Dept. of Human Services v. J. L. S.

598 September 2, 2026 No. 821 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of S. J. G. S., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. L. S., Appellant. Baker County Circuit Court 21JU03069; A189785 Matthew B. Shirtcliff, Judge. Submitted July 22, 2026. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Kyle Sessions Vazquez, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, Jon Zunkel deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General, and Brianne Bartschi, Certified Law Student, filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. ______________ * Lagesen, Chief Judge, vice Pagán, Judge. Cite as 352 Or App 598 (2026) 599 AOYAGI, P. J. In this juvenile dependency case, mother appeals a permanency judgment that changed her child’s permanency plan from guardianship to adoption. In a single assignment of error, mother contends that the juvenile court committed reversible error by waiting 24 days after the permanency hearing to enter the permanency judgment, when ORS 419B.476(5) requires the court to “enter an order within 20 days after the permanency hearing” that includes the var- ious determinations necessary to a permanency decision. Mother contends that reversal is necessary regardless of whether the error prejudiced her. As explained below, we disagree, adhere to our existing case law, and conclude that any error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm. As a preliminary matter, we agree with the parties that preservation is excused. See Dept. of Human Services v. W. H. F., 254 Or App 298, 305, 295 P3d 78 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 428 (2013) (“The court’s failure to enter the order within 20 days of the close of the hearing record was not a contention that [mother] had an opportunity to preserve.”). We therefore proceed directly to the merits. The permanency hearing occurred on December 19, 2025. The court issued a letter opinion five days later on December 24, 2025. The court then entered the permanency judgment on January 12, 2026, which was 24 days after the hearing. Mother claims error. The Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) argues that there was no error because the letter opinion satisfied the 20-day requirement in ORS 419B.476(5) or, alternatively, that any error was harmless. Mother has not responded to ODHS’s first argument.1 We need not decide whether the letter opinion qual- ifies as an “order” within the meaning of ORS 419B.476(5), because we agree with ODHS that any error was harmless. We have previously declined to reverse permanency judg- ments based on a violation of ORS 419B.476(5) if the error was harmless. See W. H. F., 254 Or App at 305 (conclud- ing that the error was harmless where the father had “not claimed any prejudice as a result of the seven-day delay, nor 1 ODHS made that argument in its answering brief. Mother did not file a reply brief, and the case was submitted on the briefs without oral argument. 600 Dept. of Human Services v. J. L. S. could he on this record”); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Kuhn, 137 Or App 275, 276, 904 P2d 177 (1995) (affirming because, even assuming that the court violated ORS 419B.476(5) and that a remedy existed, the parents had “not shown preju- dice from the court’s failure to enter the orders within the statutory time”). Mother tries to distinguish those cases or persuade us to overrule them, but they are not distinguish- able, nor are they plainly wrong. See State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 406, 338 P3d 1185 (2017) (we will overrule our own prior case law only when it is “plainly wrong”). We adhere to our existing precedent. In doing so, we note at least one instance in which we have reversed a permanency judgment based on a viola- tion of ORS 419B.476(5). In Dept. of Human Services v. E. L., 237 Or App 206, 208, 238 P3d 438 (2010), the juvenile court entered permanency judgments four months after the hear- ing, ODHS conceded error, and we reversed with minimal discussion, presumably concluding that the violation of ORS 419B.476(5) was not harmless given the length of the delay and any other relevant circumstances, although we did not explicitly address harmlessness. In this case, the permanency judgment was entered only 24 days after the hearing. Moreover, the court issued a letter opinion five days after the hearing that contained the statutorily required determinations. Even if the letter opinion did not qualify as an “order” for purposes of ORS 419B.476(5)—an issue that we do not decide today—it served the same purposes in this instance, or at least mother has not explained how it did not. Finally, mother has not identified, nor have we found, anything on the juvenile court docket that raises the specter of prejudice from the delay. A parent need not object to a court’s violation of ORS 419B.476(5) to preserve a claim of error, because it is not possible to know beforehand that a violation will occur, and, once a violation does occur, objecting would not provide the court an oppor- tunity to avoid the violation. However, parents certainly may alert the juvenile court to any specific concerns about an ongoing delay in entering the order required by ORS 419B.476(5), and, if they do, we will consider that informa- tion, along with anything else of relevance on the docket, in Cite as 352 Or App 598 (2026) 601 assessing harmlessness on appeal. Nothing has been identi- fied here. On this record, even assuming arguendo that the juvenile court missed the deadline in ORS 419B.476(5) by four days, the error was harmless on this record. We there- fore affirm the permanency judgment changing the child’s plan to adoption. Affirmed.