Full Opinion

J-S21005-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 KELLY NICOLE HERRMANN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JEREMY JON HERRMANN : : Appellant : No. 256 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered January 6, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Domestic Relations at No(s): 25DR00279, PACSES 194303238 BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2026 Jeremy Jon Herrmann (“Father”) appeals pro se from the order that dismissed his exceptions to the report and recommended child support order in favor of Kelly Nicole Herrmann (“Mother”) and made the prior interim order final.1 Also before us are Father’s applications for relief requesting that this Court take a host of actions,2 and Mother’s application for further costs and ____________________________________________ 1 The appealed-from order was issued by the trial court on December 30, 2025, but was not docketed in PACSES and served upon Appellant until January 6, 2026. 2 Father filed applications for relief on June 10, 2026, July 23, 2026, and August 21, 2026. Since the July filing indicates that it supersedes the June application, we dismiss the former as moot. In the remaining applications, Father requests such relief as directing findings as to various factual and legal issues, taking judicial notice of Nevada court filings, staying this appeal, and explaining this Court’s “sealed record” notation. Regarding the record, we (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-S21005-26 damages pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744 and 2751. Finding this appeal to be frivolous, we affirm the trial court’s order, deny Father’s applications to the extent that they are not addressed in this memorandum, grant Mother’s application in part, and remand with instructions. Mother and Father married in 2007, initially residing in Pennsylvania, but subsequently moving to Reno, Nevada. They are the parents of two minor children, J.H., born in 2015, and K.H., born in 2020 (collectively “the Children”). While still an intact family, Mother and the Children lived in California apart from Father for a time to facilitate medical care for a third, now-deceased child. After the child’s passing, Mother and the Children returned to live with Father in Nevada until November 2021 when the parties separated following an assault of Mother which resulted in Father’s pleading guilty to battery. Mother returned with the Children to California and filed for divorce. The divorce and custody matters were litigated in Washoe County, Nevada.3 By order of April 2022, Mother obtained sole legal and primary ____________________________________________ note that the sealed record designation reflects this Court’s implementation of the confidentiality provisions of the Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System’s Public Access Policy in relation to child-support records. See https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210508/214126-file-5858.pdf. The parties are permitted to inspect the sealed record in the Prothonotary’s office. This designation does not affect the trial court’s obligations to provide the parties with a copy of the list of record documents pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1931(d). 3 There is no indication that child support was requested or ordered in Nevada. -2- J-S21005-26 physical custody of the Children, with permission to relocate back to California. Three months later, Father filed a change of address indicating a move to Montana. In July 2023, without leave of court, Mother relocated the Children to Pennsylvania to reside in her parents’ home. She promptly registered the Nevada custody order with the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) and subsequently obtained a modified custody order in Pennsylvania. Since the Children have been in Pennsylvania, Father has litigated Mother’s unauthorized relocation in trial and appellate courts here and in Nevada. See Herrmann v. Herrmann, 555 P.3d 1228, 2024 WL 4274107 (Nev. App. 2024) (unpublished disposition) (affirming the Nevada trial court’s decision to relinquish custody jurisdiction to Pennsylvania because Nevada was no longer the residence of the Children or either parent); Herrmann v. Herrmann, 358 A.3d 640, 2026 WL 711548 (Pa.Super. 2026) (non- precedential decision), appeal denied, 357 A.3d 1204 (Pa. 2026) (holding the Pennsylvania trial court had jurisdiction to modify the Nevada custody order since it had become the Children’s home state and rejecting Father’s arguments that the Pennsylvania court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction due to the circumstances of Mother’s relocation because, inter alia, Mother’s relocation was not unjustifiable given Father’s history of violence toward Mother, the fact that she promptly filed a change of address, and that -3- J-S21005-26 she took the Children back to Nevada for his supervised visits); Herrmann v. Herrmann, ___ P.3d ___, 2026 WL 2621024 (Nev. App. September 3, 2026) (unpublished disposition) (affirming the denial of reconsideration of the relinquishment of custody jurisdiction on the basis that the law of the case doctrine barred relitigating the issue). On March 24, 2025, while the Pennsylvania court’s custody order was pending on appeal in this Court, Mother initiated the above-captioned case by filing a complaint for child support. Father responded with a handwritten petition for dismissal stating: [Mother] brings this child support action as a last ditch effort to muddy the waters even more. This abuse of litigation by [Mother] and her attorney is to make me a criminal knowing I cannot afford child support to help her cause. Why after [four] years, now she wants child support? [Mother] owns a house [three] bedroom/[four] stories [and] lives with her parents. [Mother] also makes over [$]70[,000] a year so again what circumstances have changed? [The trial court’s] unlawful [and] unconstitutional custody order will be overturned! I write this for my next appeal as I wait for the other one. Petition for Dismissal, 4/22/25, at 3. Notably absent from Father’s filing was any assertion that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Father pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”). The trial court promptly denied Father’s dismissal request. A hearing officer held a support conference on May 12, 2025, which Father partially attended by telephone, choosing to disconnect the call before the hearing concluded. The court entered an interim support order requiring Father to pay $634.12 per month. A rescheduled hearing was held on August -4- J-S21005-26 5, 2025, with Father terminating the call and hanging up again when the hearing officer called him back. Based upon the information he was able to gather, the hearing officer recommended Father’s support obligation to be $633.63 per month, including basic support and twenty-nine percent of the Children’s health insurance expenses, based upon Mother’s monthly net income of approximately $5,100 and Father’s monthly disability benefit of $2,127.75. The hearing officer further suggested that Father pay $30 each month for arrears dating back to the filing of the support complaint in March 2025. The court entered an interim order to that effect on August 20, 2025. Father filed exceptions, primarily asserting that there was a jurisdictional defect because: (1) “At the time of these proceedings, custody jurisdiction was under direct appeal in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania[;]” and (2) “Nevada retained jurisdiction until September 20, 2024, when my appeal there was resolved. Pennsylvania could not lawfully exercise jurisdiction before that date.” Exceptions, 9/15/25, at 1-2 (emphases in original). Citing the UCCJEA, Father further argued that Pennsylvania should have declined jurisdiction because Mother’s relocation violated the Nevada custody order. Id. at 2-3. He additionally criticized the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss the support complaint, and asserted that his due process rights were violated at the support hearing in that he was not served with Mother’s exhibits and was not allowed to state an objection. Id. at 4-5. -5- J-S21005-26 The trial court ordered briefs on Father’s exceptions and scheduled argument for December 30, 2025. Father neither appeared at the argument nor attempted to participate by phone. Nonetheless, the trial court briefly addressed his exceptions on the record. Regarding Father’s complaint that the support litigation could not proceed while the custody order was on appeal, the court observed: “Clearly, the custody rules and the [Domestic Relations Office r]ules, or the support rules I should say, are different, and, well, there’s no other way to put it other than Mr. Herrmann is incorrect on his interpretation there.” N.T. Support Argument, 12/30/25, at 3. It rejected Father’s contentions that he could not afford to pay child support and Mother did not need it because the law was clear that support must be paid in accordance with the incomes and/or earning capacities of the parents. Id. at 4. Mother’s counsel then moved to dismiss the exceptions due to Father’s failure to appear, which trial court granted, dictating the appealed-from order that made the August 20, 2025 interim support order a final order. This timely appeal followed. The trial court ordered Father to file a Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal, he complied, and the trial court authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Father presents the following questions to this Court, which we have re-ordered for ease of disposition: 1. Whether the trial court erred in exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over the support matter where Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and UIFSA because jurisdiction was not lawfully transferred from Nevada. -6- J-S21005-26 2. Whether the trial court erred by ignoring evidence and findings that the relocation of the minor children from Nevada occurred without court authorization and in violation of existing court orders. 3. Whether the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction and entering support orders while the court was divested of jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1701 due to pending appellate proceedings concerning jurisdictional issues. 4. Whether the final support order is invalid because it is derivative of proceedings that were constitutionally and jurisdictionally defective. 5. Whether the trial court erred in proceeding on a materially defective support complaint that omitted required information, lacked supporting financial documentation, and contained materially inaccurate representations. 6. Whether the trial court violated [Father]’s constitutional due- process rights by denying meaningful participation in the proceedings, including denying remote appearance despite [his] out-of-state residence and financial hardship and placing [him] on hold during proceedings such that [he] could not hear the hearing or meaningfully participate. Father’s brief at 6-7 (cleaned up). Before turning to the substance of Father’s issues, we echo the sentiments of the panel that adjudicated the appeal of the custody order in highlighting “the difficulty this Court has had in discerning which issues Father has properly preserved for our review and adequately argued in his brief.” Herrmann, 2026 WL 711548, at *3. We explained: Most troubling is the fact that throughout the majority of Father’s argument, he fails to provide citations to the record and to tell us -7- J-S21005-26 when or where he raised his claimed error to the trial court.[4] See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c), (e). For many of his issues, Father also fails to meaningfully cite legal authority or cogently explain how his cited authority supports his argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)- (b). . . . We are cognizant of Father’s pro se status. Nevertheless, it is well-settled that this status affords him no special benefit, and he must comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Moreover, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing. Equally well-settled is the fact that this Court will not act as an advocate or develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. If an issue is not properly developed with citation to legal authority; it is waived. Nor will we scour a record to find evidence to support an appellant’s argument. Id. at *4 (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As those same deficiencies plague Father’s brief in this child support appeal, we likewise ____________________________________________ 4 To the extent that Father complains in his applications for relief that the certified record does not include transcripts for certain proceedings and requests that this Court direct supplementation of the record, we observe: The ultimate responsibility of ensuring that the transmitted record is complete rests squarely upon the appellant and not upon the appellate courts. With regard to missing transcripts, the Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to order and pay for any transcript necessary to permit resolution of the issues raised on appeal. Bailer v. Shipley Energy Co., 338 A.3d 1026, 1036 n.9 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up). Here, Father in his docketing statement affirmatively represented that he had not ordered transcripts. Indeed, although this Court on April 17, 2026, granted Father leave to order the transcript of the August 5, 2025 hearing within ten days, the supplemental certified records contain no indication that he did so. See Order, 4/17/26. Without the transcripts, we have no means to assess whether he made timely, contemporaneous objections to the evidentiary rulings or his alleged exclusion from proceedings. -8- J-S21005-26 “will only address the issues that Father has properly raised and argued in this appeal.” Id. We begin with the applicable law: Our well-settled standard of review in a child support case provides that this Court will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion requires proof of more than a mere error in judgment, but rather evidence that the law was misapplied or overridden, or that the judgment was manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice, or partiality. Accordingly, we will reverse a child support order only where it cannot be sustained on any valid ground. Notably, the duty to support one’s child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is to promote the child’s best interests. Mosher v. Mosher, 362 A.3d 66, 68 (Pa.Super. 2026) (cleaned up). Father’s first four issues all attack the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Mother’s support complaint.5 He maintains that the ____________________________________________ 5 In his applications for relief, Father now appears to question whether he was subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in this support action. Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, a court’s jurisdiction over the person may be waived by entering a general appearance in the litigation rather than a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Avery, ___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 1732098, at *11 (Pa.Super. June 16, 2026) (“If individuals over whom a court lacked in personam jurisdiction came into that court and did not immediately object to the court’s alleged lack of in personam jurisdiction, they instantly submitted themselves and consented to the in personam jurisdiction of the court. . . . The waiver is the consequence of the person appearing without objecting and consenting to the court’s in personam jurisdiction. (emphasis omitted)). Here, as detailed above, Father moved to dismiss Mother’s custody complaint by attacking the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, not by asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his support obligation as a non-resident, and further participated in the support litigation when the dismissal was denied. Hence, (Footnote Continued Next Page) -9- J-S21005-26 fact that Mother relocated the Children to Pennsylvania in contravention of the Nevada custody order meant that “Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and UIFSA because jurisdiction was not lawfully transferred from Nevada.” Father’s brief at 16. He argues that the court should not have entertained the support complaint while the “broader interstate issues were still being litigated” on appeal and improperly ignored the custody order violations in adjudicating Mother’s support complaint. Id. at 33. At bottom, Father insists that the court’s “final support order did not arise from a clean, stand-alone support adjudication,” but was intertwined with the questions of which court had jurisdiction over custody of the Children. Id. at 33 Father’s arguments have no basis in law or fact. The UCCJEA and the UIFSA are separate statutory schemes with distinct jurisdictional provisions and subject matter. The UCCJEA has no bearing on support, and the UIFSA does not speak to custody. See, e.g., 23 Pa.C.S. § 5402 (explaining that child custody determinations under the UCCJEA “does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual”); 23 Pa.C.S. § 7104(b)(2) (providing that the USFIA does not grant jurisdiction to issue an order related to child custody). ____________________________________________ Father conferred jurisdiction upon the Berks County court pursuant to the long-arm provision of the UIFSA. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 7201(a)(2). - 10 - J-S21005-26 While both enactments define the home state of the child in the same manner,6 each uniform law has its own rules about jurisdiction such that different states may present the exclusive forum for the different matters. In this vein, the comments to the UIFSA make it plain that “a tribunal may have jurisdiction to establish a child-support order . . . but lack jurisdiction over child custody[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 7201, Uniform Law Comment. Since the two uniform acts are not intertwined, even if Father prevailed in the custody case such that Nevada was deemed to have retained exclusive jurisdiction to modify its custody order, that ruling would not be determinative of whether Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to enter a support order enforceable through the UIFSA. ____________________________________________ 6 The term “home state” is defined as follows: The state or foreign country in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is less than six months old, the state or foreign country in which the child lived from birth with the parent or such person. A period of temporary absence of the parent or such person is counted as part of the six- month or other period. 23 Pa.C.S. § 7101.1 (UIFSA). See also 23 Pa.C.S. § 5402 (UCCJEA) (defining “home state” thusly: “The state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child six months of age or younger, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.”). - 11 - J-S21005-26 Focusing his scant citations to legal authority on the provisions of the UCCJEA, Father offers no legal support for his contention that Pennsylvania lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the UIFSA to enter the initial support order for the Children. We observe that a child support action may be brought in the county where the support plaintiff resides, and is enforceable against a parent who lives outside Pennsylvania through the UIFSA so long as the long- arm statute provides a basis for jurisdiction over the non-resident. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.2(b), (e); 23 Pa.C.S. § 7201(a)(2) (providing that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if, inter alia, “[t]he individual submits to the jurisdiction of [Pennsylvania] . . . by entering a general appearance or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction”). When the long-arm statute is satisfied, the party commencing support proceedings against the nonresident “has two options: (1) utilize the long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent[;] or, (2) initiate a two-state proceeding under the succeeding provisions of UIFSA seeking to establish a support order in the respondent’s state of residence.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 7201, Uniform Law Comment. In interstate support litigation, if only one tribunal has entered a support order, that order controls. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 7207(a). If more than one support order has been issued, then is it necessary to look to whether one or the other had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate support, or which jurisdiction was the home state of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 7207(a.1). - 12 - J-S21005-26 Here, it is undisputed that: (1) no court in any jurisdiction had entered a child support order prior to Mother’s commencement of the instant support action; (2) at that time, the Children had been living in Pennsylvania well over six months without the benefit of any support order; and (3) Father waived any contest to the Pennsylvania court’s personal jurisdiction to adjudicate his support obligation by failing to raise an objection, instead choosing to argue that the Children were entitled to no support from him because Mother violated the custody order and had sufficient means to provide for them. We discern no error on the part of the court in adjudicating the support complaint. Further, Rule1701(a)’s mandate that “after an appeal is taken . . , the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in the matter” had no impact upon the trial court’s jurisdiction to proceed with the support matter while the custody matter was on appeal to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (emphasis added). The custody and support issues were litigated in separate cases at different dockets and involved separate legal matters. As such, the appeal of the custody order in the custody case did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with Mother’s support complaint in the instant support case. Consequently, Father’s jurisdictional challenges to the instant UISFA support order, substantiated only with inapt references to the UCCJEA’s custody provisions, are wholly ineffectual. His obdurate persistence in litigating Mother’s unauthorized custody relocation in this unrelated matter, - 13 - J-S21005-26 without even acknowledging the applicable support law, let alone proffering a legally-supported argument for an absence of jurisdiction under the UIFSA framework, is unacceptable. Father’s remaining challenges to the support order are also undeveloped, unsupported, and/or waived. He complains about defects in Mother’s support complaint without identifying what legal authority was contravened or specifying what was omitted or misstated. See Father’s brief at 27-29. These issues are waived. See, e.g., Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“We shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will deem issue to be waived.”). Father additionally laments that he was deprived of due process, claiming that he was denied remote appearances, was placed on hold when he appeared remotely, did not receive exhibits, and had his exceptions dismissed when he failed to appear. See Father’s brief at 23-26. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Interest of K.B., 331 A.3d 50, 62 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up). Father does not deny that he had notice of all proceedings. His choice not to avail himself of the opportunity to participate, either by hanging up in the midst of the proceeding or by failing to secure telephone attendance at all, does not implicate a deprivation of rights. As for whether his opportunity to be heard was meaningful, since he - 14 - J-S21005-26 did not order the transcripts of the hearings in question to substantiate his claims of what happened therein, relying instead on the representations he made in his exceptions about what occurred, these allegations have no support in the certified record to allow us to grant relief. To the extent that he has in his applications for relief asked this Court to direct the trial court to take actions or make findings relevant to these issues, we decline. It was Father’s obligation to create a factual record and litigate his support claims in the trial court. He cannot do so nunc pro tunc now that his custody-based jurisdiction challenges have proven unsuccessful. For these reasons, we conclude not only that Father has failed to establish that the trial court’s support order was the product of an abuse of discretion, but that he has undertaken this appeal without making a good faith effort to ground his complaints in law or fact. As this Court has explained: Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744, an appellate court may, it its discretion, award reasonable counsel fees against a party who has filed a frivolous appeal or whose behavior has been dilatory, obdurate or vexatious. In determining the propriety of such an award, we are ever guided by the principle that an appeal is not frivolous simply because it lacks merit. Rather, it must be found that the appeal has no basis in law or fact. Menna v. St. Agnes Med. Ctr., 690 A.2d 299, 304 (Pa.Super. 1997) (citations omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2744 (providing that an appellate court may award a reasonable counsel fee “if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious”). In such - 15 - J-S21005-26 instances, “[t]he appellate court may remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of damages authorized by this rule.” Id. Mother has applied for costs pursuant to Rule 2744, detailing Father’s prolix filings. See Application for Relief, 4/27/26, at ¶¶ 7-74. We agree with Mother that Father’s frivolous and obdurate appeal warrants a grant of relief, the amount to be determined by the trial court upon remand. However, this court’s award shall be limited to the attorney fees Mother has engendered from the instant appeal. As the Menna Court explained, in language apt to the instant case: [W]e caution both the parties and the trial court that the fees and costs currently being awarded pertain only to the present appeals and not to any of the previous litigation that this case has generated. There came a point at which appellant’s zeal to protect his rights metastasized into a feverish and futile attempt to hold some party, any party, liable for perceived wrongs. It is not our province to determine when this change occurred and to then award fees and costs retroactive to that point in time; neither is it the province of the trial court. Menna, 690 A.2d at 304–05. Instead, the trial court shall determine an award limited to Mother’s fees in preparing her appellate brief, supplemental reproduced record, and any other filings in this Court at 256 MDA 2026 necessitated by Father’s frivolous and obdurate appeal. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s January 6, 2026 support order, deny Father’s applications for relief insofar as we have not addressed them herein, grant in part Mother’s request for fees, and remand with - 16 - J-S21005-26 instructions for the trial court to determine the amount of damages in a manner consistent with this memorandum. Order affirmed. Father’s July 23, 2026 and August 21, 2026 applications for relief denied to the extent that they are not addressed in this memorandum. Mother’s April 27, 2026 application for relief granted in part. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/22/2026 - 17 -