Dept. of Human Services v. V. R. G.

No. 1012 October 21, 2026 59 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. G., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. V. R. G., Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 25JU05846; A190152 (Control) In the Matter of S. G., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. V. R. G., Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 25JU05847; A190153 In the Matter of A. G., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. V. R. G., Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 25JU05848; A190154 In the Matter of A. G., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. V. R. G., 60 Dept. of Human Services v. V. R. G. Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 25JU05849; A190155 Lindsay R. Partridge, Judge. Submitted September 23, 2026. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Kyle Sessions Vazquez, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Jentry Lanza, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. EGAN, J. Affirmed. Cite as 354 Or App 59 (2026) 61 EGAN, J. Father appeals from judgments asserting depen- dency jurisdiction over his four daughters, A, AD, AR, and S. Father asks us to review the record de novo. Father did not contest the evidence or arguments presented by the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) in the juve- nile court, explaining that he deliberately “stood silent” because he was facing criminal charges arising from the same conduct. We decline to exercise our discretion to review the record de novo because the circumstances identified in ORAP 5.40(8) concern the juvenile court’s findings and deci- sion, not a party’s strategic decision not to contest the evi- dence. Because father’s arguments were not preserved and do not meet the standard for plain-error review, we affirm the judgments asserting jurisdiction over all four children on all jurisdictional bases.1 I. BACKGROUND Four of father’s children are the subjects of this appeal: A, who was one year old at the time of the jurisdic- tional proceedings; twins, AD and AR, who were two years old; and S, who was three years old. ODHS began jurisdic- tional proceedings after the twins, AD and AR, were injured. Absent de novo review, we are bound by the juve- nile court’s findings of fact as long as they are supported by any evidence in the record. Dept. of Human Services v. M. H., 256 Or App 306, 308, 300 P3d 1262, rev den, 354 Or 61 (2013). On December 1, 2025, father called mother “around 5 or 6 p.m.” and told her that the twins had broken a baby gate on the stairs, fallen, and been injured. Father also told mother that the twins were in “trouble” and had been put in timeout. Mother arrived home between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m., when father was no longer there. While preparing the children for bed, mother noticed that AD had a facial injury and “freaked out,” asking maternal grandmother to call the police. The report of that injury brought the police and ODHS officials to the family’s home. 1 ODHS also asserted dependency jurisdiction as to mother, who is not a party to this appeal, and father does not challenge the separate jurisdictional bases regarding mother. 62 Dept. of Human Services v. V. R. G. Mother asked another resident of the home about the twins’ injuries, and he said that he “didn’t know” what had happened. S, then three years old, told mother that father had given the twins “pow pows” because they had broken the baby gate. The maternal grandparents subsequently confronted father about the injuries. Father responded, “I’m not going to lie to you, I got mad [about the baby gate] and I smacked her.” Mother and father were arrested, and the twins were taken to the emergency room. Hospital staff observed markings on the twins’ faces and concluded that they appeared to be from physical abuse. As to the twins, ODHS alleged that the children were within the court’s jurisdiction on the bases that they were at risk of harm because father physically abused them and because AD had suffered an unexplained, nonacciden- tal injury while in father’s care. As to the other two children, ODHS alleged that they were at risk of harm stemming from the alleged abuse of their siblings by father. ODHS alleged that all four children were at risk of harm in mother’s care because she needed the assistance of the agency to learn the necessary skills to protect the children from the risk of harm posed by father. The juvenile court found that father had “physically abused one of the children” and “abused another sibling,” placing the children at risk of harm. Father did not contest that evidence or the juvenile court’s findings. He later explained that he and mother had “stood silent” because he was facing felony mistreatment charges arising from the same conduct. The court entered judgments asserting jurisdiction over all four children. Father appealed and the cases were consolidated. Because father did not contest any of the evi- dence presented by ODHS at the jurisdictional hearing and does not dispute that the facts as found by the juvenile court were legally sufficient to support jurisdiction, the question that is central to this appeal is whether the record neverthe- less presents a circumstance warranting de novo review. II. ANALYSIS Father asks us to exercise our discretion to review the record de novo and make anew the factual findings Cite as 354 Or App 59 (2026) 63 necessary to determine whether ODHS proved that father physically abused AD and AR and thereby placed all four children at present risk of harm. He argues that his deci- sion to “stand silent” prevented him from testing ODHS’s evidence and makes this an exceptional case warranting de novo review. We disagree. ORAP 5.40(8)(d) does not expressly make a party’s decision not to contest the evidence at trial a basis for de novo review, and we conclude that such a consideration does not support exercising our discretion to engage in such review. Requests for de novo review “are disfavored.” ORAP 5.40(8)(c). In deciding whether to grant de novo review, we consider the nonexclusive and nonbinding factors set out in ORAP 5.40(8)(d), including whether the trial court made express factual findings; whether its decision comports with those findings and uncontroverted evidence; whether the court was alerted to a disputed factual matter and its importance to the disposition; whether the requested find- ings are important to the ruling; and whether an erroneous legal ruling, if corrected, would make de novo review judi- cially efficient. Those factors focus our inquiry on the trial court’s findings and decision. In the past, we have engaged in de novo review when a juvenile court’s key findings or ultimate conclusion were not supported by the evidence before it. In Dept. of Human Services v. B. B., 248 Or App 715, 718, 723-25, 274 P3d 242, adh’d to on recons, 250 Or App 566, 281 P3d 653 (2012), we reviewed de novo “because the trial court’s most important factual findings either plainly [did] not comport with uncon- troverted evidence in the record or [were] inconsistent with other express factual findings.” In Dept. of Human Services v. D. W. M., 296 Or App 109, 111, 437 P3d 1186 (2019), the juvenile court’s conclusion that the father did not pose a risk of sexual abuse did not comport with its express findings that he had sexually abused both the child and her older sis- ter. In both cases, the basis for de novo review was a problem with the juvenile court’s findings or its decision as related to the evidence presented. The converse is also true; when the juvenile court’s determinations are consistent with the evidence before it, 64 Dept. of Human Services v. V. R. G. the circumstances generally militate against de novo review. In Dept. of Human Services v. T. H., 313 Or App 560, 562-63, 496 P3d 704, rev den, 368 Or 637 (2021), we explained that consistent juvenile court determinations based on substan- tial, uncontested evidence weighed against reviewing the record de novo. More recently, in Dept. of Human Services v. N. B., 335 Or App 494, 499, 558 P3d 878 (2024), we declined to review the record de novo even though the juvenile court had not made express findings or credibility determinations, in part, because the evidence presented by ODHS concern- ing the father was uncontroverted. Those cases demonstrate that a relevant question is whether there is something defec- tive about the juvenile court’s findings or decision, as related to the evidence presented, that warrants de novo review. In this case, the juvenile court made express find- ings, its findings were based on the evidence before it, and father has not identified an inconsistency between those findings and the record or an erroneous legal ruling that warrants fact finding by the appellate court. The juvenile court found that father had “physically abused one of the children” and “abused another sibling,” and concluded that his conduct placed the children at risk of harm. Father does not identify an erroneous legal ruling by the juvenile court that, if corrected, would alter the record and make de novo review judicially efficient. The absence of a challenge below therefore does not supply the missing defect in the juvenile court’s decision and, in fact, weighs against exercising our discretion to engage in de novo review. See ORAP 5.40(8)(d) (iii) (listing among the considerations relevant to whether we should exercise our discretion to engage in de novo review “[w]hether the trial court was specifically alerted to a dis- puted factual matter and the importance of that disputed factual matter to the trial court’s ultimate disposition of the case or to the assignment(s) of error raised on appeal”). We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to review the record de novo. Because father did not contest ODHS’s evidence or arguments in the juvenile court, his arguments on appeal are all unpreserved. ORAP 5.45(1) provides that “[n]o matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal Cite as 354 Or App 59 (2026) 65 unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court.” Preservation principles are rooted in fairness and efficiency and are “prudential in nature,” giving the trial court “a chance to consider and rule on a contention” and avoid or correct errors, obviating the need for appeal; permitting the opposing party to respond to a contention and avoid surprise arguments; and fostering full development of the record, aiding both the trial court in making its decision and the appellate court in reviewing it. Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219-20, 191 P3d 637 (2008). Preservation requires a party to “explain its objection clearly enough for the oppos- ing party, and the trial court, to understand the issue” and avoid or correct the error. State v. Skotland, 372 Or 319, 327, 549 P3d 534 (2024). Nevertheless, we may review unpreserved argu- ments for plain error; an error is plain if it is an “error[ ] of law apparent on the face of the record.” ORAP 5.45(2). Therefore, we only review unpreserved arguments that con- cern an error of law that is “obvious, not reasonably in dis- pute” and appears “on the face of the record,” meaning that it does not require us to “go outside of the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences.” Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991). If the error meets that test, we must still determine whether to exercise our discretion to correct it and articu- late our reasons for doing so. Id. at 382. Here, the juvenile court made its decisions based on factual findings that are supported by evidence in the record and to which father made no objections. Due to father’s decision to “stand silent,” basic preservation prin- ciples have not been served—the juvenile court was given no opportunity to hear father’s arguments, ODHS had no opportunity to respond to them, and the record is insuffi- ciently developed for our review. Nothing on the face of the record suggests that the juvenile court made any errors of law when it applied the applicable law to the facts presented to it and asserted jurisdiction over the children. We there- fore conclude that there was no plain error. Having declined to conduct de novo review and because the arguments presented do not meet the standards 66 Dept. of Human Services v. V. R. G. for plain error, we affirm the judgments of the juvenile court asserting jurisdiction over father’s four children. Affirmed.