Full Opinion

J-S30031-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: S.M., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 287 WDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Juvenile Division at No. CP-25-DP-0000006-2026 BEFORE: STABILE, J., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: October 20, 2026 S.M. (Mother) appeals from the order which adjudicated her infant daughter, S.M. (Child), dependent pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). Upon review, we affirm. Case History Child was born in January 2026 to Mother and V.C. (Father).1 The juvenile court explained: Mother is no stranger to the juvenile court. On January 4, 2023, the Erie County Office of Children and Youth (the Agency) sought an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) for [Child’s] maternal half- siblings F.M. (4/[]/08) and R.M. (10/[]/20). The Agency requested the Children’s removal upon receiving a referral that on January 2, 2023, F.M. was life-flighted to Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh (CHOP) and placed in an induced coma after he “sustained a traumatic head injury of unknown origin and [Mother] [was] unable to explain the injury or circumstances surrounding the injury.” To make an incredibly long story short, ____________________________________________ 1 Father has not filed an appeal. J-S30031-26 F.M. and R.M. were both adjudicated dependent. Mother was given a treatment plan and [was] ultimately unable to alleviate the circumstances that led to the removal of F.M. and RM. Mother’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated to F.M. on December 15, 2023, in part due to F.M.’s wishes. Mother appealed the Decree and it was affirmed by the Superior Court on October 16, 2024. The Agency continued to work toward reunification with Mother and R.M., however, Mother remained unable to alleviate the circumstances that led to R.M.’s removal. On August 1, 2024, an Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights trial (IVT trial) was held and the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights to R.M. by decree that same day. Mother again appealed the Decree[, which] was affirmed by the Superior Court on April 10, 2025. On January 28, 2026, the Agency received a referral that Mother had given birth to [Child], was refusing any testing on both herself and [Child], and [was] exhibiting behaviors that caused … concern for her mental health. Juvenile Court Opinion (JCO), 3/25/26, at 1-3 (citations omitted). On January 29, 2026, the juvenile court granted the Agency emergency protective custody of Child and placed Child in kinship care. After a hearing on February 4, 2026, the court ordered Child to remain in kinship care. That same day, the Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that Child was without proper parental care or control. The Agency also filed a motion requesting that the court make a finding of aggravated circumstances based on the termination of Mother’s parental rights to F.M. and R.M.2 ____________________________________________ 2 “A motion for finding of aggravated circumstances may be included in a dependency petition.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1701(A); see also Pa.R.J.C.P. 1330(c) (same). Aggravated circumstances exist when a parent’s parental rights “have been involuntarily terminated with respect to a child of the parent.” 42 (Footnote Continued Next Page) -2- J-S30031-26 The juvenile court held a dependency hearing on February 11, 2026. The Agency presented testimony from a hospital social worker, Amy Iannello, and the Agency’s caseworker, William Rounsley. Appellant testified in opposition to the dependency petition. Ms. Iannello explained that she was employed as a social worker at the hospital when Child was born. N.T., 2/11/26, at 5. She relayed that Mother “refused all blood work, all cord blood testing. The heel stick bilirubin check was refused. . . . And she declined the newborn screen.” Id. Ms. Iannello stated: I explained to Mother the risk for hypoglycemia. Mother declined blood monitoring for this infant. Mother was educated about VKDB. She declined vitamin K, erythromycin ointment, and hepatitis B vaccine. She was educated about the potential risk of intracranial bleeds and death. [It] is noted that [Mother] signed the refusal form. Mother did not provide clear information regarding her other children. [I n]oted several times that she refused and then was explained the risks. Id. at 8. In addition, Ms. Iannello observed Child to appear “jittery,” and testified that Mother refused to provide “any information as far as her history with child welfare, where she lived, whether she had mental health issues, and whether she was getting drug and alcohol services.” Id. at 6. ____________________________________________ Pa.C.S. § 6302(5). Notably, the juvenile court found aggravated circumstances in this case but directed the Agency to “provide services and a treatment plan for Mother.” N.T., 2/11/26, at 37. -3- J-S30031-26 The Agency’s caseworker, Mr. Rounsley, testified to receiving the intake referral for Child. Id. at 10. He noted that Mother had “a significant history with the Agency” dating back to January of 2011, which included mental health diagnoses of “major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post- traumatic stress disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.” Id. at 10, 12. According to Mr. Rounsley, Mother most recently “reported she’s not receiving any current mental health treatment.” Id. at 11. He stated that when he spoke with Mother the prior Wednesday, she indicated that an evaluation would determine that she did not need services, which Mr. Rounsley perceived as “putting the cart before the horse.” Id. at 15. When the Agency’s counsel asked Mr. Rounsley whether Mother was taking medication, he stated that the only “medication I’m aware of is limited to a medical marijuana card.” Id. at 11. Mr. Rounsley also testified that Mother had a history of substance abuse and “briefly” participated in treatment in 2023. Id. He noted that Mother had taken one recent drug test, on February 2, 2026, with negative results. Id. at 17. However, he expressed concern that when he “went to her home, I believe there were ten bottles of wine on her counter, which [for] somebody that’s admitted to . . . alcohol abuse . . . is noteworthy.” Id. Mother testified that she refused medical testing for Child because the tests “were not medically necessary.” Id. at 22. With respect to her mental health, Mother stated she was “looking to get a re-evaluation by a licensed psychiatrist and psychologist who specializes in these situations for these -4- J-S30031-26 purposes.” Id. at 24. She explained that she was seeking the services from an online company called “Kindest Minds.” Id. Mother denied using drugs or alcohol and said that the wine bottles Mr. Rounsley saw were “collector bottles” that “have not been opened.” Id. at 24-25. After hearing the evidence, the juvenile court determined that the Agency “met its burden by clear and convincing evidence” as to Child’s dependency and found aggravated circumstances “with regard to the termination of Mother’s parental rights to two other children before this court.” Id. at 34-35. The court specifically found Child “was without proper care or control as Mother’s mental health, which had ultimately caused her termination of parental rights to two of her other children, appeared to be unstable and untreated at the time of [Child’s] birth.” JCO at 7. On February 17, 2026, the juvenile court entered a written order adjudicating Child dependent and finding that aggravated circumstances existed as to Mother. On February 23, 2026, Mother filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Mother presents the following issue for review: Whether the [juvenile] court abused its discretion in concluding that the [Agency] established statutory grounds for adjudication based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented at the time of the adjudication hearing in this matter, where the merits of the evidence at issue focused almost exclusively on prior [dependency] adjudication[s and involuntary terminations] of [M]other[’s rights]? Mother’s Brief at 2. -5- J-S30031-26 Discussion We review orders in dependency proceedings for an abuse of discretion. See Int. of A.D.-G., 263 A.3d 21, 28 (Pa. Super. 2021). This Court’s standard of review of a dependency order requires us to accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations when supported by the record. See Interest of K.B., 331 A.3d 50, 56 (Pa. Super. 2025). The juvenile court “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In the Interest of X.P., 248 A.3d 1274, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). We have explained: Our standard of review in dependency cases is well established; the standard this Court employs is broad. ... We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge because he is in the position to observe and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who appear before him. Relying upon his unique posture, we will not overrule [the juvenile court’s] findings if they are supported by competent evidence. In re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted). To adjudicate a child dependent based upon lack of parental care or control, a juvenile court must determine that the child: is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for h[er] physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent … that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). -6- J-S30031-26 “The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care and control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete questions: whether the child presently is without proper care and control, and if so, whether such care and control are immediately available.” In re M.W., 842 A.2d 425, 428 (Pa. Super. 2004). A determination of lack of parental control may be based on evidence of conduct by the parent that places the health, safety, or welfare of the child at risk. In re R.P., 957 A.2d at 1212 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1)). “In determining whether there exists proper care, acts and omissions of a parent must weigh equally since parental duty includes protection of a child.” Id. Here, Mother argues that the juvenile court’s adjudication of dependency “improperly rested on speculation and historical conduct rather than present inability to parent.” Mother’s Brief at 3. According to Mother: The adjudication in this case effectively treated Mother’s prior history as dispositive rather than examining her present circumstances. Mother argues that no current credible evidence was presented by the Agency at the time of the adjudication hearing [which] amounts to a showing of lack of proper parental control. A review of the transcript in this matter shows simply this, a mother, who had a child, that had some things happen in her past, including [] prior involuntary termination[s], but there was no current medical neglect, current drug use or current showing of mental illness that would necessitate a finding of dependency. Id. at 4. The record belies Mother’s argument. As indicated above, the juvenile court found Child was without proper parental care or control because Mother’s -7- J-S30031-26 mental health “appeared to be unstable and untreated.” JCO at 7. Although the court referred to Mother’s dependency and termination history with her two other children, the court additionally explained: Mother’s behaviors at the hospital resulting in the referral [to the Agency concerning Child] are consistent with the behaviors she displayed throughout the (twenty) 20 months that she was under her prior court order, i.e., unstable mental health and inability to make decisions which are in the best interest in the welfare and safety of [C]hild. Mother presents well initially, and quite frankly can be very convincing. However, it is the juvenile court’s experience with Mother that the more she talks the more apparent her mental health instability becomes. This factor remained true during Mother’s testimony at both the Shelter Care and Adjudication Hearings, which the juvenile court found lacked credibility. The record from the adjudication hearing reflects that Mother’s conduct at the time of [Child’s] birth evidences a lack of proper parental care or control necessary for the safety and wellbeing of [C]hild. Mother’s refusal to cooperate with the hospital regarding basic information; history with child welfare; prior drug and alcohol treatment; and prior mental health treatment, combined with her refusal to allow [Child] to undergo testing demonstrates concerns for her mental health and ability to ensure [Child’s] welfare. When coupled with Mother’s substantial child welfare history culminating in the involuntary termination of her parental rights to both F.M. and R.M. in 2023 and 2024, the record is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence was presented that Mother’s conduct, both past and present, poses a risk to the health, safety and welfare of [C]hild. Id. at 8. As the record supports the juvenile court’s determination that Mother’s mental health caused Child to be without proper parental care or control, we affirm the order adjudicating Child dependent. Order affirmed. -8- J-S30031-26 DATE: 10/20/2026 -9-