Full Opinion

No. 1105 November 12, 2026 703 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Estate of Penny Mae Plymale, Deceased. Keith A. VAN ZANDT, Respondent, v. Faye DeMARTIN-RIDENS, Appellant. Curry County Circuit Court 23PB05789; A188184 Cynthia Lynnae Beaman, Judge. Submitted October 22, 2026. Faye L. DeMartin-Ridens filed the brief pro se. No appearance for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. AOYAGI, P. J. Affirmed. 704 Van Zandt v. DeMartin-Ridens AOYAGI, P. J. In this probate matter, respondent, appearing pro se, appeals a judgment awarding the estate $30,000 in dam- ages for respondent’s breach of a settlement agreement relat- ing to a manufactured home. She raises two assignments of error. First, she contends that the probate court violated her due process rights when it finished the hearing without her. Second, she challenges the $30,000 award, asserting that the court made internally inconsistent rulings. The per- sonal representative (PR) has not appeared on appeal. As explained below, we affirm. Background. This proceeding concerns the estate of Penny Mae Plymale, who was respondent’s stepmother and who lived in a manufactured home on respondent’s property. Respondent brought a claim against the estate, asserting that the decedent owed her $38,000, and also seeking to have the estate pay $500 per month for “rent, storage, and maintenance,” plus pay for insurance, for so long as “dece- dent’s Fleetwood manufactured home” remained on respon- dent’s property.1 The PR disallowed the claims. Eventually, respondent and the PR reached a settlement. The settle- ment agreement begins with binding recitals that the estate owns the manufactured home and that respondent owns the real property on which it is located, followed by the settle- ment terms, including that the PR would market and sell the manufactured home, with respondent’s full cooperation, and would pay $650 per month rent to respondent until such time as the manufactured home was removed from her real property. In his first accounting for the estate, the PR reported that respondent had thwarted his efforts to sell the manufactured home. Respondent filed an objection to the accounting, in which she claimed to have owned the manufactured home since 2010. The PR then filed a petition asserting claims against respondent for breach of contract, 1 In her opening brief, respondent describes her filed claim as asserting respondent’s ownership of the manufactured home. But that is not what the filed claim says. It refers to “decedent’s Fleetwood manufactured home” and seeks payments for rent, storage, maintenance, and insurance that are necessarily pre- mised on the estate owning the manufactured home and needing to pay to keep it on respondent’s property. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 703 (2026) 705 conversion, and, alternatively, replevin. Meanwhile, respon- dent moved to dismiss the entire case based on “false infor- mation” being presented to the court and, later, based on “new bank evidence” of her ownership. The upshot of respon- dent’s position was that she had owned the manufactured home since 2010 and that her settlement agreement with the PR was obtained through fraud and legal malpractice. The probate court scheduled a hearing on the peti- tion and motions for April 25, 2025. At the beginning of the hearing, respondent’s neighbor notified the court that respondent was at the emergency room receiving treatment for “an anxiety thing” that happened on the way to court. After confirming with the hospital that respondent was in the emergency room, the court rescheduled the hearing to May 27, 2025. Prior to the May 27 hearing, respondent moved to appear remotely, explaining that she had been hospi- talized for five days after the last hearing “due to compli- cations concerning my heart and other [m]ental disorder due to STRESS,” that it was very stressful to travel the 38 miles to Gold Beach, and that she therefore wanted to appear remotely this time. The probate court granted the motion. The hearing was held as scheduled. Approximately 90 minutes into the hearing, while a witness was testifying, respondent disconnected. The court stopped the hearing and adjourned for 15 minutes to find out whether her departure was intentional. When the hearing resumed, the court put on the record that a court employee had called respondent, who told the employee that she had to go to the hospital because she could not find “her nitro something.” The court noted “for the record” that respondent had “indicated that she really didn’t have anything to say, and she objected to the entire proceeding in total.” The court stated that it was fine for respondent to leave, but that it would continue the hearing in her absence, unless anyone objected, which no one did. The remainder of the hearing took 33 minutes. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court approved the PR’s first annual accounting, denied respondent’s motions to dismiss, and granted the PR’s petition relating to the manufactured home. The court entered a judgment 706 Van Zandt v. DeMartin-Ridens awarding the estate $30,000 in damages for respondent’s breach of the settlement agreement and ordered that the estate “shall have no further title, rights, or responsibilities regarding” the manufactured home. Alleged due process violations. For her first assign- ment of error, respondent claims that the probate court violated her federal constitutional due process rights “by proceeding while she was medically unable to participate.” She asserts that she departed the May 27 hearing due to a “severe and life-threatening” medical condition that the court was on notice of as a result of the April 25 reschedul- ing. Although not technically included in her assignment of error, respondent also argues that the court violated her due process rights in other ways on May 27, including by pro- ceeding “despite numerous technical difficulties” that made the “proceedings hard to follow,” by not rescheduling based on respondent’s inability to “understand the nature of the proceedings,” by not ordering an in-person hearing, and by requiring respondent’s neighbor to leave the room respon- dent was in during the hearing. As an initial matter, we conclude that respondent did not preserve for appeal any of the issues now raised. “Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal,” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15 P3d 22 (2000), although we have discretion to review unpre- served issues for “plain” error, ORAP 5.45(1). Respondent contends that the probate court was sufficiently aware of her medical condition that she did not need to object to the hearing continuing without her or otherwise preserve her claim of a due process violation. We disagree. The court had minimal information about respondent’s medical condition, beyond that it was stress or anxiety related and that she was taking medication for it, and respondent did not claim to be having a medical emergency when contacted by court staff, only that she was going to the hospital to get some kind of medication that she could not find at home. The assigned claim of error is unpreserved. As for the other alleged due process violations—relating to technical difficulties, not understanding the proceeding, and the neighbor—respon- dent does not claim to have preserved those issues, and Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 703 (2026) 707 review of the record confirms that she did not. Our review is therefore limited to plain-error review, which respondent has requested, as allowed by ORAP 5.45(7). An error is “plain” when it is an error of law, the legal point is obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and the error is apparent on the record without our having to choose among competing inferences. State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013). Whether an error is “plain” is a question of law. State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160, 167, 130 P3d 780 (2006). It is ultimately a matter of discretion whether we will correct a plain error. State v. B. M., 347 Or App 763, 766 n 2, 589 P3d 209 (2026). Here, the probate court did not plainly violate respondent’s constitutional due process rights by finishing the May 27 hearing in her absence. Respondent abruptly left the hearing without explanation. There is no evidence that she was in visible medical distress when she left. Nonetheless, to ensure that it was not an accidental dis- connection, the court took a recess and reached out to her. According to the court record, what respondent told court staff was that she needed to go to the hospital to get some kind of medication that she could not locate at home. It is far from obvious that respondent’s statement amounted to a claim of a medical emergency. Moreover, as the court noted, respondent had indicated earlier in the hearing that “she really didn’t have anything to say” and “objected to the entire proceeding in total.” Based on the information that it had, the court did not err, let alone plainly err, in con- tinuing with the hearing. Cf. Lovette and Lovette, 139 Or App 550, 552, 913 P2d 333 (1996) (holding that it was in the court’s discretion to deny a requested postponement of trial, where a party left without explanation and his counsel could only speculate that he might be ill). Finally, we note that, if respondent in fact had a medical emergency, she could have filed a motion after the hearing, with supporting documen- tation, in which case the probate court might have provided some relief, or at least she would be in a better position to claim error. The probate court also did not plainly violate respondent’s due process rights by proceeding with the 708 Van Zandt v. DeMartin-Ridens hearing despite some technical difficulties. Respondent asked to appear remotely, so she will not be heard to com- plain on appeal that she disliked some inherent aspects of a remote format. State v. Kammeyer, 226 Or App 210, 214, 203 P3d 274, rev den, 346 Or 590 (2009). And we see nothing in the record suggesting a degree of technical difficulties that would give rise to a federal constitutional violation, let alone a “plain” one. To the contrary, the court ensured that everyone was connected before starting the hearing, and it addressed all technical issues brought to its attention once the hearing began. As for respondent’s assertion that she “could not understand the nature of the proceedings,” that is not a basis for a due-process claim. Finally, as to respon- dent’s neighbor, the record shows that respondent herself asked the neighbor to leave the room that she was in, appar- ently because he was talking to her during the hearing. The court’s only “order” regarding the neighbor was that, if and when he rejoined, he refrain from talking in the background while the hearing was going on. For those reasons, we reject the first assignment of error. Alleged inconsistencies in judgment. In her second assignment of error, respondent claims that “[t]he judgment awarding damages is legally baseless because the trial court’s own ruling negates the foundation for liability.” She argues that the probate court’s approval of the PR’s account- ing and finding of a breach of contract is inconsistent with the judgment, in which, as respondent sees it, the court “effec- tively invalidat[ed] the same contract by ruling [r]espondent was the legal owner of the manufactured home.” The question presented is fundamentally a legal one, so we review for legal error. See Fogh v. McRill, 153 Or App 159, 165, 956 P2d 236, rev den, 327 Or 431 (1998). Respondent misunderstands the judgment. Under the settlement agreement, the estate was the recognized owner of the manufactured home. Respondent’s breach of the settlement agreement prevented the PR from selling the manufactured home, causing $30,000 in damages, which the court awarded to the estate. Had the court allowed the Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 703 (2026) 709 estate to keep the manufactured home in addition to receiv- ing the $30,000, that would have amounted to a double recov- ery, so the court ordered as part of the judgment that the estate would “have no further title, rights, or responsibilities regarding” the manufactured home. (Emphasis added.) By breaching the settlement agreement, respondent effectively created a situation in which, instead of the PR selling the manufactured home to a third party, the PR was forced to sell it to respondent for $30,000.2 The court did not find that respondent was the legal owner before the resulting release of interests. There is no inconsistency in the judgment. We reject the second assignment of error. Affirmed. 2 We note that, to the extent the estate needs to take action to formally trans- fer ownership of the manufactured home to respondent, we understand the judg- ment to implicitly require the estate to take that action. Any issues regarding the formalities of ownership should be resolved by the estate and, if necessary, the trial court.