State v. Solano

580 October 1, 2026 No. 38 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Respondent on Review, v. PLACIDO SALVADOR SOLANO, aka Placido Salvadorsolano Petitioner on Review. (CC 19CR05482) (CA A177959) (SC S071185) En Banc On review from the Court of Appeals.* Argued and submitted January 28, 2025. Ryan T. O’Connor, O’Connor Weber LLC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Kyleigh Gray, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. DUNCAN, J. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. ______________ * Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court, Todd L. Van Rysselberghe, Judge. 332 Or App 646, 551 P3d 938 (2024) Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 581 582 State v. Solano DUNCAN, J. On review in this criminal case, we address two questions. The first is whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence defendant proffered under OEC 608(1) to impeach the complainant, A. OEC 608(1) authorizes one wit- ness to testify about another witness’s character for truth- fulness or untruthfulness, provided that the testimony is in the form of opinion or reputation testimony. Defendant and A are cousins, and defendant sought to present several family members to testify about their opinions that A has a char- acter for untruthfulness. The family members had known A most of her life and had had frequent contact with her until she accused defendant of the charged crimes. The trial court excluded the witnesses’ testimony on the ground that defen- dant had failed to lay a foundation for it. In doing so, the trial court applied Court of Appeals case law holding that, for one witness to provide opinion testimony about another witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, the witnesses must have had recent contact. Although defendant’s wit- nesses had had frequent contact with A for most of her life, they had had little to no contact with A during the three-year period between her accusations and defendant’s trial. Based on that three-year gap, the trial court held that the witnesses’ contacts with A were too remote and excluded their opinions about A’s character for untruthfulness. The Court of Appeals affirmed, adhering to its case law that conditions the admis- sion of OEC 608(1) opinion evidence on recent contacts. State v. Solano, 332 Or App 646, 651, 551 P3d 938 (2024). This court has not yet addressed the foundation requirements for lay witness opinion evidence proffered under OEC 608(1). Here, based on the text, context, and leg- islative history of OEC 608(1), we conclude that recent con- tacts are not a precondition to the admission of such evidence. Their existence can support, but is not necessarily required for, the admission of the evidence. As we will explain, lay opinion evidence proffered under OEC 608(1) is subject to the foundation requirements set out in OEC 701 for lay opinion evidence in general; specifically, it must be “(1) [r]ationally based on the perception of the witness; and (2) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of [the] testimony of the witness or the Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 583 determination of a fact in issue.” In this case, the trial court erred in applying a recency requirement that is not part of the OEC 701 foundation requirements. The error was not harmless because the trial court could have admitted the evi- dence if it had applied the OEC 701 foundation requirements and the evidence was relevant to A’s credibility, upon which the state’s case depended. Therefore, we reverse the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that relates to defendant’s OEC 608(1) evidence, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The second question in this case, which we address because of the possibility that it could arise on remand, is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s pretrial motion to preclude the use of the term “disclosure” to refer to the allegations against him. Defendant argued that describ- ing a statement as a “disclosure” implies that the statement is true and, therefore, constitutes improper vouching. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Solano, 332 Or App at 655. Based on the definition of “disclosure” and exam- ples of how the term is commonly used, we conclude that describing a statement as a “disclosure” does not necessarily convey a belief that the statement is true. Therefore, we con- clude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to categorically preclude use of the term. Accordingly, we affirm the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that relates to that motion.1 I. BACKGROUND Defendant and A are part of a large, extended family that regularly gathered together when defendant and A were children. One night in 2008, A’s family invited 1 In his petition, defendant challenged the two trial court rulings described above, as well as the trial court’s admission of A’s hearsay statements under OEC 803(18a)(b), which establishes an exception for certain statements by child declarants. Defendant had objected to the admission of the hearsay statements, arguing that the OEC 803(18a)(b) exception applies only when the declarant is a child at the time of trial, which A was not. Defendant renewed that argument in both the Court of Appeals and this court. But, after defendant filed his brief in this court, we decided State v. Akins, 373 Or 476, 568 P3d 174 (2025), in which we held that the exception applies even if the declarant is no longer a child at the time of trial. Given Akins, we reject defendant’s challenge to the admission of A’s hearsay statements without further discussio 584 State v. Solano defendant and his brother, Octavio, to sleep over at their new apartment, which was not yet fully furnished. At the time, defendant was 13, Octavio was 11, A was 7, and her sister, J, was 6. The four children slept on a bedroom floor. The girls did not report anything unusual about the sleepover that night or for the next ten years. In 2018, A and J accused defendant and Octavio of sexually abusing them at the sleepover. They spoke first to their mother, who contacted the police. They were ques- tioned by a police officer and later interviewed by a foren- sic interviewer. A alleged that defendant and Octavio had sexually touched her and that defendant had sexually pene- trated her. J alleged that Octavio had sexually touched her. In 2019, the state charged defendant with first- degree rape and first-degree sexual abuse of A, and it charged Octavio with first-degree sexual abuse of J.2 The charges against defendant were later severed from those against Octavio, so that the brothers’ cases would be tried separately. Due in part to the COVID-19 pandemic, defen- dant’s trial was not held until 2021. Octavio’s trial was to follow.3 Defendant filed a pretrial motion to preclude the use of the term “victim” to refer to A and J and the use of the term “disclosure” to refer to their allegations of abuse. Defendant’s position was that use of the terms would con- stitute vouching, which is the expression of one’s personal opinion about the credibility of another’s statement and is prohibited under Oregon law. See State v. Sperou, 365 Or 121, 128-30, 442 P3d 581 (2019) (defining vouching and describing rules prohibiting witnesses and lawyers from vouching); see also id. at 139 (holding that trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to prohibit witnesses’ use of the term “victim” to refer to the complainant and oth- ers who had accused the defendant of sexual abuse where the accusations constituted the only evidence of the sexual 2 Although A had reported that Octavio had sexually touched her, the state did not charge him with any crimes against her. It charged him only with sexual abuse of J. 3 Although the brothers’ cases were tried separately, during defendant’s trial, the parties and their witnesses referred to the allegations against Octavio because they arose out of the same sleepover and were reported and investigated together. Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 585 abuse). The trial court granted the motion as to the term “victim,” but denied it as to the term “disclosure.” At defendant’s trial, the state called A and J as wit- nesses, and they testified about the night of the sleepover. A testified that defendant had sexually touched her. J testi- fied that she did not hear defendant do anything that night, but that Octavio had sexually touched her (J). In addition to A and J, the state called witnesses who relayed the out-of- court statements that A and J had made about the alleged crimes, specifically, A and J’s mother, the police officer who questioned them, and the forensic interviewer. The state also presented a recording of A’s forensic interview and the testimony of a police officer who attended the interview. The prosecutor used the term “disclosure” during his opening statement and closing argument and while questioning the police officers. The officers did not use the term themselves. The forensic interviewer used the term once when generally describing her office’s method for con- ducting interviews. Defendant’s defense was that A and J had fabricated their allegations in order to secure visas available to crime victims. Both defendant and Octavio testified and denied the allegations. In addition, three of defendant’s cousins and one of his sisters testified about how the extended fam- ily interacted and that it was common for all the cousins to watch movies together or sleep in the same room at family gatherings. The three cousins testified that defendant had always been sexually appropriate during those gatherings. The defense also presented several witnesses who testified that, prior to A and J’s allegations, A and J’s mother had spoken frequently about people she knew who had received crime-victim visas and how she hoped something would happen to her family so that they would qualify for such visas. At trial, defendant sought to have seven witnesses testify, pursuant to OEC 608(1), about their opinions of A’s character for untruthfulness. The prosecutor objected, and the parties litigated the matter outside the presence of the jury. The prosecutor argued that defendant had failed to lay 586 State v. Solano a foundation for the witnesses’ testimony. He asserted that, under Court of Appeals case law, defendant had to show that the witnesses had recent contact with A and that, because the witnesses had little to no contact with A in the preced- ing three years, defendant could not satisfy that “recency” requirement.4 Defense counsel made an offer of proof. He first called one of defendant’s sisters, Carmella, as a witness. Carmella testified that she had known A for over 15 years, had had frequent conversations with her, and had heard her lie on multiple occasions. But, in the three years between when A made her allegations against defendant and the trial, Carmella had had contact with A only once. The trial court excluded Carmella’s opinion that A was untruthful, ruling that, although there was a time when Carmella had had frequent contact with A, it could not find that the “rule about recency” was satisfied. Defense counsel then informed the trial court that another one of defendant’s sisters, Rafaela, would testify similarly, and the trial court excluded her testimony for the same reason, stating that her contacts with A were not “recent enough.” Finally, defense counsel called defendant’s aunt, Angelita, who also testified that she had known A for more than 15 years and had spent time with her at family gather- ings; in addition, she had worked with A. Angelita testified that, over the years, she had heard A lie about family and work matters. Angelita had had “a lot” of contact with A, but not in the three years before trial. Based on the three-year gap, the trial court ruled that Angelita’s contacts failed to satisfy the recency requirement. Defense counsel informed the court that the remaining four witnesses had similar contacts with A, and that, in light of the trial court’s ruling, he would not call them as witnesses in his offer of proof. In their closing arguments, the parties contended that the case turned on whether the jurors believed A’s 4 The state based its argument about the recency requirement on State v. Caffee, 116 Or App 23, 840 P2d 720 (1992), rev den, 315 Or 312 (1993), and its progeny: State v. Maxwell, 172 Or App 142, 18 P3d 438, rev den, 332 Or 559 (2001), and State v. Paniagua, 268 Or App 284, 341 P3d 906 (2014). Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 587 statements. The prosecutor told the jurors that “[t]his case hinges on whether you believe the statements of [A],” and he encouraged them to consider both A’s in-court testimony and her out-of-court statements to others. Defense counsel highlighted inconsistencies in A’s statements and the pos- sibility that she had fabricated the allegations to secure a visa. The jury found defendant not guilty of the rape charge, but guilty of the sexual abuse charge. Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant assigned error to the trial court’s exclusion of his witnesses’ testimony about A’s char- acter for untruthfulness. Defendant asserted that the wit- nesses’ testimony had “probative value as to A’s testimony at trial despite the gap in contact. The state would have been free to highlight the three-year gap in contact during cross-examination. The jury should have been permitted to determine the weight to give the character witnesses’ testimony.” Defendant further asserted, in the alternative, that even if the trial court did not err in excluding the witnesses’ tes- timony as to A’s character at the time of trial, “it erred by failing to evaluate whether the testimony could be used to impeach A in her role as a hearsay declarant.” Defendant contended that, because the state had introduced A’s initial allegations against him, his witnesses could testify about her character for truthfulness at the time she made the alle- gations, which was three years before the trial. See OEC 806 (authorizing impeachment of hearsay declarants). Relying on State v. Maxwell, 172 Or App 142, 18 P3d 438, rev den, 332 Or 559 (2001), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the witnesses’ testi- mony about A’s character at the time of trial. Solano, 332 Or App at 651. In Maxwell, the Court of Appeals ruled that “[t]he admissibility of evidence of prior character to prove present character depends on whether, in the discretion of the trial court, the contacts on which the opinion is based are frequent enough and recent enough to have probative value to the testimony given in court.” 588 State v. Solano 172 Or App at 154-55 (emphasis in original). Applying Maxwell, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in concluding that the witnesses’ contacts with A were not sufficiently close in time to trial for their opinions regarding A’s character to be probative. Solano, 332 Or App at 651. The Court of Appeals then held that defendant had not preserved his alternative argument that the witnesses’ testimony was admissible to impeach A as a hearsay declar- ant. Id. at 654. On that point, Judge Págan dissented. Id. at 658. He would have held that defendant had preserved the argument and that the trial court had erred in exclud- ing the witnesses’ testimony regarding A’s character for truthfulness at or around the time of her initial allegations against defendant “because it is the recency in relation to the statement being admitted that is important for the fact-find- er’s consideration[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). Defendant also assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to prohibit the use of the term “disclo- sure” to refer to A and J’s allegations of abuse, relying on Sperou, in which this court held that, in the context of that case, witnesses’ use of the term “victim” to refer to the com- plainant and others who had accused the defendant of sexual abuse constituted vouching. 365 Or at 132. Defendant argued that “disclosure” has “the connotation of exposing previously hidden but truthful information,” and, therefore, “[t]he jury would understand the use of the word to suggest that there was something factual to divulge and, thus, as a comment on the credibility of the accuser and of what was being revealed.” The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument about the term “disclosure,” reasoning that “[t]he term itself does not express that the disclosed information is necessarily true or false. Rather, it suggests that the information was not previously shared.” Solano, 332 Or App at 655. Accordingly, the court “decline[d] to extend [Sperou’s] holding to the term ‘disclosure’ in the context that it is presented to us here.” Id.5 On defendant’s petition, we allowed review. 5 The Court of Appeals left open “the possibility that the term ‘disclosure’ may, in some instances, constitute improper vouching.” 332 Or App at 655 n 6. Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 589 II. ANALYSIS On review, defendant renews his challenges to the trial court’s ruling that he had failed to lay a foundation for his witnesses’ testimony about A’s character for untruthful- ness and its ruling denying his pretrial motion to preclude the use of the term “disclosure” to refer to the allegations against him. We address those rulings in turn. A. OEC 608(1) Evidence 1. Parties’ arguments Defendant argues that, in excluding his witnesses’ testimony about A’s character for untruthfulness, the trial court applied “the incorrect foundational test under OEC 608(1)[.]” He contends that the trial court should have applied the foundation requirements for lay opinion evidence under OEC 701, which are that the evidence must be “(1) [r]ation- ally based on the perception of the witness; and (2) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of [the] testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue.” He further contends that the witnesses’ opinions satisfied those requirements because (1) the witnesses had “long and close familial rela- tionships” with A, and (2) A’s credibility was “the central issue in the case.” According to defendant, “[t]he three-year lapse in contact went to the weight of their opinions. It was grist for cross-examination, not grounds to exclude their opinions for lack of foundation.” The state agrees with defendant that, when deter- mining whether a party has laid a foundation for lay opinion evidence about a witness’s character for truthfulness, prof- fered under OEC 608(1), a trial court should apply the two requirements set out in OEC 701. But the state contends that the trial court properly concluded that defendant’s wit- nesses “lacked a current basis for their opinion testimony concerning A’s character for truthfulness at the time of trial.” (Emphasis in original.) That is because, according to the state, recent contacts are required. 2. Standard of review Before analyzing OEC 608(1), we address the standard of review. In the past, this court has made broad 590 State v. Solano statements about how we review evidentiary rulings, includ- ing, for example, that “[w]e review the decision to admit or exclude [character] evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 232, 809 P2d 81 (1991); see also State v. Caffee, 116 Or App 23, 27, 840 P2d 720 (1992) (cit- ing Walton when reviewing the exclusion of opinion evidence proffered under OEC 608(1)). But, in State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 310-13, 4 P3d 1261 (2000), this court undertook an effort to prescribe, with greater precision, how appellate courts are to review trial court rulings. We first noted that we had “previously explained that, with respect to many evidentiary decisions, trial courts possess broad discretion, as long as they exercise discretion within the range of legally permissible decisions.” Id. at 310. We then observed that some evidentiary rulings are based on multiple subsidiary determinations, including factual and legal determinations. Id. at 312. We explained that our standard of review varies for different types of determina- tions. Id. We review factual findings to determine whether they are supported by any evidence in the record. Id. at 313 n 9. We review legal conclusions for legal error and defer to exercises of discretion that are within the range of legally permissible outcomes: “[W]e first must review evidentiary rulings without defer- ence to determine whether proper principles of law were applied correctly. Next, and also without deference, we must determine whether application of those principles leads to only one correct outcome. If there is only one legally correct outcome, and the trial court arrived at that outcome, it did not err; conversely, if the trial court arrived at a different outcome, it did err. Only if we determine that the applica- tion of the correct legal principles leads to more than one correct outcome do we continue to review whether the trial court abused its discretion in choosing an outcome. If the trial court’s decision was within the range of legally correct discretionary choices and produced a permissible, legally correct outcome, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.” Id. at 312. Consequently, review of a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence may require applica- tion of multiple standards of review, depending on the types of determinations that the trial court had to make. Id. Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 591 We noted that such an approach is clearer than reviewing all evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and treating legal errors as abuses of discretion. Id. at 312 n 8. We explained: “To say that a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong principle of law or incorrectly applies the correct rule of law leads to the same result. However, the formulation that we have set out is more straightforward and correctly distinguishes that we do not defer to trial courts’ legal determinations. To say that an appellate court should review the legal aspects of an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion and that a trial court abuses its discretion if it makes a legal error unnecessarily complicates a simple principle, i.e., that appellate courts review questions of law anew without deference to the decisions of trial courts.” Id. Thus, under Oregon law, when reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, we must first identify and clas- sify the determinations underlying the ruling. If a determi- nation is a factual finding, our task is to determine whether it is supported by any evidence in the record. Id. at 313 n 9. If it is a determination about what legal principles apply or how those principles should be applied, we review it for errors of law. Id. at 312. If the legal principles were cor- rectly identified and correctly applied, we then determine whether application of the principles leads to only one cor- rect outcome. Id. If it does, then we determine whether the trial court reached that outcome. Id. But if it does not, we determine whether the trial court’s outcome was within the range of permissible outcomes. Id.6 In keeping with that approach, when determining whether we review a legal ruling for errors of law or abuse of 6 In this way, the formulation set out in Rogers differs from the approach taken by federal courts, which review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and treat legal errors as abuses of discretion. As we have noted, “federal appel- late courts review all evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” State v. Blue, 374 Or 439, 456-57, 580 P3d 826 (2025) (citing General Elec Co v. Joiner, 522 US 136, 141-42, 118 S Ct 512, 139 L Ed 2d 508 (1997) (emphasis in Blue)). But, even under that approach, “an erroneous construction of the law would meet that stan- dard, and no federal court has ever held that a district court’s error as to a matter of law is not an abuse of discretion.” Blue, 374 Or at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless, “this court is not bound by the standard used to review an evidentiary rule’s federal counterpart.” Id. 592 State v. Solano discretion, we have looked to whether the proper principles of law were applied. For example, in Rogers, we held that the trial court had erred in ruling that an expert was not quali- fied to testify about a particular matter because he lacked a medical degree. Id. at 316-17. We ruled that “we do not assume a disqualification from the lack of a particular educational or professional degree.” Id. at 316. Instead, proper application of OEC 702, which governs expert testimony, “requires assess- ment of the particular qualifications of each witness.” Id. If the proper principles of law were applied, we have looked to whether their application leads to only one correct outcome. We have held, for example, that whether evidence is relevant, whether a hearsay statement qualifies as an excited utterance, and whether a party presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find a fact, are questions for which there is only one correct answer and, therefore, we review rulings on those questions for errors of law. See State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481, 982 P2d 1133 (1999) (conclud- ing that a determination of relevance under OEC 401 “can yield only one correct answer; evidence is either relevant or it is not”); State v. Cunningham, 337 Or 528, 538, 99 P3d 271 (2004) (concluding that “a statement is either an excited utterance under OEC 803(2) or it is not”); State v. Blue, 374 Or 439, 457, 580 P3d 826 (2025) (concluding that “whether a party has raised a ‘genuine question * * * as to the authen- ticity of the original’ under OEC 1003(1) is a question that we review for legal error, because there is only one correct answer: either the opponent pointed to evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that the original is not what the proponent claims it to be, or there is no evidentiary basis for the jury to find that the original is inauthentic”). Here, defendant argues that the trial court did not apply the correct foundational test for OEC 608(1) evidence. In other words, he argues that the trial court did not apply the correct legal principles when determining whether he had laid a foundation for his OEC 608(1) evidence because it applied a recency requirement. Defendant’s argument, and the trial court’s ruling, require that we determine the foundation requirements for OEC 608(1) evidence, which is a question of law that we review for errors of law. Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 593 3. Foundation requirements for OEC 608(1) evidence OEC 608(1) authorizes the admission of evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. It provides: “(1) The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but: “(a) The evidence may refer only to character for truth- fulness or untruthfulness; and “(b) Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.” 7 OEC 608(1) is an exception to the general rule that evidence of a person’s character may not be used to prove that the person acted in conformity therewith. OEC 404(2) (stating general prohibition and exceptions); OEC 404(2)(c) (estab- lishing exception for character evidence covered by other rules, including OEC 608); OEC 608 Commentary (1981) (noting that OEC 404 “prohibits the admission of character evidence to prove that a person acted in conformity there- with, subject to several exceptions,” including “the admis- sion of character evidence touching a witness’s credibility,” and that OEC 608 “develops that exception”). Under OEC 608(1), evidence of a witness’s character is limited to opinion or reputation evidence. Whether a party has laid a foundation for evidence relates to the admissibility of the evidence and, therefore, is a matter for the trial court. See OEC 104(1) (providing that “preliminary questions concerning * * * the admissibility of 7 OEC 608 has two subsections. Only OEC 608(1) is at issue in this case. OEC 608(2) provides: “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attack- ing or supporting the credibility of the witness, other than conviction of crime as provided in [OEC 609], may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. Further, such specific instances of conduct may not, even if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness.” Thus, OEC 608(2) prohibits a party from attacking or supporting the credibility of a witness either by introducing extrinsic evidence of specific instances of the witness’s conduct or by cross-examining the witness about such instances. 594 State v. Solano evidence shall be determined by the court”). The foundation requirement exists to help ensure that evidence presented to factfinders is the type that they could rely on. Accordingly, when determining whether a party has laid a foundation for evidence, the trial court’s role is not to determine whether it would rely on the evidence, but rather whether a factfinder could rely on it. That is because, whether a party has laid a foundation for evidence affects whether the evidence can even be presented to the factfinder. Once the evidence is pre- sented, the parties are still able to present other evidence and make arguments about whether the factfinder should rely on the evidence. Thus, when determining whether a party has laid a foundation for evidence, a trial court plays a gatekeeping role; its task is to keep out evidence that a factfinder could not rely on to make the finding that the evi- dence is being proffered to prove.8 OEC 608(1) does not specify what a party must show to lay a foundation for evidence about a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. But the text, context, and legislative history of the rule provide guidance. See Crimson Trace Corp v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Or 476, 485, 326 P3d 1181 (2014) (when construing the Oregon Evidence Code, which was adopted by the legislature, “our task is to determine what the legislature intended, using our traditional analytical framework, which focuses on the statute’s text, context, and any helpful legislative history”). We begin with the text. By its terms, OEC 608(1) concerns evidence of a witness’s “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” (Emphasis added.) “ ‘Character’ gener- ally indicates ‘a person’s disposition or propensity towards certain behavior, such as honesty,’ * * * or ‘a person’s tendency to act in a certain way in all varying situations of life.’ ” State v. Marshall, 312 Or 367, 371-72, 823 P2d 961 (1991) (quoting State v. Carr, 302 Or 20, 25, 725 P2d 1287 (1986)). The fact that “character” refers to a person’s disposition or propensity 8 Even if a party has laid a foundation for evidence, it may still be excluded under other rules of evidence, including OEC 403, which provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out- weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumula- tive evidence.” Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 595 or the person’s tendency to act in a certain way indicates that an opinion about a person’s character must be based on information sufficient to support an inference about the person’s “disposition”—that is, “the inclination, tendency, or power of anything to act in a certain manner under given circumstances,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 655 (unabridged ed 2002)—or “propensity”—that is, “a natural inclination : innate or inherent tendency,” Webster’s at 1817. Because “character” is intended to capture a trait that con- tinues over time, information about a single instance of con- duct may be insufficient to support an inference about a per- son’s character. But it is difficult to generalize about what types of information are sufficient to support an inference about a person’s character. As the legislative commentary to the Oregon Evidence Code states, “If character is defined as the kind of person one is, then account must be taken of the various ways to develop a picture of character.” OEC 405 Commentary (1981) (so noting in connection with OEC 405, which governs methods of proving character). The nature, frequency, and recency of one person’s contacts with another person are all relevant to whether the first person has a suf- ficient basis to support a reasonable inference about the sec- ond person’s character. The question in this case is whether recent contacts are required to support such an inference. The text of OEC 608(1) does not require recent con- tacts. It does not limit character evidence about a witness’s truthfulness or untruthfulness to evidence based on events within a certain number of years, even though the legisla- ture knows how to limit evidence in that way. See OEC 609 (authorizing impeachment of a witness through evidence of certain criminal convictions, provided that the conviction or release from confinement occurred within the preceding 15 years). The commentary to OEC 608(1) makes clear that the scope of the rule is narrow. The commentary states that “inquiry is limited to character for veracity rather than character generally. The result is to sharpen relevancy and reduce surprise, waste of time and confusion.” OEC 608 Commentary (1981). Thus, the commentary reflects the leg- islature’s belief that evidence of a witness’s character for 596 State v. Solano truthfulness or untruthfulness is relevant and that it can be introduced in the form of opinion or reputation testimony— which will likely be brief—without interfering with the fair- ness or efficiency of a trial. The commentary also states that OEC 608 is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 608 (FRE 608). Id. Prior to the enactment of FRE 608, evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness had to be presented in the form of reputation evidence. FRE 608 expanded the per- missible forms of evidence about a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness to include opinion evidence. Regarding the foundation requirements for opinion evidence proffered under FRE 608, a leading treatise explained that FRE 608 does not require proof of frequent or recent con- tacts as a precondition to the admission of the evidence: “Witnesses may now be asked directly to state their opinion of the principal witness’ character for truthful- ness and they may answer for example, ‘I think X is a liar.’ The rule imposes no prerequisite conditioned upon long acquaintance or recent information about the witness; cross- examination can be expected to expose defects of lack of familiarity and to reveal reliance on isolated or irrelevant instances of misconduct or the existence of feelings of per- sonal hostility towards the principal witness.” 3 Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 608[04], at 608-20 (1978) (empha- sis added), quoted in United States v. Lollar, 606 F2d 587, 589 (5th Cir 1979). To be clear, the treatise was not say- ing that the frequency or recency of contacts is irrelevant. It was simply saying that neither frequent nor recent contacts are required for admission. In doing so, it was recognizing that opinions about a person’s character can be based on different types of contacts. A person may have had frequent contact with a witness years ago, but those contacts may still be sufficient to support a reasonable inference about the witness’s character. That is because a person’s character tends to endure over time; it is a longer-term attribute. As another court has observed, “honesty is more like climate than like weather: it is a stable attribute even though sub- ject to daily variations.” State v. Tedder, 403 F3d 836, 839 (7th Cir 2005). Thus, if a person has an opinion about a wit- ness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness based on Cite as 375 Or 580 (2026) 597 close and frequent contacts years before the witness testi- fies at trial, that opinion may be admissible to prove the witness’s character at the time of trial. See id. (affirming trial court’s admission, under FRE 608(a), of the defendant’s brothers’ testimony that they had a low opinion of the defen- dant’s honesty, even though the brothers had not had con- tact with the defendant for more than a decade, reasoning that “[t]he long break in family relations was a subject for cross-examination and argument by counsel”); see also OEC 609 (authorizing impeachment of a witness based on certain convictions after the passage of up to 15 years from the con- viction or release from confinement, whichever is later). The fact that the Oregon legislature based OEC 608 on FRE 608 indicates that the legislature did not intend to condition the admission of opinion evidence on frequent or recent contacts, but instead intended to allow trial courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a person’s con- tacts with a witness provide a rational basis for the person’s opinion about the witness’s credibility. That understanding is further supported by OEC 701, which governs lay opinion testimony in general. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (stating that the context of a statute includes related statutes); see also State v. Lawson/James, 352 Or 724, 751, 291 P3d 673 (2012) (stating that the rules of evidence “articulate minimum standards of reliability intended to apply broadly to many types of evidence” and applying several rules to the admission of eyewitness identi- fications, including OEC 602, OEC 701, and OEC 403). As relevant here, OEC 608(1) authorizes the admis- sion of opinion evidence about