Albina Vision Trust Inc v. Multnomah County Assessor
CourtOregon Tax Court
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketTC-MD 250583N
JudgeBoomer
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
Property Tax
ALBINA VISION TRUST INC, )
)
Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 250583N
)
v. )
)
MULTNOMAH COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Defendant. ) DECISION
Plaintiff appealed Defendant’s denial of property tax exemption under ORS 307.130 for
property identified as Account R712216 (subject property) for the 2025-26 tax year.1 Plaintiff
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
and a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff did not explain why its Motion was for Partial
Summary Judgment, and so the court concludes this matter is ready for Decision.2
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Plaintiff is an Oregon nonprofit corporation and a public charity under IRC section
501(c)(3). (Ptf’s Mot at 2-3.) In its 2023 federal tax filing, Plaintiff stated its mission as:
“facilitating the reinvention of 94 acres in Portland’s Albina area, from which
thousands of primarily African American residents were displaced over decades
of urban renewal. [Plaintiff’s] mission is to spur the creation of an innovative and
remarkable place that is diverse, inclusive, affordable, and accessible. [Plaintiff]
is committed to healing past harm, amplifying underrepresented voices and
setting a precedent for innovative community renewal.”
1
Plaintiff’s application for exemption, filed March 19, 2025, requests exemption for the “2024, 2025” tax
years. (Compl at 5.) Defendant explained that 2024 year was rescinded. (Def’s Mot at 3, n1.)
2
For instance, Plaintiff did not identify material facts in dispute or additional issues to be resolved, such as
a request to reduce real market value separate from Plaintiff’s exemption claim.
3
The parties did not file stipulated facts, and Plaintiff did not offer any declarations or exhibits to support
its Motion. Accordingly, the facts stated here are based on the Declaration of Veronica Clevidence, Tax Exemptions
Specialist for Defendant, and any undisputed allegations made by Plaintiff.
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 1 of 10
(Decl of Clevidence, Ex C at 34 (Form 990).)
Plaintiff describes its work as falling into three categories: 1) planning and policy; 2) real
estate development; and 3) partnerships. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex E.) Its planning and policy
work includes “building an entire zip code from the ground up” pursuant to a Community
Investment Plan developed over three years and adopted by the City of Portland in 2024. (Id. at
3.) Under that plan, Plaintiff is working on infrastructure projects with the Oregon Department
of Transportation, the City of Portland, and the Metro Regional Government to create walkable
and bikeable corridors and to reconnect historic neighborhoods. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff’s real
estate development includes several housing developments, including many units of “affordable
housing.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff is also developing commercial spaces and “an education hub” in
conjunction with housing units. (Id.) Plaintiff’s partnership work includes 1) an alliance with
the Portland Trail Blazers to “transform[] the Moda Center into a state-of-the-art, communally
integrated event venue”; and 2) a partnership with Lewis & Clark College to create “a permanent
physical space in the redeveloped Lower Albina district with Lewis & Clark as an anchor tenant”
offering education and economic opportunity. (Id. at 6-7.)
Plaintiff notes that it has received grants from the state to further its mission. (Ptf’s Mot
at 2.) Plaintiff’s 2023 federal tax filing reports that Plaintiff received $478,904 in government
grants and just over $2.5 million in other contributions, gifts, and grants. (Decl of Clevidence,
Ex C at 9.) Plaintiff received land with a value of $1,970,000 in February 2023. (Id. at 23.)
Plaintiff explained that it “acquires parcels of land for the purpose of developing affordable
housing.” (Ptf’s Mot at 4.) Plaintiff received $1.7 million for an affordable housing project, of
which Plaintiff kept a “developer fee” of $49,098.90 and invested the balance of $1.654 million
back into the project. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex B at 2-6, C at 9.) Plaintiff’s reported expenses
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 2 of 10
included wages, compensation, employee benefits, and payroll taxes; events and sponsorship;
“other operating costs”; accounting; occupancy; and interest. (Id.)
Plaintiff maintains that part of its mission and activities is educational. (Ptf’s Mot at 5.)
In 2025, Plaintiff gave more than 40 free tours of the neighborhood, educating guests on the
history of the neighborhood and displacement of black residents, and held 17 community events
to share its vision and receive feedback. (Id. at 5.)
The subject property is 4,489 square feet including 1,283 square feet of dedicated office
space and 3,206 square feet of “gallery/event” space. (Def’s Mot at 2; Decl of Clevidence, Ex B
at 2.) Plaintiff acquired the subject property in September 2023, and it serves as Plaintiff’s
headquarters as well as “workspace for staff, event space for larger convenings, and a gallery
space for local Black artists.” (Compl at 5; Def’s Mot at 1; Decl of Clevidence, Ex E at 6.)
Plaintiff’s policies and procedures relating to the event space were not fully developed or
publicly available as of May 2025. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex B at 9-11.) At that time, Plaintiff
allowed smaller groups (1 to 20 attendees) to host events for free during business hours, based on
availability. (Id. at 9.) Small groups had used the subject event space three times in a span of
three months. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff anticipated renting the event space to larger groups (20 to 50
attendees) no more than 2 or 3 times per month. (Id. at 9.)
A portion of the event space serves as an art gallery. (Decl of Clevidence, Ex B at 9.)
Artists loan artwork to Plaintiff for a period of 6 months. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff does not broker any
sales but will send purchase inquiries to the artist. (Id. at 8-9.) The gallery is free and open to
the public during Plaintiff’s business hours, so long as the event space is not in use by Plaintiff’s
staff or for third party events. (Id.)
///
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 3 of 10
II. ANALYSIS
The issue presented is whether the subject property qualifies for property tax exemption
under ORS 307.130 for the 2025-26 tax year.4 Under ORS 307.130(2), property owned “by art
museums * * * or incorporated literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions shall be
exempt from taxation” so long as such property “is actually and exclusively occupied or used in
the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on by such institutions.” Thus, to
qualify for property tax exemption under ORS 307.130, the taxpayer seeking exemption must
satisfy the “entity-level” requirements in the statute and the subject property must satisfy the
“property use” requirements in the statute. Dept. of Rev. and Washington County Assessor v.
The New Friends of The Beaverton City Library, 23 OTR 512, 516 (2019).5
Plaintiff claims exemption as a benevolent or charitable institution and asserts its use of
the subject property qualifies under ORS 307.130.6 (Ptf’s Mot at 3.) Defendant disputes that
Plaintiff satisfies either the entity or property test. (Def’s Mot at 4-6.) The court grants a motion
for summary judgment only if “the pleadings * * * declarations, and admissions on file show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to prevail as
a matter of law.” See TCR-MD 13; TCR 47 C. As the party seeking affirmative relief, Plaintiff
ultimately bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that their claim of
exemption meets the relevant statutory requirements. ORS 305.427. Property tax exemption
4
The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2023.
5
“The entity-level requirements differ, depending on whether the organization seeks exemption as a
charitable, literary or scientific institution.” Id.
6
The terms “benevolent” and “charitable” have the same meaning. New Friends, 23 OTR at 516, at n5.
The statute also exempts property of “art museums” but Plaintiff does not allege that it was an art museum, though
some part of the subject property was used as an art gallery. See YU Contemporary v. Dept. of Rev., 22 OTR 349,
364-65 (2017) (noting that the property of art museums is “a distinct category” under the statute).
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 4 of 10
statutes are strictly but reasonably construed, “giving due consideration to the ordinary meaning
of the words of the statute and the legislative intent.” See North Harbour Corp. v. Dept of Rev.,
16 OTR 91, 94-95 (2002).
A. Whether Plaintiff was a Charitable Institution Under ORS 307.130(2)
To be a charitable institution under ORS 307.130(2), “(1) the organization must have
charity as its primary, if not sole, object; (2) the organization must be performing in a manner
that furthers its charitable object; and (3) the organization’s performance must involve a gift or
giving.” SW OR. Pub. Def. Services v. Dept. of Rev., 312 Or 82, 89, 817 P2d 1292 (1991).
Defendant challenges the first and third elements of that test here. (Def’s Mot at 4.)
1. Charity as primary, if not sole, object
Although the historical definition of charity was more limited, the legislature expanded
the definition in ORS 307.130, stating “[a]n institution shall not be deprived of an exemption
under this section because its purpose or the use of its property is not limited to relieving pain,
alleviating disease or removing constraints.” ORS 307.130(4). The related administrative rule
adds that “[t]he activity conducted by the charitable institution must be for the direct good or
benefit of the public or community at large. Public benefits must be the primary purpose rather
than a by-product.” OAR 150-307-0120(4)(b). “The articles and bylaws of a corporation are
prima facie evidence of the character of the corporation.” Dove Lewis Mem. Emer. Vet. Clinic v.
Dept. of Rev., 301 Or 423, 427, 723 P2d 320 (1986).
The court did not receive copies of Plaintiff’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.
Plaintiff’s mission as reported on its federal tax filing indicates that its primary purpose was
creating “an innovative and remarkable place that is diverse, inclusive, affordable, and
accessible.” Plaintiff’s current projects include developing affordable housing, along with
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 5 of 10
walkable and bikeable corridors, and spaces dedicated to education.7 In Defendant’s view,
Plaintiff is primarily a developer, not a charity, as evidenced by the development fee it received
for its services. (Def’s Mot at 5.) Benefits to the community are a by-product. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s stated mission is directed at benefiting the Albina community. It appears that
the City of Portland and community at large similarly view Plaintiff’s mission as beneficial to
the public, as evidenced by the City of Portland adopting the Community Investment Plan and by
the significant grants, gifts, and other contributions made to Plaintiff to support its work. A
major part of Plaintiff’s mission and activity is developing affordable housing, which may be a
charitable purpose. See, e.g., Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or 257, 381 P3d 809
(2016) (granting exemption to vacant residential lots acquired by nonprofit corporation for the
purpose of building housing for sale to low-income families at below market prices); see also
Habitat for Humanity Mt Angel Area Inc v. Marion County Assessor, TC-MD 020065E, 2003
WL 25846519 (Or Tax M Div, Jan 30, 2003) (reaching same outcome).8 Indeed, ORS 307.130
currently grants an exemption for certain property of nonprofit corporations used as low-income
housing. See 2014 Or Laws ch 7 (creating exemption subject to 2018 sunset); 2021 Or Laws ch
455 (extending sunset to 2028).
///
7
Plaintiff’s projects also include some commercial development. However, those do not appear to be
charitable endeavors even if the developments are beneficial for Plaintiff’s mission. See Young Men’s Christian
Assoc. of Columbia-Willamette v. Dept. of Rev., 308 Or 644, 655, 784 P2d 1086 (1989) (restating principle that
“charitable use of a part of the property of an exempt organization or institution does not qualify its remaining
property, not so used, for exemption, even if the income from the non-exempt property is used to support the
organization’s charitable purpose”).
8
Those cases concerned whether vacant land could be considered “actually and exclusively used” for the
charitable purpose but implicitly recognized that the purpose of building low-income housing was charitable. This
court has separately granted exemption to senior living and adult foster care facilities where the court found
sufficient evidence of gift or giving, such as through below-market rents. See Rigas Maja, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 12
OTR 471 (1993) (adult foster and assisted care facility); Samaritan Village, Inc. v. Benton County Assessor, TC-MD
001064C, 2003 WL 25846514 (Or Tax M Div, Jan 23, 2003) (income and age restricted senior living facility).
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 6 of 10
Plaintiff’s primary purpose of improving the Albina neighborhood, including by developing
affordable housing, is charitable. The next question is whether Plaintiff’s performance involved
a gift or giving.
2. Gift or giving
Gift or giving “is what distinguishes charity from nonprofit.” Samaritan Village, TC-MD
001064C at *5. It entails “giving something of value to a recipient with no expectation of
compensation or remuneration.” OAR 150-307-0120(4)(d). Whether an organization’s
performance involves gift or giving is considered from the perspective of “the recipient of the
charitable giving.” SW Oregon, 312 Or at 91. Four non-exhaustive factors are “particularly
probative of ‘gift or giving’:
(1) Whether the receipts are applied to the upkeep, maintenance and equipment of
the institution or are otherwise employed;
(2) whether patients or patrons receive the same treatment irrespective of their
ability to pay;
(3) whether the doors are open to rich and poor alike and without discrimination
as to race, color or creed; [and]
(4) whether charges are made to all customers and, if made, are lesser charges
made to the poor or are any charges made to the indigent.”
New Friends, 23 OTR at 519. The first factor “functions mainly to sift out institutions whose
activities inure to the benefit of those who organize or run it.” Id. at 520. “The remaining three
factors focus on the extent to which a taxpayer ensures that the poor have access to the products
or services that the taxpayer sells.” Id. Gift or giving may occur when an organization delivers
its product or service at no cost or at a price below the market. OAR 150-307-0120(4)(d).
The court begins by examining evidence of Plaintiff financial resources to determine if its
receipts were applied to its “upkeep, maintenance, and equipment.” Plaintiff reportedly received
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 7 of 10
$1.7 million for an affordable housing project, of which Plaintiff kept a “developer fee” of
$49,098.90 and invested the balance of $1.654 million back into the project. Plaintiff’s other
income is from grants, gifts, and contributions. Plaintiff’s use of its income was not directly
addressed but it appears from Plaintiff’s federal tax filing to be used for employees and
operations. Although the evidence presented was limited, the court finds the first gift or giving
factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
The second through fourth gift or giving factors consider whether the poor and indigent
have access to Plaintiff’s services. It does not appear Plaintiff provides its primary services for
free, and the court did not receive evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff offered its services
at below market rates. Without evidence of below market rates, a sliding scale, or similar, the
court cannot find that Plaintiff’s services are equally available to rich and poor alike. The second
through fourth gift or giving factors weigh against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that gift or giving is found in its use of the subject property event space
for community meetings and a free art gallery, along with Plaintiff’s educational neighborhood
tours and its community visioning events. Providing a space for community gatherings might
qualify for exemption. See Prospect Community Club v. Jackson County Assessor, TC-MD
160267R, 2017 WL 2671168 (Or Tax M Div, Jun 21, 2017) (exemption granted to hall used as a
“community club” offering weekly meals for senior citizens, holiday gatherings, and below
market event rentals). As of the 2025-26 tax year, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s use of its
event space involved sufficient gift or giving. Plaintiff had allowed three smaller groups to use
the space for free and was still developing its policy for larger groups to use the space. Plaintiff
did not identify the nature of the events and their connection to Plaintiff’s charitable purpose.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s neighborhood tours and community meetings were offered for free
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 8 of 10
to the community and tend to support Plaintiff’s gift or giving. Plaintiff reportedly gave more
than 40 free tours and held 17 community meetings over the course of a year. Plaintiff did not
quantify those activities in the context of Plaintiff’s overall operation or primary purpose of
improving the Albina neighborhood. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s free tours and meetings count as
some evidence of gift or giving. See, e.g., Serenity Lane v. Lane County Assessor, 21 OTR 229,
243 (2013) (finding addiction treatment facility’s internship program weighed “at the margins”
in favor of gift or giving, even though it would not qualify as sufficient on its own).
Ultimately, the court finds insufficient evidence to conclude Plaintiff was a charitable
institution based on its gift or giving. Plaintiff engaged in some giving through its art gallery,
event space, free tours, and meetings. But Plaintiff did not quantify those activities, and they
appear incidental to Plaintiff’s primary activity of development, which was not available to rich
and poor alike on the evidence presented. The court cannot say that those activities are sufficient
evidence of gift or giving to qualify Plaintiff as a charitable organization.
The court also received arguments from the parties on whether the subject property was
actually and exclusively used for Plaintiff’s charitable purpose under ORS 307.130(1).
However, the court need not reach this second issue due to the insufficiency of Plaintiff’s
evidence to support a conclusion that it was a qualifying charitable organization.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon careful consideration, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
the subject property qualifies for exemption under ORS 307.130. Now, therefore,
IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is denied, and Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
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DECISION TC-MD 250583N 9 of 10
IT IS FURTHER DECIDED that Plaintiff’s appeal is denied.
ALLISON R. BOOMER
PRESIDING MAGISTRATE
To appeal this Decision, file a complaint in the Regular Division of the Oregon
Tax Court. Appeals are accepted by electronic filing; by mail at 1163 State
Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563; and by hand delivery to 1241 State Street, Salem,
OR, Floor 4R.
Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of this Decision
or this Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.
This document was signed by Presiding Magistrate Allison R. Boomer and
entered on November 18, 2026.
DECISION TC-MD 250583N 10 of 10