State v. Sarria

516 September 3, 2026 No. 37 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Respondent on Review, v. COLTON JAMES GERRY SARRIA, Petitioner on Review. (CC 21CR41830; 22CR24774) (CA A180013 (Control); A180014) (SC S071459) En Banc On review from the Court of Appeals.* Argued and submitted June 5, 2025. Emma Izaguirre, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section. Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. MASIH, J. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court in 21CR41830 is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court in 22CR24774 is reversed, and that case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. Masih, J., authored the majority opinion, in which Bushong and James, JJ., joined, and in which Flynn, C.J., joined except as to “Part III-D,” and in which DeHoog, J., joined except as to “Parts III-A and B.” ______________ * On appeal from Union County Circuit Court, Thomas B. Powers, Judge. 335 Or App 201, 557 P3d 1155 (2024). Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 517 Duncan, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which Garrett, J., joined, and in which Flynn, C.J., joined in “Part II-C,” and in which DeHoog, J., joined in “Part II-A.” 518 State v. Sarria MASIH, J. ORS 135.335(3) provides that, with the consent of the court and the state, a criminal defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or no contest, reserving the right on appeal “to a review of an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.” In this consolidated criminal case, defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of failure to appear on a criminal citation, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motion that challenged the validity of the criminal citation. Defendant’s pretrial motion, which sought dismissal of the failure-to-ap- pear charge, asserted that the underlying criminal citation was invalid because it had been issued by the court instead of a peace officer, as defendant contended was required by the statutes governing criminal citations. The trial court denied defendant’s motion on the merits, ruling that the underlying criminal citation was lawful. On appeal, the state asserted that defendant’s chal- lenge failed both for procedural reasons and on the merits. The Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of defendant’s challenge to the validity of the criminal citation. Instead, it affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the state’s alternative procedural ground, made for the first time on appeal, that defendant’s motion to dismiss amounted to a challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s anticipated proof and that such a challenge is not a basis for pretrial dismissal in a criminal case. State v. Sarria, 335 Or App 201, 202, 557 P3d 1155 (2024). We allowed review to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to reach the merits of defen- dant’s legal argument. As explained below, given the cir- cumstances and trial court record in this case, reflecting that the state raised no procedural objections to the pretrial challenge and the trial court ruled on the merits, we conclude that the answer to that question is yes. Additionally, as to the merits of defendant’s challenge to the criminal citation, we conclude that the citation was not lawfully issued under the criminal citation statutes for purposes of the charge of failure to appear. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in part, reverse the judgment of the circuit Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 519 court, and remand that case to the circuit court for further proceedings.1 I. BACKGROUND In 2021, the state filed an information charging defendant with unlawfully purchasing a firearm based on evidence that, almost two years earlier, he had attempted to purchase a firearm despite being prohibited from doing so because of prior convictions. Along with the informa- tion, the district attorney’s office filed a document captioned “Affidavit in Support of Citation” and asked the trial court to issue a citation to defendant to appear in court. The dis- trict attorney’s office drafted, and the trial court signed, a document titled “Citation,” which stated, in part: “IN THE NAME OF THE STATE OF OREGON, “YOU ARE HEREBY CITED to appear in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Union, located in La Grande, Oregon, on the 21st day of September, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. of that day on the charge of Unlawfully Purchasing Firearm (2010). Said charge is alleged to have been committed on January 30, 2020.” (Underline in original.) A Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy received the citation document on September 8, 2021, and served defendant with the same citation document on September 16, 2021. Defendant did not appear in court on September 21, 2021. On October 21, 2021, at the state’s request, the trial court issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest on the unlawful purchase charge. A sheriff’s deputy served the warrant on defendant on November 30, 2021. Defendant subsequently appeared in court, and the unlaw- ful purchase case moved forward. Thereafter, defendant moved to dismiss that case on the basis that it had not been properly commenced before the statute of limitations had expired.2 The day before the hear- 1 Although defendant also filed a notice of appeal challenging his conviction for unlawful purchase of a firearm, he does not raise a challenge to that convic- tion on appeal or before this court, and seeks only reversal of the judgment of his conviction for failure to appear. Accordingly, our decision does not disturb the trial court judgment in the unlawful purchase case. 2 Although the citation erroneously stated that the offense of unlawful pur- chase had been committed on January 30, 2020, the state’s filed information 520 State v. Sarria ing on that motion, the state brought a new case in which it charged defendant with one count of failure to appear on a criminal citation under ORS 133.076.3 At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the unlawful purchase case on stat- ute of limitations grounds, defendant also argued that the new failure-to-appear charge should be dismissed because it was based on defendant’s failure to appear on the criminal citation served in the unlawful purchase case, and the trial court had lacked authority to issue the citation and the form of the citation did not comply with statutory requirements. The trial court delayed its ruling on defendant’s motions and requested additional briefing regarding the validity of the underlying criminal citation. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss both the unlawful purchase and the failure-to-appear cases. At the hearing on those motions, defendant again argued that the criminal citation in the unlawful purchase case was invalid because, by statute, citations must be issued by peace officers—not courts—and although a court may authorize a peace officer to issue and serve a crimi- nal citation, the court itself could not issue the citation. See ORS 133.110 (providing that, “[i]f an information or com- plaint has been filed,” the magistrate finds that there is probable cause, and “the offense is subject to issuance of a criminal citation under ORS 133.055, the court may autho- rize a peace officer to issue and serve a criminal citation in lieu of arrest”); see generally ORS 133.055 to 133.073 alleged that it had occurred on October 22, 2019, and it was undisputed before the trial court that the warrant for arrest was issued one day before the expira- tion of the statute of limitations and was not served on defendant until after. See ORS 166.425(2) (classifying unlawful purchase of a firearm as Class A misde- meanor); ORS 131.125(8)(b) (providing a two-year statute of limitations for mis- demeanors); ORS 131.135 (“A prosecution is commenced when a warrant or other process is issued, provided that the warrant or other process is executed without unreasonable delay.”). 3 ORS 133.076 provides: “(1) A person commits the offense of failure to appear on a criminal cita- tion if the person has been served with a criminal citation issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076 and the person knowingly fails to do any of the following: “(a) Make an appearance in the manner required by ORS 133.060. “(b) Make appearance at the time set for trial in the criminal proceeding. “(c) Appear at any other time required by the court or by law. “(2) Failure to appear on a criminal citation is a Class A misdemeanor.” Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 521 (providing requirements for issuance of criminal citation). He further argued that the citation was not issued on the required uniform citation form and otherwise failed to com- ply with statutory requirements for criminal citations.4 See ORS 1.525(3) (requiring all enforcement officers to use uni- form citation forms adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court barring certain exceptions not relevant here); but see ORS 133.073 (permitting peace officers to electronically file crim- inal citations with or without a complaint in a different size or format than the uniform citation form in lieu of filing a duplicate paper copy so long as it contains all statutorily required information). Therefore, he maintained, he “could not fail to appear * * * based on the unauthorized and insuf- ficient citation.” The state argued that the court had acted under its lawful authority because, unlike the other rele- vant citation statutes, ORS 133.110 does not require any particular form or process for issuing a criminal citation. Additionally, the state argued that, even if the underlying unlawful purchase criminal citation had been insufficient, a flaw in its form did not justify dismissal of the unlawful purchase charge, because the state had also later secured a warrant in that case before the statute of limitations had expired. Nor did it justify dismissal of the failure-to-appear charge, the state argued, because defendant had not been prejudiced. However, at no point did the state contend that the validity of the citation was an issue that could only be addressed at trial or that defendant’s motion to dismiss the failure-to-appear charge was otherwise impermissible. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion in each case. As to the failure-to-appear charge, the court concluded that the underlying citation to appear on the unlawful purchase charge was “lawful * * * both in its form and its content,” had lawfully been served on defendant, and included “contents [that] were sufficient to put [defendant] on notice to be in court to answer to the citation under the 4 Specifically, in his written motion, defendant asserted that even if the court were to find that it did have the authority to issue a citation itself and that it was not required to use the forms adopted by this court, the criminal citation still suf- fered from a number of facial deficiencies rendering it invalid, such as the wrong incident date and year of the alleged offense, the wrong address of defendant, no address or phone number for the court, and no certification or name of the peace officer who issued the citation. 522 State v. Sarria statute.” Having concluded that the citation had been lawfully issued, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the two- year statute of limitations on the unlawful purchase charge expired before the case was properly commenced, based on either the citation or the subsequently issued warrant. Pursuant to a plea agreement and ORS 135.335(3), defendant then entered an identical conditional guilty plea in each case, reserving his right to challenge his convictions on appeal based on the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss. As contemplated by ORS 135.335(3), both the state and the trial court consented to the conditional plea. The plea petitions read: “I am entering a CONDITIONAL PLEA pursuant to ORS 135.335(3) and reserve for appeal the following pre- trial rulings: The order signed on 8/25/2022 that denies Defendant’s Motions filed into cases 21CR41830 and 22CR24772 on 2/23/2022 and 5/31/2022 that were argued in omnibus hearings on the record on 5/25/2022 and 8/22/2022.” (Boldface and capitalization in original.) The trial court accepted the pleas and entered a judgment of conviction in each case. Defendant appealed, challenging only the trial court’s ruling denying his motion to dismiss the fail- ure-to-appear charge based on the lawfulness of the crimi- nal citation. On appeal, defendant renewed his argument that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to issue the underlying criminal citation in the first place.5 In response, the state disputed defendant’s understanding of the validity of the citation. But the state also asserted, for the first time, that defendant’s argument failed on procedural grounds as well as on the merits. The state argued that the trial court had correctly denied defendant’s motion, which it character- ized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s antici- pated evidence that could only be made during trial—not in a pretrial motion to dismiss. And, the state asserted, even in the context of a conditional plea, the Court of Appeals was 5 As previously noted, in the trial court, defendant raised additional facial deficiencies in the criminal citation. However, on appeal and before this court, defendant focuses his argument on the question of the trial court’s authority to issue a criminal citation. Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 523 required to consider only whether the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss, not its reasoning for its denial. In other words, the state contended, because defendant was not entitled to the relief that he sought in his pretrial motion (dismissal), the trial court did not err in denying the motion, which was “fatal to his challenge on appeal,” regardless of the merits of defendant’s challenge to the validity of the cita- tion. In his reply brief and supplemental memorandum of additional authorities, defendant asserted that, as contem- plated by ORS 135.335(3), both the state and the trial court had consented to the conditional plea, and that all involved understood the nature of the issue defendant preserved in his conditional plea: “The trial court understood and ruled on the merits of the issue defendant raised, the same issue defendant would have raised in a stipulated facts trial. * * * Thus, this court can and should reach the merits of the issue that defendant preserved in his conditional plea.” At oral argument before that court, defendant con- tinued to draw the court’s attention to the fact that the validity of the citation was on appeal as part of a conditional plea and that, in the context of the failure-to-appear charge, it was a purely legal issue on which the case “rises and sets” and about which “no one was misled or confused.” Counsel for the state acknowledged that they had “struggled a lit- tle bit with whether to make the [alternative procedural] argument because * * * everybody agreed to this process.” However, they indicated that the state had wanted to “raise the issue because this isn’t the typical way in which it is raised.” They concluded with the concession that, “especially in the context of a conditional plea where the defendant entered a guilty plea with the idea that [he] get[s] to challenge this on appeal[,] * * * it would be fair to say everybody planned for this to be this way and that it is the equivalent of a stipulated facts trial.” The Court of Appeals, relying on its own precedent regarding bases for pretrial motions to dismiss, ruled on the alternative procedural ground, concluding that defendant had not made a cognizable pretrial motion. Sarria, 335 Or App at 202-03. Because it was affirming the trial court for 524 State v. Sarria that procedural reason, the Court of Appeals “express[ed] no opinion on the merits of defendant’s statutory arguments related to the issuance of criminal citations.” Id. at 204. Defendant petitioned for review, which we allowed. II. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS In this court, defendant asserts that the Court of Appeals should have rejected the state’s alternative pro- cedural basis because it amounts to a “right for the wrong reason” argument that fails the requirements of Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634, 20 P3d 180 (2001).6 More specifically, defendant argues that, had the state raised its procedural argument before the trial court, he could have litigated the legal issue in a myr- iad of other ways—such as moving to exclude the criminal citation, proposing a jury instruction, or moving for judg- ment of acquittal during a stipulated facts or bench trial. He argues further that the title or form of his motion did not affect the substance of the issue litigated, as evidenced by the trial court ruling on the merits that the citation was lawful, particularly where there was a proper method that defendant could have used to litigate the issue. See State v. McKenzie, 307 Or 554, 561, 771 P2d 264 (1989) (holding that the Court of Appeals should have treated defendant’s mislabeled motion for judgment of acquittal as a prema- ture motion in arrest of judgment and reached the merits of the issue because, “[l]abels notwithstanding, a viable issue [was] presented”). Defendant maintains that looking past the form and reaching the merits of his legal challenge was even more important in the context of an appeal following a conditional plea entered into with the consent of both the state and the trial court, through which the parties agreed that defendant could obtain appellate review of his legal argument without proceeding to trial. Therefore, “[r]efusing to consider the merits of the reserved issues on appeal” in this case would frustrate not only the parties’ intent, but the intent of the legislature in codifying conditional pleas. 6 The “right for the wrong reason” principle allows a reviewing court, at its dis- cretion, “to affirm the ruling of a lower court on an alternative basis when certain requirements are met,” including, as relevant here, that the evidentiary record is sufficient to support the proffered alternative basis. Outdoor Media, 331 Or at 659. Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 525 For its part, the state now contends that its con- sent to the entry of a defendant’s conditional plea does not constitute a stipulation that the issue reserved for review is “reviewable on appeal or will provide a basis for reversal if any part of the trial court’s reasoning was wrong.” In the state’s view, appellate review of a pretrial ruling reserved through a conditional guilty plea under ORS 135.335(3) is, with two exceptions, no different from the type of review available in other cases.7 It argues that, because the reserved ruling must be an “adverse determination” of a “pretrial motion,” as opposed to an adverse ruling on a legal question, defen- dant is entitled to reversal of his conviction on appeal only if the appellate court determines that the trial court was required to have granted the pretrial motion to dismiss. And the state maintains that defendant’s motion to dismiss the failure-to-appear charge based on his claim that the citation was not properly issued was a pretrial challenge to the suffi- ciency of the state’s evidence—a motion that cannot be made pretrial in the form of a motion to dismiss or in any alter- native form identified by defendant on appeal. Therefore, the state reasons, because defendant’s motion could not be brought pretrial, and because the conditional plea statute uses the phrase “adverse determination of any specified pre- trial motion,” the Court of Appeals was correct not to reach the merits of defendant’s challenge to the criminal citation. Thus, “[e]ven if both parties assumed that defendant’s chal- lenge was properly raised and that the appellate courts would review the question about the validity of the citation, that did not require the appellate court to ignore procedural grounds for affirming the trial court’s ruling.” III. ANALYSIS As mentioned above, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits of defendant’s pretrial motion based on its agreement with the state’s alternative argument that the motion constituted an improper pretrial challenge to the suf- ficiency of the state’s anticipated proof. The Court of Appeals is correct that a challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s 7 The two exceptions are (1) that review on appeal is limited to the rulings that a defendant identifies in their written reservation and (2) that, if the ruling is incorrect, a defendant is entitled to remand and an opportunity to withdraw the plea without regard to whether ruling was harmless. 526 State v. Sarria anticipated proof is not usually the basis for dismissal of a criminal case pretrial. See, e.g., ORS 136.445 (motion for judg- ment of acquittal must be made after the close of the state’s evidence or all the evidence and serves as a bar to another prosecution for the same offense). However, in the specific circumstances presented here, we disagree with the Court of Appeals’ adoption of the state’s characterization of defen- dant’s motion and its acceptance of the state’s alternative pro- cedural argument. As we will explain, that argument fails the requirements of Outdoor Media, because, had the state argued otherwise in the trial court, defendant could have developed a different path to the legal ruling he was seeking. Moreover, meeting the requirements of Outdoor Media is par- ticularly important in the context of a conditional plea such as in this case, when the unraised arguments fault defendant for failing to raise his challenge to the citation at trial, and the state’s agreement to the conditional plea meant the case would not proceed on the path that the state now contends was necessary. Ultimately, given the lack of factual dispute regarding the citation, defendant’s motion was one seeking a ruling on a preliminary legal question—something that the state had never disputed was appropriate for pretrial deter- mination and reservation in a conditional plea before the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to reach the merits of that preliminary legal question reserved with the consent of the parties and the trial court. A. Outdoor Media Requirements As previously noted, the “right for the wrong rea- son” principle allows a reviewing court the discretion to affirm the ruling of a lower court on an alternative basis when, among other requirements, the evidentiary record is sufficient to support it. Outdoor Media, 331 Or at 659. As relevant here, that includes “(1) that the facts of record be sufficient to support the alternative basis for affirmance; (2) that the trial court’s ruling be consistent with the view of the evidence under the alternative basis for affirmance; and (3) that the record materially be the same one that would have been developed had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance below.” Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 527 Id. at 659-60. “In other words, even if the record contains evidence sufficient to support an alternative basis for affir- mance, if the losing party might have created a different record below had the prevailing party raised that issue, and that record could affect the disposition of the issue, then we will not consider the alternative basis for affirmance.” Id. 660 (italics in original). On review, the state first disputes the character- ization of its argument as an alternative basis to affirm. It argues that it is not obvious that the trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the failure-to-appear charge based only on the merits of defendant’s challenge to the cita- tion, and that, therefore, Outdoor Media does not apply. The problem with that argument, as we discuss further below, is that the trial court clearly ruled on the merits of the motion, concluding that the citation was lawful. The state neither raised any procedural objection to the form of defendant’s motion nor to the trial court’s ability to resolve the legal validity of the citation pretrial. Alternatively, the state argues that, if the Court of Appeals ruled on a basis not raised or decided below, it prop- erly did so because all the requirements of Outdoor Media are met. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that, because the record would have developed differently in the trial court if the state had raised its procedural argument sooner, the final requirement is not met. We agree with defendant. Had the state objected at any point that defendant instead needed to raise a different pretrial challenge or proceed to trial to obtain reversal of the trial court’s legal ruling, defendant would have been alerted that the state believed he needed to use a different mechanism to get a ruling that could be reversed on appeal, and he therefore would likely have developed a materially different record for appeal. The record reflects that defendant initially filed a motion to dismiss the unlawful purchase charge, argu- ing it had not been properly commenced before expiration of the statute of limitations. By the time of the hearing on the motion, however, defendant had also been charged with failure to appear on a criminal citation under ORS 133.076. Thereafter, defendant sought to expand the hearing to argue 528 State v. Sarria both the underlying issue of the validity of the criminal cita- tion, and to also argue a motion to set aside the criminal cita- tion.8 The state raised no objection to the form of defendant’s motions. The trial court agreed to defer ruling on defendant’s arguments to permit the parties to brief the issues. Following that hearing, defendant filed a new motion to dismiss challenging the validity of the criminal citation for purposes of both charges.9 As to the failure to appear on a criminal citation charge, ORS 133.076 requires the state to prove both that “the person has been served with a criminal citation issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076” and that “the person knowingly fails” to appear as required. (Emphases added.) Thus, defendant sought a pretrial determination by the court that the criminal citation “served” on him was not “issued” in compliance with ORS 133.055 to 133.076. In sup- port of that motion, defendant submitted eight exhibits of the type that one might submit in a stipulated facts trial.10 In its response, the state again argued the mer- its of the validity of the criminal citation. It did not make any objection to defendant raising the legal issue through a motion to dismiss. Nor did it dispute defendant’s premise that the state intended to rely on the citation that defen- dant attached to the motion to prove the failure-to-appear charge. And, like defendant, it submitted three exhibits of the type that one might submit in a stipulated facts trial.11 At the hearing, the trial court noted that defen- dant’s presence would not be necessary, because “there are 8 Pursuant to ORS 133.069(3), a defendant may move to set aside a criminal citation issued with a form of complaint, and “the court shall set the complaint aside” if it does not conform to the requirements of that statutory provision. 9 Defendant filed an identical motion to dismiss in both the unlawful pur- chase case and the failure-to-appear case. He did not renew his oral motion to set aside the criminal citation under ORS 133.069, and as we will explain, argu- ments regarding who has the authority to issue a citation are not solely depen- dent upon the requirements of ORS 133.069. 10 The exhibits, with defendant’s descriptions, were as follows: Ex 101 (police report); Ex 102 (OECI register of actions); Ex 103 (Affidavit in support of war- rant); Ex 104 (Firearm Instant Check); Ex 105 (LEDs return); Ex 106 (Warrant 10/21/21); Ex 107 (Citation Return rcvd 10/12/21); Ex 108 (Citation demonstrative). 11   The three exhibits were as follows: the judgment from defendant’s prior convictions for counts constituting domestic violence; the sheriff’s return of ser- vice of the citation; and the sheriff’s not served return. Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 529 some facts at issue, but they’re all apparent from the court records, so it’s not really much of an evidentiary hearing.”12 It then invited counsel for defendant to “tell [the court] what relief that you are requesting on behalf of your cli- ent and why you think the court ought to grant that relief.” At the request of defense counsel, in support of defendant’s argument, the trial court received into evidence defen- dant’s exhibits without objection. Regarding the validity of the citation issue, the state argued that “this court is not required to issue a citation in conformance with the Uniform Criminal Citation requirements” but could “actually issue its own citation and its own form of citation so long as it has those * * * requirements that are listed out in my brief.” The state also requested admission of its three exhibits.13 Importantly, the state again did not raise any objections as to the form or timing of defendant’s motion. The trial court ruled on the merits of defendant’s pretrial motions. It first found the citation lawful, expressly noting, “Well, I’m finding first off that the citation that was issued was lawful under the statute, both in its form and in its content.” The court explained that “the threshold ques- tion is the lawfulness of the citation[,] and I do find that it’s lawful under the relevant statutes of ORS 133.055, ORS 133.066. * * * [T]he contents were sufficient to put him on notice to be in court to answer to the citation under the statute.” It then rejected defendant’s statute of limitations argument in the unlawful purchase case on the additional basis that the warrant had been issued before the statute of limitations expired and served without unreasonable delay. It concluded by noting that, “for the reasons I just described on the record[,] the motion to dismiss is denied. And that motion to dismiss is denied in both these cases.” The court then issued written orders denying the motion to dismiss filed in both cases. Subsequently, the trial court, the state, and defen- dant consented to defendant’s entry of a conditional plea as to both charges, and defendant submitted plea petitions 12 See also ORS 136.040(1) (providing that if the charge is a misdemeanor, the trial may proceed without the defendant if the defendant appears by counsel). 13 It is not apparent whether the trial court admitted the exhibits. 530 State v. Sarria specifying that he was reserving both pretrial rulings for appellate review: “I am entering a CONDITIONAL PLEA pursuant to ORS 135.335(3) and reserve for appeal the following pre- trial rulings: The order signed on 8/25/2022 that denies Defendant’s Motions filed into cases 21CR41830 and 22CR24772 on 2/23/2022 and 5/31/2022 that were argued in omnibus hearings on the record on 5/25/2022 and 8/22/2022.” (Boldface and capitalization in original.) The record indi- cates that at no time during the conditional plea proceed- ings did the state suggest that there was any procedural obstacle to the Court of Appeals reaching the merits of the trial court’s ruling on the validity of the underlying citation. Thus, from this record, it is clear that the trial court ruled on the merits of defendant’s motion and that the state made no objections to the form of defendant’s motion, the nature of the proceeding, or to the trial court’s determi- nation on the merits of the pretrial motion. Like the trial court, we view defendant’s motion as one seeking a ruling on a preliminary legal question, given that “[the] facts at issue” were “all apparent from the court records.” Had the state objected at any point that defendant needed to use a different procedural mechanism to raise that issue, defen- dant could and likely would have created a different record. At least some of the potential alternative paths to a legal determination that defendant identifies—includ- ing a motion in limine to exclude the criminal citation or a request for a jury instruction defining what constitutes a “criminal citation issued under ORS 133.055 to 133.076” for purposes of the charge of failure to appear—seem to fall within the scope of the types of matters that can be addressed by the trial court pretrial. See, e.g., ORS 135.037 (describing scope and purpose of an omnibus hearing).14 14 ORS 135.037(1) requires a trial court, upon the motion of any party, to order an omnibus hearing “[a]t any time after the filing of the accusatory instru- ment * * * and before the commencement of trial.” The express purpose of an omnibus hearing is to “rule on all pretrial motions and requests, including but not limited to” challenges to the accusatory instrument or the suppression of evidence, among other things. ORS 135.037(2). Importantly, ORS 135.037(3) pro- vides that, at the time of the omnibus hearing, the court “may also consider any matters that will facilitate trial by avoiding unnecessary proof or by simplifying the issues to be tried, or that are otherwise appropriate under the circumstances Cite as 375 Or 516 (2026) 531 Obtaining such a ruling pretrial would allow the parties to make informed decisions as to how to proceed, includ- ing proceeding to a stipulated facts trial, negotiation of a conditional guilty plea, or other resolution of the case. However, we also recognize that those alternatives would not necessarily result in a dismissal of the case unless the ruling either triggered the court to do so on its own motion, or it prompted the district attorney to exercise their right to apply for dismissal. See ORS 135.755 (“The court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the dis- trict attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order the pro- ceedings to be dismissed.”). The other procedural mechanism identified by defendant to get a ruling on the validity of the citation on which the state relied—i.e., a motion for judgment of acquit- tal during a stipulated facts or bench trial—by definition is not resolved pretrial. See ORS 136.445 (motion for judgment of acquittal must be made after the close of the state’s evi- dence or all the evidence). But defendant maintains that it is a mechanism that would have been available to him had the state objected to the procedural mechanism of a motion to dismiss or not consented to resolution of the case through a conditional guilty plea where defendant could challenge the trial court’s ruling without proceeding to trial. We agree. Defendant’s arguments under Outdoor Media are further supported by the conditional plea statute, ORS 135.335(3), because, in this case, with the consent of the state and the trial court, defendant gave up the right to create a record at trial. We therefore turn to a review of that statute. As we will explain next, we conclude that, by creat- ing an exception to the limits to appeal for defendants who enter guilty or no-contest pleas, the legislature created a path to appellate review of certain legal issues that a defen- dant otherwise could raise only after proceeding to trial. And with the state’s agreement to that path, defendant did not pursue the other possible paths to securing a ruling on the citation that would be reviewable following a judgment. to facilitate disposition of the proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) This court has also recognized that the legislative intent of the statute is “to provide an early, coor- dinated resolution of legal issues in criminal cases.” State ex rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 616, 956 P2d 202 (1998). 532 State v. Sarria B. Conditional Plea Statute, ORS 135.335(3) ORS 135.335 appears in the chapter of the Oregon Revised Statutes that relates to arraignment and pretrial provisions. It governs the pleas available to a criminal defen- dant. ORS 135.335(1) lists the pleas that may be entered: guilty, not guilty, and no contest. In 1999, the legislature amended ORS 135.335 to add a subsection (3), creating an additional type of plea: the conditional plea. Or Laws 1999, ch 134, § 1. ORS 135.335(3) provides: “With the consent of the court and the state, a defen- dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or no contest reserving, in writing, the right, on appeal from the judg- ment, to a review of an adverse determination of any spec- ified pretrial motion. A defendant who finally prevails on appeal may withdraw the plea.” The text of the statute begins with the concept of consent. For a defendant to enter a conditional plea, it contemplates the consent of both the trial court and the state. To memo- rialize that the plea was in fact conditional and to specify the legal ruling that is the basis for the pursuit of the condi- tional plea, the plea must set out—in writing—the adverse determination that the defendant is reserving the right to appeal. The writing requirement for the reservation is fol- lowed immediately by the words “the right, on appeal * * *, to a review,” indicating that what the written reservation is designed to preserve is a right to review on appeal. The scope of that appellate right to review is set by the next clause—i.e., “of an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.” According to the witnesses who appeared before the legislature, the purpose of the conditional plea statute leg- islation was to facilitate efficient resolution of cases where defendants sought to preserve for appeal legal challenges to pretrial issues, without requiring the parties to go through a stipulated facts trial. The legislature adopted the condi- tional plea statutory provision as part of House Bill (HB) 2293 in 1999. Or Laws 1999, ch 134, § 1. The bill was intro- duced at the suggestion of the past-chairman of the Oregon State Bar Criminal Law Section, Charles Kochlacs. Tape Recordin