7 Accordingly, we offer no opinion with respect to the orphans’ court’s findings
regarding Section 2511(a)(5). See In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969, 979 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc) (observing that this Court may proceed to a review of one
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
In order to satisfy Section 2511(a)(2), the petitioning party must
establish: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”
In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021). The grounds
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subsection of Section 2511(a) “[w]ithout considering the orphans’ court’s
determinations” under any other subsection).
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for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) due to parental incapacity are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; those grounds may include acts of refusal
and incapacity to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097,
1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T.,
296 A.3d 1085, 1110 n.23 (Pa. 2023).
Further, this Court has stated that
incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be
determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of
providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly
relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to
[Section 2511(a)(2)].
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted). When “a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct
his . . . life in a fashion that would provide a safe environment for a child,
whether that child is living with the parent or not, and the behavior of the
parent is irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the
termination of parental rights is justified” pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). In
re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010). Overall, we emphasize that
“[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt
assumption of full parental duties.” A.H., 247 A.3d at 443.
If the orphans’ court concludes that adequate grounds for termination
exist pursuant to Section 2511(a), the court then turns to Section 2511(b),
which requires that it “give primary consideration to the developmental,
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physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(b); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Our Supreme Court has directed
that a Section 2511(b) inquiry must include consideration for the bond
between the parent and the child. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
1993). With respect to the bond analysis, we have explained:
The orphans’ court must determine whether the parent and child
share an emotional bond and assess whether the bond is
necessary and beneficial to the child, such that maintaining the
bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare. If a bond exists, the court must ascertain the
effect upon the child of severing the bond. Because the severing
of any parent-child bond may be emotionally painful for a child,
the orphans’ court cannot preclude termination based solely on
evidence of an adverse or detrimental impact to the child.
Instead, focusing upon the child’s development, and mental and
emotional health, the orphans’ court should assess whether
severing the bond is the kind of loss that would predictably cause
extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm
to the child.
In re Adopt. of G.W., 342 A.3d 68, 90 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). The extent of the “bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In
re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Nevertheless, the Section 2511(b) analysis does not end with the
evaluation of the parent-child bond. See G.W., 342 A.3d at 91. The orphans’
court must also consider:
the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster care
. . .; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and bonded
with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including
intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.
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Id. These considerations are all of “‘primary’ importance in the Section
2511(b) analysis” and “may contribute equally to the determination of a
child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.”
K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109. Indeed, the orphans’ court’s discretion includes
placing “appropriate weight on each factor present in the record” when
conducting “a full [Section 2511](b) analysis focused on the child.” Id. at
1113-14.
We will begin by addressing Mother’s first claim for relief, which
challenges the orphans’ court’s findings with respect to Section 2511(a)(2).
Overall, Mother argues that CYS failed to present sufficient evidence that
termination was warranted pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See Mother’s
Brief at 14-16. Specifically, she contends that CYS did not present any
evidence that she continued to abuse illicit substances following her
reincarceration in November 2024. See id. at 14. Mother also contends that
although she was incarcerated at the conclusion of the termination hearing,
her release date was allegedly imminent. See id. at 15. Therefore, Mother
claims that she had effectively remedied any alleged parental incapacity,
neglect, or refusal. See id. at 15-16. Finally, Mother asserts that the orphans’
court did not recognize the various programs she completed while
incarcerated. See id. at 14-15.
The orphans’ court concluded that Mother’s parental rights should be
terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), under the following rationale:
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Even though Mother has been convicted of [EWOC] and even
though she admitted to the caseworker on the day of the incident
that she was caring for Child when the incident occurred, Mother
continues to deny that she is guilty of the crime and she claims
that she does not deserve to be in jail because she did not do
anything wrong. All this despite Mother having completed a valid
and knowing nolo contendere plea from which no appeal was
taken. Her testimony that she is not guilty and that she does not
belong in jail is not credible.
...
Mother refrains from drug use in the structured environment of a
jail. She has shown that she has no ability to refrain from drug
use outside the structured jail environment.
...
Mother has had multiple attempts at rehabilitation that have all
been unsuccessful as evidenced by the use of those drugs while
she was pregnant, when Child was born, on or near the date of
the June 7, 2024 incident, after the June 7, 2024 exposure of Child
to this drugs, and up until the time she was placed in the
structured environment of jail in November 2024. All of this
history of use came about when Mother was undergoing
treatment, while she had another dependency case in Allegheny
County for another child, and while she was on probation in
Allegheny County for another [EWOC] conviction. Nothing has
deterred Mother from continued active fentanyl abuse.
Rather than accepting responsibility for the results of the July
2024, and November 2024, positive drug screens, Mother offered
excuses and claimed, incredibly, that she was a victim of a false
positive test. . . .
...
No prognosis is given or arises out of the evidence that the
ongoing drug addiction of [Mother] will change anytime soon. The
drug use of [Mother] is unimpacted by any efforts at treatment
and has persisted . . . .
Mother [] completed a parenting class[] before the June 7, 2024
incident. Yet [her] parenting failure[] led to the neglect of Child
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to such a degree that the court found that [her] conduct exposed
Child to a substantial risk of death. . . .
...
The court acknowledges that Mother [has] participated in prison
programs. This is commendable, but it cannot be the decisive
factor under these circumstances. . . .
In this case, the lifestyle of [Mother] which included rampant drug
use while [she was] on probation in Allegheny County and
continuing to commit criminal acts that endangered the welfare of
[Child] culminated in a period of incarceration for [Mother]. Child
. . . was only 13 months old when Mother was jailed. She is now
25 months old. Therefore, [Mother] has been in jail for nearly
one-half of her life. [Mother] wasted the valuable available
resources that could have been used to preserve the parental
relationship. Instead, it was [her] own conduct that squandered
the rehabilitation opportunities and it was [her] conduct that led
to [her] predictable incarceration.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/1/26, at 46-47, 52-58 (cleaned up). Upon review,
we conclude that the record fully supports the orphans’ court’s findings.
Primarily, the certified record confirms that Mother did not acknowledge
any wrongdoing, or provide any credible explanation, regarding the near-fatal
incident involving Child on June 7, 2024. Ms. Barnhart testified that, three
days after the incident, Mother claimed that while Parents were collectively
bathing Child, “[Mother] had looked down at her phone. She heard a gasp,
and [Child] went underwater, consuming a lot of water.” N.T., 10/14/25, at
18. Of particular note, Mother’s initial recitation indicated that she was
present at the time of these events. See id.
Subsequently, however, Parents’ accounts changed significantly
following their arrests. Ms. Barnhart testified that in August 2024, Father
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informed her that he was bathing Child, alone, while Mother was at work. See
id. at 24-25; see also N.T., 9/23/25, at 70. Ms. Barnhart testified that Father
claimed he had “stepped out for a moment” and returned to find Child
submerged in the bath. N.T., 10/14/25, at 39. According to Father, Mother
arrived home to find him attempting to revive Child and she contacted
emergency services. See id. at 24-25. Mother echoed this account of the
events and stated that her “only fault was leaving [Child] with Father that
day[.]” N.T., 9/23/25, at 47-48; see also N.T., 10/14/25, at 41.
During the termination hearing, Mother reiterated that she held no
responsibility for Child’s near-fatal incident, as follows:
Q: And you testified today, under oath, when asked earlier, that
you still hold that you had nothing to do with the incident in June
of 2024?
A: That’s not what I said. I said that I might believe that I’m not
-- I don’t deserve to be in jail for what I’m in jail for, but I still
believe that the decision I’ve made and choices I’ve made led up
to this point. So, yes, I take responsibility for choices I’ve made
along the way that led up to this point, but I don’t -- I’m not going
to take responsibility for her drowning in that bathtub when I was
not there.
Q: For her overdosing?
A: No, I was not there. I did not give her drugs. I did not watch
her take drugs. I was not there.
N.T., 12/12/25, at 141-42 (cleaned up). Throughout Child’s dependency,
Mother also failed to provide any explanation for how Child consumed fentanyl
and xylazine. See id.; see also N.T., 10/14/25, at 34-35.
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The certified record similarly reflects that Mother has consistently
diminished the extent of her addiction to narcotics. Mother testified that her
use of fentanyl began in 2021 and continued during her pregnancy with Child.
See N.T., 10/1425, at 19; N.T., 9/23/25, at 31. Since that time, Mother
reported that she has unsuccessfully attempted various rehabilitation and
treatment programs. See id. at 31-32. Despite her extensive history of
fentanyl abuse, Mother has refused to accept the results of positive drug
screens on multiple occasions. See id. at 29-30, 36-37; N.T., 10/14/25, at
33-34.
While the certified record indicates that Mother has refrained from drug
use while incarcerated, given Mother’s history of failed rehabilitation and
positive drug screens immediately prior to her incarceration, the court was
well within its discretion to not find Mother credible regarding her ability to
remain sober upon her release. It is axiomatic that the orphans’ court was
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented by the parties. See
In re R.A.M.N., 230 A.3d 423, 427 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that the trial
court “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is
likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.”).
Finally, the court acknowledged that Mother’s earliest possible release
date is March 2026. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/1/26, at 56. However,
Mother’s parole violation in Allegheny County remained pending at the time of
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the termination hearing. See N.T., 10/14/25, at 46; see also N.T., 9/23/25,
at 29. Even assuming that Mother was released in March 2026 without
incident, she still had the potential of further incarceration due to her parole
violation in Allegheny County. See N.T., 9/23/25, at 27-28; see also N.T.,
10/14/25, at 46. Furthermore, her Beaver County sentence also required her
to complete an additional four years of probation. See N.T., 9/23/25, at 27-
28. Mother, herself, conceded that she could not provide a timeframe as to
when she might be in a position to assume care and custody of Child due to
the ongoing consequences of her criminal behavior. See N.T., 12/12/25, at
140-141.
Relatedly, the orphans’ court also emphasized that, following her
anticipated release from incarceration, Mother planned to return to the home
of her maternal grandmother in Allegheny County, which is “the residence in
which Mother was living when she tested positive for fentanyl upon her
incarceration in Allegheny County [J]ail in November 2024.” Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 5/1/26, at 17 (citing N.T., 9/23/25, at 33, 42). Accordingly, the court
expressed significant doubt regarding Mother’s long-term stability there.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the record sufficiently
establishes that Mother suffers from a repeated and continued incapacity,
neglect, and refusal insofar as she has refused to acknowledge her role in
Child’s near-fatal abuse and is unable to control her illicit drug addiction, which
has caused Child to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence
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necessary for her physical or mental well-being. Furthermore, the record
supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that Mother’s incapacity, neglect, and
refusal, cannot or will not be remedied. Therefore, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the orphans’ court’s determination that involuntary termination
of Mother’s parental rights was warranted pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
Turning to Section 2511(b), Mother assails the orphans’ court’s denial
of her motion for a bonding assessment between her and Child. See Mother’s
Brief at 18-19. Mother asserts that Ms. Barnhart testified that Mother shares
a bond with Child, but she did not comment on the potential harm of severing
the bond. See id. at 18. While Mother acknowledges that orphans’ courts
are not required to order bonding assessments, she contends that one was
necessary in this particular case to “determine the effect on [Child] of severing
the parent-child bond.” Id. at 19.
The orphans’ court made the following findings with respect to Section
2511(b) and its denial of Mother’s request for a bonding assessment.
The court acknowledges that Mother loves Child and Child does
have a bond with Mother. However, the bond with Mother is
similar to the bond that Child has with other people [with] whom
Child interacts. Mother’s visits with Child since her incarceration
were virtual one-hour visits when Mother was in Allegheny County
Jail and in person one-hour visits every other week while she was
in Beaver County Jail. . . . Child has never displayed sadness
when leaving the one-hour visits with Mother and her departure
after the visits did not ever lead to negative behaviors resulting
from that separation. . . .
Child is loving and outgoing. She has a relationship with the
caseworker that brings Child to the visits and that bond with the
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caseworker is at least as strong as the bond that Child has with []
Mother[.]
...
. . . Child’s bond with [Mother] is not such that severance of the
bond [] would have a detrimental effect on Child.
Focusing upon Child’s development, and mental and emotional
health, the orphans’ court finds that the limited bond that Child
has with [Mother], if severed, will not be the kind of loss that
would predictably cause extreme emotional consequences or
significant, irreparable harm to Child. Child departs from her
visits with [Mother] without any evidence of sadness. There are
no negative or adverse changes in Child after the visits end. Child
looks forward to returning to her home and seeing the foster
parents when visits end. The foster parents are the individuals
that Child looks to for real love, stability, necessities, care, and
all of her other needs. She has blossomed into a healthy toddler
because foster parents have taken care of her emotional and
physical needs completely. They accepted Child into their home
only days after she nearly died from a combination of drowning
and exposure to fentanyl and they carefully and with love have
taken care of her since that time.
...
With respect to the contention of Mother [] that the orphans’
court erred in denying the motion that was presented at the
beginning of the [termination] hearing and then again at the
beginning of the second day of testimony, the law is well-settled
that a “formal bonding evaluation” is not required to terminate
under Section 2511(b). In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 944 (Pa.
Super. 2018). The Superior Court has held that, “[i]n analyzing
the parent-child bond, the orphans’ court is not required by
statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation be
performed by an expert.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533
(Pa. Super. 2018). “Section 2511(b) does not require a formal
bonding evaluation.” In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 328 (Pa.
Super. 2017).
Testimony of the caseworker who monitored nearly every visits
with [] Mother provided the orphans’ court with evidence of the
limited bond that [Mother] had with Child. The court made
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extensive findings related to the limited relationship that Child
had with [Mother]. . . .
Accordingly, the orphans’ court committed no error of law and no
abuse of discretion with respect to the motion for a bonding
assessment.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/1/26, at 66-68, 72-73 (cleaned up). We agree.
As aptly stated by the orphans’ court, it is well settled that “[w]hen
conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use expert
testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.
Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.”
In re Adoption of C.P.D., 324 A.3d 11, 27 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citing In re
Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010)). The court acted within its
discretion by relying on the testimony of Ms. Barnhart, and as discussed infra,
the orphans’ court’s findings are well supported in the certified record.
Ms. Barnhart testified that Mother attended supervised visits with Child
every other week for one hour. See N.T., 10/14/25, at 27. From November
2024 to June 2025, and from October 2025 through the conclusion of the
termination hearing, these visits occurred virtually due to Mother’s
incarceration in Allegheny County Jail. Ms. Barnhart reported that Mother
struggled to maintain Child’s attention during virtual visits. See id