State v. Wells

No. 1037 October 28, 2026 237 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jordan G. WELLS, Defendant-Appellant. Wasco County Circuit Court 25VI80285; A188352 Marion T. Weatherford, Judge. Submitted September 23, 2026. Appellant filed the brief pro se. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. HELLMAN, J. Affirmed. 238 State v. Wells HELLMAN, J. Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for a violation of failure to register a vehicle, ORS 803.300. In his sole assignment of error, he argues that the trial court erred when it found him in violation of ORS 803.300, because his title proved that he had, in fact, registered his vehicle. We affirm. A police officer observed a vehicle without visi- ble license plates being operated within the city limits of The Dalles. The officer stopped the car, which defendant was driving, and asked to see defendant’s registration. In response, defendant produced the vehicle’s title. The officer cited defendant for failure to display plates, ORS 803.540, and for failure to register a vehicle, ORS 803.300. Before the trial court, defendant argued for a defi- nition of “register” that tracked the common meaning of the word; specifically, “having the owner’s name entered in a register” and “to enroll formally.” Defendant took the posi- tion that, when read together, ORS 801.100, ORS 801.410, and ORS 803.300 created a situation in which the only type of registration that he was required to accomplish was “ownership registration,” which he did by applying for and receiving a title to the vehicle.1 He further argued that any interpretation of ORS 803.300 that required registration before operation would be unconstitutional because it would be an impermissible restriction on the constitutional right to travel. The trial court ultimately determined that defen- dant was in violation of ORS 803.300 and imposed a $115 fine. This appeal followed. 1 As an initial matter, we observe that defendant’s argument misunder- stands the term “ownership registration.” The Oregon Vehicle Code, ORS chap- ters 801 to 826, ORS 801.010, uses that term to describe a particular time span during which a vehicle registration remains valid, and which applies to only select classes of vehicles, see ORS 803.400(4) (stating that “ownership registra- tion” is valid from “the day the vehicle is registered * * * until the ownership of the vehicle changes”); ORS 803.415(2), (8), (9), (12) (identifying classes of vehicles subject to “ownership registration,” including government-owned vehicles, school vehicles, and vehicles owned by disabled veterans or former prisoners of war). “Ownership registration” thus does not represent a distinct pathway for register- ing one’s vehicle, as defendant’s argument assumes. See, e.g., ORS 805.040 (clari- fying that government-owned vehicles remain “subject to the same requirements and provisions for registration as are other vehicles”); ORS 803.050(3)(a) (same, as to school vehicles). Cite as 354 Or App 237 (2026) 239 On appeal, defendant repeats his arguments regarding the interpretation of ORS 803.300. We review a trial court’s interpretation of a statute for legal error. State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 256, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042 (1999). To determine the meaning of a statute, we use our well-established process of considering the statute’s text, context, and any pertinent legislative history. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). The question here involves the meaning of the term “register” in ORS 803.300(1). That provision states that “[a] person commits the offense of failure to register a vehicle if the person owns a vehicle in this state and the person does not register the vehicle in this state.” If the legislature does not provide a definition of a statutory term of common usage, we assume that that term has its ordinary meaning. State v. Meiser, 372 Or 438, 451, 551 P3d 349 (2024). In that situation, we may consult the term’s dictionary definition. Id. However, “[w]hen the leg- islature provides a definition of a statutory term, we use that definition.” State v. Delaurent, 320 Or App 191, 195, 514 P3d 113, rev den, 370 Or 303 (2022); see also ORS 801.100 (“Except where the context requires otherwise, the defini- tions given in the vehicle code govern its construction.”). Here, the legislature defined the term at issue in ORS 801.410. Because there is a legislative definition of “register,” we do not look to the common meaning of the term, as defendant argues. ORS 801.410 defines “ ‘[r]egistration’ or ‘register’ ” as “the recording of a vehicle as authorized for use within a juris- diction and includes any documentation or devices issued as evidence of that authorization.” “Register” thus means “the recording of a vehicle as authorized for use within a jurisdic- tion.” ORS 801.410 provides that “[t]his state registers vehi- cles as provided under ORS 803.350.” ORS 803.350 (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, chapter 415, section 51, in turn, provides the “qualification[s] for registration”; essentially, a list of tasks that a vehicle owner must complete to register their vehicle with the state.2 Those include obtaining a title 2 The legislature amended ORS 803.350 in 2025, and that amendment took effect on January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025, ch 415, § 51. That amendment does not 240 State v. Wells and providing proof thereof, completing a registration appli- cation, paying registration fees, proving compliance with or an exemption from certain pollution control requirements, establishing domicile or an exemption therefrom, turning over any former registration or title documents, and, if requested, establishing that the vehicle meets legal require- ments for highway operation. ORS 803.350(1) - (9) (2023); see also ORS 803.370 (establishing requirements for vehicle registration applications). Thus, although defendant correctly points out that ORS 801.410 contemplates “[t]his state” as formally regis- tering vehicles, ORS 803.350 (2023) makes clear that a vehi- cle owner must take certain steps—beyond holding title to their vehicle—to qualify for and complete that registration process. Therefore, ORS 803.300(1), in making criminally liable “the person [who] does not register the[ir] vehicle in this state,” applies to vehicle owners who fail to take the steps outlined in ORS 803.350 (2023) and thereby fail to successfully register their vehicle with the state—in other words, those who fail to secure “the recording of [the] vehicle as authorized for use” in Oregon. It is undisputed that defendant completed only the first qualification for registration listed in ORS 803.350 (2023): obtain and provide proof that he had title to the vehi- cle. But, when read together, ORS 801.410 and ORS 803.350 (2023) require all the “qualification[s] for registration” listed in 803.350 (2023) to be completed before the vehicle can be registered. Because defendant did not do so, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that he did not “register” his vehicle, as that term is defined for purposes of criminal liability under ORS 803.300(1). We have considered defendant’s argument that a statutory requirement to register a vehicle prior to “operat- ing it on the highways of this state” works an “unconstitu- tional deprivation of his right to travel.” The constitutional right to travel refers to the “right of a United States citizen to travel from one State to another and to take up residence impact this case, and we refer to the statutory language that was in effect at the time of the traffic incident, as well as when defendant filed both his trial and appellate briefs. Cite as 354 Or App 237 (2026) 241 in the State of [their] choice.” Jones v. Helms, 452 US 412, 418, 101 S Ct 2434, 69 L Ed 2d 118 (1981). Defendant cites Reitz v. Mealey, 314 US 33, 36, 62 S Ct 24, 86 L Ed 21 (1941), overruled in part on other grounds by Perez v. Campbell, 402 US 637, 649-52, 91 S Ct 1704, 29 L Ed 2d 233 (1971), but that case does not aid his argument. In Reitz, the United States Supreme Court held that, “The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process.” 314 US at 36; see also Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 US 610, 622, 35 S Ct 140, 59 L Ed 385 (1915) (condoning state regu- lation of vehicles operating on highways, including registra- tion requirements, where such regulation is “necessary for public safety”). Because defendant did not demonstrate that Oregon’s vehicle registration requirement was an inappro- priate means of regulating the use of motor vehicles, defen- dant has not established that application of ORS 801.410, ORS 803.350 (2023), or ORS 803.300(1) violated his consti- tutional rights. Affirmed.