Fidelity Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Hudler
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledOctober 28, 2026
DocketA183379
JudgeShorr
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1043 October 28, 2026 265
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
a Florida corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Martin L. HUDLER,
a citizen of the State of Oregon,
Defendant-Appellant.
Deschutes County Circuit Court
22CV03852; A183379
Alycia M. Herriott, Judge.
Argued and submitted August 27, 2025.
Blaine Clooten argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the briefs was Brownstein Rask LLP. Also on the opening
brief was Charles R. Markley.
Brian Meenaghan argued the cause for respondent. Also
on the brief was Fidelity National Law Group.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Affirmed.
266 Fidelity Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Hudler
SHORR, P. J.
This appeal concerns a default judgment that was
entered against defendant after he failed to appear follow-
ing service by publication. In three assignments of error,
defendant challenges the denial of his ORCP 71 B(1) motion
to set aside the default judgment. We affirm.
“On review of an order denying a motion to set aside
a judgment, we set out the undisputed facts in the light most
favorable to the moving party.” Union Lumber Co. v. Miller,
360 Or 767, 769, 388 P3d 327 (2017). “However, we accept
the trial court’s findings of disputed fact, if there is evidence
to support those findings.” Id. We recite the facts in accor-
dance with that standard although we do not relay all of the
facts in this nonprecedential memorandum opinion.
Plaintiff sued defendant for unjust enrichment by
filing a complaint in early 2022. In the months that followed,
plaintiff attempted to serve defendant through several ave-
nues, including by engaging process servers and private
investigators to determine defendant’s address. Plaintiff
ultimately moved to serve defendant by publication in
Deschutes County and that motion was granted. In granting
the motion, the trial court also ordered plaintiff to mail cop-
ies of the paperwork to all addresses listed for defendant in
plaintiff’s declaration that was filed in support of the motion.
Defendant did not make an appearance and
plaintiff moved for, and was granted, a default judgment.
Approximately three months later, defendant moved for
the judgment to be set aside. At a hearing on defendant’s
motion, defendant testified, among other things, that he was
in and out of the hospital for cancer treatment during the
time plaintiff was attempting service, and confirmed that
he gave a process server an address in New York where he
was “staying with a friend of [his].” Defendant also clari-
fied that he was only requesting relief under the “excusable
neglect” provision of ORCP 71 B:
“THE COURT: All right. And then, I want to be clear.
You indicated—under ORCP 71, there are a number of
avenues for the Court to grant relief. You’ve indicated * * *
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 265 (2026) 267
excusable neglect. Is that * * * the finding that you’re ask-
ing the Court to make under ORCP 71B?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor, we would
request that because of the nature of the illness; that it
distracted [defendant]. Again, it didn’t cause any prejudice
to [plaintiff]. And we could have accepted service and not
had any of this today.”
The judge denied defendant’s motion and this appeal
followed.
We review the trial court’s ultimate decision under
ORCP 71 B(1) for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Sunriver
Resort Limited Partnership, 252 Or App 299, 306, 287 P3d
1153 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013). However, “whether
certain conduct or inaction constitutes excusable neglect is
a question of law, and we review the trial court’s answer
to that question for legal error.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Union Lumber Co., 360 Or at 778
(“Conclusions that a trial court reaches under ORCP 71 B as
to whether a moving party’s neglect, inadvertence, surprise,
or mistake constitute cognizable grounds for relief, are legal
rulings that an appellate court reviews for errors of law.”).
ORCP 71 B(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[o]
n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party * * * from a judgment for the following rea-
sons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect[.]” “The focus of the inquiry is whether the totality of
the circumstances reflects that the party seeking relief from
judgment has taken reasonable steps to protect its inter-
ests.” Wetzel v. Sandlow, 318 Or App 608, 616, 509 P3d 182
(2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We turn to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal. In his
second assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial
court erred in dismissing his motion as untimely. We assume
without deciding that plaintiff’s motion was timely because,
as we explain, the trial court did not err in also rejecting
plaintiff’s arguments on the merits.
In his first assignment of error, defendant appears
to argue that the trial court erred in some manner because
268 Fidelity Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Hudler
defendant was never properly served under ORCP 7 D.1
Plaintiff asserts that that issue was not raised below and
is unpreserved. In its written ruling below, the trial court
denied defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment under
ORCP 71 B(1)(a) as untimely, but also gave its reasons for
why it would reject defendant’s arguments on the merits for
defendant’s claimed excusable neglect in not answering the
complaint. The court did not rule on a motion brought under
ORCP 7 D because defendant did not file such a motion.
The court’s ruling makes sense considering that the court
explicitly asked defense counsel at a hearing on the motion
if excusable neglect under ORCP 71 B(1)(a) was the basis for
defendant’s motion, and counsel responded, “Yes.”
However, even assuming that defendant’s written
memorandum in support of the ORCP 71 (B)(1)(a) motion
to set aside preserved the arguments he makes now, we
still affirm. Defendant was served by publication after it
appeared that personal service was not possible under the
circumstances. Those circumstances included, among other
things, “[a]n extensive SSN trace,” driver’s license records,
and Deschutes County Tax Assessor records all establishing
that defendant resided in Sunriver; defendant confirming
his Sunriver address to a process server; and defendant tell-
ing a process server that he was both aware of the docu-
ments to be served and would accept service at an address
in New York despite not residing there. Having reviewed
the record and defendant’s argument, we reject any conten-
tion that the trial court erred in not voiding the judgment
because of improper service of the complaint.
In defendant’s third assignment of error, he argues
that the trial court erred by determining that he failed
to establish “excusable neglect.” Defendant contends that
plaintiff’s failure to personally serve him combined with
his evidence that he was hospitalized for cancer treatment,
under the totality of the circumstances, amounted to excus-
able neglect.
1
We note that defendant fails to properly assign error to any trial court
ruling in his first assignment of error. Instead, in that assignment, defendant
argues that “[Plaintiff’s] Service by Publication Was Deficient” without referring
to a trial court ruling. See ORAP 5.45(3) (stating that assignments of error must
be to the trial court’s ruling that is being challenged).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 265 (2026) 269
In making its “excusable neglect” determination,
the trial court found that defendant had actual knowledge
of plaintiff’s lawsuit against him, that defendant provided
a process server with an address at which he did not live,
and that defendant did not inform the process server that he
would accept service through his attorney:
“Here, Plaintiff[ ] ha[s] provided evidence that Defendant
had actual knowledge that a process server was attempt-
ing service on him. Defendant acknowledged as much in
his testimony at the motion hearing. However, contrary
to the information inferred from Defendant’s Declaration,
Defendant did not immediately notify his counsel or direct
the process server to forward the documents to an attor-
ney. Rather, Defendant provided an address to the process
server. The address was to a residence that Defendant did
not live at. The occupants of that residence had no knowledge
of Defendant. At that point, Defendant made no additional
effort to accommodate service through counsel or ascer-
tain the nature of the documents being served. Considering
these circumstances in conjunction with the other efforts by
Plaintiff[ ], the totality of the circumstances does not sup-
port a finding of excusable neglect. Therefore, even if the
motion was timely made, the motion is denied on the merits.”
Those factual findings are supported by evidence in the
record and are thus binding on us on appeal. On this record
with two starkly different versions of the events surround-
ing plaintiff’s effectuation of service and defendant’s knowl-
edge of the complaint, the trial court was not required to
believe—and, in fact, did not credit—defendant’s alternative
narrative in which he denied any knowledge of the filing of
the complaint and the attempts to serve him until after the
default judgment was entered. Under those circumstances,
the trial court could conclude that defendant did not take
sufficiently “reasonable initial steps to ensure that an appro-
priate response would be filed to a complaint.” See Johnson,
252 Or App at 306 (“Generally speaking, neglect that leads
to a default will be deemed ‘excusable’ when a defendant, or
a person acting on the defendant’s behalf, took reasonable
initial steps to ensure that an appropriate response would
be filed to a complaint, even though the process later broke
down.”); Saldivar v. Roberts, 240 Or App 371, 377, 246 P3d
91 (2011) (“[S]imply choosing to ignore a matter—even in the
270 Fidelity Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Hudler
face of difficult circumstances—does not qualify as a rea-
sonable explanation so as to give rise to excusable neglect.”).
The trial court thus did not err.
Affirmed.