Full Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT MAGISTRATE DIVISION Property Tax ALBINA VISION TRUST INC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 250583N ) v. ) ) MULTNOMAH COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) ) Defendant. ) DECISION Plaintiff appealed Defendant’s denial of property tax exemption under ORS 307.130 for property identified as Account R712216 (subject property) for the 2025-26 tax year.1 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff did not explain why its Motion was for Partial Summary Judgment, and so the court concludes this matter is ready for Decision.2 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS3 Plaintiff is an Oregon nonprofit corporation and a public charity under IRC section 501(c)(3). (Ptf’s Mot at 2-3.) In its 2023 federal tax filing, Plaintiff stated its mission as: “facilitating the reinvention of 94 acres in Portland’s Albina area, from which thousands of primarily African American residents were displaced over decades of urban renewal. [Plaintiff’s] mission is to spur the creation of an innovative and remarkable place that is diverse, inclusive, affordable, and accessible. [Plaintiff] is committed to healing past harm, amplifying underrepresented voices and setting a precedent for innovative community renewal.” 1 Plaintiff’s application for exemption, filed March 19, 2025, requests exemption for the “2024, 2025” tax years. (Compl at 5.) Defendant explained that 2024 year was rescinded. (Def’s Mot at 3, n1.) 2 For instance, Plaintiff did not identify material facts in dispute or additional issues to be resolved, such as a request to reduce real market value separate from Plaintiff’s exemption claim. 3 The parties did not file stipulated facts, and Plaintiff did not offer any declarations or exhibits to support its Motion. Accordingly, the facts stated here are based on the Declaration of Veronica Clevidence, Tax Exemptions Specialist for Defendant, and any undisputed allegations made by Plaintiff. DECISION TC-MD 250583N 1 of 10 (Decl of Clevidence, Ex C at 34 (Form 990).) Plaintiff describes its work as falling into three categories: 1) planning and policy; 2) real estate development; and 3) partnerships. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex E.) Its planning and policy work includes “building an entire zip code from the ground up” pursuant to a Community Investment Plan developed over three years and adopted by the City of Portland in 2024. (Id. at 3.) Under that plan, Plaintiff is working on infrastructure projects with the Oregon Department of Transportation, the City of Portland, and the Metro Regional Government to create walkable and bikeable corridors and to reconnect historic neighborhoods. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff’s real estate development includes several housing developments, including many units of “affordable housing.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff is also developing commercial spaces and “an education hub” in conjunction with housing units. (Id.) Plaintiff’s partnership work includes 1) an alliance with the Portland Trail Blazers to “transform[] the Moda Center into a state-of-the-art, communally integrated event venue”; and 2) a partnership with Lewis & Clark College to create “a permanent physical space in the redeveloped Lower Albina district with Lewis & Clark as an anchor tenant” offering education and economic opportunity. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff notes that it has received grants from the state to further its mission. (Ptf’s Mot at 2.) Plaintiff’s 2023 federal tax filing reports that Plaintiff received $478,904 in government grants and just over $2.5 million in other contributions, gifts, and grants. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex C at 9.) Plaintiff received land with a value of $1,970,000 in February 2023. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff explained that it “acquires parcels of land for the purpose of developing affordable housing.” (Ptf’s Mot at 4.) Plaintiff received $1.7 million for an affordable housing project, of which Plaintiff kept a “developer fee” of $49,098.90 and invested the balance of $1.654 million back into the project. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex B at 2-6, C at 9.) Plaintiff’s reported expenses DECISION TC-MD 250583N 2 of 10 included wages, compensation, employee benefits, and payroll taxes; events and sponsorship; “other operating costs”; accounting; occupancy; and interest. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that part of its mission and activities is educational. (Ptf’s Mot at 5.) In 2025, Plaintiff gave more than 40 free tours of the neighborhood, educating guests on the history of the neighborhood and displacement of black residents, and held 17 community events to share its vision and receive feedback. (Id. at 5.) The subject property is 4,489 square feet including 1,283 square feet of dedicated office space and 3,206 square feet of “gallery/event” space. (Def’s Mot at 2; Decl of Clevidence, Ex B at 2.) Plaintiff acquired the subject property in September 2023, and it serves as Plaintiff’s headquarters as well as “workspace for staff, event space for larger convenings, and a gallery space for local Black artists.” (Compl at 5; Def’s Mot at 1; Decl of Clevidence, Ex E at 6.) Plaintiff’s policies and procedures relating to the event space were not fully developed or publicly available as of May 2025. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex B at 9-11.) At that time, Plaintiff allowed smaller groups (1 to 20 attendees) to host events for free during business hours, based on availability. (Id. at 9.) Small groups had used the subject event space three times in a span of three months. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff anticipated renting the event space to larger groups (20 to 50 attendees) no more than 2 or 3 times per month. (Id. at 9.) A portion of the event space serves as an art gallery. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex B at 9.) Artists loan artwork to Plaintiff for a period of 6 months. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff does not broker any sales but will send purchase inquiries to the artist. (Id. at 8-9.) The gallery is free and open to the public during Plaintiff’s business hours, so long as the event space is not in use by Plaintiff’s staff or for third party events. (Id.) /// DECISION TC-MD 250583N 3 of 10 II. ANALYSIS The issue presented is whether the subject property qualifies for property tax exemption under ORS 307.130 for the 2025-26 tax year.4 Under ORS 307.130(2), property owned “by art museums * * * or incorporated literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions shall be exempt from taxation” so long as such property “is actually and exclusively occupied or used in the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on by such institutions.” Thus, to qualify for property tax exemption under ORS 307.130, the taxpayer seeking exemption must satisfy the “entity-level” requirements in the statute and the subject property must satisfy the “property use” requirements in the statute. Dept. of Rev. and Washington County Assessor v. The New Friends of The Beaverton City Library, 23 OTR 512, 516 (2019).5 Plaintiff claims exemption as a benevolent or charitable institution and asserts its use of the subject property qualifies under ORS 307.130.6 (Ptf’s Mot at 3.) Defendant disputes that Plaintiff satisfies either the entity or property test. (Def’s Mot at 4-6.) The court grants a motion for summary judgment only if “the pleadings * * * declarations, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” See TCR-MD 13; TCR 47 C. As the party seeking affirmative relief, Plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that their claim of exemption meets the relevant statutory requirements. ORS 305.427. Property tax exemption 4 The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2023. 5 “The entity-level requirements differ, depending on whether the organization seeks exemption as a charitable, literary or scientific institution.” Id. 6 The terms “benevolent” and “charitable” have the same meaning. New Friends, 23 OTR at 516, at n5. The statute also exempts property of “art museums” but Plaintiff does not allege that it was an art museum, though some part of the subject property was used as an art gallery. See YU Contemporary v. Dept. of Rev., 22 OTR 349, 364-65 (2017) (noting that the property of art museums is “a distinct category” under the statute). DECISION TC-MD 250583N 4 of 10 statutes are strictly but reasonably construed, “giving due consideration to the ordinary meaning of the words of the statute and the legislative intent.” See North Harbour Corp. v. Dept of Rev., 16 OTR 91, 94-95 (2002). A. Whether Plaintiff was a Charitable Institution Under ORS 307.130(2) To be a charitable institution under ORS 307.130(2), “(1) the organization must have charity as its primary, if not sole, object; (2) the organization must be performing in a manner that furthers its charitable object; and (3) the organization’s performance must involve a gift or giving.” SW OR. Pub. Def. Services v. Dept. of Rev., 312 Or 82, 89, 817 P2d 1292 (1991). Defendant challenges the first and third elements of that test here. (Def’s Mot at 4.) 1. Charity as primary, if not sole, object Although the historical definition of charity was more limited, the legislature expanded the definition in ORS 307.130, stating “[a]n institution shall not be deprived of an exemption under this section because its purpose or the use of its property is not limited to relieving pain, alleviating disease or removing constraints.” ORS 307.130(4). The related administrative rule adds that “[t]he activity conducted by the charitable institution must be for the direct good or benefit of the public or community at large. Public benefits must be the primary purpose rather than a by-product.” OAR 150-307-0120(4)(b). “The articles and bylaws of a corporation are prima facie evidence of the character of the corporation.” Dove Lewis Mem. Emer. Vet. Clinic v. Dept. of Rev., 301 Or 423, 427, 723 P2d 320 (1986). The court did not receive copies of Plaintiff’s articles of incorporation or bylaws. Plaintiff’s mission as reported on its federal tax filing indicates that its primary purpose was creating “an innovative and remarkable place that is diverse, inclusive, affordable, and accessible.” Plaintiff’s current projects include developing affordable housing, along with DECISION TC-MD 250583N 5 of 10 walkable and bikeable corridors, and spaces dedicated to education.7 In Defendant’s view, Plaintiff is primarily a developer, not a charity, as evidenced by the development fee it received for its services. (Def’s Mot at 5.) Benefits to the community are a by-product. (Id.) Plaintiff’s stated mission is directed at benefiting the Albina community. It appears that the City of Portland and community at large similarly view Plaintiff’s mission as beneficial to the public, as evidenced by the City of Portland adopting the Community Investment Plan and by the significant grants, gifts, and other contributions made to Plaintiff to support its work. A major part of Plaintiff’s mission and activity is developing affordable housing, which may be a charitable purpose. See, e.g., Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or 257, 381 P3d 809 (2016) (granting exemption to vacant residential lots acquired by nonprofit corporation for the purpose of building housing for sale to low-income families at below market prices); see also Habitat for Humanity Mt Angel Area Inc v. Marion County Assessor, TC-MD 020065E, 2003 WL 25846519 (Or Tax M Div, Jan 30, 2003) (reaching same outcome).8 Indeed, ORS 307.130 currently grants an exemption for certain property of nonprofit corporations used as low-income housing. See 2014 Or Laws ch 7 (creating exemption subject to 2018 sunset); 2021 Or Laws ch 455 (extending sunset to 2028). /// 7 Plaintiff’s projects also include some commercial development. However, those do not appear to be charitable endeavors even if the developments are beneficial for Plaintiff’s mission. See Young Men’s Christian Assoc. of Columbia-Willamette v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or 644, 655, 784 P2d 1086 (1989) (restating principle that “charitable use of a part of the property of an exempt organization or institution does not qualify its remaining property, not so used, for exemption, even if the income from the non-exempt property is used to support the organization’s charitable purpose”). 8 Those cases concerned whether vacant land could be considered “actually and exclusively used” for the charitable purpose but implicitly recognized that the purpose of building low-income housing was charitable. This court has separately granted exemption to senior living and adult foster care facilities where the court found sufficient evidence of gift or giving, such as through below-market rents. See Rigas Maja, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 12 OTR 471 (1993) (adult foster and assisted care facility); Samaritan Village, Inc. v. Benton County Assessor, TC-MD 001064C, 2003 WL 25846514 (Or Tax M Div, Jan 23, 2003) (income and age restricted senior living facility). DECISION TC-MD 250583N 6 of 10 Plaintiff’s primary purpose of improving the Albina neighborhood, including by developing affordable housing, is charitable. The next question is whether Plaintiff’s performance involved a gift or giving. 2. Gift or giving Gift or giving “is what distinguishes charity from nonprofit.” Samaritan Village, TC-MD 001064C at *5. It entails “giving something of value to a recipient with no expectation of compensation or remuneration.” OAR 150-307-0120(4)(d). Whether an organization’s performance involves gift or giving is considered from the perspective of “the recipient of the charitable giving.” SW Oregon, 312 Or at 91. Four non-exhaustive factors are “particularly probative of ‘gift or giving’: (1) Whether the receipts are applied to the upkeep, maintenance and equipment of the institution or are otherwise employed; (2) whether patients or patrons receive the same treatment irrespective of their ability to pay; (3) whether the doors are open to rich and poor alike and without discrimination as to race, color or creed; [and] (4) whether charges are made to all customers and, if made, are lesser charges made to the poor or are any charges made to the indigent.” New Friends, 23 OTR at 519. The first factor “functions mainly to sift out institutions whose activities inure to the benefit of those who organize or run it.” Id. at 520. “The remaining three factors focus on the extent to which a taxpayer ensures that the poor have access to the products or services that the taxpayer sells.” Id. Gift or giving may occur when an organization delivers its product or service at no cost or at a price below the market. OAR 150-307-0120(4)(d). The court begins by examining evidence of Plaintiff financial resources to determine if its receipts were applied to its “upkeep, maintenance, and equipment.” Plaintiff reportedly received DECISION TC-MD 250583N 7 of 10 $1.7 million for an affordable housing project, of which Plaintiff kept a “developer fee” of $49,098.90 and invested the balance of $1.654 million back into the project. Plaintiff’s other income is from grants, gifts, and contributions. Plaintiff’s use of its income was not directly addressed but it appears from Plaintiff’s federal tax filing to be used for employees and operations. Although the evidence presented was limited, the court finds the first gift or giving factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor. The second through fourth gift or giving factors consider whether the poor and indigent have access to Plaintiff’s services. It does not appear Plaintiff provides its primary services for free, and the court did not receive evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff offered its services at below market rates. Without evidence of below market rates, a sliding scale, or similar, the court cannot find that Plaintiff’s services are equally available to rich and poor alike. The second through fourth gift or giving factors weigh against Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that gift or giving is found in its use of the subject property event space for community meetings and a free art gallery, along with Plaintiff’s educational neighborhood tours and its community visioning events. Providing a space for community gatherings might qualify for exemption. See Prospect Community Club v. Jackson County Assessor, TC-MD 160267R, 2017 WL 2671168 (Or Tax M Div, Jun 21, 2017) (exemption granted to hall used as a “community club” offering weekly meals for senior citizens, holiday gatherings, and below market event rentals). As of the 2025-26 tax year, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s use of its event space involved sufficient gift or giving. Plaintiff had allowed three smaller groups to use the space for free and was still developing its policy for larger groups to use the space. Plaintiff did not identify the nature of the events and their connection to Plaintiff’s charitable purpose. Similarly, Plaintiff’s neighborhood tours and community meetings were offered for free DECISION TC-MD 250583N 8 of 10 to the community and tend to support Plaintiff’s gift or giving. Plaintiff reportedly gave more than 40 free tours and held 17 community meetings over the course of a year. Plaintiff did not quantify those activities in the context of Plaintiff’s overall operation or primary purpose of improving the Albina neighborhood. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s free tours and meetings count as some evidence of gift or giving. See, e.g., Serenity Lane v. Lane County Assessor, 21 OTR 229, 243 (2013) (finding addiction treatment facility’s internship program weighed “at the margins” in favor of gift or giving, even though it would not qualify as sufficient on its own). Ultimately, the court finds insufficient evidence to conclude Plaintiff was a charitable institution based on its gift or giving. Plaintiff engaged in some giving through its art gallery, event space, free tours, and meetings. But Plaintiff did not quantify those activities, and they appear incidental to Plaintiff’s primary activity of development, which was not available to rich and poor alike on the evidence presented. The court cannot say that those activities are sufficient evidence of gift or giving to qualify Plaintiff as a charitable organization. The court also received arguments from the parties on whether the subject property was actually and exclusively used for Plaintiff’s charitable purpose under ORS 307.130(1). However, the court need not reach this second issue due to the insufficiency of Plaintiff’s evidence to support a conclusion that it was a qualifying charitable organization. III. CONCLUSION Upon careful consideration, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the subject property qualifies for exemption under ORS 307.130. Now, therefore, IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied, and Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. /// DECISION TC-MD 250583N 9 of 10 IT IS FURTHER DECIDED that Plaintiff’s appeal is denied. ALLISON R. BOOMER PRESIDING MAGISTRATE To appeal this Decision, file a complaint in the Regular Division of the Oregon Tax Court. Appeals are accepted by electronic filing; by mail at 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563; and by hand delivery to 1241 State Street, Salem, OR, Floor 4R. Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of this Decision or this Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B. This document was signed by Presiding Magistrate Allison R. Boomer and entered on November 18, 2026. DECISION TC-MD 250583N 10 of 10