Faustin v. Emp. Dept.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledOctober 28, 2026
DocketA189445
JudgeJoyce
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
274 October 28, 2026 No. 1045
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Aurrin FAUSTIN,
Petitioner,
v.
EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT
and Serendipity Center, Inc.,
Respondents.
Employment Appeals Board
2025EAB0590;
A189445
Submitted October 6, 2026.
Aurrin Faustin filed the brief pro se.
Jona J. Maukonen waived appearance for respondent
Employment Department.
No appearance for respondent Serendipity Center, Inc.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
JOYCE, J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 274 (2026) 275
JOYCE, J.
Claimant, appearing pro se, appeals from a final
order of the Employment Appeals Board (board) determin-
ing that employer had discharged claimant for misconduct
and, therefore, claimant was disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits. Neither employer nor the depart-
ment appear on appeal. Concluding that the board’s deci-
sion is supported by substantial evidence and substantial
reason, we affirm.
Having considered claimant’s brief and the per-
tinent parts of the record identified by claimant, we are
unpersuaded that the board committed reversible error. In
reaching that conclusion, we note that we have limited our
review to claims of error that are properly presented in the
opening brief. It is an appellant’s duty to identify the specific
ruling(s) challenged on appeal, show us that the claims of
error were adequately preserved, and provide a cogent argu-
ment that conforms to the applicable standard of review and
is supported by legal authority and citations to the appel-
late record.1 Although we recognize the challenges inher-
ent in appearing pro se in an appellate court and may show
some leniency toward technical deficiencies up to a point,
we cannot step out of our role as neutral arbiter to “make or
develop a party’s argument.” Beall Transport Equipment Co.
v. Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700 n 2, 64 P3d 1193,
adh’d to as clarified on recons, 187 Or App 472, 68 P3d 259
(2003); see also Briggs v. Lamvik, 242 Or App 132, 142 n 9,
255 P3d 518 (2011) (stating similar).
With that limitation in mind, we have considered
claimant’s arguments, and we are unpersuaded that the
board erred in the ways claimed. We review the board’s order
for “substantial evidence, substantial reason, and errors of
law.” Barrera v. Employment Dept., 333 Or App 673, 675, 553
P3d 48 (2024).
1
See, e.g., ORAP 5.45(3) (“Each assignment of error must identify precisely
the legal, procedural, factual, or other ruling that is being challenged.”); ORAP
5.45(4)(a) (“The court may decline to consider any assignment of error that
requires the court to search the record to find the error or to determine if the
error properly was raised and preserved.”); ORAP 5.45(5) (standard-of-review
requirements).
276 Faustin v. Emp. Dept.
As we understand his arguments on appeal, claim-
ant first contends that the board erred when it refused to
consider the entirety of the written argument that he filed
on October 10, 2025. We disagree. The board found that the
written argument contained information that was not part
of the hearing record and declined to consider that new evi-
dence because claimant did not show that factors or circum-
stances beyond his reasonable control prevented him from
offering the evidence during the hearing. See OAR 471-041-
0090(1)(b) (the board may consider evidence that was not
received into the hearing record when the party offering the
additional evidence establishes both that “[t]he additional
evidence is relevant and material to [the board’s] determi-
nation” and that “[f]actors or circumstances beyond the par-
ty’s reasonable control prevented the party from offering
the additional evidence into the hearing record”). Although
claimant now seems to argue on appeal that such factors
and circumstances did exist, our review is confined to the
record that was before the board. See ORS 183.482(7). We
have reviewed the record, including claimant’s October 10
filing, and conclude that the board’s finding that claimant
had not demonstrated that there were factors or circum-
stances beyond his control that prevented him from offering
the evidence during the hearing is supported by the evi-
dence in the record. The board correctly determined that it
could only consider claimant’s October 10 filing to the extent
it was based on the hearing record.
We next understand claimant to argue that several
of the board’s findings, as articulated in the board’s findings
of fact, were not supported by the evidence. Having reviewed
the record, we conclude that the board’s findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record. To the extent
claimant is challenging the board’s ultimate finding that
employer terminated claimant due to his behavior follow-
ing feedback about emails claimant had sent, that finding is
also supported by substantial evidence.
Turning to claimant’s final argument, we under-
stand him to contend that the board incorrectly found that
claimant violated employer’s attendance notice policy. The
board found that employer’s written attendance policy
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 274 (2026) 277
stated, in part, that employees were “expected to personally
notify [their] supervisor” if they were not able to report for
work on time. The board also found that claimant’s super-
visor informed him on April 2 that claimant was expected
to notify his supervisor about absences, and that claimant
nonetheless did not notify his supervisor of his absence on
April 7. Claimant does not contest any of those findings.
Instead, claimant largely focuses on the wording of employ-
er’s written policy and argues that an expectation is not
the same as a requirement, such that the board incorrectly
found that claimant violated the policy when he called the
receptionist instead of his supervisor to report his inabil-
ity to come to work on April 7. However, the board’s find-
ings that employer had a policy that employees must con-
tact their supervisor to notify them of an absence and that
claimant violated that policy when he failed to notify his
supervisor about his absence on April 7 are all supported by
substantial evidence.
Affirmed.